Has OPEC Lost Control of the Price of Oil?

• The shale revolution effectively sidelined OPEC's control over global oil prices, but the consequences of a year of low prices are shifting power back to the cartel.

In the aftermath of another inconclusive meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, oil prices have been testing their lows from the 2008-9 financial crisis,  For all the attention and speculation devoted to OPEC-watching whenever they meet, the question we should be asking about OPEC is whether the current situation shares enough of the elements that defined those periods in the past when the cartel's actual market control lived up to its reputation.

That reputation was established during the twin oil crises of the 1970s. US oil production peaked in late 1970, and to the extent there was then a global oil market, the key influence in setting its supply--and thus prices--passed from the Texas Railroad Commission to OPEC, which had been around since 1960.  From 1972 to 1980, the nominal price of a barrel of oil imported from the Persian Gulf increased roughly ten-fold, with disastrous effects on the global economy.

Just a few years later, however, oil prices collapsed.  OPEC's control was undermined by new non-OPEC production from places like the North Sea and Alaskan North Slope and a remarkable 10% contraction in global oil demand. The turning point came in 1985. Saudi Arabia, which had successively cut its output from 10 million barrels per day (MBD) in 1981 to just 3.6 MBD, introduced  "netback pricing" as a way to protect and recover market share.

That move helped set up nearly 20 years of moderate oil prices, during which OPEC's most successful intervention came in response to the Asian Economic Crisis of the late 1990s, when together with Mexico, Norway, Oman and Russia, it sharply curtailed production to pull the oil market out of a tailspin.

The proponents of today's "lower for longer" view of oil prices may see compelling parallels in the circumstances of the mid-1980s, compared to today's. Production from new sources, mainly US "tight oil" from shale, has created another global oil surplus. In the 1980s nuclear power and coal were pushing oil out of its established role in power generation. Now, renewables and electricity are beginning to erode oil's share of transportation energy, while the slowdown of China's economic growth and concerns about CO2 emissions raise doubts about the future growth of oil demand.

However, these similarities break down on some fundamental points. First, the production profile of shale wells is radically different from that of large, conventional onshore oil fields or offshore platforms. Once drilled, the latter produce at substantial rates for decades, while tight oil wells may deliver two-thirds of their lifetime output in just the first three years of operation. Sustaining shale production requires continuous drilling. In fact, new non-shale projects similar to the ones that underpinned oil-price stability from 1986-2003 make up the bulk of the $200 billion of industry investment that has reportedly been cancelled in response to the current price slump.

Another major difference relates to spare capacity. During most of the 1980s and '90s, OPEC maintained significant spare oil production capacity, much of it in Saudi Arabia. That wasn't necessarily by choice, but it was what enabled OPEC to absorb the loss of around 3.5 MBD from Kuwait and Iraq in 1990-91 while continuing to meet the needs of a growing global market. The virtual disappearance of that spare capacity was a key trigger of the oil price spike of 2004-8. (See chart below.)  A little-discussed consequence of OPEC's current strategy to maintain, and in the case of Saudi Arabia to increase output has been a decline in OPEC's effective spare capacity, to just over 2 MBD, compared to 3.5 MBD in the spring of 2014.

As a result, global spare oil production capacity is essentially shifting from Saudi Arabia, which historically was willing to tap it to alleviate market disruptions, to Iran, Iraq and US shale. The responsiveness of all of these is subject to large uncertainties. Iran's production capacity has atrophied under sanctions, and it isn't clear how quickly it can ramp back up once sanctions are fully lifted. Iraq's capacity and output have increased rapidly, but key portions are threatened by ISIS.

Meanwhile, US tight oil production is falling, although numerous wells have been drilled but not completed, presumably enabling them to be brought online quickly, later--perhaps mimicking spare capacity. How that would work in practice remains to be seen. One uncertainty that was recently resolved was whether such oil could be exported from the US. As part of its recent budget compromise, Congress voted to lift the 1970s-vintage oil export restrictions. Even with US oil exports as a potential stabilizing factor, a world of lower or more uncertain spare capacity is likely be a world of higher and more volatile oil prices.

Oil prices were largely unshackled from OPEC's influence last year, after Saudi Arabia engineered a new OPEC strategy aimed at maximizing market share. However, with oil demand continuing to grow and millions of barrels per day of future non-OPEC production having been canceled--and unlikely to be reinstated any time soon--and with OPEC's spare capacity approaching its low levels of the mid-2000s, the potential price leverage of a cut in OPEC's output quota is arguably greater than it has been in some time.

 

In 2016 we will see whether OPEC finally pulls that trigger, or instead chooses to remain on a "lower for longer" path that raises big questions about the long-term aims of its biggest producers.

 

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation

Do OPEC Meetings Matter?

Yesterday's meeting of OPEC in Vienna attracted extra attention because of disagreements between Saudi Arabia and Iran that extend well beyond the oil fields. The resulting impasse over increasing production to stem high oil prices and support a weakening global economy produced a much-quoted assessment from the Saudi Oil minister, Ali Naimi, who described it as "one of the worst meetings we ever had in OPEC." Yet while the events in the Middle East were at the forefront for most commentators, the outcome of the meeting seems understandable purely in the context of OPEC's own history and the current fundamentals of the market. I'm not sure why so many people appeared to expect OPEC to boost output in anticipation of demand that might not materialize.

I have followed OPEC meetings for nearly 30 years, though not always as closely as when I was trading oil and its products, the prices of which stood to rise or fall depending on what was decided in Vienna. My interest in this meeting went up significantly when I received a call inviting me to participate in a panel discussion about it on the Voice of Russia radio network yesterday afternoon. An hour or two of research revealed a global oil market that is currently well-supplied, with inventories in most developed countries running at fairly typical levels and inventories in the US actually on the high side of normal for this time of the year. That's pretty much the argument that OPEC's price hawks took into yesterday's session.

However, the Saudis and others arguing for higher quotas were looking ahead to the effects of summer demand, especially in rapidly growing Asia, and the buildup of inventories for the fall and winter heating fuel season. They--along with the IEA--anticipated demand growing faster than supply, particularly when the impact of the curtailments from Libya and Yemen are factored in. Such events are important because of the quality difference between the oil that's been shut in in those countries and the spare capacity elsewhere that's available to make up for it.

OPEC's main problem is that the outlook for the global economy has weakened in the last few weeks, and not just because oil has risen to above $115 per barrel, compared to its average of $80 or so last year. The stakes for them look even higher when you factor in a history that includes boosting production in the late 1990s to meet roaring demand in Asia-Pacific, only to see the Asian Economic Crisis slam demand growth in the region into reverse, sending crude prices tumbling from the $20s to single digits by the end of 1998. The doves within OPEC were focused on keeping prices below the level at which large chunks of demand were destroyed in 2008, while the hawks seemed willing to risk that outcome to avert a future price collapse and preserve the revenue they need to fund their national agendas.

The potential consequences for individual OPEC members are substantial. Consider Algeria, which exports about 1.8 million barrels per day. The difference between the current price and what they realized last year equates to more than $20 billion annually. That might sound small in the context of the current debate over trillion-dollar US deficits, but it's nearly 15% of Algeria's GDP. It's no wonder that smaller producers and others with limited capacity to increase output--and thus revenue--would drag their feet on agreeing to raise quotas for countries with spare capacity.

If it sounds like I'm rationalizing cartel behavior that would be illegal in the US, that's not my intent. It's clear to me that oil prices are significantly higher than they would be, because OPEC has chosen to produce around 2 million barrels per day less than it did in 2008. In part they've had to do that to accommodate higher non-OPEC production--think Brazil and Russia--along with rising biofuel production, without weakening prices. The consequences for US consumers are equally clear: Gasoline prices are still more than $1 per gallon higher than a year ago, and even ignoring the impact on diesel or jet fuel that translates into an additional drain of $100-150 billion per year that can't be spent on other goods and services that would contribute more to the recovery.

OPEC meetings do matter, because as long as OPEC possesses both spare production capacity and the discipline to withhold it from the market, it retains the power to control oil prices. If we want to understand the decision process of this group of countries that is always struggling to reconcile its own often-competing, but still broadly aligned self-interests, our assessment should focus on their issues more than ours, however much we are affected by the outcome. Yesterday we saw the price hawks stymie the efforts of those producers who are worried that if they squeeze consumers too hard, demand will fall back to the lows of 2009, costing them hundreds of billions of dollars per year in revenue. But if demand continues to grow, that was surely not the last word, and this debate must be revisited within a few months.