Showing posts with label embargo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label embargo. Show all posts

Thursday, November 07, 2013

Energy Security Four Decades After the Arab Oil Embargo

  • The Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-74 focused our attention on energy security and set in motion drastic changes in the way we produce, trade and consume energy.
  • With US energy output approaching or exceeding 1970s levels, some experts now advocate prioritizing competition from non-petroleum fuels over reducing oil imports.
Forty years ago this month the United States and other Western countries experienced a new phenomenon as an embargo on oil deliveries from a group of the world’s largest oil exporters took effect. The embargo was a response to the military support that the US and some of its allies were providing to Israel during the Yom Kippur War then underway in the Middle East. A recent session hosted by the US Energy Security Council commemorating these events included a fascinating conversation between Ted Koppel and Dr. James Schlesinger, US Secretary of Defense at the time of the embargo and later the first US Energy Secretary.

The other, related purpose of the meeting was a presentation and discussion on the proposition that fuel competition provides a surer means of achieving energy security than our pursuit of energy independence for the next four decades following the Arab Oil Embargo. This idea warrants serious consideration, since energy independence, at least in the sense of no net imports from outside North America, is finally beginning to appear achievable.

The 1973-74 embargo was the first oil shock of a tumultuous decade, and it triggered a true crisis. The US had relied on oil costing around $3 per barrel (bbl), not just to fuel our transportation system, but also for 17% of our electricity generation and numerous other uses. The US was then one of the world’s largest oil producers but required imports comprising about one-third of supply to balance our growing demand. With the sudden loss of over a million barrels per day of oil imports from the Middle East, and lacking the sort of strategic petroleum reserve that was established a few years later, an economy already battling inflation was tipped into recession.

The embargo rattled more than the US economy; it challenged basic assumptions of American life, including our sense of entitlement to cheap and plentiful gasoline. Before the oil crisis, gasoline prices hovered around the mid-30-cent mark, with occasional local “gas wars” taking the price down to the high-20s--the inflation-adjusted equivalent of $1.60 per gallon now. Of course with average fuel economy around 13 miles per gallon, the effective real cost per mile wasn’t necessarily lower than today’s.

Within a year gas was over 50¢ at the pump, and by the end of the decade it passed $1.00/gal. for the first time. The gas lines that resulted from the unexpected supply shortfall and the federal government’s efforts to limit the ensuing increase in prices were an affront to drivers, a category that encompassed most of the over-16 population.

That first oil crisis and the subsequent energy crisis resulting from the Iranian Revolution in 1979 set in motion a number of important changes, including a sharply increased focus on energy efficiency, a deliberate effort to diversify our sources of imported oil, a pronounced shift away from oil in power generation — to the point that it now makes up less than 1% of US power plant fuel — and the beginnings of our search for affordable, renewable alternatives to oil.

The US Energy Security Council is an impressive group that includes many former government officials and captains of industry. They’ve clearly spent a lot of time studying this issue, and their report is worth reading. As I understand their conclusions and recommendations, they regard high oil prices as a bigger risk to the US economy than oil imports, per se, because of the impact of oil prices on consumer spending and the balance of trade. They have concluded that the most effective way to apply downward pressure on prices is not simply to reduce US oil imports, but to introduce meaningful fuel competition into transportation markets, where oil remains dominant with a share of around 93%.

The group doesn’t dismiss the benefits of increasing US oil production from sources such as the Bakken, Eagle Ford and other shale formations, but because these are relatively high-cost supplies, they have concluded that their leverage on global oil prices is limited. That means that higher US oil output couldn’t provide a path back to the price levels that prevailed before the Iraq War, when West Texas Intermediate crude averaged $26/bbl in 2002 and gasoline retailed for $1.35/gal.

This is a reasonable argument, though it’s worth considering that a return to $75/bbl might be feasible, if US production kept rising. That could yield US retail gasoline prices around $2.75/gal., equating to $2.15 in 2002 dollars. This isn’t as far-fetched as it might seem, because the global oil price is determined not by the entire 90 million bbl/day of world supply and demand, but by the last few million bbl/day of incremental supply, demand, and inventory changes.

The Council’s view also appears to emphasize the direct impact of oil prices on consumer spending without recognizing that rising production and falling imports shield the economy as a whole from the worst effects of high oil prices. With oil’s contribution to the trade deficit shrinking steadily, the main impact of higher oil prices is to divert money from consumers to shareholders of oil companies — of which I should disclose I am one. While exacerbating income inequality, that should at least result in a smaller impact on GDP and employment than the combination of rising oil prices and rising imports.

If the discussion had stopped at that point, the meeting would have been just another interesting Washington gabfest. However, the group’s analysis includes a set of actions it has identified as necessary for achieving their desired outcome: US energy security extending beyond the current US oil boom, underpinned by an expanding unconventional gas revolution that is widely expected to last for decades.

Their recommendations include giving fuels like methanol derived mainly from natural gas the chance to compete with gasoline made from oil, and with biofuels.They would start with revisions to the current US Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards to give carmakers incentives — not cash subsidies or mandates — to make at least half of all new vehicles fully fuel-flexible, capable of tolerating a wide range of blends of methanol, ethanol and gasoline. That seems like a no-regrets approach that could be achieved at a very low incremental cost per car. Even if you never bought a gallon of E85, M85, or M15, it could pay for itself by protecting your car from the damage that might result if you inadvertently filled up with gasoline containing more than the 10% of ethanol that carmakers believe is safe for non-flex-fuel cars. Other recommendations include easing regulations for retrofitting existing cars for flex-fuel and forming an alcohol-fuels alliance with China and Brazil.

Yet while I repeatedly heard that the group wasn’t promoting any single fuel, talk of methanol dominated the conversation. The moderator, Ann Korin, even joked that the session sounded like an “alcohol party.” As I later pointed out to her, there wasn’t a single mention of drop-in fuels — gasoline and diesel lookalikes derived from natural gas or biomass. I regard that as a crucial omission, because such fuels would be fully compatible with the billion cars already on the road, rather than just the 60 million or so new cars produced each year. They could provide greater leverage on oil prices by producing pipeline-ready products with which consumers are already familiar, from sources other than crude oil.

Part of the appeal of methanol seemed to be the potential for producing it from shale gas at a cost well below the cost of gasoline, even on an energy-equivalent basis — an important caveat, because a gallon of methanol contains half the energy of a gallon of gasoline. I hear the same argument in support of various pathways for producing jet fuel from non-oil sources, and it subscribes to the same fallacy: that market prices are set by manufacturing costs rather than supply and demand.

Fuel is a volume game. For a non-oil gasoline substitute to drive down oil prices –and thus motor fuel prices– as far as the Council apparently envisions, it would take at least several million barrels per day, on an oil-equivalent basis. Producing six million bbl/day of methanol from natural gas would consume 20 billion cubic feet per day of it. That’s 30% of last year’s US dry natural gas production, requiring 100% of the Energy Information Administration’s forecasted growth of US natural gas production through 2034. A number of other entities have their eyes on that same gas for other applications.

As many of the speakers at the Energy Security Council event reminded us, the world is a very different place than it was in 1973. Among other changes, US energy trends are headed in the right direction, with oil demand flat or declining, production rising and imports falling. That alone makes us more energy secure than we were, either five years ago or in 1972. Future oil supply disruptions are also unlikely to look much like the Arab Oil Embargo.

The Council is certainly correct that our unexpected shale gas bonanza, producing large quantities of new energy at a price equivalent to oil at $25 or less per barrel, provides a unique opportunity to weaken OPEC’s influence on oil prices. In pursuing that goal, however, it’s essential to remain flexible concerning the best pathways for gas to compete in transportation fuel markets, whether as CNG or LNG, or through conversion to electricity, methanol, or petroleum-product lookalikes. Consumer acceptance could prove to be the biggest uncertainty governing the ultimate outcome.

A different version of this posting was previously published on Energy Trends Insider. 

Wednesday, December 16, 2009

The Other Countdown

I missed commenting on the latest round of oil deals in Iraq, which could see that country's output quickly double and eventually quadruple, causing no small amount of anxiety within OPEC. It's looking increasingly likely that the world may need that oil sooner rather than later, though. While the backdrops of photos from Copenhagen display the "tck tck tck" mantra symbolizing the conference as our last, best chance to avert catastrophic climate change, we shouldn't forget that another clock with a shorter timeline is also ticking down on our last chances to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

Business leaders are often advised not to let the urgent drive out the important. Although climate change has been billed as having both attributes, so do Iran's nuclear ambitions, and their implications in the next decade take urgency to a higher level. Yesterday's Washington Post featured a chilling analysis of the progress Iran has been making on fronts other than the Uranium enrichment that has attracted so much attention. This includes a leaked memo from the International Atomic Energy Agency assessing Iran's capabilities and another purportedly from inside Iran showing that the government is working on a "neutron initiator." If these assessments are right, then the controversial National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 placed far too much faith in indications that the regime had decided to cancel work on a warhead. Our subsequent patience with them--and with our Security Council partners--has provided Iran with crucial time in which to advance its goals.

While we were in a poor position to ratchet up the pressure sufficiently in 2007 or 2008, when Iran's oil exports made the difference between high oil prices and a crippling oil shock, that constraint disappeared last fall. The combination of OPEC's current spare capacity of at least 6 million barrels per day and the prospect of Iraqi output increases that could dwarf Iran's exports has largely neutralized the threat of an Iranian embargo, perhaps permanently.

Now, it's still possible that the visible parts of Iran's nuclear efforts are a sham mounted mainly for our benefit, similar to the double feint concocted by Saddam Hussein, in which he claimed not to be doing something while doing just enough behind partially-closed doors to make that claim look false. In retrospect that strategy made a certain amount of sense for Iraq, which after its defeat by Coalition forces in the Gulf War could not have defended against a conventional attack from the larger neighbor it had fought to a standstill a decade earlier. However, it makes little sense for Iran, which already has powerful defenses and a wide array of weapons and allies with which to retaliate in case of an attack by the US, the only power that could seriously threaten it at this point.

If the op-ed in the same issue of the Post is correct about the difficulties of mounting effective deterrence once Iran has the Bomb, then we don't have much time left to exercise the remaining diplomatic and economic options in our playbook. That means assessing the positions of Russia and China with a gimlet eye and determining for ourselves whether they would ever sacrifice their trade and security connections with the Islamic Republic, in order to forestall nuclear developments that they likely see as not aimed against them in any case. As weak as our hand looks now, it will only get worse later. In the context of this countdown, today's relatively high inventories of crude oil and refined products look like a very good thing.

Wednesday, September 30, 2009

Resolving Iran Oil-Price Risk

It hasn't been easy keeping up with all the recent developments related to Iran's nuclear program, which still looms as a large, unresolved risk embedded in the global price of oil--though you would never know it from the behavior of oil markets in the week since Iran's hidden nuclear enrichment site was revealed. It's not clear whether traders have concluded that the exposure of the Qom site strengthens the hand of the US, Britain, France and Germany sufficiently to make a diplomatic solution likelier--and conflict correspondingly less likely--or the impact of this story has been overwhelmed for the moment by weak market fundamentals. After all, this is merely the latest phase of a crisis that has been simmering for a number of years; a wait-and-see attitude looks prudent, particularly in light of the market's current capacity to adjust for the temporary loss of Iran's oil output, should that ensue. However, I believe that we are also approaching the point at which much of this uncertainty resolves, because fairly soon the US and its allies must choose either to act decisively to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear arms, or relinquish those options and focus on containing the threat.

Our relative torpor on the subject of Iran's nuclear enrichment program and that country's ultimate nuclear ambitions has been jolted by a succession of events this month. First, President Obama announced his intention to abandon the development of land-based anti-ballistic-missile sites in Central Europe, the main purpose of which was to intercept Iranian ICBMs on their way to targets in Europe or the US, in favor of a sea-borne strategy focused on shorter-range missiles. Then came the announcement at the G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh that Iran was building a secret uranium enrichment site that could start operations as soon as next year, potentially capable of producing roughly one atomic bomb's worth of weapons-grade material a year. Neither the fact that the US and its allies have apparently known about the Qom site for several years nor the last-minute disclosure of the facility by Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency seemed to dampen the shock effect of the announcement. After customarily glib excuses, the Iranian regime's next step was to test-fire short- and medium-range missiles. The US has demanded immediate inspections of the new facility, and the UN Security Council meets tomorrow to take up these matters.

So where does this leave us, other than with nerve-wracking reminders of the pre-war situation with Iraq? If we've been paying attention, the latest revelation shouldn't have come as much of a surprise. As I explained at length in 2005, the arguments that Iran's enrichment efforts were aimed at anything other than a nuclear weapons capability were always pretty weak. Stripping away the diplomatic language of the US and its allies and the lame obfuscations from Tehran, the uncovered Qom facility leaves scant room for doubt concerning the determination of the Iranian government to militarize its nuclear program. Whether or not it is also currently developing warheads that would use the uranium enriched at sites like the one at Qom, there is no other plausible reason for building a nuclear facility in secret under a military base. And common sense tells us that, as with mice, where there is one there are very likely others.

What I conclude from all this is that we are approaching a set of distinct decision points, after a long and intricate dance that probably served the interests of both parties. The passage of time has allowed Iran to make steady progress on enrichment and missile technology, but it has also opened up options for us. As I noted last fall, lower oil prices have created a window for a set of actions--truly crippling sanctions, a naval blockade, or air attack on the facilities in question--that would have been unthinkable when oil was marching steadily toward $100/bbl and beyond. That window will begin to close once the global economy resumes growing rapidly enough to erode the healthy cushion of spare global oil production capacity that now stands at 5.5 million barrels per day--a buffer that would also erode from the other direction if new oil projects fail to keep up with oil's intrinsic decline rates. In other words, if the situation isn't resolved one way or another within the next year or so, the strategy of containment of a nuclear-armed Iran in a new kind of Cold War could become the only viable option left to us.

Wednesday, October 29, 2008

Iran's Oil Shield Slips

Between the US election and the gyrations of the financial markets, some important implications of the declining price of oil haven't received the attention they deserve. A case in point is the effect on Iran's geopolitical posture, particularly with regard to its nuclear program. Many articles have considered the impact of lower oil prices on that country's economy and its influence in the greater Middle East. However, as global demand for oil slows and its price sinks toward $60 per barrel, the effectiveness of Iran's implied threat to suspend oil exports in response to aggressive sanctions or a military strike on its nuclear facilities also erodes. This should create an opportunity for some very assertive diplomacy by the next administration, backed by a much more credible recourse to force. Given the progress of the visible parts of its nuclear program, this could be our last chance to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

A recent Washington Post op-ed by two former US Senators, one from each party, described the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran, along with a set of principles for addressing this challenge vigorously and promptly. Several years ago I took a detailed look at the rationale for Iran to build an entire nuclear fuel cycle for civilian purposes and found it wanting. The world's second-largest natural gas reserves provide it with a much more cost-effective means of generating additional power for its economy, without exposing the country to international sanctions or potential attack. Notwithstanding the findings of a controversial US National Intelligence Estimate last year, the simplest explanation for Iran's tenacity in pursuing uranium enrichment is the option that creates for building nuclear weapons. Nor has the International Atomic Energy Agency been able to gather enough information within Iran to rule out this scenario. This interpretation also aligns nicely with Iran's extensive work on ballistic missiles, which without the extreme accuracy of US missiles looks like a very expensive way to deliver conventional explosives.

Until recently, Iran has held all the cards. With the US focused on wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran successfully played off Russia and China against other UN Security Council members that sought tougher sanctions to back up their diplomatic efforts to halt the nuclear program. And as oil prices went from high to astronomical, the consequences of a disruption in Iranian oil exports became increasingly unbearable and unthinkable for the US and the world economy. While still potentially quite disruptive and hardly to be invited lightly, that prospect looks much less dire today.

Iran exports a bit more than 2 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil. For most of the last four years, that quantity exceeded the sum of global spare oil production capacity, rendering Iran's contribution indispensable. That is no longer the case. Just last week OPEC announced production cuts that could cover all but 900,000 bpd of Iran's exports, with further cuts in prospect. Any shortfall beyond that could be made up from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which could supply the difference for up to two years, if necessary. Oil prices would rise, though prompt releases from the SPR would limit the magnitude of any spike. In other words, if the Iranian government has assumed that the dreadful prospect of an Iranian oil embargo was sufficient to deter any measures strong enough to force them to give up their nuclear program, or to disable it on the ground, they should reconsider. Their ace-in-the hole looks more like a 10 or a Jack, today.

These altered circumstances should not be construed as providing a green light for air strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities. That option should remain a last resort, due to its many adverse consequences beyond oil. At the same time, because this and a number of less-violent steps suddenly look feasible, it might induce Iran to negotiate, prompted by the realization that it has more valuable things at stake than a uranium-enrichment program, including the health of an economy that is critically dependent on oil revenue and on imports of petroleum products that its own refineries cannot produce in sufficient quantity to satisfy domestic demand without rationing. While not exactly a silver lining of the present global crisis, this constitutes an opportunity that Western governments cannot afford to ignore, because its consequences will endure long after the present financial and economic problems have been resolved.