What Do Futures Markets Tell Us About Long-term Oil Prices?

• The tendency to believe that the prices of oil futures contracts are predicting the future price of oil is understandable but not supported by the track record of such bets.
• The prices of long-dated oil futures merely reflect where buyers and sellers are willing to strike a deal today, for their own, diverse reasons.

A recent article in the Wall Street Journal reminded me of numerous debates about the significance of energy futures prices, when I was a trader and later a trading manager for the former Texaco, Inc.  Do changes in futures contract prices actually predict future oil prices as the Journal's reporter suggests? If so, then it might be reasonable to conclude that today's low oil prices could persist for years. However, from my perspective that over-interprets the market data and ignores some important oil fundamentals.

As tempting as it might be to think so, the futures market for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil isn't a crystal ball, and neither is the market for UK Brent crude. A futures price is simply the price someone is willing to pay or receive now for oil to be delivered (or settled without delivery) later. It is typically based on business needs, rather than deep analysis.  A concrete example might be helpful.

The parties who on August 11th bought or sold oil for $56 or $57 in December 2017 likely did so, not because they were certain what the price would be then, but because they couldn't be sure and either needed to hedge another transaction or activity, or thought it constituted a reasonable bet. Aggregating a modest number of such transactions--long-dated futures trade much less frequently than those for the near months--doesn't improve the accuracy of these bets on an inherently unpredictable commodity over long intervals. Anyone who thinks it does should examine the track record of oil futures as predictions; it is a sobering exercise, especially for those who have traded this market.

Consider that while the September 2015 WTI contract closed at a little over $43 per barrel that afternoon, traders were buying and selling the same contract for more than twice as much during long stretches of 2012--about as far removed from us as the late-2017 contract prices cited in the Journal article as evidence of a persistent oil-price slump. Prices for the September 2015 contract were even higher in the middle of last year, when traders knew nearly as much about the growth of US tight oil production and its rising productivity as we do today, but crucially didn't know that OPEC would choose not to cut output to alleviate an over-supplied market as they had done in the early 1980s and late 1990s. Similar examples abound.

So how else might one explain the fact that long-dated oil contracts are trading for less today than they were this spring, if not as a prediction of a longer period of low prices ahead? Behavior and learning play key roles. With the  first anniversary of this historic price collapse just a few months off, expectations of a quick rebound in prices have faded. The possibility that the US could produce as much tight oil, for now, with fewer than half as many drilling rigs in operation as a year ago has sunk in. So has the reality that as painful as $50 oil is for some of OPEC's members, cartel leaders like Saudi Arabia show little inclination to blink first.

However, others are blinking, and that's why I'm skeptical that oil prices can remain this low indefinitely. The cuts in staff and investment budgets by major oil companies and their national oil company peers have been breathtaking, totaling $180 billion this year according to one analysis. The cuts suggest that the projects in question require significantly higher oil prices to be profitable, even after recent cost reductions, or have become too risky at current prices.

Few of these companies are big players in shale. Their bread and butter is large, conventional onshore oil fields and enormously expensive deepwater oil projects, the collective output of which is inherently subject to annual declines in output. Decline is the "silent killer" of output, to the tune of 5% or so every year. The only way to offset this trend within the portfolios of these producers is to spend large sums every year on new wells and new projects--projects that according to Rystad Energy, as cited by Bloomberg, have been cut more than at any time since 1986.

We must also put the US shale revolution in its proper context. When added to a global market that was balanced between supply and demand at around $100 per barrel, it was a game-changer, not least because no other producer or group of producers was willing to reduce output enough to accommodate this new source. However, even at today's 5.4 million barrels per day US tight oil represents only about 6% of global supply. The combination of shale plus OPEC covers less than half the world's oil demand.

The remainder must come from onshore and offshore oil fields in non-OPEC countries like Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Norway, and Russia. This non-OPEC supply has grown thanks to  a wave of completions of  large projects begun 5-10 years ago, when prices were rising rapidly. However, reduced investment now surely means lower non-OPEC production within a year or two.

The key question for future oil prices is therefore when demand, which according to the International Energy Agency is growing rapidly under low prices, and supply, for which new investment has suddenly shifted from the accelerator to the brake pedal, will cross over, erasing today's glut. It's hard to infer the answer from the thinly traded market for long-dated oil futures contracts.

The Impact of the Global "Sweet" Crude Bulge

• The recent slide in global oil prices has been compounded by the pressure that rising US shale oil production is putting on the price of sweet crude benchmarks like Brent.
• OPEC's producers may suffer as much as those in the US, while consumers benefit from significantly lower fuel prices than last year.

When the US went to war in Iraq in 2003, the price of oil embarked on a trend that took it from around $30 per barrel to nearly $150 before collapsing in the recession in 2008. This time, as a new US-led coalition takes on ISIS with a bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria, the price of oil is falling, down 20% in the last two months. It's not just that global economic growth has weakened recently, or that soaring shale oil output in the US has averted another oil crisis. Oil's current downturn also reflects the fact that new production from the Bakken, Eagle Ford and other shale deposits is particularly well-suited to undermine oil's global benchmark prices, for Brent and West Texas Intermediate, both of which are made up of light sweet crude oil streams.

The numbers for US shale, or "light tight oil" (LTO) as it's often called, are impressive, especially to those accustomed to watching the gradual ebb and flow of different oil sources over long periods. In the 12 months ending in June 2014, US oil production grew by 1.3 million barrels per day (MBD), not far short of Libya's pre-revolution exports. Since January 2011, the US added 3 MBD, or about what the UK produced at its peak in 1999. In fact, since 2010 incremental US LTO production has exceeded the net decline of the entire North Sea (Denmark, Norway and UK) by around 2 MBD, contributing to a significant expansion of Atlantic Basin light sweet crude supply.

The New York Mercantile Exchange defines light sweet crude as having sulfur content below 0.42% and an API gravity between 37 and 42 degrees. That's less dense than light olive oil. The specification for Brent is similar. Much of the LTO produced from US shale formations fits those specifications, and what doesn't is typically even lighter and lower in sulfur.

The current "contango" in Brent pricing, in which contracts for later delivery sell for more than those for delivery in the next month or two, is another sign of a market that is physically over-supplied: more oil than refineries want to process, with the excess going into storage. However we also see indications that the historical premium assigned to lighter, sweeter crude versus heavier, higher-sulfur crude is under pressure.

One example of this is the gap or "differential" between Louisiana Light Sweet, which wasn't caught up in the delivery problems that plagued West Texas Intermediate for the last several years, and Mars blend, a sour crude mix from platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. From 2007-13 LLS averaged around $4.50 per barrel higher than Mars, while for the first half of this year it was only $2.75 higher and today stands at around $3.40 over Mars.

And while OPEC's reported Reference Basket price has been falling in tandem with Brent, its discount to Brent had also narrowed by about $1 per barrel, prior to the price plunge of the last couple of weeks, compared with the average for 2007-13. Considering that OPEC's basket includes light sweet crudes from Algeria, Libya and Nigeria that sell into some of the same Atlantic Basin markets as Brent, that looks significant.

By itself a narrowing of the sweet/sour "spread" of only a dollar or so per barrel isn't earth-shattering. However, because the surge of US oil production is effectively focused on the oil market segment represented by the price of Brent, it compounds the pressure on OPEC, many of whose members link the price of their output to Brent. This might help explain why the response of OPEC's leading producer, Saudi Arabia, has been to cut prices rather than output, in an apparent effort to maintain market share rather than price level.

The Saudis know better than anyone how that movie could end. The Kingdom's1986 decision to implement "netback pricing", linking the price of its oil to the value of its customers' refined petroleum products, helped precipitate a price collapse so deep that it took oil prices 18 years to reach $30/bbl again, by which time the dollar had lost a third of its value.

Whether aimed at US shale producers or as a reminder to the rest of OPEC, which appears to be unprepared to make the output cuts necessary to defend higher oil prices, the Saudi action increases the chances that oil prices will over-correct to the downside, rather than rebounding quickly. If so, the impact of the sweet crude bulge in the Atlantic Basin--only a little more than 3% of global oil supplies--could play a disproportionate role in prolonging the pain producers will experience until oil markets eventually reach a new equilibrium.

In the meantime, US consumers are benefiting from gasoline prices that are already $0.15 per gallon lower than this week last year. Today's wholesale gasoline futures price for November equates to an average retail price well below $3.00 per gallon, after factoring in fuel taxes and dealer margins, compared to last year's average retail price for November of $3.24. After factoring in lower diesel and heating oil prices, the fall in oil prices could put an extra $10 billion in shoppers' pockets for this year's holiday season.

A substantially different version of this post was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation

ISIS Threatens Iraq's Oil Upside

• Even if its threat to Iraq's oil exports can be contained, the newly asserted "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria" has altered the political risk of projects there.
• That could hamper future production that was expected to be a major factor in meeting growing oil demand later this decade.

Last month's blitzkrieg advance of Al Qaeda spinoff ISIS in northwestern Iraq rattled global oil markets and politicians. Oil prices have risen by only a few dollars, reflecting the remoteness of the current threat from Iraq's main producing region and validating OPEC's recent characterization of the global oil market as "adequately supplied." Yet even as the rebel offensive appears to stall, the escalation of risk in Iraq and its neighbors could affect geopolitics, oil supplies and fuel prices for the rest of the decade.

Iraq currently exports around 2.7 million barrels per day (MBD) of oil, or 7% of global oil exports. It is effectively the number two producer in OPEC. Having recovered beyond pre-war levels, Iraq's oil industry has been growing, while Iran's exports are constrained by international sanctions and Libya's output has become highly erratic following that country's revolution.

In the International Energy Agency's latest Medium-Term Oil Market Report Iraq accounts for 60% of OPEC's incremental production capacity through 2019 (see chart below) and nearly a fifth of all new barrels expected to come to market in that period. This is a more conservative view of Iraq's growth potential than in previous scenarios, but it still leaves Iraqi oil, together with " tight oil" in the US and elsewhere, as the bright spots of the IEA's supply forecast.

Following ISIS's capture of Mosul in northern Iraq, the Heard on the Street column in the Wall St. Journal painted a stark picture of how the destabilization of Iraq could limit investment in the country's oil industry, truncating its expansion. That would increase longer-term oil price volatility and make investments elsewhere more attractive, not just in North American tight oil but also in energy efficiency and alternatives to oil.

Warning signs seem ample. The "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria" might never capture Baghdad or directly threaten the giant oil fields of southern Iraq that are reviving with help from international firms like BP, ExxonMobil and Shell. However, ISIS's actions in the territory they now control, and the fears they incite across a much larger swath of Iraq, are sparking renewed sectarian violence and prompting foreign companies to evacuate personnel. This undermines the IEA's medium-term forecast, which despite being "laden with downside risk" will apparently not be revised in light of recent events. It also raises the potential for jumps in nearer-term oil and petroleum product prices.

It is noteworthy that oil prices haven't gone up significantly, as they did when Libya's revolution began. From February 15 to April 15, 2011 the price of UK Brent Crude jumped 22%.  Iraq's troubles added about 5% to the Brent price, some of which has already dissipated. However, average US gasoline prices are $0.21 per gallon ahead of their level for the same week last year, in part because tensions in Iraq and elsewhere have forestalled the typical post-Memorial Day price drop.

The market's relatively muted response could change abruptly if the Iraqi military suffered further setbacks at the hands of ISIS and its allies, or if ISIS turned its attention to the oil infrastructure of central and southern Iraq. They attacked the country's largest refinery at Baiji, north of Baghdad, and I have seen conflicting reports of its current status.

As several analysts have noted, anything that threatened the country's oil exports, most of which pass through the Gulf port of Basra, could send oil prices substantially higher. That's because other supply outages have reduced usable spare production capacity elsewhere--oil that isn't now being produced but could ramp up quickly--to less than 4 MBD, a narrower margin than in several years. Even if lost Iraqi output were made up by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the further contraction of spare capacity would drastically increase price volatility and boost oil prices from today's level, until Iraq's exports--or Iran's--were restored.

Nor would booming domestic oil and gas-liquids production, which is surely helping to hold down global oil prices, insulate US consumers from increases at the gas pump. The oil that US refineries process and the products they sell are still priced based on the global market. If Brent crude spikes, so will US gasoline and diesel. That would have less impact on the US economy than in the past, when imports made up a much higher share of supply, but shifting money from the pockets of consumers to those of oil company shareholders is rarely popular.

An Iraq-driven oil price spike would affect politics and geopolitics, too. An unstable Iraq makes it more difficult to maintain the sanctions pressure on Iran, particularly if the US and Iran ended up coordinating their responses  in Iraq. It's even harder to envision a consensus on keeping  more than 1 MBD of Iran's oil bottled up if oil prices returned to $150/bbl.

That could also complicate the debate over exporting US crude oil, already a tough sell for politicians who came up during the era of energy scarcity. As a practical matter, if exports began while prices were rising sharply for other reasons, convincing US voters that the two factors were unrelated would be challenging. A full-blown oil crisis in Iraq or the wider Middle East would likely result in the idea being tabled for an extended period.

It's tempting to view the success of ISIS in seizing territory on both sides of the Iraq/Syria border as a temporary outgrowth of Syria's civil war. If that were the case, the situation might revert to the status quo ante, once the Iraqi army--with some outside help--mopped up ISIS.

Even if this genie could be rebottled, however, the aftermath of the Iraq War and the "Arab Spring" revolutions is exerting  great stresses on the post-World War I regional order, overlaid on 13 centuries of animosity between Sunnis and Shi'ites.  An accident of history and geology has made this area home to much of the world's undeveloped conventional onshore oil reserves. Can its stability be restored with a few deft military and diplomatic moves, or might that require a complete rethinking of boundaries and nations, as recently suggested by the foreign affairs columnist of the Washington Post?

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

Oil's Eastern Hemisphere is Shifting, Too

• OPEC's exports earned record revenue last year, but the pressure on the cartel is increasing as Eastern Hemisphere production expands, along with higher unconventional oil production in North America.
• Increasing supply doesn't guarantee lower oil prices in the future, but it will help accommodate growing demand from the developing world, reducing the risk of price spikes such as we saw in 2008.

No one should be surprised that the turmoil in Egypt has caused jitters in the oil markets.  Although Egypt has recently become a net oil importer, the possibility of extended violence or even civil war poses risks to the tanker traffic through the Suez Canal. This has helped to push UK Brent crude to its highest level since April and contributed to higher prices for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude than we've seen in over a year.  Yet while these events provide the latest of many prods to nudge oil prices higher, underlying long-term supply trends look favorable.  That's not just because of surging US oil output, which is largely attributable to shale or "tight oil."

US production of crude oil and natural gas liquids grew by roughly 2 million barrels per day (MBD) from 2008-12, with a similar increase expected by 2020, even in the relatively conservative forecast of the US Energy Information Administration.  As a result, US oil imports are shrinking, scrambling long-established supply patterns in the Atlantic Basin. However, North America isn't the only place where supply is expanding, nor is the shale revolution responsible for the production growth in the Eastern Hemisphere, at least not yet.

The big story there is Iraq. Thanks to the development contracts its government negotiated with international firms after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi production is growing and might eventually reach the potential suggested by its enormous conventional oil reserves. Whether or not Iraq really has 150 billion barrels of oil in the ground-- this figure ratcheted up over the years in an odd two-step with its historical rival Iran--the consensus is that it has ample scope to boost output at relatively low cost. 

As the Financial Times reported, Iraq's plans to increase oil production capacity from around 3 MBD to 12 MBD, which would put it in the same league with Saudi Arabia, are now in doubt due to multiple concerns.  But even with companies seeking to renegotiate service contracts that looked too lean when they were set, and the Kurdistan Regional Government in the north of Iraq signing deals independently of Baghdad, Iraq produced more oil last year than it had since the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. The International Energy Agency apparently expects Iraqi production to nearly double to 6.1 MBD by the end of the decade.

If this comes to pass, it will significantly alter the dynamics within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and possibly change OPEC's role in the market. It would lift Iraq well above other producers like Iran, Kuwait, the UAE, and Venezuela--all clustered around 2-3 MBD--and leave it second only to Saudi Arabia. Given recent Saudi domestic consumption trends, the race for future export leadership could be even tighter.

Despite record oil revenue last year, tensions are growing within OPEC, which had welcomed post-war Iraq back into its ranks and didn't constrain its output with an official production quota.  This accommodation is even simpler today, with OPEC operating without country-specific quotas. Yet in the absence of a large increase in demand for OPEC's oil in the developing world, a steadily expanding Iraq will either force painful adjustments on other members or bust the cartel's quota entirely.  Whether that results in rising inventories or merely higher spare production capacity, it would exert downward pressure on oil prices and on OPEC members' national budgets.

Another important shift is associated with the growth of oil output in Kazakhstan, the second-largest oil producer to emerge from the breakup of the Soviet Union.  Production has increased steadily since the 1990s, reaching 1.7 MBD last year. With the startup of the supergiant Kashagan field later this year, the country's production should exceed 3 MBD by 2020, with exports over 2 MBD. That would make Kazakhstan a bigger factor in global oil markets than Iran, as long as the latter continues to be hemmed in by sanctions. 

No one can predict oil prices in 2020 with any certainty. However, the combination of significant supply growth in North America, Iraq and the Former Soviet Union with flat or shrinking demand in the US and Europe provides headroom for further demand growth in Asia and the Middle East itself.  That doesn't necessarily augur a big drop in prices ahead--much of this new production isn't exactly cheap--but it could signal a period of greater price stability than we've experienced for a while.  That's assuming none of the various crisis scenarios erupts in the meantime.

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

Could US Oil Trends Alter How Oil Prices Are Set?

• Oil prices weren't always set by a transparent global market. Current pricing mechanisms emerged from much less transparent precursors.
• Resurgent US production, combined with restrictions on US oil exports, could disconnect the US from the global oil market, with unexpected results.

If you follow energy closely, you've likely lost count of the number of times you've heard an economist, executive or government official explain that oil prices are set by the global market, and not by oil companies or the US government.  Although somewhat over-simplified, this statement has been valid for roughly 30 years.  However, it hasn't always been the case. Current trends in US production, together with existing regulations, make me wonder if it will remain accurate in the future, as the US inches closer to what is commonly referred to as energy independence. 

The market-based system of oil prices, with its transparency and easy trading among regions, didn't appear overnight.  Until the early 1970s, Texas played a role similar to Saudi Arabia's current swing producer role within OPEC.  By limiting the output of the state's oil wells, the Texas Railroad Commission effectively determined the global price of oil--to the extent there was one--until Texas had no spare capacity left.  That set the stage for OPEC, a succession of oil crises, and the US oil price controls that were imposed in the 1970s in an attempt to help manage inflation. There was also no single, representative oil price.  Instead, prices were set by producers' contract terms and the discounts large refiners could negotiate, or by federal regulations.  The current system emerged from a series of developments in the 1980s.

When US oil price controls ended in 1981, oil futures trading was just getting underway on the New York Mercantile Exchange.  The heating oil contract was launched in 1980, followed by the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil contract in 1983. This combined large-scale oil trading with an unprecedented level of transparency.   It was also significant that the US, the world's biggest oil consumer, had become a major oil importer after domestic production peaked in 1970.  Because refineries on the coasts competed for oil supplies with refiners on other continents, the price of WTI couldn't get too far out of line with imported crudes without creating arbitrage opportunities for traders.  And any part of the US connected by pipeline to the Gulf Coast was effectively linked to oil prices in Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

After OPEC miscalculated the response to the very high prices its members were demanding in that period--reaching $100 per barrel in today's dollars--global oil demand shrank by nearly 10% from 1979 to 1983, while non-OPEC production grew by more than 12%.  Prices soon collapsed, and OPEC's dominance of oil markets faded for most of the next two decades, during which the futures exchanges and trading relationships of the modern oil market took hold. 

What could shake the current system of oil prices?  It has already withstood recessions, wars in the Middle East, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the explosive growth of Asia, with China alone adding oil demand comparable to that of the EU's five largest economies.  However, since the current system is based on the free flow of oil between regions, anything that impedes that flow could undermine the way oil is currently priced.

Setting aside conflict scenarios, consider the potential impact of sustained growth in US production, combined with flat or declining demand and no change in the current prohibition on most US crude oil exports.  The gyrating differential between WTI and UK Brent crude, reflecting rising production in the mid-continent and serious logistical bottlenecks, provides a glimpse of what this could be like.  With much of the new US production coming in the form of oils lighter than those for which most Gulf Coast refineries have been optimized, keeping rising US crude output bottled up here could result in US crude prices diverging even farther  from global prices, while forcing US refineries to operate less efficiently and import and export more refined products.  With oil imports drastically reduced and oil exports still banned, US oil prices might be influenced more by the global market for refined products, with its different dynamics and players, than by the global crude oil market .

In some respects, that sounds a lot like what many politicians and "energy hawks" have been seeking for years: a US no longer subject to foreign oil producers' price demands.  Yet this same scenario could yield all sorts of unintended consequences, including a less competitive US refining industry and higher or at least more volatile prices for gasoline, diesel and jet fuel.  And just as we've seen with cheap natural gas, cheaper oil could undermine the economics of the unconventional oil and gas production that makes it possible in the first place. 

US oil export policy merits a thorough reevaluation, and soon, because the regional impacts of a continued no-export stance could become pronounced, even if the US never reached overall oil self-sufficiency. Such a review should include related regulations, such as the Jones Act restrictions on shipping. With crude oil exports to Canada -- virtually the only allowed export destination for our newly abundant crude types--already rising rapidly, some Canadian refineries may be positioned to supply US east coast fuel markets more cheaply than refineries in New Jersey.  That certainly qualifies as an unintended consequence.

A slightly different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

How Will Oil's Current Slide Affect Gasoline Prices?

• How far could crude oil prices fall, and what does it mean for US pump prices this summer?
• The broad trends behind oil's current weakness could persist for some time. 

We all carry assumptions around with us.  For many who follow energy one such assumption is that oil prices, and thus gasoline prices, generally rise over time.  In an otherwise fairly well-reasoned blog post I read yesterday, that logic underpinned the case for electric vehicles (EVs) becoming more attractive to consumers.  Yet if we review the history of oil prices, it becomes clear that they don't only rise.  Just recently, the price of Brent crude oil, the current world benchmark, has declined roughly 11% since the start of April, prompting speculation about where it's headed from here and what that might mean for motorists.  It's worth stepping back from the day-to-day volatility of the market to consider what's behind this drop, as well as how OPEC might respond if the recent trend continues.

Start with the fundamentals of demand and supply.  Demand in the developed world remains weak. Despite modest GDP growth in 2012, US oil demand fell by 2% last year and is now 11% below its 2005 high.  This year, the unemployment rate is down a bit, but economists see signs of another  "spring swoon." The outlook seems no better in the other big economies, including China, prompting the International Energy Agency last week to cut its estimate of annual oil demand growth to just below 800,000 barrels (bbl) per day, with the US government cutting its estimate even further.  Meanwhile, many refineries are either undergoing maintenance or about to, reducing the most direct element of demand, at least temporarily. 

On the supply side, US production growth remains the big story.  US crude oil output is currently 7 million bbl/day, up nearly a million bbl/day in just the last year, and projected to average at least 300,000 bbl/day more than that for 2013. Overall, the IEA anticipates non-OPEC oil supply to increase by 1.1 million bbl/day this year.  Whenever non-OPEC growth exceeds the growth of demand, while inventories and spare production capacity are adequate, that puts pressure on OPEC and oil prices tend to weaken.  North Korea, Iran and a few other hot spots provide ample geopolitical risk, but the market has already absorbed the loss of about half of Iran's exports due to sanctions, while some other problem areas, such as Sudan/South Sudan, are being resolved. 

Taking all this into account, the market seems to have concluded prices were too high.  This is the other face of speculation that is never subjected to Congressional investigations.  Yet it also seems premature to assume this is the start of a major move downward, or an imminent oil price collapse.  Nick Butler of the Financial Times suggested that normal economics would take us to around $70/bbl, though I think he underestimates OPEC's cohesion and their willingness to absorb pain to defend a crucial price threshold.  Their experience in 2008-9 provides a vivid recent reminder that selling 10% less oil at something close to the current price is a much better deal for them than selling all the oil they can at $35/bbl.

It's also not clear how quickly a sharp drop in prices would undermine the output of the Bakken, Eagle Ford and other big US shale oil plays. These reservoirs require more intensive drilling than conventional oil fields, and many of the drilling rigs in use there were redeployed from gas-rich opportunities after the US price of natural gas slid sharply in the last several years.  It also seems that some of the weakness in Brent is specific to its market. West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude hasn't dropped as quickly, thus narrowing the gap between the two from $20/bbl as recently as February to about $11 today.  So those parts of the US where refiners still import significant quantities of foreign crude pegged to Brent, such as the east coast, might see more gasoline price relief than those where abundant supplies of cheaper, WTI-related crude have kept pump prices lower.

And that's what it boils down to for most Americans, who don't burn crude oil or invest in oil futures.  The Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the US Department of Energy recently issued its Summer Fuels Outlook, projecting that US gasoline prices would average $3.63 per gallon for the April-September "driving season", down from $3.69 last year and up just slightly from last week's $3.61/gal. However, that forecast was based on a July Brent crude price of $107/bbl.  Crude oil makes up around two-thirds of the retail cost of a gallon of gasoline in the US, where fuel taxes are relatively low compared to other developed economies. If Brent merely held where it is today we could see summer gasoline prices below $3.50/gal. for the first time in several years.

Longer-term, oil and gasoline prices remain as unpredictable as ever.  However, the trends combining to produce today's weaker prices could well have staying power.  It's still relatively early days in the US shale, or "tight oil" upsurge, with more growth expected, and new-car fuel economy continues to improve.  Those factors support the trend of falling US oil imports, which will take pressure off global markets, no matter what happens to demand in Asia.  At least until we see a different configuration of factors the argument for suspending our assumption of steadily rising future oil and motor fuel prices looks pretty robust.  That suggests that the case for EVs and alternative fuels must be made on the basis of other factors and, if anything, be prepared to weather another period of lower fuel prices should oil continue to weaken.

The Summer Oil Slump

Instead of US consumers facing $5 gasoline this summer, as some analysts had predicted, we now find prices slipping well below $4 per gallon as oil prices respond to weakening demand, a stronger dollar, and steady supply growth.  Yet as welcome as this is, it's largely the result of a mountain of bad news: Not only does financial turmoil threaten the very existence of the European Monetary Union and its currency, the Euro, but economic growth in the large emerging economies is also slowing, at least partly in response to the weakness in the developed countries that constitute their primary export markets.  The engine of global growth for the next year or two just isn't obvious.  That's the backdrop for this week's OPEC meeting in Vienna.

Before we become too enthusiastic about the prospect of a period of cheaper oil, we should first put "cheap" in context.  Even ignoring West Texas Intermediate (WTI), the doldrums of which I've discussed at length, the world's most representative current crude oil price, for UK Brent, has fallen consistently below $100 per barrel for the first time since the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011.  Yet even if it fell another $10/bbl, to about where WTI is currently trading, it would still exceed its annual average for every year save 2008 and 2011.  So while oil might be less of a drag on the economy at $90/bbl than at $120, that's still short of the kind of drop that would be necessary for it to provide a substantial positive stimulus, particularly when much of the drop reflects buyers around the world tightening their belts. 

The US is in a somewhat better position, thanks to surging production of "tight oil" in North Dakota and onshore Texas. This has more than made up for the inevitable slide in output from the deepwater Gulf of Mexico, two years after Deepwater Horizon and the ensuing drilling moratorium. With much of the new production trapped on the wrong side of some temporary pipeline bottlenecks, parts of the country are benefiting from oil prices that are $10-15/bbl below world prices, although short-term gains are a poor reason to perpetuate those bottlenecks, rather than resolving them and allowing North American production to reach its full potential.

Then there's the issue of speculation, which some politicians blamed for the recent spike in oil prices.  To whatever extent that was true--and I remain skeptical that the impact was nearly as large as claimed--we could be about to see what happens when the dominant direction of speculation flips from "long" to "short"--bullish to bearish--as noted in today's Wall St. Journal.  Since the main effect of speculation is to increase volatility, we could see oil prices temporarily drop even further than today's weak fundamentals would suggest they should.

All of this will be on the minds of the OPEC ministers meeting in Vienna Thursday, along with the usual dynamics between OPEC's price doves and hawks.  The pressures on the latter have intensified as Iran copes with tighter sanctions on its exports and Venezuela's ailing caudillo faces a serious election challenge.  OPEC meetings are rarely as dramatic as last June's session, but the global context ensures a keenly interested audience for this one.  Given the impact of gas prices on US voters, both presidential campaigns should be watching events in Vienna as closely as any traders.  $3.00 per gallon by November isn't beyond the realm of possibility.  It would only require a sustained dip below $80/bbl.

Petroleum Prices Set Records in 2011

Without much fanfare, the Energy Information Agency of the US Department of Energy released a report on 2011 energy commodity prices yesterday. It confirmed that crude oil and key petroleum products set annually averaged price records last year. This largely snuck up on us, because it occurred without the kind of dramatic price spike we experienced in 2008 or in the oil crises of the 1970s. Prices rose early in the year, during the Libyan revolution, and they didn't fall much, subsequently. The situation was also masked by the ongoing crude oil bottleneck in the US mid-continent, which depressed prices of the grade of US oil that for decades had been regarded as the best indicator of global oil prices, a role in which it has recently fallen short. These record prices for oil and its products are of more than just statistical interest; they help to explain the persistent weakness of the economy, representing an incremental drain of roughly $100 billion, compared to 2010, based on our net petroleum imports. That's roughly half the impact of the social security payroll tax holiday over which Congress and the administration have been sparring.

The EIA reported that UK Brent Crude, probably the best gauge of global oil prices at the moment, averaged over $111 per barrel last year. That's 40% higher than in 2010, and $14/bbl over 2008, the year in which West Texas Intermediate came very close to $150/bbl before ending the year at $45. Of even greater interest to most Americans, the pump price for unleaded regular gasoline in 2011 averaged $3.52 per gallon. Although in contrast to 2008 it only broke the $4 mark in a few regional markets like California, New England and Chicago, and even there only for a month or two, it beat the 2008 national average by more than $0.25/gal. through sheer persistence. And for the most part that didn't happen because the US is now a net exporter of gasoline and other petroleum products. It happened mainly because the global crude oil market was influenced more by the instability in North Africa and the Middle East than by worries about the US economy and the fate of the European Union and its currency, the Euro.

Of course all of the above prices are in nominal dollars, so I thought it was worth taking a quick look at real prices. After adjusting for consumer price inflation, that $3.52 mark for gasoline ties 2008's real-dollar all-time annual record, and it exceeds the average for the peak oil-crisis-year of 1981 by about 28 2011 cents. It's a little harder to gauge whether last year's Brent price set a record for crude oil in real dollars, but it seems likely. Either way, what's remarkable about these price levels is that they occurred despite weak economic growth in the developed world and slowing growth in key developing countries like China. That raises ample questions about what we should expect this year.

I've seen a wide range of estimates for where oil prices will settle out this year. The fundamentals of oil itself seem on the bearish side, with US production growing, thanks to unconventional plays like the Bakken and the Eagle Ford shale, and Libyan output gradually returning. Demand growth could also ease, especially if Europe falls into recession. Arrayed against those factors are a fairly cohesive OPEC, which benefits when oil prices are as high as possible without actually throttling the economy, and the standoff brewing between tougher Western sanctions on Iran and Iran's threats to close down the Strait of Hormuz, through which something like 40% of global oil exports flow. Election-year politics might have an influence, too, recalling the administration's willingness last year to release oil from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve for reasons that were rather less than compelling at the time. All in all, when we've spent the last several years lurching from one crisis to the next, it's not hard to imagine another crisis just around the corner. Let's hope that 2012 surprises us with stability.

Why Haven't Gas Prices Fallen More?

With the US economy stuck in the doldrums, weakening the demand for oil and its products, and with the fall of at least portions of Tripoli foreshadowing the eventual return of Libyan oil exports to the market, it must seem puzzling that US gasoline prices haven't dropped farther in the last few weeks. As of Monday, the national average price for unleaded regular stood at $3.58 per gallon, only 3% lower than a month ago, when crude oil was just shy of $100 per barrel, compared to around $84 today. On Monday's evening news, CBS ran a segment attempting to explain this apparent disconnect. Unfortunately, they over-simplified the main explanation with a graphic showing cheaper domestic crude oil mixing with higher-priced imported oil. The "A" answer to this question is simpler but not well-understood, even though its elements have been fairly widely reported: Americans are simply looking at the wrong crude oil price, out of long habit. When you compare current gasoline prices and more representative crude oil prices, there isn't much of a disconnect about which to grumble.

The source of this confusion is the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil (WTI), which for three decades has been the most watched and widely traded oil price in the world, and the basis of what most people mean when they talk about the price of "oil." In fact, there are numerous distinct grades of oil, each with its own price reflecting quality, location and availability. However, until recently most of these prices were based on the price of WTI, plus or minus a relatively narrow band of premiums or discounts, so using WTI as a barometer of all oil prices didn't cause much confusion or inaccuracy. The emergence of a pronounced and lengthy supply bottleneck at the Cushing, OK delivery location for the WTI futures contract has exploded this convenient set of relationships and assumptions.

Because more oil has been going into tankage at Cushing than was leaving those tanks over the last year or so, the price of WTI--itself a category, rather than a single stream of oil--has become massively depressed relative other types of crude oil, not just imported oil but also oil in other locations in the US that aren't affected by the bottleneck. Consider some important examples. While oil produced in Kansas, New Mexico and Oklahoma is all cheaper due to the Cushing effect, Louisiana Light Sweet, which historically traded within a dollar of WTI, is now worth nearly $20/bbl more, putting it much closer to the price of UK Brent crude--the best current gauge of global oil prices--than to WTI. Meanwhile, Bloomberg reports Alaskan North Slope crude (ANS) for delivery on the West Coast at nearly $107/bbl, or $24 over WTI. That's surprising, considering that ANS is heavier and higher in sulfur than WTI, and thus requires more processing. Just as remarkably, California heavy crude at Midway-Sunset is quoted at more than $10/bbl above WTI, when based on history and quality I would expect to see a discount of at least that magnitude. In other words, for now at least, the price of WTI is simply no longer representative of the crude that many US refineries are processing, from either foreign or domestic sources.

When you compare the wholesale price of gasoline from US refineries near the East, West and Gulf coasts to the cost of their crude inputs at around $100 or more, the difference of $15-17/bbl isn't historically unusual. Meanwhile, refineries in the middle of the country have recently been experiencing much stronger margins. This disparity is evident in the second quarter earnings reported by various US refining companies. East coast refiner Sunoco, which hasn't benefited much from cheap WTI, reported a net loss for the quarter, while Valero, with a bigger and more geographically dispersed refining system that includes facilities processing large quantities of WTI-related crude, saw refining segment earnings increase by 39% compared to the second quarter of 2010. The Cushing effect was even more pronounced for the recently merged HollyFrontier Corp., which apparently runs little crude that isn't priced near WTI and saw second-quarter net income almost triple versus 2Q2010. Even after that extra profit margin, gas prices in Tulsa, OK are currently as low as $3.30/gal., or about 15 cents per gallon less than the national average after adjusting for differences in state gas taxes.

Gasoline prices are determined by more than just crude oil prices, though in the long run the two must move together, because the latter represents the largest component of the cost of the former. At least until the bottleneck in Cushing is resolved by new pipeline capacity to the Gulf Coast, one option for which was just canceled, we will need to look beyond our old reliable WTI price indicator in order to compare gasoline and crude prices on a representative basis. I've been paying a lot more attention to the Brent market, and the Wall St. Journal still publishes daily prices for Louisiana Light Sweet and ANS. When and if those indices drop significantly, then it will be time to start looking for a commensurate drop in retail gasoline prices at the pump.