How Can US Natural Gas Reduce Europe's Dependence on Russia?

• The EU's dependence on Russian natural gas is directly linked to its own gas production, which has fallen faster than EU member countries' demand for gas.
• While US LNG exports aren't an immediate remedy, due to permitting and construction time lags, the prospect of their availability is already affecting the gas market.

Russia's annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula has drawn new attention to Europe's reliance on energy supplies from Russia, particularly for natural gas. Lacking the means to force Russia's president to back down, US politicians and leading newspapers have latched onto the idea of exporting shale gas to reduce the EU's vulnerability to an accidental or intentional disruption of these supplies.  The efficacy of this strategy depends on more than the logistics and timing of US liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects.

The European Union is expected to import 15.5 billion cubic feet (BCF) per day of natural gas from Russia this year, roughly half of which would normally be transported by pipelines passing through Ukraine. Worries about the security of these supplies in the current crisis are compounded by Europe's increasing reliance on gas imports from all sources.

While EU gas consumption, based on the union's 28 current member countries, has been essentially flat over the last decade, its production has declined by more than a third, as shown in the chart below. As of the end of 2012, EU self-sufficiency in gas stood at just 35%. The widening of the gap between EU gas demand and production bears a close resemblance to the situation in which the US found itself with regard to crude oil prior to the shale revolution, and it is the main source of Europe's vulnerability in natural gas.

After Russia, the EU's main gas suppliers are Norway and Algeria, primarily by pipeline, followed by LNG sourced from Qatar, Nigeria and other countries.  Russia's leading role in supplying Europe's gas is consistent with its status as the world's second-largest gas producer and largest gas exporter, its proximity to the EU, and its pipeline network developed over multiple decades. Europe's gas supply mix includes ample political risk, but none of the EU's other suppliers are geopolitical rivals like Russia.

The EU has three main options for reducing its dependence on gas imports from Russia. It could shrink natural gas consumption, which is already happening to a modest degree as pricey gas-fired power generation is being squeezed out between subsidized wind and solar power and cheaper coal power, in a mirror image of US trends of the last several years.  This seems inconsistent with the EU's long-term emission goals and its need for gas to back up intermittent renewable electricity generation, so the further scope for this option appears limited, at least for the next decade.

EU countries could also attempt to revive domestic gas production. Europe's conventional gas fields may be in decline, other than in non-EU Norway, but its shale gas potential was estimated at 470 trillion cubic feet (TCF) in the US Energy Information Administration's global shale assessment last year. That's about 40% bigger than Europe's reserves and technically recoverable resources of conventional gas. Uncertainties on this estimate are still large, but it's in the same ballpark with the Marcellus shale in the eastern US, which currently produces over 14 BCF/day.

Unfortunately, initial efforts in Poland's shale have been disappointing, while Germany, France, and other countries have imposed explicit or implicit moratoria on shale gas development. Unless these policies are reversed in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, the EU will be unable to grow its way out of its dependence on Russia.

That leaves import diversification as the likeliest path for weaning Europe off Russian gas. This process is underway incrementally, hastened by previous Russian gas brinksmanship. Interest in US gas is understandable on many levels, not least because even after increasing production by around 17 BCF/day since 2006, US shale resources are expected to add another 13 BCF/day by 2020.

Energy experts have been quick to point out that the first US LNG exports won't be available for at least several years, and that companies, rather than governments, are the main parties involved in gas contracts. Customers in Europe will have to compete for US and other LNG supplies with customers elsewhere, especially in Asia, where China's gas demand is growing and Japan's post-Fukushima nuclear shutdowns have dramatically increased LNG imports.

These constraints are real. However, they ignore the ways in which changing the market's expectations about future LNG supplies--and potentially prices--could affect the calculations of Europe's gas buyers today and limit the political leverage that Russia's dominant gas export position conveys. Anecdotal reports suggest that US LNG is already a factor in contract renegotiations in Eastern Europe. As Amy Myers Jaffe of UC Davis and formerly the Baker Institute tweeted a few weeks ago, "it isn't about physical LNG cargo to Europe; it is about US exports promoting market liberalization (and) greater liquidity." 

 A decision by the US government to streamline the permitting and development of LNG facilities wouldn't enable US exports to displace Russian gas in Europe this year or next, but it would put Russia on notice that in the future it must compete in a market in which gas customers in Europe and elsewhere will have much greater choice. That would certainly complicate President Putin's plans.

 

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

Making Oil-by-Rail Safer

• A series of rail accidents involving trains carrying crude oil has focused attention on safety procedures and even the tank cars used in this service.
• Another concern is the variable characteristics of the "light tight oil "now shipped by rail in large quantities. That isn't the result of "fracking", but of the oil's inherent chemistry.   

The growth of North American oil production from unconventional sources has resulted in a dramatic expansion in the volume of crude oil shipped by rail. Unfortunately, as crude oil rail traffic has increased, so have rail accidents involving crude oil, including the tragic explosion and fire in Lac-Megantic, Quebec last July. That event and subsequent accidents have focused railroads, regulators and shippers on the need to improve the safety of oil-by-rail as quickly as possible.

In the immediate aftermath of Lac-Megantic, the Federal Railroad Administration issued an emergency order on procedures railroads must follow when transporting flammable and other hazardous materials. And on February 21, 2014 railroads reached a voluntary agreement with the US Department of Transportation (DOT) on additional steps, including reduced speed limits for oil trains passing through cities, increased track inspection, and upgraded response plans. These steps have the highest priority, because crude oil loaded in tank cars doesn't cause rail accidents. Every incident I've seen reported in the last year began with a derailment or similar event.

At the same time, the packaging and characteristics of the oil can affect the severity of an accident.  Investigators have focused on two specific issues in this regard, starting with the structural integrity of the tank cars carrying the oil. The vast majority of tank cars in this service are designated as DOT-111--essentially unpressurized and normally non-insulated cylinders on wheels. These cars routinely carry a variety of cargoes aside from crude oil, including gasoline and other petroleum products, ethanol, caustic soda, sulfuric acid, hydrogen peroxide, and other chemicals and petrochemicals.

Their basic design goes back decades, and even the older DOT-111s incorporate learnings from earlier accidents. A growing proportion of the US fleet of around 37,000 DOT-111 tank cars in oil service consists of post-2011, upgraded cars that have been strengthened to resist punctures, but the majority is still made up of older, unreinforced models. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is studying whether to make upgrades mandatory, but some railroads and shippers aren't waiting. Last month Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway, owned by Warren Buffet's Berkshire Hathaway, announced it would buy up to 5,000 new, more accident-resistant tank cars.

Another issue that has received much attention since Lac-Megantic concerns the flammability of the light crude from shale formations like North Dakota's Bakken crude, which accounts for over 700,000 barrels per day of US crude-by-rail. The Wall Street Journal published the results of its own investigation, reporting that Bakken crude had a higher vapor pressure--a  measure of volatility and an indicator of flammability--than many other common crude oil types.

The Journal apparently based its findings on crude oil assay test data assembled by the Capline Pipeline.  Although a Reid Vapor Pressure of over 8 pounds per square inch (psi) for Bakken crude is higher than for typical US crudes, it's not unusual for oil as light as this. That's especially true where, due to lack of field infrastructure, only the co-produced natural gas is separated out, leaving all liquids in the crude oil stream.

What makes this situation unfamiliar in the US is that domestic production of oil as light as Bakken had nearly disappeared before the techniques of precision horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing were applied to the Bakken shale and similar "source rock" deposits. (Note: High vapor pressures are characteristic of the naturally-occurring mix of hydrocarbons in very light crudes, rather than a result of the "fracking" process.) Nor is the reported vapor pressure for Bakken or Eagle Ford crude higher than that of gasoline, a product that is federally certified for transportation in the same DOT-111 tank cars that carry crude oil.

The variability of the vapor pressure data that the Journal's reporters identified for Bakken crude may result from another unfamiliar feature of such "light tight oil". Crude produced from conventional reservoirs, which are much more porous than the Bakken shale, tends to be relatively homogeneous. However, because the Bakken and other shales are so much less porous, limiting diffusion within the source rock reservoir, the composition of their liquids can vary much more between wells.

In any case, vapor pressure isn't the preferred measure of fuel flammability. Actual rail cargo classifications are based on flash point and initial boiling point. These routine quality tests aren't included in Capline's publicly available data. PHMSA initiated "Operation Classification" to ensure that manifests and tank car placards for crude oil shipments accurately reflect the potential hazards of each cargo, based on such measurements. The agency has determined that it hasn't always been done consistently, and DOT issued another emergency order requiring shippers to test oil for proper classification.

As mentioned in an oil-by-rail webinar yesterday, hosted by Argus Media, assigning the proper classification to oil shipments may seem like a bureaucratic concern--it doesn't necessarily affect the tank car type chosen to transport the crude--but it can have a significant impact on operational factors such as routing and the notification of first responders along the route.

There's no quick and simple way to make the transportation of crude oil by rail as safe as hauling a dry bulk cargo like grain. Tank car fleets can't be replaced overnight, not just because of the cost involved, but due to limited manufacturing capacity. However, in the meantime significant improvements can be achieved through a combination of government attention and sustained industry initiatives. Since the new crude streams traveling by rail play a key role in increasing North America's energy security, this is in the interest of everyone involved--producers, shippers, railroads, and not least the communities through which this oil travels.

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.
 

Will Shale Oil Growth Lead to New US Refineries?

• The revival of US oil production is spurring new investments in refineries, including the restart or new construction of small refineries near these resources.
• How well such investments perform will depend on both the longevity of shale oil production and policies concerning its export.

An article on the revival of some mothballed US oil refineries and the possible construction of new ones provided yet another indication of industry confidence that record growth in oil production from US shale deposits isn't just a temporary phenomenon.  Refineries--even small ones--aren't usually quick-return investments. Restarting one or building a new one requires a positive view of future feedstock availability, product demand and other uncertainties.

The number of US refineries has fallen steadily, from 301 in 1982 to 143 last year. Because this mainly involved the retirement of smaller, less efficient facilities, while larger refineries "de-bottlenecked" or expanded, US refinery capacity actually grew over this period. It's generally cheaper to expand an existing facility, leveraging its infrastructure and experienced staff, than building a "grassroots" facility.

The hurdles facing new refinery construction in the US have been compounded by environmental regulations covering permits, emissions and product specifications. The time when a new entrant could simply distill light crude oil, sprinkle in some tetraethyl lead and other additives, and sell a full slate of refined products is long gone. New refineries in North Dakota, Texas and Utah are apparently focused on producing diesel fuel from the shale, or "tight" oil in the Bakken, Eagle Ford, and Uinta shales, respectively, and selling the rest of their output to other refiners or petrochemical plants as feedstocks .

With diesel demand in the producing areas booming, thanks to the needs of drilling rigs and the trucks that haul water, sand and equipment, as well as oil from leases not connected to pipeline gathering systems, this opportunity could last as long as the drilling-intensive shale development does. In other words, the demand aspiring refiners see appears to be linked directly to their source of supply.

Meanwhile larger plants, such as several of  Valero's Texas refineries, are in various stages of investments to enable them to process more light oil, reversing a multi-decade trend of investment to handle increasingly heavy and sour (high-sulfur) imported crudes. As with the smaller refineries, this shift requires high confidence in the long-term availability and favorable pricing of these high-quality domestic crude oil types.

The reasonableness of that assumption depends on the longevity of tight oil production. Large conventional inland oil fields typically reach peak output within a few years and then decline gradually, with long plateaus. Whether shale deposits, with their distinct geology, will follow the same pattern remains to be seen. Despite a few projections suggesting that tight oil output of the major shale basins could soon peak and decline rapidly, most mainstream forecasts suggest a long life for these resources, particularly as the technology to develop them continues to improve. 

For example, in its latest Annual Energy Outlook, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) anticipates US tight oil production reaching 4.8 million barrels per day (MBD) by 2021, before gradually declining back to levels near today's in 2040. By contrast BP's just-released Energy Outlook 2035 sees comparable growth over the next few years but little subsequent decline, with tight oil at 4.5 MBD in 2035. Meanwhile, ICF International recently issued its Detailed Production Report, projecting shale/tight oil production in the US and Canada to reach 6.3 MBD by 2035, including 1.3 MBD from the tight oil zones of the Permian Basin of Texas.

The other big uncertainty concerning the availability of light tight oil for new or expanded US refineries depends on federal export policy, which I addressed in a recent post. This issue is highly controversial. A quick reversal of existing rules would be surprising, though as the New York Times noted, possible compromises under existing law could facilitate an expansion of crude oil exports beyond current shipments to Canada. While unlikely to dry up domestic availability of tight oil, such measures could shrink the current discounts for these crudes, compared to internationally traded light crudes like UK Brent. That seems less of a risk for small, simple, inland refineries than for larger facilities, especially those near coastal ports.

This isn't the first time investors have considered the need for new US refineries. There was similar interest after hurricanes Katrina and Rita slashed Gulf Coast refinery output for several weeks in 2005, though it ultimately led nowhere. If today's circumstances prove more supportive, it will be because the US hasn't experienced anything comparable to the shale revolution since the 1920s and '30s, when rapid oil production growth was accompanied by a wave of refinery construction, though in a very different business and regulatory climate. If that parallel holds, consumers stand to benefit from the resulting increase in competition.

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

Energy Risks of the Ukraine Crisis

• Russia's intervention in the Crimean Peninsula poses few risks to Europe's energy supplies, but escalation or Western sanctions could change that assessment.
• If the crisis expanded to mainland Ukraine, the integrity of that country's pipelines and the natural gas they carry to EU members would be the most immediate energy concern.

Although Ukraine's energy assets don't appear to be a major focus of Russia's occupation of the Crimean peninsula, any escalation of the crisis could have serious energy consequences, regionally and globally. The initial reaction of energy markets has been cautious, with Monday's jump of around 2% for Brent crude and nearly 10% for European gas futures largely erased in Tuesday's trading. While some of Russia's oil exports to Europe transit through Ukraine, the latter's natural gas pipelines are the bigger worry, especially in light of Russia's past use of the "gas weapon."

It's always dicey commenting on an unfolding event of this magnitude, which various observers have nominated as the most serious geopolitical crisis in post-Cold War Europe. I've spent the last few days following developments, listening to conference calls, and speaking with a Russia expert of my acquaintance. Dismissing the current events as out of tune with the 21st century ignores the complex history of a region that has seen multiple episodes of great-power conflict, just as trying to impose a Western mindset on President Putin's intentions is likely to come up short.

His latest reported comments suggest that he may have achieved his initial goals, at least insofar as giving him, rather than the new government in Kiev, control over Russia's access to the strategic Black Sea naval installations. Any broader goals are unclear at this point, and as a military expert highlighted in a media call hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations, the current confrontation in Crimea runs the risk of "unintended escalation." Wars have started this way.

So what's at stake, in energy terms? An infographic from Business Insider puts the gas situation in perspective. Russia's share of Europe's gas supply has fallen to 22% as EU members diversified their sources of supply in the aftermath of past interruptions in Russian gas deliveries. Still, roughly two-thirds of Russian gas sent to the EU passes through Ukraine's territory, and the pipelines that transit Belarus and the Baltic Sea lack sufficient capacity to reroute the entire volume should Ukraine's pipelines be disrupted.

Whether that occurred as an intentional reaction by Russia to steps that the US and EU are considering in response to its intervention in Crimea, or as a result of armed conflict in mainland Ukraine, natural gas prices in Europe would spike, even with ample gas in storage after a relatively warm winter. That would adversely affect EU economies still recovering from recession and the EU's financial crisis.

European natural gas prices are already much higher than those in the US, and any further increase would ratchet up the pressure on the EU's manufacturing sector. Nor is there nearly as much LNG available globally to make up any shortfall as there will be in just a few years, once US exports gear up and several large Australian LNG projects come onstream. Ironically, Ukraine is building its own LNG import facility to diversity its supplies--luckily not sited in Crimea.

The threat to oil deliveries seems less acute, short of an embargo that would hurt Russia as much as its customers. In 2012 Russia exported around 6 million barrels per day of oil and condensate to European refineries by various routes, including the southern leg of the Druzhba pipeline that crosses Ukraine on its way to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. While a disruption of this flow could force refiners in those countries to scramble for alternative supplies, Russian oil would probably still find its way to world markets via other routes, including to the Baltic ports. Ensuing world oil price increases would likelier reflect an overall risk premium than a more localized physical shortfall.

Even if the situation doesn't progress beyond its current state, longer-term energy impacts could still follow. These include a recognition of heightened political risk for investments in Russia and its "near abroad" neighbors, along with the results of any financial sanctions that might be imposed.

If Mr. Putin is satisfied to engineer greater Crimean autonomy or independence from a more EU-oriented government in Kiev, and if the EU/US response is limited to financial measures to prop up that government, then the consequences--similar to those for Russia's ongoing occupation of part of Georgia--could be minimal. The EU can't go any farther than Germany will support, and thanks to the Nordstream gas pipeline led by its former Chancellor, Germany has less at stake in Ukraine than some of its neighbors. It has already distanced itself from suggestions of evicting Russia from the G8 group of nations. In that context, the US administration seems unlikely to sustain a harder line than Brussels.

Can Solar Fill the Hydropower Gap During California’s Drought?

• Although the scale of California's conventional hydropower remains much larger than that of solar power, solar's rapid growth provides a meaningful contribution to the grid.
• Solar power can work nearly anywhere, but installing it where it's actually sunny much of the time pays big dividends.

After reading a San Jose Mercury article with the unwieldy title, “Drought threatens California’s hydroelectricity supply, but solar makes up the gap” I was intrigued enough to do a little fact-checking on state-level  electricity statistics. The article quoted the head of the California Energy Commission, who implied that solar power additions were sufficient to make up for any shortfall in hydro, historically one of the state’s biggest energy sources. My initial skepticism about that claim turned out to be largely unfounded.

Solar has been growing rapidly, especially in California, but even with nearly 3,000 MW of photovoltaic (PV) and solar thermal generation in place, it’s still well short of the scale of California’s 10,000 MW of hydropower dams, especially when you consider that the latter aren’t constrained to operate only in daylight hours. However, I also know better than to respond to a claim like this without checking the data on how much energy these installations actually deliver.

My first look at the Energy Information Administration’s annual generation data seemed to confirm my suspicions. In 2012 California’s hydropower facilities produced 26.8 million megawatt-hours (MWh), while grid-connected solar generated just 1.4 million MWh. However, when I looked at more recent monthly data, the mismatch was much smaller, due to solar’s strong growth in the Golden State. For example, in September 2013 California solar power generated 435 MWh, or nearly 24% of hydro’s 1.8 million MWh.

The potential drought benefits of solar stand out even more sharply when we compare the growth in solar generation to the change in output from hydro. Last year solar electricity in the state increased by 2.4 million MWh, compared to 2012, while hydropower fell by 2.3 million MWh. That added solar power won’t provide grid operators the same flexibility as the lost hydropower, because of its cyclical nature, but it is clearly now growing at a rate and scale that makes it a serious contributor.

I’d be remiss if I didn’t point out that solar in California is still nowhere near the scale of the state’s biggest electricity source, natural gas generation, which in 2013 produced over 100 million MWh, or 57% of the state’s non-imported electricity supply. Gas is also filling much of the roughly 18 million MWh shortfall left by the early retirement of Southern California Edison’s San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station last summer, and if the state’s drought worsens, gas will be the main backup for further declines in hydropower.

Yet solar’s growing contribution to the state’s energy mix provides a clear demonstration that while generous state and federal policies can make installing PV economically attractive nearly anywhere, it’s abundant sunshine like California’s that makes it a useful energy source, especially when drought conditions reduce the output of other, water-dependent energy supplies.

A different version of this posting was previously published on Energy Trends Insider.

A Solar Car for the Masses?

• Ford is currently showing a concept car that addresses the shortcomings of solar-powered transportation in a clever way.

• If they can make it a cost-effective option, it would provide consumers a new kind of convenience, in contrast to the compromises inherent in most EVs.

It’s car show season again, with the annual crop of car-model launches like the new Corvette “supercar” and the Acura TLX prototype. However, my biggest regret in missing this year's Washington DC Auto Show was not seeing the Ford “C-MAX Solar Energi” concept, an unlikely marriage of electric vehicle (EV) and solar photovoltaic panels (PV). The car previously debuted at this year’s Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas.

This isn’t the first time a carmaker has put solar panels on the roof of a car, even if we exclude competitions like the Solar Car Challenge and other efforts to test how far or fast one-off solar vehicles designed by engineering students or enthusiasts could travel. However, I believe this is the first time an “OEM” has added solar panels to a production car for the purpose of providing a significant fraction of its motive power.
The biggest hurdles that any attempt to power a car with onboard solar panels must overcome are the low energy density of sunlight at the earth’s surface and the relatively low rate at which current solar panels can convert it into power. A typical EV requires 0.25-0.33 kilowatt-hours (kWh) of energy to travel one mile. 1.5 square meters of solar panel on the roof of a vehicle would receive on average only about 1.6 kWH per day in much of the US, assuming it was stationary and never parked under a roof or tree, and much less in winter. That’s only enough energy to travel 5 or 6 miles, or the equivalent of around 12 ounces of gasoline in a typical hybrid car. It's hard to fight physics.

The clever part of Ford’s solar design is its recognition that the rate of self-charging from the car’s rooftop wouldn’t be sufficient to liberate its owner from the gas pump without help in the form of an “off-vehicle solar concentrator.” This is essentially a glass carport that focuses the sun’s rays on the car’s PV roof and, according to the write-up in MIT’s Technology Review, works with the car’s software to move the car during the course of the day to keep the roof in the brightest area. That maximizes the amount of energy stored in the car’s battery, yielding enough for the daily needs of a fair percentage of drivers.

It’s not immediately obvious that combining two of the most expensive energy technologies of today — EV and PV — represents a good strategy for making them more competitive with the status quo, particularly given the likelihood of relatively stable gasoline prices for the next few years and the significant improvements being made in the fuel economy of conventional cars. 40 mpg highway is no longer considered remarkable. The ordinary hybrid version of the C-MAX is rated at 43 mpg combined city/highway, and the plug-in version on which the solar prototype is based is rated at 100 mpg-equivalent on electricity alone.

I have no idea what Ford would charge for the solar option should it eventually build the car, but it’s a good bet that it would be a significant multiple of the roughly $300 cost of the solar panels. Even without the Fresnel-lens carport, integrating PV into the car’s roof in a durable manner, together with the necessary changes to the car’s power management hardware and software, are unlikely to come cheap. Nor is it obvious that putting solar panels on a car’s roof is the best way to provide renewable electricity for vehicles. As Technology Review notes, Tesla is pursuing high-voltage (i.e., rapid) recharging facilities powered by stationary solar arrays, thus removing the constraint on effective PV area. It would be even simpler for many EV owners who want to avoid “exporting” their automobile emissions to fossil-fuel power plants to sign up for 100% renewable power from their local utility.

It’s no secret that EV sales have been disappointing, initially, for various reasons. 2013 sales figures for the US indicate that EVs, including plug-in hybrids like the non-solar C-MAX Energi, accounted for just under 100,000 new vehicles in 2013, or 0.6% of the US car market, compared to nearly 500,000 hybrids, or just over 3% of total sales of 15.5 million. If the US Congress eventually pursues tax reform along the lines suggested by recently retired Senate Finance Committee chair Max Baucus (D-MT), then the federal EV tax credit of up to $7,500 per car, which has helped push EV sales to current levels, would be in jeopardy. Carmakers should be thinking seriously about the long-term value proposition for EVs on their own merits.

The C-MAX Solar looks like a step in that direction. Once technology-hungry early adopters and the greenest consumers have been satisfied, the mass market will be seeking cars that compete on mainstream measures of convenience, cost and performance. In that light, even a Tesla that can be recharged to half its battery capacity in around 20 minutes via the company’s network of Superchargers falls short, compared to a gasoline car that can be refueled in under 3 minutes. No recharger on earth can deliver energy to a car at the effective rate of a gas pump, without dramatic changes in battery technology.

Yet the C-MAX Solar can do something that no other type of car can: make its own fuel, in a car that can also be refueled conventionally at any gas station, anywhere. That could provide a unique selling point, enhancing the convenience of cars in a totally new way, rather than requiring compromises on convenience as other plug-in EVs do.

I’ve long believed that the transition from fossil fuels to low-emission energy technologies has been hobbled by its dependence on government subsidies and would accelerate when those technologies can outperform on measures of “better, faster, cheaper.” Ford’s solar prototype must still demonstrate that it can become a real production car, rather just than a car show concept. If it does, it could help make EVs attractive to average consumers without requiring thousands of tax dollars in incentives. That could help create the basis for a truly sustainable transition to a new energy economy.

A different version of this posting was previously published on Energy Trends Insider.

US Oil Demand Returns to Growth

• Early estimates indicate that US oil demand grew by 2% last year, after several years of declining consumption.
• Although superficially consistent with recent GDP data, it's not yet clear whether this reflects a new trend or the results of non-recurring factors. 

After three straight years of declining oil consumption and a substantial net reduction since 2005, preliminary estimates suggest that US demand for petroleum and its products grew by 2% last year. In the estimation of the International Energy Agency (IEA) US demand growth in 2013 even outstripped that of China.  However, it strikes me as an exaggeration--or at least premature--to see signs, as a recent headline in the Financial Times suggested, that "America returns to gas-guzzling oil demand."  Is this a new trend, or just another blip?

The Energy Information Agency (EIA) of the US Department of Energy won't issue final figures on 2013 consumption for a few more weeks. In the interim, the American Petroleum Institute (API) released its estimates for December and the Fourth Quarter, showing a 5.8% year-on-year uptick for the month and a 4.6% increase for the quarter, compared to the final quarter of 2012. API's Chief Economist John Felmy cited "continued progress in domestic manufacturing as well as the broader economy."

The US economy has shown unexpected strength recently but continues to disappoint a sizable majority of Americans, based on recent polling. The economy added just under 200,000 jobs per month last year, while total employment remains  below its pre-recession peak. The government's first estimate at the end of January indicated that US gross domestic product grew by 3.2% in the fourth quarter of 2013, slower than the third quarter's relatively strong 4.1% pace. That puts full-year growth at 1.9%, or less than the 2.8% rate for the 2012 when US oil consumption shrank by 2% from the year before.

In any case, the  linkage between economic growth and oil demand has weakened over time, falling by more than 60% since the mid-1970s and by 20% just since 2000. In fact, following the peak in US oil demand in 2005, estimated oil and natural gas consumption per dollar of real GDP has declined by an average of 1.7% per year, only a little less than the average of post-recession US GDP growth. So annual efficiency gains come close to offsetting the impact of economic growth on US oil demand.

Some of this is the result of specific efficiency improvements, such as the 1.0 mile-per-gallon increase in the fuel economy of vehicles sold in 2013, compared to the previous year. Tracking data from the University of Michigan indicate a 16% improvement in the fuel economy of new cars since the 2008 model year. Of course it takes time for the impact of new higher-mpg vehicles to make a dent in the demand of a fleet of roughly 235 million cars and light trucks. That's even true of plug-in electric vehicles that use no liquid fuel at all. With cumulative US sales of around 160,000, EVs are displacing less than 5,000 barrels per day (bpd) of gasoline at this point, in a 9 million bpd market.

Because the primary use of oil in the US is in transportation, with less than 1% of it going to generate electricity, we should look at indicators of transportation activity for signals about changes in oil demand. The Federal Highway Administration's tally of US vehicle miles traveled (VMT) for 2013 was just 0.6% higher than 2012, through November, and remained more than 2% below its 2007 peak, only slightly more than a decade ago. If there's been a recent shift in driving habits, it's either well-hidden or involves a switch back to putting more miles on less-efficient vehicles--countering the anecdotal trend of the last few years. In the longer term, VMT growth will face headwinds from the changes in driver demographics I described last August.

In seeking explanations for last year's higher demand, we also can't ignore one-time factors like weather. Heating-degree-day data for the northeast during the fourth quarter shows a nearly 10% increase compared to 4Q2012. That indicates more days when the average temperature was farther below 65 F, and presumably more consumption of heating fuel as a result--a trend that seems to be continuing this quarter.

Scrutinizing EIA's detailed data on product supplied reveals that around two-thirds of the roughly 300,000 bpd annual increase in demand in 2013 (through October) was in the categories of liquefied petroleum gases (LPG) and low-sulfur distillate, both used for heating. For that matter, much of the growth in LPG demand is being met from the processing of shale gas, rather than crude oil refining, so its inclusion as part of "oil demand" is somewhat misleading. Nor do growing US net exports of refined products, at  around a million barrels per day last year according to API, have any bearing on this discussion, since they aren't included in the figures on which US consumption is gauged.

Another factor to consider when evaluating changes in oil demand is pricing. US retail gasoline prices averaged $0.11 per gallon less in 2013 than 2012, while retail diesel averaged around $0.05/gal. less. Those don't seem like big enough changes to affect demand, but the fourth quarter comparison is more dramatic, with gasoline and diesel $0.22 and $0.15/gal., respectively, less than a year earlier. That, together with a cooler fall, might help explain the fourth quarter bump in API's figures, which showed gasoline demand up by 3.7% year-on-year, and diesel up 5.3%.

Indications of a resurgence in US oil demand growth depend heavily on a single quarter's results, following a quarter of above-trend GDP growth--partially offset by efficiency gains that are expected to grow--and reinforced by cooler weather.  While I can easily imagine that a return to robust US economic growth, combined with persistently weaker fuel prices, could put US oil consumption on an ascending path again, I'd like to see a few more data points before discerning larger implications for global oil demand and prices.

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

Interpreting the State Department's Latest Assessment of the Keystone XL Pipeline

Earlier today, I participated in a webchat hosted by The Energy Collective on the subject of the emissions and market impact of the Keystone XL Pipeline (KXL). It was prompted by last week's release of the State Department's "Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement" (SEIS) on the project. I encourage you to view the Youtube video of the event, but I thought I should also share some of what I learned in the course of preparing for the webchat, along with a few thoughts there wasn't time to discuss online.

The full SEIS runs around 2,000 pages. I focused on the 38-page Executive Summary and referred to the relevant sections of the longer document when I needed more detail. In particular, I wanted to understand how the authors of the report had assessed the project's impact on greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), including how they went about trying to gauge how the market would behave with and without the controversial northern leg of the pipeline, linking the Alberta oil sands developments to the main US oil storage and trading hub in Cushing, OK. (The southern segment of the pipeline, from Cushing to the Gulf Coast, is already in operation, because it didn't require a permit to cross an international border.)

President Obama's stated criterion--I still believe he will make the final call--is ensuring the project does not "significantly exacerbate the climate problem." In terms of emissions, the SEIS analysis shows a range of incremental lifecycle GHG impact of 1.3-27.4 million tons of CO2 equivalent per year. For a project this size, that falls below what I'd consider a reasonable threshold for "significantly". It's equivalent to 0.02-0.4% of total US emissions. On the low end that's on par with US emissions from making glass--not generally considered an important emitter.

Yet even if you don't accept State's conclusion that at expected oil prices over the next few decades the oil that would be carried by KXL would be produced with or without the pipeline, the total direct emissions of 147-168 million tons/yr would still only constitute 0.3% of global emissions of around 50 billion tons. As Jesse Jenkins of the Energy Collective pointed out in the webchat, the emissions of any project would look small compared to global emissions. That's precisely the point, when opponents have characterized them as "game over" for the world's climate.

The key to the conclusions in the SEIS is that these barrels will find a market somewhere, and in the process they will back out some other crude oil. As a result, they would have a minimal impact on the global oil price, and so would be unlikely to increase demand, which is what determines how much oil is refined globally. It's also the case that the alternative crude oils the incremental oil sands production would displace aren't much lower in lifecycle emissions, e.g., heavy Venezuelan or Middle East crudes.

Meanwhile, the report indicates that alternative dispositions would involve either longer or more energy-intensive transportation, including rail and/or tanker, entailing around a million tons per year in higher emissions, along with more spillage than expected from KXL. On that basis, it's hard to read this report as anything other than an endorsement of the view that the pipeline would have a minimal net impact, relative to the likely outcomes that would follow if it is not built.

One of the main points we didn't have much time to discuss in the webchat concerned the role of the SEIS in the decision that the administration must eventually make about the project's permit. I thought the most insightful recent comment on this came from President Obama's first Secretary of Energy, Dr. Steven Chu. He sees Keystone as a mainly a political choice. I agree. However, I wonder if the political considerations have started to shift.

Until recently, it seemed that the balance of political costs and benefits favored continuing to delay the decision as long as possible, by whatever means came to hand. That was certainly the case in 2012, with the White House at stake. An approval then might have pleased independent voters, but it would also have deterred an important segment of the President's political base. This year, with control of the US Senate--and thus the administration's agenda in its final two years--potentially up for grabs, the costs might be rising. At least four Democratic Senators in states that voted for Governor Romney in 2012 (Alaska, Arkansas, Louisiana and North Carolina) have made recent statements in support of the permit for KXL. An October surprise on Keystone might come too late to help them.

Nothing in the Supplemental Environmental Impact Report altered my previous view that President Obama should approve the permit for KXL. Yet because it was written after the Lac-Megantic rail disaster, I thought its figures on the potential for more rail accidents and fatalities if the pipeline isn't built added a compelling argument. Oil by rail is a new reality of the North American energy economy; KXL won't change that fact, one way or the other. However, the addition of up to 1,000 more rail cars of crude oil per day, passing through many more communities than the pipeline would, is a sobering reality to weigh against opposition that I heard another participant in today's webchat suggest was at least partly symbolic.

The Pros and Cons of Exporting US Crude Oil

• Calls for an end to the effective ban on exporting most crude oil produced in the US are based on a growing imbalance in domestic crude quality.
• At least recently, the ban has likely benefited refiners more than consumers. Assessing the impact of its repeal on energy security requires further study. 

Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), the ranking member of the Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee, issued a white paper earlier this month calling for an end to the current ban on US crude oil exports. Her characterization of existing regulations in this area as "antiquated" is spot on; the policy is a legacy of the 1970s Arab Oil Embargo. However, not everyone sees it the same way, either in Congress or the energy industry.

This isn't just a matter of politics, or of self-interest on the part of those benefiting from the current rules. Questions of economics and energy security must also be considered. The main reason these restrictions are still in place is that for much of the last three decades US oil production was declining. The main challenges for the US oil industry were slowing that decline while ensuring that US refineries were equipped to receive and process the increasingly heavy and "sour" (high sulfur) crudes available in the global market. The shale revolution has sharply reversed these trends in just a few years.

No one would suggest that the US has more oil than it needs. Despite the recent revival of production, the US still imported around 48% of its net crude oil requirements last year. Even when production reaches its previous high of 9.6 million barrels per day (MBD) as the Energy Information Agency now projects to occur by 2017, the country is still expected to import a net 38% of refinery inputs, or 25% of total liquid fuel supply. The US is a long way from becoming a net oil exporter.

The driving force behind the current interest in exporting US crude oil is quality, not quantity, coupled with logistics. If the shale deposits of North Dakota and Texas yielded oil of similar quality to what most US refineries have been configured to process optimally, exports would be unnecessary; US refiners would be willing to pay as much for the new production as any non-US buyer might. Instead, the new production is mainly what Senator Murkowski's report refers to as "LTO"--light tight oil. It's too good for the hardware in many US refineries to handle in large quantities, and for most that can process it, its better yield of transportation fuels doesn't justify as large a price premium as for international refineries with less complex equipment.

As a result, and with exports to most non-US destinations other than Canada or a few special exceptions effectively barred, US producers of LTO must discount it to sell it to domestic refiners. Based on recent oil prices and market differentials, producers might be able to earn as much as $5-10 per barrel more by exporting it. Meanwhile the refiners currently processing this oil are enjoying something of a buyer's market and are able to expand their margins. The export issue thus pits shale oil producers and large, integrated companies (those with both production and refining) such as ExxonMobil against independent refiners like Valero.

Producers are justified in claiming that these regulations penalize them and threaten their growth as available domestic refining capacity for LTO becomes saturated. Additional production is forced to compete mainly with other LTO production, rather than with imports and OPEC.

I believe producers are also largely correct that claims that crude exports would raise US refined product prices are mistaken. The US markets for gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel and other refined petroleum products have long been linked to global markets, with prices especially near the coasts generally moving in sync with global product prices, plus or minus freight costs. I participated in that trade myself in the 1980s and '90s. What's at stake here isn't so much pump prices for consumers as US refinery margins and utilization rates.

Petroleum product exports have become a major factor in US refining profitability, and refiners are reportedly investing and reconfiguring to enhance their export capabilities. This provides a hedge against tepid domestic demand. Nationally, refined products have become the largest US export sector and contributed to shrinking the US trade deficit to its lowest level in four years.  If prices for light tight oil rose to world levels US refineries might be unable to sustain their current export pace. It's up to policymakers to assess whether that risk is merely of concern to the shareholders of refining companies or a potential threat to US GDP and employment.

The quest to capture the "value added"--the difference between the value of manufactured products and raw materials--from petroleum production is not new. It helped motivate the creation of the integrated US oil companies more than a century ago and impelled national oil companies such as Saudi Aramco, Kuwait Petroleum Company, and Venezuela's PdVSA to purchase or buy into refineries in Europe, North America and Asia in the 1980s and '90s.

On the whole, OPEC's producers probably would have been better off investing in T-bills or the stock market, because the return on capital employed in refining has frequently averaged at or below the cost of capital over the last several decades. It's no accident most of the major oil companies have reduced their exposure to this sector. When today's US refiners argue that it is in the national interest to preserve the advantage that discounted LTO gives them they are swimming against the tide of oil industry history.

The energy security case for crude exports looks harder to make. An excellent article from the Associated Press quoted Michael Levi of the Council on Foreign Relations as saying, "It runs against the conventional wisdom about what oil security means. Something seems upside-down when we say energy security means producing oil and sending it somewhere else."  The argument hinges on whether allowing US crude exports would simultaneously promote more production and increase the pressure on global oil prices. That makes sense to me as a former crude oil and refined products trader, but it will be a harder sell to Senators, Members of Congress, and their constituencies back home.

The politics of exports may be easing somewhat, though, as a Senate vacancy in Montana could lead to a new Chair at Energy & Natural Resources who would be a natural partner for Senator Murkowski on this issue. (That shift may incidentally be part of a strategy to help Democrats retain control of the Senate.) Will that be enough to overcome election-year inertia and the populist arguments arrayed against it?

As for logistics, the administration could ease the pressure on producers without opening the export floodgates by exempting the oil output from the Bakken, Eagle Ford and other shale deposits from the Jones Act requirement to use only US-flag tankers between US ports. That could open up new domestic markets for today's light tight oil, while allowing Congress the time necessary to debate the complex and thorny export question.

Senator Murkowski wasn't alone in calling for an end to the oil export ban. In his annual State of American Energy speech presented the day as the Senator's remarks, Jack Gerard, CEO of the American Petroleum Institute, noted, "We should consider and review quickly the role of crude exports along with LNG exports and finished products exports, because of the advantages it creates for this country and job creation and in our balance of payments." In a similar address on Wednesday, the head of the US Chamber of Commerce stated, "I want to lift the ban. It's not going to happen overnight, but it's going to happen."  I'd wager he at least has the timing right.

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

Converting Coal to Synthetic Natural Gas in China

•  With so much attention focused on China's shale gas potential, its growing synthetic natural gas industry is a wild card.

• In light of China's severe air quality problems,  trading smog for higher CO2 emissions is an understandable choice, but one with global implications.

In its latest Medium-Term Coal Market Report the International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts a slowing of coal demand growth but no retreat in its global use. That won’t surprise energy realists, but the item I wasn’t expecting was the reference in the IEA press release to growing efforts in China to convert coal into liquid fuels and especially synthetic natural gas (SNG).  It’s not hard to imagine China’s planners viewing SNG as a promising avenue for addressing the severe local air pollution in that country’s major cities, but the resulting increase in CO2 emissions could be substantial. It could also affect the economics of natural gas projects around the Pacific Rim.

Air quality in China’s cities has fallen to levels not seen in developed countries for many decades. There’s even a smartphone app to help residents and visitors avoid the worst exposures. Much of this pollution, in the form of oxides of sulfur and nitrogen and particulate matter, is the result of coal combustion in power plants. Although China is adding wind and solar power capacity at a rapid clip, after years of exporting most of their solar panel output, the scale of the country’s coal use doesn’t lend itself to easy or quick substitution by these renewables.

Natural gas offers a lower-emitting alternative to coal on a larger scale than renewables. Existing coal-fired power plants could be converted to run on gas or replaced with modern combined-cycle gas turbine power plants. Gas-fired power plants emit up to 99% fewer local, or “criteria” pollutants than coal plants, especially those with minimal exhaust scrubbing.

Unfortunately, China doesn’t have enough domestic natural gas to go around. Despite potentially world-class shale gas resources and the rapid growth of coal-bed methane and more conventional gas sources, natural gas supplies only 4% of China’s energy needs. Imported LNG can help fill the gap, but it isn’t cheap. What China has in abundance is coal. Converting some of it to SNG could boost China’s gas supply relatively quickly–perhaps faster than the country’s shale gas infrastructure and expertise can gear up.

SNG is hardly a new idea; the Great Plains Synfuels Plant has been producing it in North Dakota since the 1980s. When that facility was built, natural gas prices were volatile and rising, and greenhouse gas emissions appeared on no one’s radar. The process for making SNG from coal is straightforward, and its primary building block, the gasification unit, is off-the-shelf technology. I worked with this technology briefly in the 1980s, and my former employer, Texaco, licensed dozens of gasification units in China before the technology was eventually purchased by GE. Other vendors offer similar processes.

Gasifying coal adds a layer of complexity, compared to gasifying liquid hydrocarbons but this, too, has been demonstrated in commercial operations. Most of the output of the facilities Texaco sold to China was used to make chemicals, but the chemistry of turning syngas (hydrogen plus carbon monoxide) into pipeline-quality methane is no more challenging.

This effort is already under way in China. Last October Scientific American reported that the first of China’s SNG facilities had started shipping gas to customers, with four more plants in various stages of construction and another five approved earlier this year. The combined capacity of China’s nine identified SNG projects comes to around 3.5 billion cubic feet per day, or a bit more than the entire Barnett Shale near Dallas, Texas produced in 2007 as US shale gas production was ramping up. It’s also just over a quarter of China’s total natural gas consumption in 2012, including imported LNG.

To put that in perspective, if that quantity of SNG were converted to electricity in efficient combined cycle plants their output would be roughly double that of China’s 75,000 MW of installed wind turbines in 2012, when wind generated around 2% of the country’s electricity.

The appeal of converting millions of tons a year of dirty coal into clean-burning natural gas, in facilities located far from China’s population centers, is clear. This strategy even has some similarities to one pursued by southern California’s utilities, which for years imported power from the big coal-fired plants at Four Corners.  For that matter, the gasification process has some key advantages over the standard coal power plant technologies in the ease with which criteria pollutants can be addressed. Generating power from coal-based SNG might actually reduce total criteria pollutants, rather than just relocating them.

However, wherever these plants are built they would add around 500 million metric tons per year of CO2, or around 5% of China’s 2012 emissions, a figure that dwarfs even the most pessimistic estimates of the emissions consequences of building the Keystone XL pipeline. That’s because the lifecycle emissions for SNG-generated power have been estimated at seven times those from natural gas, and 36-82% higher than simply burning the coal for power generation.

What could possibly lead China’s government to pursue such an option, in spite of widespread concerns about climate change and China’s own commitments to reduce the emissions intensity of its economy? Having lived in Los Angeles when it was still experiencing frequent first-stage smog alerts and occasional second-stage alerts, I have some sympathy for their problem. China’s air pollution causes even more serious health and economic impacts and has been blamed for over a million premature deaths each year. By comparison the consequences of greenhouse gas emissions are more indirect, remote and uncertain. Any rational system of governance would have to put a higher priority on air pollution at China’s current levels than on CO2 emissions.

It might even turn out to be a reasonable call on emissions, if China’s planners envision carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) becoming economical within the next decade. It’s much easier to capture high-purity, sequestration-ready CO2 from a gasifier than a pulverized coal power plant. (At one time I sold the 99% pure CO2 from the gasifier at what was then Texaco’s Los Angeles refinery to companies that produced food-grade dry ice.) It should also be much easier and cheaper to retrofit a gasifier for CCS than a power plant.

In an internal context the trade-off that China is choosing in converting coal into synthetic natural gas is understandable. However, that perspective is unlikely to be shared by other countries that won’t benefit from the resulting improvement in local air quality and view China’s rising CO2 emissions with alarm. I would be surprised if the emissions from SNG were factored into anyone’s projections, and nine SNG plants could be just the camel’s nose under the tent.

In an environment that the IEA has described as a potential Golden Age of Natural Gas, large-scale production of SNG could also constitute an unexpected wild card for energy markets. When added to China’s shale gas potential, it’s another trend for LNG developers and exporters in North America and elsewhere to monitor closely.

A different version of this posting was previously published on Energy Trends Insider.

Canada: From Energy Supplier to Competitor?

• In addition to its impact on global oil and natural gas pricing and trade, the shale revolution is altering the energy relationship between the US and Canada.
• This long-standing supplier/customer relationship is becoming more complex as producers in both countries seek new markets outside North America.

In remarks last month the Canadian Natural Resources Minister, Joe Oliver, suggested that with the continued growth of unconventional oil production in the US, "Our only customer will become a competitor." Considering plans for liquefied natural gas export facilities on both sides of the border, he might have included LNG in that comment, too. Let's take a look at the kind of competition he might have had in mind.

Canada has long been an important supplier of crude oil to US refineries, since at least the 1950s. For much of the 1980s and '90s it was in a virtual three-way tie with Mexico and Venezuela for the #2 spot on the list of top oil exporters to the US, behind Saudi Arabia. Since 2004 Canada has claimed first place on that list as its production expanded, while Mexican and Venezuelan output declined and some Saudi oil went to other markets. From 2010 to 2012 exports of Canadian crude oil to the US, including oil sands crude, increased by 23% to over 2.4 million barrels per day (bpd). This has provided Canada with a reliable outlet for its production and the US with additional supplies not exposed--except for price--to ongoing instability in the Middle East and other regions.

However, with or without the Keystone XL Pipeline, the competition to feed US refineries is becoming more intense.  Canada's growing crude exports, including significant quantities of heavy and/or sour crude oil, must displace similar crudes imported into the US from  Latin America and the Middle East without losing ground to the expanded light oil production from US shale plays such as the Bakken and Eagle Ford, and the otherwise mature Permian Basin of Texas and New Mexico. Each of these areas now yields a million bpd. These dynamics are compounded by 1970s-vintage US oil-export rules that keep domestic crude bottled up in the Gulf Coast and weaken the economics of oil production throughout much of North America. 

If it seems odd for a Canadian official to talk about competition within the US market in this way, consider that the main country exempted from current US oil export restrictions is Canada. US oil exports to eastern Canada by rail and by tanker have grown rapidly in the last two years and are likely to expand beyond the current 100,000 bpd level, if export license applications are any indication. US oil exports to Canada may be displacing non-North American crudes today, but they likely also have an adverse effect on the economics of projects intended to ship more western Canadian crude eastward. So Canada now understandably looks towards Asia, home to the world's fastest oil-demand growth, as the logical destination for at least some of its future oil production.

 Natural gas creates another, perhaps more plausible arena for export competition between Canada and the US. Canada envisions a resurgence in gas production similar to what the US has experienced, based on a combination of conventional gas discoveries, such as in the Mackenzie Delta of the Northwest Territories, as well as the shales of Alberta and British Columbia. It also stands to gain additional gas reserves if it is successful in its bid to claim more of the Arctic. As Canadian gas is displaced from its long-standing export market in the US by the shale boom in the lower-48, LNG exports from B.C. are looking more attractive. The province lists five projects in different stages of development and highlights B.C.'s advantageous shipping route to Asia.

Many more LNG export projects have been proposed for the US, with at least four having received approval to sell to countries with which the US does not have free-trade agreements. A number of these are based on existing, or at least previously permitted, LNG import facilities, giving developers a head-start on construction. The US also has a big edge in proved natural gas reserves and technically recoverable gas resources, including shale gas.

Despite these US advantages, aspiring Canadian LNG exporters won't have to contend with an enormous domestic market for their gas, in which many industries are competing to use more gas in power generation, chemicals and other manufacturing, and different paths for displacing oil from transportation, including CNG, LNG, methanol, ethanol or gas-to-liquids fuels. As a result, I suspect that a Canadian LNG plant could count on a more stable long-term cost of gas than one on the US Gulf Coast.

The protracted controversy over the Keystone XL Pipeline project has focused a great deal of public attention on a single aspect of our energy relationship with Canada, while obscuring other aspects that are beginning to shift. Adding a new competitive overlay to our long-standing energy supply chains could ultimately increase North American leverage on OPEC's pricing power, while helping to develop a deeper and more flexible global market for LNG, with resulting environmental benefits. While this might result in winners and losers at the project and company level, the overall effect should be positive for both countries.

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.