EPA's CO2 Rule and the Back Door to Cap & Trade

• Significant differences in EPA's proposed state CO2 targets for the power sector are reviving interest in cap & trade as a way to reduce compliance costs.
• This compounds the EPA plan's controversy and raises serious concerns about how the resulting revenue would be used.

Earlier this month the US Environmental Protection Agency released for comment its proposal for regulating the CO2 emissions from existing power plants. It follows EPA’s emissions rule for new power plants published late last year but takes a different, more expansive approach.  If implemented, the “Clean Power Plan” would reduce US emissions in the utility sector by around 25% by 2020 and 30% by 2030.

One of its most surprising features is that instead of setting emissions standards for each type of power plant or mandating a single, across-the-board emissions-reduction percentage, it imposes distinct emissions targets on each state. Based on analysis by Bloomberg New Energy Finance, some states could actually increase emissions, while others would be required to make deep cuts. The resulting disparities have apparently triggered new interest in state and regional emissions trading as a means of managing the rule’s cost.

Although emissions trading has become more controversial in recent years, it proved its worth in holding down the cost of implementing previous environmental regulations, such as the effort to reduce sulfur pollution associated with acid rain. It works by enabling facilities or companies with lower-than-average abatement costs to profit from maximizing their reductions and then selling their excess reductions to others with higher costs. The desired overall reductions are thus achieved at a lower cost to the economy than if each company or facility were required to reduce its emissions by the same amount.

Although the Clean Power Plan doesn’t require that states establish such emissions trading markets, its lengthy preamble includes a discussion of existing state greenhouse gas “cap-and-trade” markets in California and the Northeast. It also points out that measures to comply with the new rule may generate benefits in the markets for conventional pollutants, including those for the recent cross-state pollution rule. Administrator McCarthy also mentioned the benefits of multi-state markets in her speech announcing the new rule.

A patchwork of cap and trade markets across the US, including the addition of new states to mechanisms like the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), might help mitigate some of the cost of complying with 50 different CO2 targets. However, it would still be a far cry from the kind of economy-wide, comprehensive CO2 cap-and-trade system once contemplated by the US Congress.

Cap and trade was an idea that had gained significant momentum and even begun to appear inevitable, prior to the onset of the financial crisis in 2008. To supporters, it looked like a better way to limit and eventually cut greenhouse gas emissions than through command-and-control regulations. And the price it would establish for emissions would be based on the cost of achieving a desired level of reductions, rather than being set arbitrarily, as a carbon tax would be, without any guarantee of actual emissions reductions. Opponents viewed it as an unnecessary or unnecessarily complicated drag on the economy and a tax by another name, coining the pejorative term “cap-and-tax”.

Although early US cap-and-trade bills were bipartisan, including one co-sponsored by Senator McCain, the 2008 Republican Presidential nominee, the debate over cap and trade took on an increasingly partisan tone in a period of widening polarization on most major issues. The Waxman-Markey climate bill, with cap and trade as a major provision, was narrowly passed when Democrats controlled the House of Representatives in 2009, but various Senate versions failed to attract sufficient support, even when Democrats held a filibuster-proof supermajority in that body. The chances of enacting cap and trade legislation effectively died when a Republican won the vacant Senate seat for Massachusetts in January 2010. However, viewing this as a purely partisan divide is simplistic, at best.

Aside from opposition by key Senate Democrats, including one whose campaign included a vivid demonstration of his stand against Waxman-Markey, the versions of “cap and trade” debated in 2009 and 2010 bore little resemblance to the original idea. Waxman-Markey was a 1400-page monstrosity, laden with extraneous provisions and pork. Its embedded allocation of free allowances strongly favored the same electricity sector now being targeted by EPA’s Clean Power Plan, at the expense of transportation energy, for which low-carbon options remain fewer and more costly. It would have created a de facto gasoline tax, while yielding fewer net emissions reductions than a system with a level playing field. Subsequent bills, such as the Kerry-Lieberman bill in 2010, took this a step farther, removing transportation fuels from cap and trade and effectively taxing them at a rate based on the price of emissions credits.

Along the way, national CO2 cap-and-trade legislation evolved from a fairly straightforward way to harness market forces to deliver the cheapest emissions cuts available, to a mechanism for raising and redistributing large sums of money outside the tax code. In some cases that would have been done directly, such as in the gratifyingly brief Cantwell-Collins “cap-and-dividend” bill, or as indirectly and inefficiently as in Waxman-Markey. It’s no wonder the whole idea became toxic at the federal level.

Although emissions trading for greenhouse gas reduction came up short in the US Congress, it took hold elsewhere. The EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) is an outgrowth of the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions trading mechanism, which was included largely at the urging of the US delegation to the Kyoto climate conference in 1997. The ETS is focused on the industrial and power sectors and covers 43% of EU emissions. It has experienced significant ups and downs over the sale and allocation of emissions credits.

Cap and trade also emerged as a preferred approach for some US states seeking to reduce their emissions. California’s emissions market was established via a provision of the 2006 Climate Solutions Act (A.B. 32), and RGGI currently facilitates trading among 9 mostly northeastern states. The relatively low prices of emissions allowances in these systems–particularly in RGGI, which has traded in the range of $3-$5/ton of CO2–suggests that they may still be capturing low-hanging fruit in the early phases of steadily declining emissions caps. Their effectiveness at facilitating future low-cost emissions cuts is hard to gauge, because they also don’t exist in a vacuum.

Except for Vermont, all of the states involved have renewable electricity mandates that by their nature deliver more prescriptive emissions cuts. These markets have also been implemented in a generally weak US economy, which has constrained energy demand, and against the backdrop of the shale revolution, which has yielded significant non-mandated emissions reductions. Nor have these state and regional approaches to cap and trade entirely avoided the debates over how to spend their substantial proceeds that plagued federal cap-and-trade legislation.

For many years my view of cap and trade was that if we needed to put a price on GHG emissions, this was a better, more efficient option than an arbitrary carbon tax, or other top-down method. My experience analyzing more recent “cap-and-trade” legislation left me with serious doubts about our ability to implement a fair and effective national cap-and-trade market for CO2 and other greenhouse gases within the current political environment. Whether on a unified basis or in aggregate across many smaller systems, the enormous sums it could eventually generate are simply too tempting to expect our legislators and government agencies to administer even-handedly.

Whatever its potential benefits and pitfalls, I can’t help seeing cap and trade as a distraction in the context of the EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan. Even at its most efficient, cap and trade couldn’t render painless the wide disparities of a plan that would require Arizona to cut emissions per megawatt-hour by more than half, and states like Texas and Oklahoma to cut by 36-38%, while Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana and even California cut by less than a quarter–and under some scenarios might even increase their overall emissions. Cap and trade would merely be a footnote on the scale of transformation the EPA’s plan envisions for the US electricity sector.

A different version of this posting was previously published on Energy Trends Insider.

EPA's New CO2 Rules Create Opportunities for Natural Gas, for Now

• EPA's proposed rule for reducing CO2 emissions from power plants could increase natural gas demand in the utility sector by as much as 50%, at the expense of coal.
• Cutting emissions by regulation rather than legislation entails legal and political uncertainties that could hamper the investment necessary to meet EPA's targets.

Earlier this month the Environmental Protection Agency announced its proposal for regulating the greenhouse gas emissions from all currently operating US power plants. Unsurprisingly, initial assessments suggested it favors the renewable energy, energy efficiency and nuclear power industries--and especially natural gas--all at the expense of coal. However, the longer-term outcome is subject to significant uncertainties, because of the way this policy is being implemented.

EPA's proposed "Clean Power Plan" regulation would reduce CO2 emissions from the US electric power sector by 25% by 2020 and 30% by 2030, compared to 2005. Although it does not specify that the annual reduction of over 700 million metric tons of CO2--half of which had already been achieved by 2012--must all come from coal-burning power plants, such plants accounted for 75% of 2012 emissions from power generation.

It's worth recalling how we got here. In the last decade the US Congress made several attempts to enact comprehensive climate legislation, based on an economy-wide cap on CO2 and a system of trading emissions allowances: "cap and trade." In 2009 the House of Representatives passed the Waxman-Markey bill, with its rather distorted version of cap and trade. It died in the US Senate, where the President's party briefly held a filibuster-proof supermajority.

The Clean Power Plan is the culmination of the administration's efforts to regulate the major CO2 sources in the US economy, in the absence of comprehensive climate legislation. Although Administrator McCarthy touted the flexibility of the plan in her enthusiastic rollout speech and suggested that its implementation might include state or regional cap and trade markets for emissions, the net result will look very different than an economy-wide approach.

For starters, there won't be a cap on overall emissions, but rather a set of state-level performance targets for emissions per megawatt-hour generated in 2020 and 2030. If electricity demand grew 29% by 2040, as recently forecast by the Energy Information Administration of the US Department of Energy, the CO2 savings in the EPA plan might even be largely negated. EPA is banking on the widespread adoption of energy efficiency measures to avoid such an outcome.

Since we have many technologies for generating electricity, with varying emissions all the way down to nearly zero, many different future generating mixes could achieve the plan's goals, though not at equal cost or reliability. Ironically, since coal's share of power generation has declined from 50%  in 2005 to 39% as of last year, it could be done by replacing all the older coal-fired power plants in the US with state of the art plants using either ultra-supercritical pulverized coal combustion (USC ) or integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC). 

That won't happen for a variety of reasons, not least of which is EPA's "New Source Performance Standards" published last November. That rule effectively requires new coal-fired power plants to emit around a third less CO2 than today's most efficient coal plant designs. That's only possibly if they capture and sequester (CCS) at least some of their emissions, a feature found in only a couple of power plants now under construction globally.

It's also questionable how the capital required to upgrade the entire US coal generating fleet could be raised. Returns on such facilities have fallen, due to competition from shale gas and from renewables like wind power with very low marginal costs--sometimes negative after factoring in tax credits. Some are interpreting EPA's aggressive CO2 target for 2020 and relatively milder 2030 step as an indication that the latter target could be made much more stringent, later.

So while coal is likely to remain an important  part of the US power mix in 2030, as the EPA's administrator noted, meeting these goals in the real world will likely entail a significant shift from coal to gas and renewable energy sources, while preserving roughly the current nuclear generating fleet, including those units now under construction.

If the entire burden of the shift fell to gas, it would entail increasing the utilization of existing natural gas combined cycle power plants (NGCC) and likely building new units in some states. In the documentation of its draft rules, EPA cited average 2012 NGCC utilization of 46%. Increasing utilization up to 75% would deliver over 600 million additional MWh from gas annually--a 56% increase over total 2013 gas-fired generation, exceeding the output of all US renewables last year--at an emissions reduction of around 340 million metric tons vs. coal. That would be just sufficient to meet the 30% emissions reduction target for the electricity demand and generating mix we had in 2013.

The incremental natural gas required to produce this extra power works out to about 4.4 trillion cubic feet (TCF) per year. That would increase gas consumption in the power sector by just over half, compared to 2013, and boost total US gas demand by 17%. To put that in perspective, US dry natural gas production has grown by 4.1 TCF/y since 2008.

EPA apparently anticipates power sector gas consumption increasing by just 1.2 TCF/y by 2020, and falling thereafter as end-use efficiency improves.  Fuel-switching is only one of the four Best System of Emission Reduction "building blocks" EPA envisions states using, including efficiency improvements at existing power plants, increased penetration of renewable generation, and demand-side efficiency measures. The ultimate mix will vary by state and be influenced by changes in gas, coal and power prices.

I mentioned uncertainties at the beginning of this post. Aside from the inevitable legal challenges to EPA's regulation of power plant CO2 under the 1990 Clean Air Act, its imposition by executive authority, rather than legislation, leaves future administrations free to strengthen, weaken, or even abandon this approach.

Since EPA's planned emission reductions from the power sector are large on a national scale (10% of total US 2005 emissions) but still small on a global scale (2% of 2013 world emissions) their long-term political sustainability may depend on the extent to which they succeed in prompting the large developing countries to follow suit in reducing their growing emissions.

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

Candidates & Energy 2012: Obama

It's curious that energy hasn't been as big an issue in this year's presidential campaign as it was in 2008, the year of "Drill, baby, drill."  The price of unleaded regular gasoline has averaged roughly a dime per gallon higher through September than either last year or the same period in 2008, when prices peaked at $4.11 per gallon in July.  Gas prices are higher this year because global oil prices are also higher, with UK Brent crude averaging $15 per barrel over its 2008 full-year average, though without a similar spike.  One explanation for the reduced focus on energy is that President Obama co-opted his opponents' "all of the above" prescription, while indicators such as US crude oil production and natural gas output and prices have been moving in favorable directions.  The Obama campaign and key administration officials routinely draw a strong causal connection between those two facts, forming the basis of their campaign on energy.  But is that claim true?  Like the Washington Post fact checker's assessment of another frequent presidential assertion about energy, a finding of "true but false" seems appropriate.

Although I had intended to provide a side-by-side comparison of President Obama's and Governor Romney's energy agendas, it quickly became obvious that that was impractical, due to length and complexity.  I'll take a look at the challenger's ideas next week.  Since any re-election bid is fundamentally a referendum on the incumbent, it made sense to start with the record of an administration that came into office with an unusually clear and clearly articulated vision on energy, experienced some notable victories and defeats along the way, and ended up embracing a pair of big, emerging trends that it had done virtually nothing to foster. 

That is readily apparent when it comes to oil production, which must be a core element of any "all of the above" approach, since that "all" implicitly includes fossil fuels along with renewables and efficiency.  Go to the Obama campaign web page on energy and you'll see this chart:

It's a rescaled version of the chart below, which appears on the WhiteHouse.gov site on gas prices:

Aside from the fact that changing the axis scale makes the trend look much more dramatic, what's entirely missing from both these charts and the websites where they appear is any cogent explanation of why oil production is rising.  That requires some context about the industry and oil markets that I've overlaid in the following graphs:

Most oil projects big enough to matter aren't accomplished overnight. The process typically involves acquiring onshore or offshore leases, obtaining the necessary permits, conducting exploration activities that only proceed to the next step based on success, planning the required production wells and processing facilities, competing for internal funding against other company projects, obtaining additional permits, constructing facilities and drilling the production wells. Every step takes time.  Depending on the complexity of the project, the overall timeline can span from three to seven years, and that's if no one sues to block the project.  To see why oil production has been rising since 2009, we need to ask what was happening in 2003-6.  The answer is that after many years of being stuck in a range of $20-30 per barrel--with an excursion down to single digits in the late 1990s--oil prices tripled during that period, mainly due to the combination of global economic growth, especially in Asia, and the lagged effect on oil project investments from that late-'90s price crash.  In other words, production went up mainly because five or six years earlier the financial rewards for drilling suddenly got much bigger.

So at a minimum it's a stretch--mere spin--to claim credit for higher production that is attributable to events and perhaps policies on your predecessor's watch.  However, the picture looks worse when we factor in the policies and attitudes that went into effect when this administration took office in early 2009.  Recall that one of the first energy decisions of the new administration was Interior Secretary Salazar's cancellation of previously awarded oil leases in Utah.  Later that year a senior Treasury official--currently chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers--testified before Congress that US policies were promoting the "overproduction of US oil and gas", just as the now-touted production surge was starting.  For at least its first several years, the rhetoric and actions of the Obama White House were generally consistent with that view and with Mr. Obama's portrayal of oil and gas as "yesterday's energy" in his 2011 State of the Union address.  The brief offshore drilling opening signaled in spring 2010 was quickly retracted following the Deepwater Horizon accident, with the imposition of a six-month offshore drilling moratorium and subsequent "permitorium". Those responses--justified or not--resulted in Gulf of Mexico production falling by 22% since mid-2010, a decline that has been masked by the tremendous success of "tight oil" exploration and production in Texas and North Dakota. (The time lag for the moratorium's effects was negligible, because the deepwater projects that were halted had already been planned and permitted.)

In fact, the President's adoption of "all of the above" is fairly recent, making headlines following his 2012 State of the Union. It represents quite an evolution from Senator Obama's 2008 emphasis on renewable energy and climate change mitigation. President Obama certainly pursued those agendas with vigor, incorporating billions of dollars of federal grants and loan guarantees for renewables in the 2009 stimulus, backing the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill, and at both the Copenhagen and Cancun UN climate conferences committing the US to significant greenhouse gas reduction targets and further negotiations. 

It hasn't all worked out as planned, though.  Notwithstanding the high-profile bankruptcies of Solyndra--a colossal failure of due diligence by the administration--and other loan guarantee and grant beneficiaries, the output of wind, solar and other non-hydro renewable energy generation has indeed grown by 55% since 2008, increasing from 3.1% to 4.7% of total US electricity generation, equivalent to 1.9% of total energy consumption.  Yet sadly the wind and solar manufacturing sectors that were to have produced so many "green jobs" are caught up in parallel waves of excess global production capacity that could take years--or wrenching consolidation--to work off.  The overcapacity that has blighted the prospects of many of these companies is largely attributable to the generous incentives provided by the US and other governments from Europe to Asia.  Direct wind and solar jobs accounted for just 54,000 of the US "clean economy jobs" tallied by Brookings and Battelle in their study last year, and they look no more secure than non-green jobs.

Climate policy is another area featuring a big disconnect between effort and results. With control of both Houses of Congress, the President backed a climate bill that exhibited all the worst tendencies of that body: 1,092 pages of bloated regulations and carve-outs for favored constituencies.  Even to someone who had supported the idea of cap and trade for a decade, it was a dog's breakfast, configured mainly as a production-inhibiting tax on the US petroleum sector.  Waxman-Markey failed to pass the Senate, and a more bi-partisan bill died in the aftermath of Deepwater Horizon and the recession. Whatever one's views on the science of climate change, costly climate legislation looked like a bad bet in a weak economy.  Actual emissions have fallen, however, as a result not of policy but of another trend that wasn't on the administration's radar screen until it grew too large to ignore: shale gas.  Emissions are at a 20-year low, mainly due to fuel switching from coal to cheap natural gas in the utility sector.

Another key trend cited as evidence of the effectiveness of the administration's energy policies is the reduction of oil imports that has occurred since 2008.  Yet like the facts on oil production, the causes are only tenuously connected to those policies.  From 2008-11, US net petroleum imports fell by 2.6 million bbl/day (MBD), including refined products.  That goes a long way toward achieving then-candidate Obama's goal of reducing imports by an amount equivalent to what the US imported from the Middle East and Venezuela.  However, the biggest contributor to this reduction was the 1.1 MBD increase in total US petroleum production (including natural gas liquids), followed by a 0.6 MBD drop in demand that had more to do with reduced driving and the weak economy than the early gains from tougher fuel economy rules. Increasing biofuel production associated with the 2007 Renewable Fuel Standard contributed another 0.3 MBD, although that policy now stands in urgent need of reform.

I have watched many elections in my life, and I can't honestly say I'm surprised to see an administration running on something other than its actual energy record, which in this case includes positives such as funding ARPA-E's potentially transformational energy R&D and having enough sense to keep largely out of the way of the shale gas revolution--at least for now. Yet having focused 90% of its efforts on a set of technologies that look important for the future but will still meet less than 10% of our energy needs for some time to come, they have now hitched their electoral wagon to an oil production surge that they didn't help and partly hindered.  I can only imagine that this would be deeply disappointing to those who supported Mr. Obama in 2008 because of his vision for alternative energy and the environment.  Nor does it provide much comfort to those who found large portions of that agenda ill-considered or premature. The President's 11th-hour conversion to "all of the above" creates great uncertainty about the course he would pursue with regard to energy for the next four years, if reelected. 

Congress Defers to EPA on Climate Policy

The confrontation over climate policy that was teed up by the results of last November's mid-term election culminated with the House of Representatives voting overwhelmingly yesterday to strip the Environmental Protection Agency of its power to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. However, the more crucial votes took place on Wednesday, when the Senate defeated a string of amendments that would have similarly blocked EPA's powers to regulate CO2 and other greenhouse gases (GHGs), whether entirely, only for specific sectors, or for a period of two years. This is a worrying outcome, because it means that the Congress has effectively yielded responsibility for managing these emissions to an approach that nearly everyone, including this administration's EPA Administrator, previously saw as much less desirable, for good reasons. It will impose another layer of intrusive regulations on US industry and businesses, even though it's not clear that it will achieve much in terms of reducing US greenhouse gas emissions, let alone reducing the pace of global warming.

It's worth recalling how we got to this point. A long succession of cap and trade bills, several with bi-partisan sponsorship, ultimately failed to attract enough support to become law. The most recent such legislation, the egregious Waxman-Markey bill, may have looked more like a pork-barrel bonanza than a serious attempt to get our emissions under control, but even it was based on the principle of putting a price on emissions, and harnessing the power of the market and innovation to reduce emissions at a lower cost than through classic tailpipe and smokestack regulations. The former strategy takes advantage of the fact that greenhouse gases behave very differently than the substances associated with smog and other lung-irritating air pollution. Unfortunately, the way that EPA is approaching GHGs ignores that opportunity.

With essentially no adverse local effects, it makes sense to deal with GHGs as flexibly as possible. I can think of several adjectives to describe the path on which the EPA has embarked, but flexible isn't one of them. I suspect that many of the states whose Clean Air Act implementation plans were entirely satisfactory for their originally intended purposes but now find themselves out of compliance would agree. It's ironic that during the debate over Waxman-Markey, EPA regulation was held up as the dreaded alternative to enacting a climate bill, yet now we see a majority of the Senate treating it as something worth defending.

The net result of this week's votes is a House bill that will likely be dead on arrival in the Senate, where the leadership has demonstrated sufficient support for the EPA greenhouse gas regulations that went into effect at the beginning of this year to sustain a Presidential veto of any similar measure that might squeak past the Senate later. At the same time, 17 Democratic Senators voted for some degree of constraint on EPA's powers regarding GHGs. Even if many of those individual votes were focused on blue-state or swing-state electorates going into next year's election, that at least suggests that a bi-partisan majority of Congress does not view EPA regulation as the best strategy for reducing emissions, particularly in a weak economy. And that majority could expand next year. For those of us who are concerned about climate change but also worried that EPA's command-and-control approach to emissions will cost the US economy far more than the modest emissions reductions this will yield are worth, that provides a ray of hope that the current EPA regulations aren't the last word on the subject.

Green Jobs and a Renewable Electricity Standard

With a full-blown climate bill off the table at least for this year, a coalition of renewable energy project developers, trade associations, investors and technology providers is apparently rallying around a simpler energy bill that has been on the back burner since last year. The group's arguments in favor of the bill's key provision of a national "renewable electricity standard" (RES) focus on "green jobs" and concerns that China is passing us by. There is merit in both of these themes, though not to the extent that the RES Alliance for Jobs suggests. A national RES, which would require utilities to source a growing proportion of electricity supplies from renewable energy might help project developers and investors, but its impact on cleantech manufacturing--which is at the heart of the employment and competitiveness issues--looks much less direct.

When I examined a draft of the American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009 (ACELA) last summer, I found it preferable to the bloated Waxman-Markey bill that the House had just passed. ACELA was more genuinely bi-partisan, coming out of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee chaired by Senator Bingaman (D-NM), and it took a more realistic view of the continuing importance of a broad spectrum of energy resources, not just renewables. However, along with various other energy measures over the last year, it was overshadowed by other legislative priorities and the Macondo oil leak. In the event that this bill gets another chance before the new Congress takes office next January, we should understand what an RES can and can't do.

The industry is doubtless correct that expected demand for renewable energy hardware plays a key role when companies decide whether to begin or expand production of such gear in the US. An RES would likely boost demand for this equipment. However, as the reports earlier this year and late last year concerning the share of the Treasury's renewable energy grants awarded to non-US firms and projects using non-US equipment made clear, this is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a healthy US cleantech manufacturing sector. Absent a concerted effort to make US manufacturing more globally competitive, much of the benefit--including many of the associated "green jobs"--would accrue to other countries. An RES, like other measures emphasizing deployment, rather than manufacturing, would be a weak domestic job creator, at best. And that's without factoring in the job losses in energy-intensive sectors resulting from the higher electricity prices that a national RES would impose, as the costs of compliance get passed on to ratepayers.

Another reason that an RES, at least at the modest levels contemplated under the ACELA bill, probably wouldn't spark a huge wave of renewable energy development and manufacturing is that most of the states with significant wind, solar, or geothermal resources already have their own RPS mandates in place, generally at levels well above those that would be set by the national RES. So at least one likely short-term result would be inflation in the prices of the renewable energy credits (RECs) that make these standards work, as the states without much reliable wind or sunlight, or easily accessible hydrothermal reservoirs, scrambled to cover their new quotas from out-of-state providers. This would be a real boon for REC traders, at the expense of regulated utilities and their ratepayers.

As for being beaten by China in clean energy technology, this is a serious concern, particularly in light of recent reports that some Chinese support for cleantech might violate World Trade Organization rules. At the same time, we must factor in the reality that China has become the "workshop of the world", not just for cleantech hardware but for many other products, as well. If we wonder why China makes 40% of the world's photovoltaic cells and 30% of the world's wind turbines, the answer has a lot in common with why they also make so many of the world's laptops, PCs and flat-screen TVs. It also helps that China has one of the world's fastest-growing electricity markets, creating enormous internal demand for a wide variety of generating technologies, including renewables. Since US electricity demand has been growing much more slowly, and has recently declined, renewables here can't simply capture their fair share of growth; they must squeeze something else out--typically something that produces electricity more reliably or cheaply.

As I noted in last Monday's posting, renewable energy still needs help to compete with conventional energy. Finding the right means of providing that help is complicated by the aftermath of the financial crisis and recession. A national RES comes off second-best to a lot of other approaches that don't seem very feasible right now, and in any case it won't solve our unemployment and global competitiveness challenges. Perhaps it's the least-bad comprehensive support we can realistically provide renewables today, if we are truly convinced we must provide extra assistance beyond the federal tax credits and state-level policies already in place--and which its implementation would render somewhat redundant. That's a far cry from the expansive claims being made for it by a number of entities that stand to gain if it were enacted.

Whither Cap & Trade?

Just a year ago it seemed a near-certainty that the US would eventually adopt some form of cap & trade mechanism for greenhouse gases (GHGs). After repeated failed attempts to pass cap & trade legislation in the Senate, the House of Representatives narrowly passed the Waxman-Markey bill, HR-2454, and the Senate was expected to follow, bolstered by a filibuster-proof Democratic majority and urged on by a popular new President. Then came the divisive debate over healthcare legislation, the off-year election of Republican Scott Brown in Massachusetts, Climategate, and an oil spill that among other things derailed the latest bi-partisan (tri-partisan?) Senate climate bill. Today, the prospects for climate legislation remain highly uncertain, while the clock runs out on the current Congressional session. And if all that weren't enough, the EPA has just issued new regulations covering interstate emissions of conventional air pollutants that could effectively terminate the highly-successful sulfur-dioxide market upon which cap & trade for GHGs was based. Can cap & trade survive these travails, and should it?

Time will tell whether Waxman-Markey represented the high-water mark of cap & trade in the US, or if the hiatus since then has merely been a pause in a long process of refining and ultimately adopting this approach. Heaven knows W-M was a highly-imperfect vehicle for cap & trade, with its allocation of emissions allowances skewed to the highest-emitting sector and with hundreds of pages of extraneous provisions that could set up all sorts of unintended or undesirable consequences. The last year has also seen a proliferation of variations on cap & trade that call into question the original formulation of an economy-wide cap on emissions implemented by means of requiring emitters to purchase allowances from a gradually-shrinking national pool of emissions credits, with the proceeds doled out by Congress for purposes including clean energy R&D and deployment, deficit reduction, and mitigation of the impact on consumers and selected businesses. The Cantwell-Collins bill, for example, proposes returning most of the allowance revenue directly to consumers, while the Kerry-Lieberman bill would exclude the transportation fuels sector from cap & trade, but impose on it a sort of carbon tax based on the price of traded allowances. Both of these approaches have complex pros and cons, and as with original cap & trade their effectiveness at reducing emissions without imposing crippling costs on the overall economy depends critically on their detailed provisions, negotiated exceptions, and how they would actually be implemented.

Cap & trade has also come under fire on more fundamental grounds. Some critics have questioned the desirability of creating a vast new financial market for emissions when the shortcomings of other financial markets have caused so much harm, while others have suggested that investing in innovation to make low-carbon energy and efficiency much more cost-effective has greater potential to reduce emissions in a world in which developed-country emissions are being eclipsed by those in developing Asia.

Against this backdrop EPA Administrator Jackson's repeated assurances that she prefers legislated cap & trade to enforcement under the Clean Air Act have become increasingly divorced from reality. Her agency's determination to proceed with enforcement next year if no bill is passed, coupled with its newly-issued rules for power-plant pollution, serve mainly to remind the market that emissions allowances are not a new form of fiat currency, with intrinsic value backed by fractional reserves and the full faith and credit of the US government, but a fragile construct, the value of which can be eroded or erased at the whim of this and other regulators or the courts. Today's Wall St. Journal describes the impact of the new air pollution rules on the SOx market. Any potential participant who imagines that something similar couldn't happen to a future greenhouse gas allowance market is not paying attention.

So despite the apparent enthusiasm of the majority party's Senate caucus for enacting some kind of comprehensive climate and energy bill this year, presumably including elements of cap & trade, we're left with serious questions about whether this is an idea whose time has come and gone. From my perspective, putting a price on GHG emissions is still an essential step if we're serious about reducing them by more than the amounts that have resulted from the inadvertent combination of the recession, cheap natural gas, and existing incentives for renewable energy and efficiency. Cap & trade still has significant theoretical advantages over an arbitrary carbon tax as a means of imposing such a price, but as we've seen the likelihood of cap & trade being enacted in such a pure form seems low in the messy world of US politics--perhaps as low as the chances of a pure and simple carbon tax.

The odds against cap & trade look long at this point. Realistically, the time left for bringing a full-blown climate bill to a vote in the Senate is measured in weeks, rather than months, before the dynamics of the mid-term election campaign take over. Notions of passing an energy-only bill and then grafting on Waxman-Markey's climate provisions via a House-Senate conference committee seem even less likely to produce a mechanism that could survive the political upheaval that the mid-terms appear likely to produce. Nor should anyone be considering the last-gasp option of trying to pass climate legislation in a lame-duck session after the November election. As the Congressional Budget Office recently determined, any sort of controls on emissions are likely to reduce overall US employment--"green jobs" notwithstanding--so getting this right must be treated as more important than just getting something through before the current window closes. I will be watching developments in the weeks ahead with great interest.

Oil's Place in a Kerry-Lieberman-Graham Climate Bill

The inclusion of support for expanded US oil and gas drilling in a Senate climate proposal issued yesterday is bound to puzzle many readers. If the emissions from oil are responsible for a major portion of human-induced global warming, how can increasing our production of it contribute to reducing US emissions, as the three Senators involved suggest? The answer requires a clear understanding of where most of the emissions in the oil value chain take place. It also invokes a broader view of climate and energy security that recognizes that oil is not as close to being replaced by renewables as we'd like to think, and that in the absence of higher domestic output, our oil imports could continue to increase, with consequences--and emissions--beyond our control.

The proposed framework from Senators John Kerry (D-MA), Joe Lieberman (ID-CT), and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) was released in the form of a letter to President Obama, outlining the parameters of a climate bill that would include emissions caps and market mechanisms--presumably cap & trade--plus support for nuclear power, clean coal, and oil and gas drilling, along with other provisions to protect consumers and promote job creation by helping manufacturers become more energy-efficient. In the absence of its details, the proposal looks broadly similar to other climate measures, including Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer, but without treating domestic producers of conventional energy as undesirable elements. The trio behind this initiative is also interesting, adding Sen. Lieberman's long-standing credibility on cap & trade (3 previous Senate bills) and the bi-partisan participation of Sen. Graham.

To understand what support for domestic oil drilling is doing in a climate bill, however, you have to look at oil's continuing role in our primary energy mix and the distribution of emissions associated with its production, refining and use. Start with primary energy, with oil accounting for 37% of last year's total US energy consumption, in the form of 19.5 million barrels per day (mbd) of crude oil and refined products. Biofuels can't replace oil anytime soon, and even at its maximum extent in 2022, the entire Renewable Fuels Standard would only displace the energy equivalent of about 1.4 mbd of oil, or roughly 7% of current consumption. Nor can wind and solar power do the job; they will be fully engaged in reducing the average emissions of the US electricity mix, only about 1% of which is generated from oil. Some of that green power will eventually find its way into electric vehicles, which do displace oil, though these aren't likely to make up more than a small fraction of the US car fleet for decades. In any case, the emissions from biofuels and electric vehicles may not be that much less than from oil use.

The inescapable conclusion is that the US will continue to burn oil for a long time. The quantities will decrease as efficiency and substitutes ramp up, but not fast enough to back out all of the oil we import for a very long time, let alone all petroleum from all sources. And that's where the energy security aspects emphasized by the three Senators come in; if we're going to need oil for years to come, as much of it as possible should be produced here.

Then there are the emissions from that oil. When assessed on a full lifecyle basis, most of the emissions from petroleum occur when it is used, not when it is produced. That's even true for oil derived from oil sands, which entails significantly higher upstream emissions than for the conventional oil output this framework would promote. Depending on the crude oil source and the products involved, well-to-wheels analysis suggests that 80-90% of emissions occur at the point of use, with production, transportation and refining accounting for the much smaller remainder. As a result, the point of maximum leverage on the emissions from the oil value chain is not exploration & production, which accounts for only a few percent of emissions, or refineries that are already 90% efficient, on average, but the cars and other vehicles and devices in which we consume it. The most effective strategies for reducing oil-based emissions thus involve vehicle dieselization, hybridization, downsizing, and other efficiency measures, along with non-efficiency conservation, including carpooling, telecommuting, virtual meetings, etc.

Moreover, since climate change is inherently global in nature, it doesn't matter whether the upstream emissions associated with oil occur in the Gulf of Mexico, the Persian Gulf, or anywhere else, except to the degree that domestic conventional oil might displace oil from higher-emitting unconventional sources elsewhere. But while the sources of the oil and refined products we use are largely irrelevant from a climate change perspective, they are most certainly relevant to our energy security. Increasing domestic oil production would pay big dividends in tax revenue, job creation, and the reduction of both our trade and fiscal deficits. (Disclosure: My personal investment portfolio includes oil stocks.)

The Houston Chronicle quoted Senator Graham as saying, "There will be no bill with Lindsey Graham's vote if it doesn't have meaningful offshore and onshore exploration." If he represented Alaska, Louisiana or Texas, you might attribute that sentiment to a desire to protect his home state's energy interests. Instead, it reflects a practical reality that seems to have escaped many in the administration, who appear to equate all oil from all sources with environmental and economic ills, rather than realizing that while we all know we need to use less oil for many reasons, that doesn't preclude us from using more of the enormous oil endowment with which the US has been blessed. If we use it wisely, domestic oil can provide a necessary bridge to the clean energy future we all want, and in a manner that is consistent with reducing global greenhouse gas emissions. I don't know whether these three Senators have found the recipe for breaking the Senate impasse over climate change, but this proposal could represent just the kind of grand compromise on energy and the environment that we have needed for a long time.

The Copenhagen Scenario

It wasn't supposed to turn out this way. When delegates to the climate conference in Bali in December 2007 agreed on a two-year roadmap culminating in Copenhagen this week and next, they were widely understood to be buying time for the US to elect a new administration committed to much stronger action on climate change, for the remaining scientific uncertainties to be resolved, and for the large developing countries to be brought around to make binding commitments regarding their own growing emissions. Yet while progress has been made on all three fronts, the changes over the last couple of years have manifested in ways that still don't quite deliver the scenario necessary to set up Copenhagen to deliver on all of Bali's promises.

As I noted during the run-up to last year's election, both major US political parties chose nominees who had made climate change a central issue of their campaigns. Neither an Obama administration nor a McCain one was going to look much like its predecessor on this issue. Yet we've also seen that the partisan differences on climate change reflect deeper underlying concerns about the impact of greenhouse gas regulations on parts of the economy that aren't evenly distributed across the states, some of which rely much more than others on the production or consumption of the highest-emitting fuels, particularly coal. Those economic concerns loom larger after what we've been through in the last year or so. Together with the inability of recent Congresses to refrain from festooning every piece of major legislation with grab bags of peripheral regulations and pork, this resulted in a badly flawed House bill on cap and trade--and much else--and a Senate counterpart that is starting to look dead on arrival. With President Obama needing to arrive in Copenhagen armed with more than empty promises, we now get an anything-but-coincidental Endangerment Finding that could end up reducing emissions in the most costly way imaginable.

Then there's the science and even the climate itself, which has hardly cooperated in the two years since Bali. While this decade is still on track to be the warmest on record globally, 2008 was the also coolest year since 2000, and despite some rebound 2009 won't set any new records. And just when the science was looking settled, the emails and computer files hacked--or leaked--from a major climate research center in the UK have raised concerns about the peer review of papers questioning the consensus view, and about the processing of raw data for the "climate proxies" used to recreate historical conditions before the century or so that they have been observed accurately--data that incidentally provide key inputs to the climate models predicting the temperature and other outcomes from steadily increasing levels of CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The likelihood that the timing of this leak is no more coincidental than that of the EPA's finding doesn't alter the need for these questions to be assessed by someone besides the scientists whose work was involved.

Then there are the large, rapidly growing emissions from China, India and other developing countries, especially when changes in land use are taken into account. As I mentioned the other day, China's announcement that it would reduce the carbon intensity of its economy as it grows is a big first step, but it also falls into the category of things necessary, but not sufficient, to induce the US to commit to deep absolute cuts, particularly in light of polling that suggests the US public is less worried about climate change than it was when the economy was booming a couple of years ago--again, no coincidence.

When I return from my current travels I'll be watching the news from Copenhagen with great interest. I expect to post more on this subject, as developments warrant.

Counting All the Carbon

An editorial in this morning's Wall St. Journal reminded me that I had intended to update my readers on the latest installment in the ongoing saga concerning the global land-use impact of biofuels. The Journal's comments referred to a paper in the latest issue of Science entitled, "Fixing a Critical Climate Accounting Error", which concludes that the manner in which the greenhouse gas impacts of biofuels are currently assessed fails to account for significant emissions that occur outside the envelope normally drawn around an ethanol or biodiesel plant and the farms that supply it with feedstock. And if that omission weren't glaring enough, in the course of preparing for a meeting tomorrow I ran across another instance in which regulators appear to be turning a blind eye to the full impact of another popular option for addressing climate change, electric vehicles. As we prepare to re-orient our entire economy around the restrictions embodied in pending climate legislation, it is essential that we account for all of the emissions involved in a consistent way, and on a scale matching the global environmental problem we're trying to solve. This is crucial to making real progress on reducing emissions, rather than just making us all feel good about what we are doing.

When the emailed table of contents for the October 23 issue of Science showed up in my inbox last Friday, I spotted the name of Timothy Searchinger of Princeton University as lead author of the paper cited by the Journal today. Dr. Searchinger was also the lead author of an earlier paper in Science that I highlighted last February, when the debate concerning the global land-use implications of corn ethanol was just getting underway. Dr. Searchinger's collaborators on the new paper are an impressive bunch, including Dr. Dan Kammen, the director of the Renewable and Appropriate Energy Laboratory at U.C. Berkeley.

The report provides further evidence that it's no longer appropriate to assume that just because the carbon embodied in biofuels such as ethanol originated in green plants that absorbed it from the atmosphere, they must therefore be "carbon neutral"--other than the emissions from fossil fuels used in the cultivation, harvesting and transportation of the crops from which they are produced, along with the energy used in their processing. Additional emissions apparently result from the global displacement of the crops turned into energy here, and in some cases those emissions are on a similar order of magnitude to the direct emissions from the combustion of the biofuels--combustion that has gotten a free pass until now.

This is a highly inconvenient result for those engaged in the production of biofuels from food crops, on two levels. First, it puts the climate change justification for the subsidies and mandates responsible for the rapid ramp-up of conventional biofuel production in question. Second, the source of this doubt is no less than one of the same scientific journals in which so much of the peer-reviewed science contributing to the oft-cited scientific consensus on climate change has appeared, and subject to the same level of scientific scrutiny. Casting doubt on the source of this unwelcome message thus risks casting doubt on the entire edifice upon which the current, much-expanded biofuel endeavor rests.

Let's be clear that I don't blame the biofuel industry for promoting a product that many thought would help, but may ultimately turn out to do little or nothing to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions implicated in climate change, any more than we should blame the producers and consumers of fossil fuels for their contribution to the accumulation of those gases before the current consensus on climate change emerged. (I confess that I regard attempts to portray that consensus as having existed as long as 40 years ago as the worst kind of revisionism, since the creation of the consensus depended not on a few key insights, which might have turned out to be wrong, but on mounting evidence from the steady accumulation of peer-reviewed research during that interval.)

Having said that, I have a much harder time understanding the inclusion of an equally serious--and apparently entirely conscious--omission in the new automotive fuel economy and emissions standards jointly developed by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Transportation. I had occasion to browse through the agencies' proposed text (warning: large file) yesterday and was startled to see that for purposes of calculating carmakers' fleet CO2 emission averages, it assumes that electric vehicles (EVs) and the electric usage of plug-in hybrids (PHEVs) have zero lifecycle emissions. Not only that, but the proposed regulation would count each EV as if it replaced two other emitting cars: thus, zero GHG impact not once but twice. Even the authors admit that this is false, and here I must quote,

"EPA recognizes that for each EV that is sold, in reality the total emissions off-set relative to the typical gasoline or diesel powered vehicle is not zero, as there is a corresponding increase in upstream CO2 emissions due to an increase in the requirements for electric utility generation. However, for the time frame of this proposed rule, EPA is also interested in promoting very advanced technologies such as EVs which offer the future promise of significant reductions in GHG emissions, in particular when coupled with a broader context which would include reductions from the electricity generation. For the California Paley 1 program, California assigned EVs a CO2 performance value of 130 g/mile, which was intended to represent the average CO2 emissions required to charge an EV using representative CO2 values for the California electric utility grid."

But while I appreciate the agencies' rationalization that EVs and PHEVs might be counted as having zero emissions on a purely temporary basis in order to provide incentives for carmakers to accelerate their introduction, I'm also painfully aware that other such "temporary" measures have persisted long after the original justification for them had become obsolete--and here I can't help but think of the ethanol blending credit that is now in its 31st year.

Why do these loopholes in the way we tally greenhouse gas emissions matter enough for me to hammer away at them like this? Consider the proposed vehicle rules. By ignoring emissions that occur outside these vehicles, the government is discouraging carmakers from using less exotic technologies that might actually deliver comparable savings of fuel and emissions sooner, and at a lower cost to taxpayers and consumers. A conventional Toyota Prius hybrid running on gasoline emits only 10% more grams of CO2 per mile than California claims for an EV powered by its greener-than-average state electricity mix. Since the same number of batteries could equip many more Prius-type hybrids, at a much lower cost per car than for a full EV, the benefits of rushing EVs into production seem much less compelling at this point, particularly when the government is also subsidizing the purchasers of EVs and PHEVs to the tune of many thousands of dollars per car. That will amount to billions of dollars of extra subsidies for an incremental emissions benefit that might just be negative for an EV recharged using coal-fired power.

"Start as you mean to go on," goes the old saying. We know that whatever their energy security benefits and general hi-tech niftiness, EVs are not zero-emission vehicles, just as we now understand that it is likely that burning corn ethanol releases roughly the same level of greenhouse gases as the gasoline it is intended to replace. If cap & trade bills such as Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer are to have any integrity as tools for achieving genuine reductions in the global greenhouse gas emissions behind global climate change, then we must count all the emissions from all sources, no matter how politically unpalatable that may be. EPA and DOT might do well to heed this advice, too, before establishing a new, impossible-to-revoke entitlement for the manufacturers of electric vehicles.

"Feeding Frenzy"

An article in today's New York Times offers more detail on the manner in which Congressional climate legislation has fractured the energy industry into competing groups of haves and have-nots, based on how companies and sectors were treated under the Waxman-Markey bill and their hopes for receiving a better deal in the pending Kerry-Boxer bill in the Senate. Not only has it fragmented utilities along the axis of their emissions intensity, but it has also opened gaps within the oil & gas industry between companies that produce primarily natural gas and those that produce or process mainly oil. I don't know whether the authors of Waxman-Markey saw this potential in their design for allocating emission allowances, though some supporters are bound to see it as a beneficial feature. I regard it as a worrying symptom of the distortions inflicted on the basic concept of cap & trade, which remains the best option for guiding the economy toward a lower-emission future, but now seems likely to underperform its potential in a very costly way, as a result of these flaws.

As recently as a couple of years ago, few energy companies were enthusiastic about the prospect of cap & trade, because it was bound to raise their costs and reduce demand for their output, at least from energy sources with substantial emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. If the bill passed by the House had treated all emissions from all sectors equally--a level playing field--we'd still see visionary companies diverging from the industry's stance, but their numbers would probably be a lot fewer for the simple reason that there wouldn't be nearly as much financial gain in it for them. When no-nonsense companies like Exelon and several of its utility peers break ranks with the US Chamber of Commerce on this issue, it's a good bet that they see a direct strategic advantage that will put money in their shareholders' pockets. Simply put, this is as good a deal as they're going to get. But while I find their support of cap and trade perfectly rational and even laudable, it should by no means be read as a sign that the Waxman-Markey approach is the best means of addressing climate change.

As I've noted in previous postings, Waxman-Markey was excessively generous in handing out emission allowances to the electricity sector, at the expense of the transportation sector. It also lavished allowances on non-emitting sectors and favored causes and groups in lieu of cash--a form of largess that fundamentally undermines the accountability of these benefits, because no one knows or can know what they will be worth when they are eventually received. Yet although this is bad policy on many levels, I see many people holding their noses and supporting the W-M approach, because they conclude that once the free allocations have phased out in 2030, we'll be left with a more or less pure cap & trade system enforcing a steadily tightening cap on emissions. The problems with this thinking lie in the enormous distortions and unnecessary economic hardship those uneven allocations will create over the next 20-plus years and the opportunity cost of the emissions reductions that could have been achieved more quickly and cheaply.

My strong preference has been for an even-handed cap & trade system that would include the broadest possible collection of emissions sources, providing great diversity of abatement costs and thus great scope for emissions trading to minimize the cost of achieving our emission reduction goals, and with most of the proceeds rebated directly from the government to taxpayers. Unfortunately, the ship has sailed on that approach--at least for now--and anyone supporting cap & trade for the elegant simplicity of its mechanism for squeezing out emissions is left hoping that the legislative excesses of one chamber of Congress will cancel out those of the other, and that somehow two bad bills will beget a good one.

No Good Choices

I find myself in a foul mood concerning climate change, after a week that has seen US choices for managing our greenhouse gas emissions narrow to a trio of unappealing options. The long-awaited draft of a Senate bill on climate change issued by the Environment and Pubic Works Committee turned out to mirror most of the bad features of the distorted Waxman-Markey bill narrowly passed by the House in June. Adding insult to injury was the announcement by the Administrator of the EPA that her agency was preparing to regulate the greenhouse gases from large emitters--power plants, refineries, and other industrial facilities--as point-sources under the Clean Air Act as soon as next year. This leaves us with three poor choices: 1) a cap & trade system harnessed to the yoke of Congressional patronage and pork, 2) command-and-control regulations likely to extract emissions reductions from the highest-cost sources and thus having the most adverse impact on the economy, and 3) a status quo that will likely result in our emissions resuming their steady climb, once the economy recovers.

With regard to the Kerry-Boxer bill, designated as the "Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act"--no catchy "ACES" acronym there--I haven't had time to wade through its 801 pages, so I'll keep my comments brief. Contrary to the conclusion reached by the editors of the Washington Post, the bill does include a cap & trade mechanism for greenhouse gas emissions, though I can understand why they might not have looked for it under the obscure rubric of "Pollution Reduction and Investment Program". From my quick scan of that section, it strongly resembles the cap & trade aspects of Waxman-Markey, with the crucial difference that the allocation of emission allowances among various sectors has been left to other Senate committees to fill in. The only allocation clearly specified is that 25% of allowances should be auctioned, with the proceeds to go toward deficit reduction. As laudable as that sounds, I would merely note that every dollar raised by cap & trade that is not returned to taxpayers constitutes a new tax by another name and should be counted in the total tax burden on the productive economy.

Now let's turn to the EPA announcement, which has me even more concerned. Last week I received an emailed article from the Institute for Policy Integrity at NYU suggesting that under the Clean Air Act the EPA could create its own cap & trade system for greenhouse gases without requiring additional authorizing legislation. That briefly buoyed my hopes for a more pristine version of cap & trade, without the unseemly scramble to siphon off its proceeds to fund every pet project and cause of every Member or Senator whose vote was needed to pass the thing. Then I read Administrator Jackson's remarks describing the approach she has in mind, and I knew the EPA was applying its old pollution-abatement mentality to climate change, facilitiated by a Supreme Court ruling that unhelpfully labeled CO2 and other GHGs as pollutants. The new rule would impose New Source Review criteria on the greenhouse emissions from power plants, refineries and factories when they expand or modernize, and it parallels the Best Available Control Technology requirement that is at least logical for local air pollutants like SOx and NOx that result from fuel impurities and combustion byproducts, but that makes little sense when dealing with the results of the primary chemical reaction of combustion: C + O2 --> CO2.

With all due respect to Administrator Jackson, a fellow chemical engineer who I'm sure understands the technical side of this issue as well as I do, her remarks betray a deep misunderstanding of the economic consequences of regulating carbon this way. The key phrase in her comments, which focused on minimizing the impact on the small businesses she seeks to exclude from this ruling was, "...all without placing an undue burden on the businesses that make up the better part of our economy," as if that "better part" didn't consume the electricity, fuels and raw materials produced by the part she proposes to regulate--presumably the "worst part" of our economy. The reality is that the costs imposed on large emitters will inevitably fall on those same small businesses when they pay their utility bills, buy fuel and other inputs, and when they seek to sell to consumers and other businesses equally burdened by these new, higher energy costs.

There is simply no getting around the fact that regulating greenhouse gas emissions, which amounts to charging a fee for something that has been free since the discovery of fire, is going to impose a burden on the entire economy. The principle behind cap & trade is the effort to make that burden as small as possible, by encouraging those parties with the lowest costs of emissions abatement to make the biggest cuts. Industrial emissions reductions are inherently more expensive than those in many other sectors, and we need a solution that unleashes the cheapest CO2 cuts, instead of forcing the most expensive ones to be done first.

I haven't given up entirely on the hope that the final outcome from the Senate might restore some sanity to the cap & trade provisions that Messrs. Waxman and Markey so deftly used to co-opt the biggest emitters into supporters, as we've seen with the recent fracturing of the US Chamber of Commerce on this issue. Utilities like Exelon, PG&E, and PNM Resources must realize that they are unlikely to get a better deal on emissions than under Waxman-Markey, and I don't blame them for advancing their interests. But that doesn't make this the best solution for the economy, or more importantly the best way to go about reducing the emissions responsible for humanity's contribution to climate change. And if the White House needs the threat of new EPA rules to have at least one flag to wave at the global climate conference in Copenhagen in December, in case the Congress fails to pass a Waxman-Markey/Kerry-Boxer hybrid by then, I understand that, too. However, that doesn't justify actually implementing those regulations and making the task of reducing our emissions harder and more costly.

Cap & Trade, Gas Prices and Uncertainty

Over the weekend a New York Times editorial critical of the energy industry for trying to stir up opposition to the Waxman-Markey climate bill prompted some further thought on the potential impact of the legislation on gasoline prices. The Times appears to accept the government's analysis suggesting that the increase would amount to no more than 20 cents per gallon by 2020, though this conventional wisdom collides with common sense, since such a low price on carbon seems unlikely to stimulate sufficient conservation and investments in efficiency to deliver on a steadily-shrinking national emissions cap. In particular, the Times seems unfazed by the way the bill's allocation of free emission allowances is stacked against the oil industry, suggesting that it, of all industries, can surely afford the extra burden. Yet it's precisely that distortion that I believe could throw all of the official estimates of future permit prices--and thus gas prices--into a cocked hat, when you consider the possible dynamics of a market established along these lines.

Let's start by stating the obvious: I don't have a detailed computer model of the energy markets and US economy to query on the likely outcome from the cap & trade system that would be instituted under Waxman-Markey, though I could probably come up with some drastically-undervalued credit default swaps for anyone who believes in the infallibility of such models. My assessment relies instead on logic and the experience of a career that included a long stint in energy commodity trading, including futures, options and derivatives. Based on that experience, I believe the crucial starting point for any attempt to understand how a new market might function is supply and demand: who has the commodity in question and who needs it.

Begin with demand. The Department of Energy's recent "flash estimate" of US CO2 emissions indicates that the electricity sector accounts for 41% of emissions, followed by transportation with 33%, and the non-electricity-related emissions of the industrial sector a distant third at around 17%. These three segments thus account for 91% of our CO2 emissions, by far the largest component of our greenhouse gas output. Under cap & trade, every ton of those emissions would have to be matched with a corresponding emission allowance, or the emitter would be liable for penalties at a multiple of the going price for allowances. Anyone who is given fewer allowances than their current emissions must thus either reduce their emissions directly or purchase allowances from others. But who are the likely sellers? A careful reading of the bill provides strong hints

Under President Obama's original concept of cap & trade, in which 100% of emission allowances would have been auctioned by the government to the emitters that needed them, all sectors of the economy would have been in the same position of needing to cover their entire shortfall in the market. The government would have been the primary seller, though as the market evolved, companies that found cheap ways to reduce their own emissions would have ended up reselling allowances they had bought earlier, at a profit. Under Waxman-Markey, by my tally roughly 60% of the emission allowances would be handed out to emitters such as utilities, refiners and other industrial firms. Another 30% or so would be doled out in lieu of cash to fund efforts such as renewable energy R&D and deployment, climate adaptation and assistance to low-income consumers. Something less than 10% would be auctioned by the government itself to fund deficit reduction and other initiatives.

So on a given day, who would be selling and who would be buying? Consider the utilities and merchant power generators. As generous as the bill's authors were to this sector, it would still be short allowances from day 1, with a gap between actual emissions and free allowances equal to roughly 4% of US emissions. Non-energy industrial firms probably wouldn't be selling, either, at least unless the price got high enough to stimulate the big investments in energy efficiency that haven't risen to the top of their capital budget priorities so far. Initially, they would need to acquire allowances equal to around 5% of all emissions. And that brings us to refiners, who under Waxman-Markey would be responsible for their own emissions plus all of the emissions from the end-use of their products by non-regulated consumers, yet would receive only a 2% allocation of free allowances. Depending on how upstream production and oil imports are counted, the gap that refiners would need to cover could amount to more than 31% of all US emissions, or 3/4ths of the allowances given to non-emitting entities or auctioned directly by the government. At the same time, they have only modest scope for further reductions in their own emissions, considering that they are already 90% energy-efficient, on average. Who would be likely to have the advantage in such a situation? It sure looks like a "sellers' market" to me.

I don't doubt that refiners could probably scoop up some relatively cheap allowances from groups that get handed these tickets and don't quite know what to do with them, though market sophistication--and for-fee advice on such matters--might spread quickly. But refiners wouldn't just need to sweep up the stragglers, here. They'd require the entire allowance streams of many of the legislation's chosen beneficiaries for years to come, nor could they risk coming up massively short in any year. To me that suggests an average acquisition price for allowances that could rise well above the notional $15-$20/ton expounded by the EPA and DOE, considering that the effective price ceiling provided by brute-force CO2 reductions such as carbon capture and sequestration is probably north of $50/ton, equating to 50 cents per gallon of gasoline. While an increase that high might not be the likeliest outcome, it is at least plausible, and it would be added not to current gas prices, which have been depressed by the recession, but to those that would prevail after the legislation went into effect, when the economy--and perhaps even fuel demand--was presumably growing again. It doesn't take a leap of imagination to combine these factors to get to the $4 per gallon that the Times appears to dismiss.

From the last sentence of the editorial, I have to conclude that the Times doesn't understand the rationale for cap & trade nearly as well as they think they do. The point of this approach and any well-structured legislation implementing it is not to wean the US off of petroleum, but to reduce our emissions of the greenhouse gases implicated in climate change. While that certainly implies lower emissions from the oil sector, and thus lower consumption, it is perverse and counter-productive to shelter higher-emitting sectors that have greater flexibility for reducing emissions. The Congress may have judged that consumers would complain more about higher electricity bills than about increases at the gas pump, which could always be blamed on other factors--and on a singularly unpopular industry. But in creating such a wide disparity of demand for allowances among business sectors, they risk driving the price of those allowances much higher than otherwise, imposing an unnecessary drag on the economy. Even if their protests are motivated by self-interest, the oil industry and oil consumers are right to point this out.