Is Small Nuclear Reactor R&D Fleecing the Public?

Two weeks ago I received an email announcing that Taxpayers for Common Sense (TCS), a D.C.-based watchdog organization, had awarded this year's Golden Fleece for wasting tax dollars to the federal government's efforts to promote the development of small, modular nuclear reactors (SMRs).  My quick perusal of the award's justification left me with distinctly mixed reactions, before I filed it away with the other announcements I received that day.  Since then, every time I ran across a reference to SMRs I was drawn back to the group's assertions about the technology, while questioning whether my opinion of the award would have been different had they singled out the renewable energy loan guarantee program, renewable energy cash grants, or some other example of recent federal generosity toward emerging energy technologies. 

The Golden Fleece awards were started in the mid-1970s by Senator William Proxmire (D-WI).  He had a knack for highlighting egregious examples of government waste and bureaucratic excess, though he also periodically skewered legitimate scientific research.  My view at the time was that he possessed a genuine passion against waste but a poor understanding of how science benefits society. TCS apparently revived the award in 2000.  Its targets since then have included projects such as Alaska's infamous Bridge to Nowhere.  Fair enough.  Yet as I reread the group's claims about the government's support for this technology, it came across less as a balanced critique and more like a one-sided attack that misinterprets the concepts involved, thus falling into the same trap that the late Senator occasionally did. 

Let's set aside the question of cost for a moment.  The US is exiting an era in which government could unquestioningly pay for any idea that anyone in the administration or Congress could think up.  Programs and projects like this should indeed have to vie with each other for scarce funding, guided by a clearly articulated list of our national priorities, a consensus on which is long overdue.  However, that's not the argument TCS is making.  It rests instead on four points specific to SMRs:

First, they treat SMRs as an entirely unproven technology with no cost-performance track record, despite having reminded us a few paragraphs earlier that at least some SMR designs are an outgrowth of extremely successful naval reactor programs.  Their contention that "no one is clamoring to buy an SMR because there is no assurance that the electricity will be remotely competitive with power from other sources" could have been made about any early-stage energy technology.  That raises basic questions about the legitimate role of all federal energy R&D spending, but in the context of a single technology that happens to be at the starting blocks today.  Moreover, disqualifying SMRs on the basis of today's low natural gas prices conflates a genuinely challenging commercial environment with a standard that, if applied consistently, would soon leave us 100% reliant on natural gas for electricity generation.  Not even the most ardent supporters of shale gas would advocate that.  The better question to ask is how nuclear--small or large--fits into a diverse future energy mix.

Next TCS states that the case for SMRs contradicts the logic behind large-scale nuclear power--implying that both can't be valid--rather than viewing them as distinct and different models for nuclear generation.  If anything, the real contradiction lies in saddling SMRs with the history of cost overruns in large-scale nuclear, much of which has resulted from protracted permitting delays and lawsuits, or on-site construction problems that SMRs are specifically intended to circumvent. 

I agree with TCS when they say, "There is no assurance that SMRs would pass regulatory muster."  Yet when has any new energy technology arrived with such a guarantee?  Their concerns about the organizational challenges that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) would face if SMRs progressed strike me as a better argument for reviewing the funding, structure and processes of the NRC, than one against SMRs.

Finally, the award text evokes unmanaged nuclear waste and terrorist attacks on SMRs emplaced in suburban locations.  There's little I can add to the decades-long debate on nuclear waste other than to observe that the challenges involved fall more into the realm of politics than science and engineering.  As for SMRs in suburbs, although that might be the vision of some nuclear entrepreneurs it seems realistic now only if we define "suburb"--a word that TCS went out of its way to repeat-- as any part of the country not within some urban zone.  The likeliest locations for at least the first generation of SMRs are within the site boundaries of operating or retired large-scale nuclear power plants: locations already well-protected against terrorism and other threats.  SMRs are not coming to a neighborhood near you any time soon, with or without federal funding.

Returning to my discomfort with my initial, somewhat reflexive reaction to the award, Taxpayers for Common Sense raised some concerns about federal support for small modular reactors that could fairly be aimed at a wide array of programs within the roughly $10 billion per year portion of the Department of Energy's budget that isn't related to nuclear weapons, along with the recent federal stimulus.  Despite that, SMRs have significant potential as a future source of low-emission electricity on a scale that could prove more compatible with the current capital budgets of the power industry, and with an emerging, renewables-intensive, smart-grid-enabled energy mix.  Without singling out this technology, I agree that in a post-sequestration world of limited budgets we should be asking more of the kind of hard questions that TCS raises about "market-distorting subsidies."   However, if their intention was to stimulate that kind of debate across the whole energy space, their cause might have been better served by taking it on directly, rather than targeting a concept that enjoys wide support as a legitimate focus of federal R&D spending.  

Energy and the Federal Budget Sequester

Barring a last-second deal to avert it, the federal government's budget will be cut on Friday by $85 billion for the current fiscal year, which ends in September.  These cuts will be applied across the board to every cabinet department and agency of the federal government, though at different rates for defense and non-defense activities, and with some functions exempted by the legislation that set the sequester in place.  Energy is no exception, and some of the cuts there may seem surprising, given the President's emphasis on promoting new energy sources.  It's worth putting all this into perspective.

Much of the discussion I'm hearing about sequestration, including efforts to replace it with a mix of smaller, more-surgical spending cuts and new tax revenue, seems to miss the bigger picture.  Sequestration was devised by the White House and agreed to by Congress as an intentionally repulsive fallback to the $1.2 trillion of detailed spending reductions that were to have been negotiated in exchange for raising the federal debt ceiling by what ended up being $2.1 trillion--already spent in the meantime.  There were certainly political reasons why that deal focused on spending cuts, rather than a mix of cuts and new revenue.  However, after reviewing the White House's own data on federal revenues and expenditures for the last five years, it would be hard to avoid the conclusion that the US government has a serious spending problem, irrespective of any revenue concerns. 

Specifically, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) expects combined federal revenue for fiscal year 2013 to come in at $2.9 trillion, or 13% higher than the previous all-time, pre-recession peak in 2007.  Yet 2013 expenditures of $3.8 trillion would be 40% higher than the 2007 level--a trillion dollars more, in fact.  Some of that increase reflects carry-overs from the 2009 stimulus bill, most of which was spent in 2010-12. Even after factoring out expenditures related to the higher unemployment resulting from our weaker economy, federal spending has grown rapidly.

What does sequestration mean for federal energy programs?  Before the cuts were postponed for two months, OMB identified annual reductions totaling $2.4 billion from non-exempted programs within the Department of Energy.  That included cuts of about 8% to the department's science budget, the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE), ARPA-E, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, innovative technology loan guarantees, and other activities.  Around a billion would be cut from the DOE's nuclear weapons and defense-related work.  Yet when applied to the DOE's 2013 budget request, it appears the department would still receive about a billion dollars more after sequestration than it spent in 2008.

DOE isn't the only place that energy spending would be cut.  I was surprised when I was alerted by a friend in the renewable energy practice of the Akin Gump law firm that Treasury renewable energy grants in lieu of future tax credits would also be subject to sequestration. The federal low-income heating energy subsidy (LIHEAP) would be cut, too, along with the budget for the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, which administers offshore oil, gas and renewable energy leases. Together they amount to just over $3 billion in reductions from the roughly $44 billion appropriated for energy-related activities this year.

Across-the-board cuts should never be management's first choice for reducing expenses, because they hack away at necessary and useful functions along with the wasteful ones.  However, these cuts are occurring because the administration and Congress couldn't agree on setting priorities for where to cut. After seeing the reactions to the threat of cuts from almost every interest group in America, are we in any position to blame them?  When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority. That's what the sequester reflects, nor is it without precedent.

Because of where I live, some of my relatives, friends and neighbors will feel the direct impact of sequestration.  They have my sympathy. I'm sure it would be little consolation to them to know that  I spent several stretches of my own corporate career under various across-the-board budget cuts, pay freezes, and similar programs that frustrated me, too, because I saw so much muscle cut along with the fat. Parts of the private sector have been through their own versions of sequestration numerous times, some quite recently.  It's never ideal, but sometimes it's the only workable option to rein in spending.

With respect to energy the numbers above suggest that, if given some flexibility in how to allocate cuts on this scale, the government should be able to fund all the core functions of the Department of Energy in promoting energy security and helping to develop new technology, while preserving its key organizational capabilities.  That might not be true of the department's recent efforts in industrial policy. It remains to be seen whether the Congress and White House can agree on providing that kind of flexibility in the execution of a sequestration policy that now looks virtually certain to go into effect this weekend.