Showing posts with label oil-by-rail. Show all posts
Showing posts with label oil-by-rail. Show all posts

Monday, January 05, 2015

2014 in Review: Shale Energy's First Price Cycle

2014 was an extraordinary year in energy, vividly illustrating both sides of the Chinese proverb about interesting times. Oil market volatility was the big story for much of the year, with the dominance of geopolitical risks finally yielding to surging supplies. Of the two energy revolutions underway, shale wields the bigger stick for now, while the growth of renewables gathers momentum. All of this has implications for 2015 and beyond.
The US remained the epicenter of the shale revolution this year, with development elsewhere still subject to uncertainties about economic production potential, infrastructure, and the rules of the road. A comparison of oil-equivalent additions to US energy supplies from oil, gas and non-hydro renewables for the first nine months of the year highlights both the significance of shale and the differences in relative scale that impede a rapid shift to renewables.
Picture
 
US shale drilling added over a million barrels per day of "light tight oil" (LTO) production, compared to 2013, based on US Energy Information Administration data for the first nine months of the year. That brings cumulative gains since 2011 to nearly 3 million bbl/day. This hasn't just upended the global oil market; it has also revolutionized the way oil moves across North America. Over a million bbl/day now moves by rail, a figure recently projected to peak at 1.5 million by 2016. Nor is that entirely the result of delays to pipeline projects like Keystone XL. One proposed pipeline for Bakken LTO was reportedly canceled due to a lack of interest from shippers. Rail is expensive but provides producers and refiners with greater flexibility in both volume and destinations than fixed pipelines.

The collapse of oil prices has prompted many producers to reassess drilling plans, although it has been a boon for refiners and consumers.  Refining margins look relatively healthy, at least based on the proxy of "crack spreads", the difference between the wholesale prices of gasoline and diesel and the oil from which they are made. Some refiners also anticipate that low prices will spur demand growth, as described in a fascinating Wall St. Journal interview with Tom O'Malley, who has turned a succession of castoff refineries into profitable businesses. 

We may already be seeing the demand response to lower prices. November US volumes were at a 7-year high, according to API. This is unlikely to be replicated quickly elsewhere, however, for the same reasons that global oil demand was slow to moderate when prices rose over the last several years: In many countries the influence of oil prices on consumer behavior is overwhelmed by fuel taxes or subsidies. With prices now falling, some developing countries are capitalizing on the opportunity to unwind billions of dollars in consumption subsidies, offsetting market drops. That could have important implications for future oil demand and greenhouse gas emissions.

Meanwhile US consumers have watched retail gasoline prices fall by $1.39 per gallon since July and by over a dollar compared to a year ago. If sustained, the effective stimulus could exceed $100 billion annually, ignoring the effect of lower prices for jet fuel, diesel and other products. It's not surprising that half of respondents in last month's Wall St. Journal/NBC poll indicated this was important for their families.

While oil has been making headlines, shale gas without much fanfare added the equivalent of another half-million bbl/day to US production. That explains why despite enormous drawdowns of gas during last winter's "Polar Vortex", gas inventories began this winter much closer to normal levels than was widely expected in the  spring. Gas has lost a little ground in electricity generation to coal in the last two years, but few reading the EPA's proposed Clean Power Plan regulation would expect that trend to continue.

Shale gas remains controversial in some areas due to perceived environmental and community impacts. New York state is apparently making its temporary ban on hydraulic fracturing ("fracking") permanent, preferring to rely on shale gas supplies from neighboring Pennsylvania. Yet while shale drilling in North Dakota has led to an increase in gas flaring--burning off gas that can't economically reach a market--the latest findings from the University of Texas and Environmental Defense Fund measured methane leakage from gas wells at an average of 0.43%. That shrinks gas's emissions footprint and enhances its potential role in climate change mitigation.

Turning to renewables, wind energy now provides a little over 4% of US electricity. However, its growth has slowed due to uncertainty about continued federal subsidies. The wind production tax credit, or PTC, had previously been extended through 2013 in a way that allowed projects brought online later to benefit from the extension. It was just extended again through the end of 2014, along with a broad package of other expiring tax benefits. This late revival might be a gift to a few projects already under construction, but it seems unlikely to spur additional projects without further legislative action in the new Congress.

Solar power has also made great strides, with costs falling rapidly and US additions in 2014 expected to reach 6,500 MW, likely outpacing wind additions. This is happening despite the ongoing trade dispute between the US and China over imported solar modules. Utilities are already experiencing solar's impact on their traditional business model. Yet as important as wind and solar power are likely to be in the future energy mix, their impact in 2014, at least in the US, was still dwarfed by the growth of shale resources. Drilling is already slowing down, however, so renewables could take the lead in 2015 as shale is expected to post smaller gains.

Looking ahead, the global focus on greenhouse gas emissions will increase in the run-up to the Paris climate conference in December.  It remains to be seen whether enough progress was made in the recently completed talks in Lima, Peru, to resolve the significant remaining obstacles to a new global climate agreement. And while oil supply gains trumped geopolitics in 2014, a list of risk hot-spots from the Council on Foreign Relations includes several scenarios with major implications for oil and/or natural gas prices. Meanwhile we can expect the new Congress to take up Keystone XL, oil exports, EPA regulations, and other energy-related issues. I'd bet on another lively year.

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

Wednesday, February 05, 2014

Interpreting the State Department's Latest Assessment of the Keystone XL Pipeline

Earlier today, I participated in a webchat hosted by The Energy Collective on the subject of the emissions and market impact of the Keystone XL Pipeline (KXL). It was prompted by last week's release of the State Department's "Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement" (SEIS) on the project. I encourage you to view the Youtube video of the event, but I thought I should also share some of what I learned in the course of preparing for the webchat, along with a few thoughts there wasn't time to discuss online.

The full SEIS runs around 2,000 pages. I focused on the 38-page Executive Summary and referred to the relevant sections of the longer document when I needed more detail. In particular, I wanted to understand how the authors of the report had assessed the project's impact on greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), including how they went about trying to gauge how the market would behave with and without the controversial northern leg of the pipeline, linking the Alberta oil sands developments to the main US oil storage and trading hub in Cushing, OK. (The southern segment of the pipeline, from Cushing to the Gulf Coast, is already in operation, because it didn't require a permit to cross an international border.)

President Obama's stated criterion--I still believe he will make the final call--is ensuring the project does not "significantly exacerbate the climate problem." In terms of emissions, the SEIS analysis shows a range of incremental lifecycle GHG impact of 1.3-27.4 million tons of CO2 equivalent per year. For a project this size, that falls below what I'd consider a reasonable threshold for "significantly". It's equivalent to 0.02-0.4% of total US emissions. On the low end that's on par with US emissions from making glass--not generally considered an important emitter.

Yet even if you don't accept State's conclusion that at expected oil prices over the next few decades the oil that would be carried by KXL would be produced with or without the pipeline, the total direct emissions of 147-168 million tons/yr would still only constitute 0.3% of global emissions of around 50 billion tons. As Jesse Jenkins of the Energy Collective pointed out in the webchat, the emissions of any project would look small compared to global emissions. That's precisely the point, when opponents have characterized them as "game over" for the world's climate.

The key to the conclusions in the SEIS is that these barrels will find a market somewhere, and in the process they will back out some other crude oil. As a result, they would have a minimal impact on the global oil price, and so would be unlikely to increase demand, which is what determines how much oil is refined globally. It's also the case that the alternative crude oils the incremental oil sands production would displace aren't much lower in lifecycle emissions, e.g., heavy Venezuelan or Middle East crudes.

Meanwhile, the report indicates that alternative dispositions would involve either longer or more energy-intensive transportation, including rail and/or tanker, entailing around a million tons per year in higher emissions, along with more spillage than expected from KXL. On that basis, it's hard to read this report as anything other than an endorsement of the view that the pipeline would have a minimal net impact, relative to the likely outcomes that would follow if it is not built.

One of the main points we didn't have much time to discuss in the webchat concerned the role of the SEIS in the decision that the administration must eventually make about the project's permit. I thought the most insightful recent comment on this came from President Obama's first Secretary of Energy, Dr. Steven Chu. He sees Keystone as a mainly a political choice. I agree. However, I wonder if the political considerations have started to shift.

Until recently, it seemed that the balance of political costs and benefits favored continuing to delay the decision as long as possible, by whatever means came to hand. That was certainly the case in 2012, with the White House at stake. An approval then might have pleased independent voters, but it would also have deterred an important segment of the President's political base. This year, with control of the US Senate--and thus the administration's agenda in its final two years--potentially up for grabs, the costs might be rising. At least four Democratic Senators in states that voted for Governor Romney in 2012 (Alaska, Arkansas, Louisiana and North Carolina) have made recent statements in support of the permit for KXL. An October surprise on Keystone might come too late to help them.

Nothing in the Supplemental Environmental Impact Report altered my previous view that President Obama should approve the permit for KXL. Yet because it was written after the Lac-Megantic rail disaster, I thought its figures on the potential for more rail accidents and fatalities if the pipeline isn't built added a compelling argument. Oil by rail is a new reality of the North American energy economy; KXL won't change that fact, one way or the other. However, the addition of up to 1,000 more rail cars of crude oil per day, passing through many more communities than the pipeline would, is a sobering reality to weigh against opposition that I heard another participant in today's webchat suggest was at least partly symbolic.

Monday, January 06, 2014

Energy 2013: More Shifts Ahead?

  • 2013 was an eventful year for energy, though perhaps with fewer earth-shaking implications for the future than in other recent years.
  • Several developments concerning global oil production, when taken together, improved the odds of lower oil prices in the next several years.
Year-in-review posts have become standard fare for energy blogs; I've written my share in the past. However, while 2013 hardly lacked for interesting energy-related news and events to populate a top-ten list, most fell short of the potential to affect energy markets strongly for years to come.

For example, it is newsworthy that another year has passed without an indication of whether the White House will approve or reject the cross-border permit for the Keystone XL pipeline project. Yet the consequences of that decision are becoming less significant, at least in the reported view of Bakken shale pioneer Harold Hamm. That's due in large measure to the dramatic increase in the transportation of oil by rail, which should be on anyone's top-ten list. Nor is it clear that the EPA's proposal to scale back the Renewable Fuel Standard's (RFS) corn ethanol quota for 2014 will affect more than this year's fuel market, unlike pending Congressional legislation to reform the RFS.  California's adoption of an energy storage mandate for utilities is another notable event, but its long-term impact is contingent on the development of cost-effective storage technology and business models to enable much greater integration of renewable energy on the grid.

Instead of extending that list, I'd like to focus on three stories in which I see significant, related implications for oil markets. The first involves the temporary international agreement concerning Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology. Although relaxation of the sanctions limiting Iranian oil exports depends on a highly uncertain final agreement governing uranium enrichment, the  Arak reactor's plutonium potential, and a more intrusive inspections regime, the interim deal signals that around a million barrels per day of Iran's oil--and eventually more--could be back on the market in less than two years.

If that happens, it won't be because the Iranian government's repeated assurances of its aversion to nuclear weapons have suddenly become credible, but because most of the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany--the "P5 + 1" negotiating with Iran--are tiring of the protracted confrontation and understandably have no appetite to address this in the same way that the collapsing UN sanctions regime for Iraq was resolved in 2003.

Next consider the stunning reversal of the Mexican government's 75-year-old nationalization of oil and gas. As a result of the reforms just enacted by their congress and ratified by a majority of Mexico's states, the state oil company Pemex will be run along more commercial lines, and foreign firms will be allowed to partner with Pemex in developing the country's large untapped hydrocarbon resources. If the terms prove attractive for international energy firms, the result will move North America even closer to net energy independence. Meanwhile the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement between the US and Mexico that was just passed by the US Congress will simplify energy development that straddles the border.

Mexico's potential could be even more significant for oil markets than an unconstrained Iran. The former's production has declined by 24% since 2004--a loss of 900,000 bbl/day-- mainly due to limited reinvestment. Foreign investment can help to restore that output, but the upside potential is much bigger. Pemex has barely scratched the surface of its deepwater resources in the Gulf. Its proven and contingent reserves are estimated at 45 billion barrels, while US estimates put Mexico's shale oil, or "tight oil" resources at 13 billion barrels, slightly more than the country's proved conventional reserves. (Shale gas could exceed 500 trillion cubic feet.)

Mexico's oil output has grown dramatically before. In the decade following the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973 production increased from 500,000 bbl/day to around 3 million. A similar performance seems possible again from a higher starting point, but it's unlikely to happen overnight. As Dan Yergen pointed out in a recent Wall St. Journal op-ed, "exploration and development could take another five to 10 years" beyond the first bid rounds.

And that brings us to Saudi Arabia's options for dealing with a shifting market that will include projected US crude oil output of 9.6 million bbl/day by 2016, the recovery and growth of Iraqi production, possible exports from Canada to Asia, Mexico's potential, and the eventual return of full Iranian exports. Whether or not this wave of new or restored production will be sufficient to replace production declines elsewhere, it must undermine OPEC's control of pricing in this decade. In that light, it's hard to ignore reported indications that Saudi Arabia might abandon its role of swing producer, particularly when it comes to unilateral output cuts to balance new non-OPEC supplies.

Haven't we seen this movie before? After a dozen years of high prices and tight markets OPEC steadily lost market share in the 1980s as new fields in Alaska, Mexico and the North Sea came online. That trend culminated in Saudi Arabia's 1986 "netback pricing" decision, linking the price of its oil to the value of its customers' refined petroleum products. Following the price collapse that policy helped precipitate,  oil prices took 18 years to reach $30/bbl again, by which time the dollar had lost a third of its value.

I doubt we're in for anything that dramatic. Back then, most demand growth came from the developed countries of the OECD, rather than from the expanding middle classes of developing Asia and the Middle East itself. Moreover, today's new production has higher costs--up to $70-80 per barrel--ruling out a return to $20 oil. With many serious geopolitical risks still in play, an oil-price price correction or extended soft market seems likelier than another price collapse. In the meantime, if we're seeking $20 oil, we already have it in the form of US shale gas that averaged the equivalent of $21.64/bbl last year. And that's the early, odds-on favorite for the energy story of the decade.

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

Wednesday, September 04, 2013

Do Crude Oil Shipments Make Rail Less Safe?

  • The movement of crude oil by rail is expanding rapidly but still represents a small fraction of the hazardous goods transported by rail in North America.
  • The devastation caused by an oil train accident in Lac-Megantic, Quebec should galvanize railroads, shippers and regulators to improve rail safety for all hazardous freight. However, it does not justify banning oil-by-rail.
It’s been nearly two months since a train loaded with crude oil from North Dakota derailed and exploded in the Canadian town of Lac-Megantic, Quebec, killing an estimated 47 residents. In the interval since the accident, the relevant authorities have focused on ascertaining the cause of the accident and determining how best to improve rail safety. However, there has also been another, less-customary conversation about whether oil in general, and the specific oil on this train, might be too dangerous to transport by rail at all. That conversation would benefit from some context that appears to be absent.

Both conversations began with a tragedy in a place I recognized immediately. Ten years ago my wife and I passed through Lac-Megantic and drove along the Chaudière river that originates there, on its way to the St. Lawrence. It’s an area of natural beauty and historical significance. The images of destruction and of oil spilled in the river were gut-wrenching.

The investigation is still underway, but it seems significant that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) of the US Department of Transportation has already issued an Emergency Order banning the practice of leaving such trains unattended, pending the development of better procedures for securing them safely. Canadian authorities are reviewing their regulations and enforcement, as well as revisiting questions about the specific type of tank car in which the oil was carried. The Wall St. Journal reported that the FRA is also  looking into the testing and classification of crude oil shipments, to ensure that the tank cars used to transport different crude oils are suited to the task. Meanwhile, the rail operator involved in the accident has filed for bankruptcy on both sides of the border.

The second conversation, apparently based on a belief that it is possible to cease our use of petroleum entirely if we only have the will, is occurring in a fact vacuum. Understanding why that particular batch of crude oil was on that specific track on that day requires unpacking a nested set of factors that starts with the fact that oil still accounts for 33% of total global energy consumption, but more importantly supplies 93% of transportation energy. Numerous forecasts, including the latest from the US Department of Energy, anticipate no reduction in global oil use through 2040. Although we’ve displaced much of the oil formerly used to generate electricity and have greatly improved vehicle fuel efficiency, our most successful alternative transportation fuel, ethanol--no stranger to rail accidents--accounted for just 3% of US liquid fuel use last year, when adjusted for its lower energy content.

Although global oil movements are dominated by pipelines, tankers and barges, rail remains an important mode because of its flexibility. It’s also usually cheaper and more efficient than trucking for all but short distances--and safer, too, despite accidents like this one. Although the rapid recent growth of crude-oil-by-rail and its role in the Keystone XL pipeline debate have attracted significant attention, last year’s 234,000 tank-car loads of crude made up less than half of total US petroleum rail shipments and were dwarfed by over 1.5 million tank-car loads of chemicals hauled by rail in 2012.

Crude oil, especially light crudes like those produced from the Bakken and Eagle Ford shales, is flammable, and thus constitutes hazardous cargo. However, railroads routinely carry a wide variety of flammable and otherwise hazardous materials, including propane, gasoline, benzene, ethanol, chlorine gas, sulfuric acid and a range of other chemicals. Safety is not  determined by the cargo--if it was, none of these substances would be on trains--but by the combination of the equipment used to carry it, the rules and processes that dictate how to handle it, and the people who operate these systems. It’s no coincidence that these are the areas on which the investigations and preliminary regulatory responses have focused.

Then there are the market and logistical circumstances that resulted in a St. John, New Brunswick refinery that supplies both Canadian and US consumers and normally processes oil imported by tanker, acquiring oil produced in North Dakota and shipped halfway across the continent by rail. North American oil production is expanding rapidly, with significant economic and energy security benefits. Much of this new oil is found in places not adequately served by the large network of existing pipelines. That situation may eventually be rectified, but in the meantime the mismatch between growing landlocked oil supplies and limited pipeline outlets for them has created an opportunity for rail operators reeling from the much larger shale-gas-induced decline in coal shipments. Serving that need keeps people and trains employed. And that, ultimately, is why a train carrying Bakken crude was on a track in Lac-Megantic this July.

I can scarcely imagine what the survivors of the Lac-Megantic disaster and the families of the victims have been going through for the last two months. Their lives will never be the same. But whatever the cause of the accident is determined to have been--human error, mechanical failure, aging infrastructure or something else--it was not caused by the oil in those tank cars.

In the aftermath of an accident like this, the best thing we can do is to determine why it happened and apply those lessons to make rail transport of all hazardous cargoes safer.  Attempting to use the tragedy to advance a social cause such as “ending our reliance on oil” might be alluring to some, but the communities through which such freight travels in the course of keeping our economy running will benefit much more from the former course of action.

A different version of this posting was previously published on Energy Trends Insider.