Overproducing US Oil?

Tuesday morning I dialed into an API media teleconference concerning the administration's latest proposals on energy taxation and access. During the call API's President, Jack Gerard, mentioned the recent Congressional testimony of a Treasury Dept. official who suggested that current policies were promoting "overproduction of US oil and gas." That remark struck me as so absurd that I later asked for the reference, so that I could confirm what had actually been said. In fact, the written testimony of Alan Krueger, Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy and Chief Economist of the US Treasury, before the Subcommittee on Energy, Natural Resources and Infrastructure of the Senate Finance Committee included that statement and others in a similar vein. According to Dr. Krueger, the US oil & gas industry has benefited from a set of tax policies and incentives that have steered too much of the nation's capital investment towards energy and away from other sectors. In his view, removing those incentives would increase federal revenue by some $30 billion per year and create a "level playing field" for other forms of energy, while resulting in only insignificant reductions in US oil & gas output, with a negligible impact on our energy security. While his opinions might be shared by plenty of Americans, they reflect an excessive adherence to theory, ignoring the geopolitical circumstances in which global energy markets operate. And on a more basic level, his numbers don't even add up.

It's hard to know where to begin in analyzing Dr. Krueger's remarks. Perhaps the best starting point is the limited zone of agreement between his views and mine. From his comments about greenhouse gas emissions, I assume we share a deep concern about climate change and the contribution of fossil fuels to this problem. Reducing our emissions will require us to consume progressively less of these fuels in the years ahead, and improved energy efficiency and alternative energy production are important strategies for achieving that result. However, Dr. Krueger seems to believe that constraining domestic oil & gas production is another appropriate strategy for addressing climate change. I hope that view is merely his own and not widely shared in the administration, because it represents a horribly inefficient way to reduce emissions, at a shockingly high cost to the US economy. As I've noted many times, most of the emissions from oil and gas come from their consumption, not their production, and merely offshoring the upstream emissions associated with the oil and gas we consume would do nothing at all for global climate change, while reducing US economic output, employment, and energy security and increasing our trade deficit. In this regard the needs of energy security and climate change are perfectly aligned on the necessity of reducing our use of imported oil. Domestic oil and gas are not the enemy; they are part of the solution, and no reasonably informed person would suggest we produce too much oil.

Then there's the notion of a "level playing field," which in this case is fatally flawed for at least two reasons that should be obvious from the most cursory inspection of the issue. First, the global oil market does not conform to anyone's notion of a level playing field. The chief economist of my old firm used to preface many of his comments on oil prices by reminding his audience that the entire oil market was based on turning conventional economics on its head. If the oil market matched economic theory, the lowest cost producers would be going flat out all the time, and only enough high-cost oil from places like the US, UK, etc. would turn up to balance supply & demand. On that basis, I imagine OPEC would be producing 70 or 80% of the world's oil, and the US wouldn't be importing 57% of our crude oil needs, but perhaps 90%, because many US producers would slide right off the edge of that level playing field. Of course that wouldn't be a problem, because in that pure world no OPEC member would ever think of cutting output to raise prices, or of using oil as a geopolitical lever.

The other obvious fact undermining Dr. Krueger's hope for a level playing field arises from his administration's own policies--and those of the last several administrations--with regard to renewable energy. We have tilted the playing field quite far from the level in favor of corn ethanol and electricity from wind and a variety of other renewable sources. Putting all of these incentives into common, more familiar units might help to illustrate just how un-level we have made the field. Consider ethanol, which receives a Volumetric Excise Tax Credit, a.k.a. "blenders' credit" of $0.45 per gallon. That's $18.90 per volumetric barrel, though when we adjust for ethanol's much lower energy content compared to petroleum products, it works out to an effective rate of $32 per barrel of oil-equivalent energy (BOE). Wind power and other renewable electricity sources are eligible for a federal Production Tax Credit of $0.021/kWh generated. Assuming that they back out mainly power generated from natural gas, that works out to an effective subsidy of $2.33 per million BTUs (63% of the current spot natural gas price) or $13.40/BOE. Now let's compare those figures to that $30 billion the government could collect by closing tax loopholes that benefit oil and gas.

If you have a gut feeling that the subsidy per BOE of oil and gas would be much lower than for renewables, give yourself a gold star. The reason the incentives in question are lower is that the denominator is so large. When you add 2008 US domestic production of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids on an oil-equivalent basis, it works out to a shade over 6 billion barrels. As a result, that $30 billion worth of incentives equates to just $5 per barrel, or 12 cents per gallon, which is not only less than the incentives for renewable energy--the production of some of which appears to be no better for the environment than oil--but also less than the federal excise tax on gasoline. And while Dr. Krueger expressed concern that US lease terms for offshore oil production in the Gulf of Mexico were more generous than those of other producing countries, he does not appear to have factored in the effective 40% federal income tax rate on the earnings of the companies producing oil & gas from those fields.

Now, I can't say that taking $5 per bbl away from the domestic oil & gas industry would cripple it. At this point, the industry is pretty healthy, though not nearly as healthy as it was a year or two ago. But even in a world of $70 per barrel oil, and with US natural gas currently trading at a much lower equivalent price of $21/bbl, that $5 looks like a significant deterrent to investing in more production here--production that would contribute essentially net-zero to global greenhouse gas emissions but that would back out foreign oil and gas imports on a direct, barrel-for-barrel basis. With a lifetime of experience in that industry, I don't need an economic model to know that Dr. Krueger's estimate of losing only "one-half of one percent" of domestic oil & gas output defies common sense and looks suspiciously like a manifestation of "garbage in, garbage out".

There is legitimate debate over the best way to address the externalities associated with our use of oil and gas and the emissions they create, and I come down squarely on the side of recognizing the emissions externality via the mechanism of cap & trade--though not in the grossly-distorted
form inherent in Waxman-Markey. That's an entirely different kettle of fish than making US hydrocarbon production less competitive with the imported oil and gas with which it must contend, in a global market that is anything but level, thanks to OPEC and the consequences of resource nationalism. A quick review of Dr. Krueger's impressive bio suggests that his main expertise lies in the economics of education and labor. It is clearly not in energy. We live in a world in which the geopolitics of energy are so challenging, and in which the EU subsidizes airliners, while China apparently subsidizes tire makers, and any number of countries--now including ours--subsidize carmakers. In that context, a modest level of incentives for the production of domestic energy from a variety of sources, including oil and gas, doesn't look so extraordinary. If anything, it's sensible and prudent.

Mega Gas Project

I took some pride in Chevron's announcement earlier this week that it and its partners would proceed with construction of the Gorgon LNG plant in Australia. That's partly due to my vicarious interest in this project as a Chevron shareholder, but mainly from my peripheral involvement in the early stages of planning and thinking about it when I worked at Texaco. Prior to merging with Chevron, Texaco held a 25% interest in the Gorgon natural gas field, as did Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Shell. Because of the scale of the resource involved, even that one-quarter share was enough to make Gorgon potentially one of Texaco's most valuable long-term assets. However, the technical complexity of the project, combined with the uncertainties about the future global gas market, made it difficult to create the necessary consensus among the partners about how best to proceed. In retrospect, it probably took the merger to give one party a big enough stake in the project to drive it forward.

At a planned production rate of 15 million tons per year of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and 300 terajoules per day of pipeline gas for use on the mainland, it's a little hard to put the scale of the project in perspective. It works out to around 2.2 billion cubic feet per day of total natural gas delivery, which is equivalent to the entire production of the largest independent US gas driller, Chesapeake Energy Corp., one of the most aggressive developers of the shale gas deposits that are transforming the US natural gas market. If Gorgon's entire output were sent to gas turbine power plants, it would generate around 85 billion kilowatt-hours per year, as much as 32,000 MW of wind turbines or 9 nuclear power plants of 1200 MW each--and over a similar 40 year operating life. However you look at it, it's big.

Among the challenges the field's owners needed to overcome in order to get to this point was a plan for handling the relatively high CO2 content of the gas in the Gorgon field, at around 12%. Even a decade ago, it was becoming clear that such large quantities of CO2 could not simply be vented to the atmosphere. According to Chevron's fact sheet for the project, the CO2 content of the gas will be separated and sequestered in geological reservoirs under Barrow Island, where the LNG plant will be located, and it will apparently rank among the world's largest carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) projects to date, with total storage of up to 120 million tons of CO2 over the life of the project.

Of course, that doesn't negate the entire greenhouse gas impact of such a project, which must be compared to the emissions that would occur if it didn't proceed. Chilling natural gas to -260 °F, at which it becomes a liquid, requires a significant expenditure of energy, typically generated by burning more gas. As a result, the lifecycle emissions of LNG are somewhat higher than those for pipeline gas, though they are still substantially less than from the coal or oil it would displace in power generation in the Asian market for which most of Gorgon's output is slated. According to a recent study by Pace Consultants, the emissions from gas liquefaction, LNG transportation, and re-gasification at destination would effectively increase the lifecycle emissions from a combined-cycle power plant by roughly 22%, compared to one running on domestic (pipeline) gas. However, that result would still come in around 40% lower than the emissions from the best coal-fired power technology without CCS, and 60% less than typical coal-fired power plants.

Technology has also advanced in other areas, since the Gorgon field was first discovered in the early 1980s. The idea of developing Gorgon and the nearby fields such as Jansz and Chrysaor using sub-sea completions, with no surface platform standing above them, is a reflection of how far the state of the art has come since then. The comparison of Gorgon's offshore and onshore footprint to Australia's other giant offshore gas field, the Northwest Shelf, which was developed in that timeframe using then-current technology, is remarkable. As one of the videos on Chevron's Gorgon sitelet points out, the development also had to be done in a manner that was harmonious with the nature preserve on Barrow Island. That complicated the permitting process and added additional years to the development timeline.

And that's really my key take-away for this project. While a variety of factors contributed to Gorgon's requiring something like 33 years from discovery to first production, big energy projects aren't like building a supermarket or office park. Aside from the great patience these efforts require, large sums of money must be spent over a long span of time before the first dollar of revenue can be collected to recoup them. That requires the deepest of pockets and the most meticulous strategic and financial planning. Only governments and the very largest companies--with massive free cash-flow or debt capacity--can pull this off. Moreover, because of the numerous risks associated with geology, permitting and development, a project like this works best when that risk is shared by more than one party, each of which has a portfolio of sufficient size and diversity to absorb the delays that are inherent in such ventures. So while it's true that the oil Super Majors need big LNG projects to bolster reserve replacement and cash flows that are being pinched by the challenges of gaining access to large-scale oil projects in the current environment, the global supply of clean gas from such projects would be much lower, without companies on this scale to develop them. This is a match that is both good for business and good for the long-term decarbonization of global energy supplies.

Fuel Cell Trains

I often use my gym time to catch up on interesting podcasts, and NPR's excellent Science Friday series is one of my favorite sources. I just caught up with a recent segment on the development of hydrogen-powered trains, which seem like a particularly clever use of a promising technology that must still overcome serious obstacles in its automotive applications. But while I give the host, Ira Flatow, credit for pursuing the question of where the hydrogen for trains would come from, his guests' answers left something to be desired. That's not just because they tended to downplay the emissions associated with producing hydrogen, but because this omission might result in ignoring what could be an even better, more efficient fuel-cell configuration for trains and other large vehicles.

The basic idea of powering trains with fuel cells offers several important advantages--and one very serious disadvantage--for rail companies and their stakeholders. It also represents a less revolutionary change for rail than for automobiles, since trains are already partially or wholly-electrified, and a fuel cell is just another way to generate that electricity. Even the diesel locomotives that fuel-cell locos would be intended to replace are really diesel-electric hybrids. The key benefits of using fuel cells instead of big diesels for this application include substantial reductions in local pollutants, including soot, along with much quieter operation. Unfortunately, even if fuel cell trains could circumvent many of the infrastructure hurdles that have impeded automotive fuel cells, they still look prohibitively expensive. Diesels are pretty cheap on the basis of $ per kilowatt of generating capacity, while fuel cells are still much pricier, by at least a factor of 10.

Ignoring cost, fuel cell trains would face fewer obstacles to wide-scale deployment than fuel cell cars. As one of the program's guests pointed out, hydrogen storage, the Achilles heel of fuel cell cars, is not a problem in this situation. If necessary, a fuel cell train could carry an entire tank-car of compressed hydrogen behind the locomotive, and it wouldn't alter the train's performance or cost appreciably. That would also reduce the need for a widely-dispersed refueling infrastructure. For that matter, a train could carry along its own refueling set-up, in the form of an electrolyzer and compressor. It would require only fresh water--reminiscent of the coal-burning locos of yore--and a place to plug in. However, when you follow that plug back to its ultimate source, you find that the CO2 emissions of a hydrogen train could be quite a bit higher than zero, and possibly even higher than those of the diesel train it would replace, because our power generating mix is still dominated by fossil fuels.

So whether the H2 for a fuel cell train would be produced from natural gas, as most of the substantial quantity of industrial H2 in the US is, or from grid electricity, it results in CO2 emissions somewhere. In fact, because electrolysis of water into H2 is only about 80% efficient, the associated emissions of electrolytic H2 used to fuel a train would be 25% higher than the average of the grid power used to produce it. And although it's theoretically possible to generate H2 solely from off-peak renewable electricity when the latter is not being used to back out higher-emitting power sources, the capital cost of that route is much higher, because it would only operate a small fraction of the time. At least for the near-to-medium term, most H2 will likely be generated from natural gas, and that argues for a very different configuration for the fuel cell train than the one considered in this episode of Science Friday. Instead of using low-temperature automotive-design fuel cells, which require a source of pure H2, a high-temperature fuel cell of the type used for stationary power generation might make more sense. Not only do these operate more efficiently, resulting in lower overall emissions, but they can also run directly on natural gas and other light hydrocarbons, producing the H2 they require internally, rather than externally. In that case, the fuel tank for a fuel cell locomotive might just be an ordinary propane tank car, for which the entire supply chain is already well-developed.

If you've ever waited for a train in an underground or partially-enclosed station with several diesel locomotives idling away, you'll probably join me in wishing the hydrogen train test project team good luck with this initiative. The benefits of converting trains to fuel cells seem obvious, assuming this can ever be done at a competitive cost. At the same time, I hope the developers will take a broader view of hydrogen as not just another fuel, but as part of our overall energy ecology. That might lead them to an even more viable, beneficial result, with a better chance of showing up in real train yards, and eventually even passenger trains.

The Sun or the Atom

It looks like we might finally see a solar power installation built on a large enough scale to enable meaningful comparisons between it and our current largest low-emission energy source, nuclear power. Tuesday's announcement by First Solar, Inc. that it had negotiated a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese government to install up to 2,000 MW of capacity in Inner Mongolia could take solar out of the world of rooftops and into direct competition with central power plants. It also provides an opportunity to assess this technology on a more consistent basis with our other full-scale energy options, even if it's clear that they ultimately serve somewhat different portions of the power market.

For years I've been reading suggestions for covering large swaths of desert with solar panels, and this looks like the largest realistic proposal so far, involving 25 square miles of desert near the city of Ordos, China. While the Desertec project in North Africa might ultimately be much bigger, that still looks like a much more remote possibility, at this point, though it was also clear from First Solar's press release that their project in China will start at a modest scale of 30 MW and work its way up from there. I can't help wondering if some of the project's later phases might be contingent on continuing to reduce the cost of solar power from today's levels. As I noted recently, even with solar module costs below $1/Watt for First Solar's thin-film technology, non-module costs can still push total installed costs above $4/W. That would put the Ordos project in roughly the same category as a new nuclear power plant in terms of total cost, not just notional output.

And while we're looking at output, we ought to consider how comparable an installation of 2,000 MW of solar panels anywhere on earth would really be to two coal-fired power plants, as was mentioned in several news reports on this story. Although I couldn't find data specifying the actual annual number of peak-sun hours for Ordos City, a glance at this solar irradiance map of China suggests that this location gets around 6 kW/m2/day, equal to 6 peak-sun hours per day, on average. That gives this project an average capacity factor of 0.25, which means that 2,000 MW of peak solar power would generate roughly the same amount of electricity annually as one 700 MW coal-fired power plant or a single 550 MW nuclear power plant, if there were such a thing. Perhaps this project's biggest benefit is in its scalability. Unlike a new nuke, which would probably take about as long to build, the Chinese won't need to wait until the project was completed in 2019 to get useful electricity from it. Each sub-project would stand on its own, and the first one could start generating within a year or two.

On balance, then, this huge solar project could produce as much peak power as a pair of nuclear power plants (or large coal-fired plants)--though still quite a bit less than either of those technologies over the course of a year--while costing about as much as one large nuclear reactor, even allowing for significant cost improvement between the time the first and last solar panels are installed. How useful such a facility will be is largely a function of whether that region of China has a greater need for lots of power when the sun happens to shine, or reliable power around the clock. I'm as pleased as anyone that China appears to be diversifying its energy mix away from coal, even to a modest degree, and there's certainly nothing about building such a facility that precludes expanding nuclear power, since in the long run the country is likely to need lots more of both. Still, in terms of bang for the buck and without factoring in what this one project might do to help bring down the cost of solar power elsewhere, it hardly seems an obvious choice.

Cap & Trade, Gas Prices and Uncertainty

Over the weekend a New York Times editorial critical of the energy industry for trying to stir up opposition to the Waxman-Markey climate bill prompted some further thought on the potential impact of the legislation on gasoline prices. The Times appears to accept the government's analysis suggesting that the increase would amount to no more than 20 cents per gallon by 2020, though this conventional wisdom collides with common sense, since such a low price on carbon seems unlikely to stimulate sufficient conservation and investments in efficiency to deliver on a steadily-shrinking national emissions cap. In particular, the Times seems unfazed by the way the bill's allocation of free emission allowances is stacked against the oil industry, suggesting that it, of all industries, can surely afford the extra burden. Yet it's precisely that distortion that I believe could throw all of the official estimates of future permit prices--and thus gas prices--into a cocked hat, when you consider the possible dynamics of a market established along these lines.

Let's start by stating the obvious: I don't have a detailed computer model of the energy markets and US economy to query on the likely outcome from the cap & trade system that would be instituted under Waxman-Markey, though I could probably come up with some drastically-undervalued credit default swaps for anyone who believes in the infallibility of such models. My assessment relies instead on logic and the experience of a career that included a long stint in energy commodity trading, including futures, options and derivatives. Based on that experience, I believe the crucial starting point for any attempt to understand how a new market might function is supply and demand: who has the commodity in question and who needs it.

Begin with demand. The Department of Energy's recent "flash estimate" of US CO2 emissions indicates that the electricity sector accounts for 41% of emissions, followed by transportation with 33%, and the non-electricity-related emissions of the industrial sector a distant third at around 17%. These three segments thus account for 91% of our CO2 emissions, by far the largest component of our greenhouse gas output. Under cap & trade, every ton of those emissions would have to be matched with a corresponding emission allowance, or the emitter would be liable for penalties at a multiple of the going price for allowances. Anyone who is given fewer allowances than their current emissions must thus either reduce their emissions directly or purchase allowances from others. But who are the likely sellers? A careful reading of the bill provides strong hints

Under President Obama's original concept of cap & trade, in which 100% of emission allowances would have been auctioned by the government to the emitters that needed them, all sectors of the economy would have been in the same position of needing to cover their entire shortfall in the market. The government would have been the primary seller, though as the market evolved, companies that found cheap ways to reduce their own emissions would have ended up reselling allowances they had bought earlier, at a profit. Under Waxman-Markey, by my tally roughly 60% of the emission allowances would be handed out to emitters such as utilities, refiners and other industrial firms. Another 30% or so would be doled out in lieu of cash to fund efforts such as renewable energy R&D and deployment, climate adaptation and assistance to low-income consumers. Something less than 10% would be auctioned by the government itself to fund deficit reduction and other initiatives.

So on a given day, who would be selling and who would be buying? Consider the utilities and merchant power generators. As generous as the bill's authors were to this sector, it would still be short allowances from day 1, with a gap between actual emissions and free allowances equal to roughly 4% of US emissions. Non-energy industrial firms probably wouldn't be selling, either, at least unless the price got high enough to stimulate the big investments in energy efficiency that haven't risen to the top of their capital budget priorities so far. Initially, they would need to acquire allowances equal to around 5% of all emissions. And that brings us to refiners, who under Waxman-Markey would be responsible for their own emissions plus all of the emissions from the end-use of their products by non-regulated consumers, yet would receive only a 2% allocation of free allowances. Depending on how upstream production and oil imports are counted, the gap that refiners would need to cover could amount to more than 31% of all US emissions, or 3/4ths of the allowances given to non-emitting entities or auctioned directly by the government. At the same time, they have only modest scope for further reductions in their own emissions, considering that they are already 90% energy-efficient, on average. Who would be likely to have the advantage in such a situation? It sure looks like a "sellers' market" to me.

I don't doubt that refiners could probably scoop up some relatively cheap allowances from groups that get handed these tickets and don't quite know what to do with them, though market sophistication--and for-fee advice on such matters--might spread quickly. But refiners wouldn't just need to sweep up the stragglers, here. They'd require the entire allowance streams of many of the legislation's chosen beneficiaries for years to come, nor could they risk coming up massively short in any year. To me that suggests an average acquisition price for allowances that could rise well above the notional $15-$20/ton expounded by the EPA and DOE, considering that the effective price ceiling provided by brute-force CO2 reductions such as carbon capture and sequestration is probably north of $50/ton, equating to 50 cents per gallon of gasoline. While an increase that high might not be the likeliest outcome, it is at least plausible, and it would be added not to current gas prices, which have been depressed by the recession, but to those that would prevail after the legislation went into effect, when the economy--and perhaps even fuel demand--was presumably growing again. It doesn't take a leap of imagination to combine these factors to get to the $4 per gallon that the Times appears to dismiss.

From the last sentence of the editorial, I have to conclude that the Times doesn't understand the rationale for cap & trade nearly as well as they think they do. The point of this approach and any well-structured legislation implementing it is not to wean the US off of petroleum, but to reduce our emissions of the greenhouse gases implicated in climate change. While that certainly implies lower emissions from the oil sector, and thus lower consumption, it is perverse and counter-productive to shelter higher-emitting sectors that have greater flexibility for reducing emissions. The Congress may have judged that consumers would complain more about higher electricity bills than about increases at the gas pump, which could always be blamed on other factors--and on a singularly unpopular industry. But in creating such a wide disparity of demand for allowances among business sectors, they risk driving the price of those allowances much higher than otherwise, imposing an unnecessary drag on the economy. Even if their protests are motivated by self-interest, the oil industry and oil consumers are right to point this out.

What Does Tiber Tell Us?

Like many bloggers this week, I've been thinking about the implications of BP's big, new oil find in the Gulf of Mexico. Some analysts suggest that the Tiber field might contain as much as 3-4 billion barrels of oil, though much of it might never be recovered. The Wall St. Journal's Environmental Capital blog suggests that such discoveries serve as a kind of Rorschach test, with the various interpretations of it telling us more about the observer than the thing being observed. Fair enough. Without venturing into grandiose conclusions about whether the Tiber-1 deep water well refutes--or in some convoluted fashion confirms--the central hypothesis of the Peak Oil theory, this discovery provides a handy opportunity to remind my readers of a few principles and themes about oil exploration and production that I've been discussing here for the last six years:

1. There's still life in the old dog. While the US has been drilled like a pincushion for 150 years, we have still not found every barrel of oil that nature provided us. Don't be misled by proved reserves data that seem to show that we have less than 12 years of oil left at current production rates. In point of fact, the US has produced a cumulative 200 billion barrels of oil from reserves that never exceeded 40 billion barrels. Not only do we continue to find new resources in the manner of Tiber-1, but we continually learn how to extract more oil from the reservoirs we've already found, revising their reserves steadily upward over time.
2. A discovery like Tiber doesn't mean we've merely added two weeks worth of production to reserves. US oil production, like global production, is comprised of the contributions from thousands of oil fields and hundreds of thousands of oil wells, with the most productive 20% or so accounting for roughly 87% of output. If initial guesses of recoverable oil are right, then the Tiber field could yield on the order of 100,000 bbl/day of oil for 20 years--2% of US production for a generation. If we turn up our noses at that, then we surely ought to think twice about wind power. In 2008 all the wind turbines in the US generated 52 billion kilowatt-hours, backing out natural gas power generation equivalent to just 245,000 bbl/day of oil, or 5% of US oil output.
3. We've heard a lot from skeptics about how inconsequential the oil in areas that have been off limits to drilling would be, whether we're talking about offshore California, the eastern Gulf of Mexico, or the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Yet without actually exploring these areas using the kind of technology that found the Lower Tertiary trend of which Tiber appears to be a part, in a place that just a few years ago would have seemed both inaccessible and highly improbable, we can't know what's really there, waiting to be discovered. In that light, the official estimate of 18 billion barrels of "undiscovered, technically recoverable" oil in these areas must be regarded as an extremely conservative lower bound, based on totally obsolete 1970s technology.
4. Although finding more oil may look problematic from a greenhouse gas perspective, oil is not our worst fuel, and it remains the hardest to displace, because of its unique combination of energy density and portability. I share the vision of many for a future made up of electrified cars and low- or no-emission power plants, but we're going to burn many billions of barrels of oil getting there. For reasons including national security, national pride, and our balance of trade, it matters whose oil it will be, as we make the long transition to a more sustainable energy economy. If we ignore that principle, we're likely to end up even more reliant on unstable foreign suppliers, before we arrive at the elusive promised land of energy independence.

Can Solar Compete?

I'm still catching up on articles I missed during my recent vacation. A pair of them from MIT's Technology Review caught my attention, because they seemed to contradict each other. In this month's briefing on low-carbon electricity technologies, TR concluded that while the cost of solar power has declined significantly, it remains too expensive to compete with electricity from fossil fuels. What's needed, they indicate, is better technology. And yet in another article earlier in August TR reported that industry experts at a recent symposium argued that current solar technology had already achieved the necessary cost reductions to compete with conventional energy, and would become more competitive as it scales up. If even MIT's signature technology journal can't agree who's right on this point, how in the world should policy makers decide whether the priority for solar should be further R&D or deployment of the technology we've already got?

There's little debate that solar power is one of the most promising energy options available to us, at least for eventually replacing much of the electricity we currently generate from fossil fuels. The basic science has been well-understood for a long time, either in terms of photovoltaic cells that produce power directly, or the use of concentrated solar radiation to generate steam for power. Unlike energy technologies such as biofuels from cellulose or algae, we don't have to wonder whether we can ever harness solar at a useful scale. Notwithstanding the serious challenges of transmission, distribution and storage, we know that if we covered a modest fraction of the surface area of the US with solar panels or concentrators, they could generate as much electricity as we currently consume, in contrast to the 2/100ths of a percent that it contributed last year. So while there's still plenty of room to improve the technology for turning sunlight into electricity, the main obstacle we encounter is cost. If solar isn't quite cheap enough today, could merely scaling up the existing technologies make it truly cost-competitive with power from coal and natural gas?

Answering that question is complicated by the way we typically compare different power generating technologies on the basis of their "capacity" costs--what it costs to manufacture and install or construct them. For many years the solar industry has pursued a goal based on reducing the manufacturing cost of a solar module below $1 per peak Watt, which would roughly match the installed cost of a gas turbine power plant and come in around half the cost of a coal-fired power plant. Last year a company called First Solar announced that it had reached that milestone. Unfortunately, however, module costs are only half the story. A solar installation requires more than the bare solar module, which converts sunlight into DC power. In fact, a recent study by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory showed that in the last decade non-module costs had declined from around $6 per Watt to just under $4. So even if we extrapolate that trend to $3/W, the installed cost of the industry-leading solar technology would still be around $4/W, and many of the utility-scale solar projects I've been reading about come in around $5-6/W, a level that is far higher than the cost of a natural gas turbine.

Of course gas turbines have a big hidden cost, too, in the form of a perpetual fuel requirement. If you do the math, though, even with fuel cost included a gas turbine runs around half the cost of currently-deployed utility-scale solar power. In order to calculate this, you must make an assumption about how many hours per day the turbine will operate. For the purposes of an apples-to-apples comparison, I chose six hours, which is roughly the number of peak-sun-hours that a solar array would get in a prime location in the Southwest. At a conservative heat rate of 10,000 BTU/kWh, the comparable fuel consumption for each Watt over 20 years would be around 440,000 BTUs. That sounds like a lot, but at recent natural gas prices it would cost around $2. Add another buck for the capacity cost, and we're under $3/W on an undiscounted basis. (Assume that future gas prices inflate at the discount rate, and the NPV would match this figure.) Even adding a $20/ton charge for CO2 emissions would only bring that up by about $0.50/W, based on average emissions for gas-fired power plants. That ignores maintenance and other costs, but then I've ignored solar array maintenance and the gradual deterioration of solar cell output, as well.

In this simple comparison, at least, it appears that today's best solar technology is still somewhat more expensive than the fossil-based power it's likely to be displacing in a typical power grid, while most of the solar arrays now being installed reflect costs at least 40% higher than gas turbines, even after accounting for fuel and CO2 emissions. I'm skeptical that simple economies of scale beyond those already achieved could deliver that kind of improvement any time soon. That might explain the necessity for a 30% federal tax credit or grant on solar installations, along with generous state-level incentives and renewable portfolio standards--mandates on utilities for a targeted level of renewable power. Absent these, much of today's solar activity would probably grind to a halt.

In this light, answering the question we started with requires defining the basis on which we expect solar power to compete in the future. If we're satisfied with needing to apply a combination of incentives and utility mandates more or less indefinitely, in order to achieve the desired level of solar power deployment, then the current technology and its incremental evolution might be perfectly adequate to the task. If, on the other hand, we'd prefer to see solar and other renewables weaned off these subsidies and able to compete on a truly level playing field with conventional energy sources--after adjusting for emissions at market prices--then it looks like a lot more R&D is called for.

150 Years of Oil

As I noted in my first posting of the month, August 2009 marks the 150th anniversary of the first commercial oil well. Edwin Drake's well in Titusville, PA hit "paydirt" on August 27, 1859, and the world has never been the same since, though it took decades for oil production to grow beyond levels that would seem trivial today. In its early years the price of oil was even more volatile in real terms than it has been recently, as new sources of supply and new markets repeatedly swung the industry from boom to bust and back again. That led to numerous business failures, consolidations, and the eventual domination of a few large players. Although the world is quite different today, and history rarely repeats itself exactly, there might still be some lessons for alternative energy firms in the early history of the incumbent industry they are attempting to unseat.

Oil statistics back to 1859 are a little shaky, though this chart of oil's annual production history provides a useful overview of the early trends, if we ignore the portion devoted to projecting future output. From its current position of energy dominance, it's easy to forget that the initial success of oil was hardly a foregone conclusion, and its biggest early gains were matched by serious setbacks. While oil has never relinquished the lubricant markets it captured early on, kerosene met a very different fate. It was the most important oil product for several decades, rapidly penetrating illumination markets and displacing whale oil, which was facing its own imminent Peak Oil by then. However, it's no accident that one of the most important early markets for my former employer, Texaco Inc., which along with many other firms grew out of the great gusher at Spindletop, TX more than 40 years after Drake's well, was "oil for the lamps of China." By the early 20th century the US lighting market was already being swept by electrification. Oil was rescued from impending oblivion when a relatively unimportant byproduct called gasoline found its "killer ap" in the early automobile.

As impressive as the growth rates for wind and solar power have been over the last few years, they still fall short of the early growth of car ownership. Between 1901 and 1916, annual US car registrations grew from a few thousand units to over one million, a sustained compound average growth of around 40% per year. Over the same interval, oil production more than quadrupled, led by the combination of soaring demand for gasoline, which was produced by simple distillation of petroleum in "tea kettle" refineries, and the discovery of numerous large oil fields. This remarkable growth wasn't spurred by government incentives or economics that made oil and its products merely a little better than their closest competition. It was the result of a quantum leap in personal mobility facilitated by oil's extraordinary inherent advantages in convenience. Huge surpluses of energy could be extracted from the ground and delivered relatively easily and cheaply to cars in the most remote corners of the country.

The difference in oil's success in the transportation and illumination markets is clear. In modern terms we'd say that two transformational technologies competed head to head, with each ultimately dominating the market in which it had clear advantages of better/faster/cheaper. Kerosene, which lost to electric lighting, is only important today because it turned out to make a wonderful fuel for a device that didn't exist in Drake's time, the jet engine. And it has taken a further century for the technology of electricity to advance to the point at which it is again competitive in transportation, having once lost that battle definitively a century ago, with the mass production of the Model T.

The lessons for today's energy situation are worth contemplating. For example, ethanol has just experienced a boom and bust cycle that the early oil barons would readily understand. Over-investment in capacity still destroys margins, and distribution remains a serious constraint. More importantly, perhaps, ethanol lacks a better/faster/cheaper edge as it fights for market share with petroleum products. Must true success for biofuels await innovations that will turn cheap cellulose into molecules that carry energy at least as efficiently as those in oil, or for the mass production of new conversion devices (engines or fuel cells) that can overcome ethanol's shortcomings relative to gasoline? Oil's history poses similar questions for wind and solar power, which for all their environmental benefits remain costlier and less reliable than conventional sources of electricity. Subsidies and regulations seem anemic substitutes for the inherent advantages of cost and convenience that can sweep away incumbent technologies within a decade or two. I can't help wondering whether the story of today's alternative energy technologies will more resemble that of oil's experience in illumination or in transportation.

The Demise of MPG

Even before the advent of partially- or fully-electric cars, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the old fuel economy metric of miles per gallon isn't as useful for measuring energy consumption in vehicles as when it was first codified in the original Corporate Average Fuel Economy standard in the 1970s. That is due in part to the proliferation of new fuels--E85, LPG, LNG, CNG, methanol, and hydrogen--but also because expressing the relationship between distance and volume in this way obscured the diminishing returns to higher levels of fuel economy. As a Wall St. Journal column earlier this week put it, adding electricity into the mpg mix, "risks giving consumers inaccurate information about the financial and environmental costs of driving." But if we need a new metric, what should it measure?

I've been interested in this issue for some time, and GM's recent announcement that its new Volt plug-in hybrid achieves 230 mpg in city driving prompted some further thought. I don't doubt the accuracy of that figure or the thought that GM's engineers put into bridging this new vehicle type into a system that was designed when the average US fuel economy was 13.1 mpg and unleaded gasoline was the newest fuel around. Yet all this figure tells us is how much liquid fuel the car's generator would consume over a carefully-chosen driving interval, completely ignoring the electricity--with its cost and consequences--required to deliver that result. Nissan's Twittered riposte that it's new Leaf electric car gets 367 mpg is even less useful, because the assumptions behind it are not clear--and might just ignore some basic engineering realities.

Without access to Nissan's calculation, I can only guess at how they might have arrived at it by backing into it. (Skip this if you hate numbers.) Start with the fact that each gallon of petroleum gasoline (without ethanol) carries 115,000 BTUs of energy. At an official conversion of 3412 BTUs per kilowatt-hour (kWh), that equates to 33.7 kWh per gallon, so 367 mpg implies that the Leaf would go nearly 11 miles per kWh. That's pretty amazing by itself, considering that the Volt is generally expected to go between 4 and 6 miles per kWh. It also suggests that the Leaf would be using less than half of its 24 kWh Lithium Ion battery pack to deliver its advertised 100 mile range. But even if this is all correct, there's a basic problem with the calculation; in the real world it can take a lot more than 3,412 BTUs of primary energy to generate one kWh of electricity, depending on how you do it. If the power source is surplus wind, solar or nuclear power that wasn't already being used to displace power generated from fossil fuels, the BTUs required could be effectively zero. Otherwise, for power generated from coal or natural gas they would range between 6,000-12,000 BTU/kWh. Even assuming a relatively conservative 8,000 BTU/kWh for the natural gas turbines that provide the incremental power supply for many markets, the resulting equivalent mpg falls from 367 to 156 mpg. But that still doesn't tell us enough, in my estimation.

The problem here is the existence of a variety of perspectives on vehicle energy efficiency with competing information needs. From the standpoint of energy policy, we are most concerned about annual oil consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. We already have a new federal mileage standard that is set in terms of grams of CO2-equivalent per mile, which gets at the latter issue. The EPA's current mpg methodology based on liquid fuels comes close to addressing the former, though the increasing contribution of biofuels renders it suspect. Unfortunately, any standard or metric that treats non-petroleum energy as essentially free seems certain to result in colossal unintended consequences, as non-oil energy sources ramp up. The engineer in me would argue strongly for something like the MPGe calculation used for the Automotive X-Prize, comparing all the energy delivered to the car in any form with how far the car went. However, from a consumer perspective that still seems overly complex and opaque. While I would certainly prefer the inverted form of fuel economy--gallons per 100 miles--to our current mpg, it's hard to beat miles per dollar as a means of comparing how much it will cost the average driver to operate any of these new cars.

Money is the common denominator for most of the things we consume, so why shouldn't it be for vehicle energy, as well? At current pump prices, an average American passenger car goes about 9.5 miles per dollar (mp$), while a Prius-type hybrid approaches 20 mp$. If we factor in electricity at the national average retail price of $0.11/kWh, then the Chevrolet Volt would deliver something in the vicinity of 30 mp$, if I've correctly understood how they arrived at their 230 mpg figure, while the Leaf might yield as much as 99 mp$--though my natural skepticism about its unofficial claims leads me to suspect it would be closer to 45 mp$. Of course, when you have to pay $5,000-10,000 extra for a battery pack, you'd certainly hope the operating cost per mile would be a lot lower than for a conventional car. And that's precisely the kind of comparison that a truly useful fuel economy metric should facilitate.

In the near term, the EPA should continue its work on adapting the familiar mpg metric to a new world of more diverse vehicle technologies, but for the longer term it ought to convene other government agencies, car and fuel companies, universities, and consumer groups for the purpose of developing a new and more helpful set of metrics that would tell consumers what they need to know about costs and consequences as the car fleet undergoes its long transition toward an uncertain destination.

Deficits, Dollars, and the Price of Energy

The latest revision to the forecasted federal deficit has implications beyond the sustainability of current government spending. Reading a pair of high-profile, skeptical assessments of Peak Oil in the context of a $9 trillion deficit projection for the next decade, it occurred to me that the most serious risk of higher oil prices in the near future might not be flagging production or surging demand but the further depreciation of the US dollar. The quickest route back to $4 gasoline could run through Washington, DC, rather than Riyadh or Beijing, and that might not be as helpful for renewable energy as its advocates might guess.

The main worry I've heard expressed about the size of the federal deficit has focused on the risk of inflation. However, high deficits carry another risk that could have a much more direct effect on energy prices, which in turn could help re-ignite inflation. The problem is acute because it goes well beyond the one-time impact of federal stimulus efforts, which have apparently ballooned this year's deficit to $1.6 trillion. Fundamentally, there is a persistent and growing gap between government revenue and expenses, exacerbated by high unemployment and lower income--and thus lower tax collection--particularly from the top quintile of earners who have consistently been paying 86% of the federal income tax. Unless that gap can be brought back into line with recent history, the government will soon face a difficult choice. Financing a steady stream of trillion-dollar annual deficits will require either interest rates high enough to attract investment from all over the world--and thus high enough to stifle a nascent recovery--or the monetization of the debt by means of the Federal Reserve printing even more money than recently. The latter course, which seems likely to be more politically palatable, despite Dr. Bernanke's reappointment, would inevitably weaken the dollar and lead in fairly short order to higher energy prices.

We got a taste of this effect in 2007, when oil prices and the dollar moved in opposite directions in an oil-dollar price loop that looked more than merely coincidental. A weaker dollar encourages producers to raise prices, or to consider pricing their output in a stronger, more stable currency. Meanwhile, non-US consumers experience stable or falling energy prices that encourage demand growth, which eventually leads to higher prices in all currencies. Either way, US consumers would see higher prices for petroleum products, though it's not clear how much further demand could fall in the near term, with US oil consumption already running 10% below 2007's, on a comparable year-to-date basis.

The dollar has already weakened by about 10% against the Euro and 5% vs. the Japanese Yen since March, as the resolution of the financial crisis and early signs of a global recovery have eased the fears that prompted a classic flight to dollar safety. This shift merely returns the exchange rate to roughly its level of pre-crisis 2008. Oil prices have risen by around 40% over the same interval, though how much of that is due to a weaker dollar is far from clear. However, from today's $70/bbl level, another 25% drop in the value of the dollar could return us to the threshold of $100 oil.

Higher oil prices due to a weaker dollar would not necessarily be beneficial for biofuels and other alternatives to oil, either. If we learned anything from the oil price spike of 2006-'08, it was that higher oil prices don't automatically make alternative energy more competitive. If only oil prices were moving, it might be helpful, but the only way to achieve that is through taxation, not inflation or currency depreciation. Just as oil functions in a global market, so too the components of the main alternative energy technologies have become global, with wind turbines and solar panels sourced globally and in high demand in many regions. So too for the steel and other basic materials for constructing such installations, as well as the grains and oilseeds turned into ethanol and biodiesel. A weaker dollar wouldn't just mean higher oil prices, but higher prices at least for all of the new energy sources to which we are turning in our effort to address climate change and bolster our energy security.

At an average price for 2008 of $93/bbl, oil made up just 15% of the value of the goods and services we imported last year, and a weaker dollar would see the prices of a host of other things--cars, electronics, call-center assistance, for example--go up, as well, fueling inflation and further depressing our standard of living. That scenario is hardly inevitable. A sea change on the part of the American public could convince the Congress and administration that we are finally prepared to pay for the government we have been demanding, or to see government services fall to a level commensurate with the level of taxation we appear willing to bear. Or the Fed could start raising interest rates to defend the dollar, in spite of the consequences for economic growth and unemployment. I'm pretty sure which choice I'd vote for.

US Refineries Under Cap & Trade

A new study confirms my previous suspicions that the allocation of free emission allowances in the Waxman-Markey climate bill would disproportionately disadvantage the US oil sector, with serious consequences for our energy security. In particular, it quantifies the impact on the refining sector, which was chosen by the bill's authors as the focal point for collecting the "tax" on all carbon emissions from the use of petroleum products. In the view of EnSys Energy Systems, Inc., based on their model of global downstream petroleum markets, US refineries would run much less crude oil and be able to invest much less in modernization. As a result, US imports of refined products would grow significantly, despite lower overall consumption, and employment in the US refining sector would fall, while the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from domestic refineries would be largely offset by increases abroad. Such an outcome would benefit neither the global climate nor US national security.

When I examined the preliminary version of Waxman-Markey in early June, I concluded that because it doled out so many free emission allowances to the electricity sector, its main effect for at least the first two decades would be to function as a tax on the petroleum sector, though without the clarity and transparency of a gasoline tax. Those allocations didn't change materially during negotiations, with the final House bill offering roughly 2% of emission allowances to refineries that would be saddled with the responsibility for between 33% and 44% of all US GHG emissions, depending on how you slice them. Compare that to the electricity sector, which accounts for 39% of emissions but would get at least 35% of the free allowances.

Rather than going through the details of the EnSys study, which was commissioned by API, I'd like to approach this by considering how an evenly-distributed cap & trade system (or carbon tax) should reasonably be expected to affect the oil industry, which after all accounts for a major share of US emissions. You'd hardly expect it to get off scot-free. However, it's a fact that most emissions in the petroleum value chain occur when refined fuel is burned, rather than during production (extraction) or refining. The Ensys study puts the refining contribution at less than 10% of all emissions from well to wheels. Although refiners ought to see their operating costs rise under cap & trade, giving them further incentives to increase their already impressive efficiency of roughly 90% (energy out vs. energy in), the impact should properly be relatively modest. The bulk of the impact from cap & trade should manifest in the form of higher end-user prices for gasoline, diesel and jet fuel, putting commensurate pressure on consumers to use less. The outcome of that reduction would fall on the marginal suppliers of refined products to the US market: foreign refiners that sent us over 3 million barrels per day last year. EnSys concludes that Waxman-Markey would have entirely the opposite result, enriching foreign refiners at the expense of the employees and owners of US facilities.

I wouldn't be surprised if the EnSys study were greeted with the customary skepticism of a finding that supports the interests of the constituency that paid for it. API and its member companies have much at stake in this debate. But if you doubt the likelihood of the scenario it describes, you need only review the regulatory history of the US refining industry and the long-term trend of our refined product imports, which have increased at double the rate of our crude oil imports. Between 1993 and 2007--before the recession axed them--net US refined product imports (after subtracting out exports) grew by a compound average rate of roughly 6% per year, compared to an average increase of 3% per year for net crude imports over the same period. This coincided with increasingly strict regulations on permits for new facilities and on refinery emissions of criteria pollutants, along with ever-tougher rules on gasoline and diesel fuel specifications, culminating in the current reformulated gasoline and ultra-low-sulfur diesel specs. With the exception of a couple of years of stellar margins late in that interval, returns on refinery investments were very poor, and the major oil companies were steadily shedding refining capacity as a bad bet. Today, even the independent refining companies that created profitable businesses by purchasing these assets at a fraction of their replacement cost are suffering from low profits.

If anything, the economic impact on the US refining industry from regulating carbon emissions could be even worse than this recent history, since it hinges on the basic chemistry of combustion itself, rather than the removal of impurities that constitute only a small percentage of their feedstock inputs, even for the highest-sulfur crudes. That could happen even with an even-handed approach to cap & trade or a carbon tax, but it would be a certainty under a system that appears designed mainly to shield utilities and their customers at the expense of the entire existing transportation fuel system. The principal means of reducing GHGs from the latter is through cuts in consumption, not more efficient refining, and even our recent low level of product imports offers the opportunity to cut our emissions from petroleum products by roughly 7% with a minimal effect on US refineries. Instead, Waxman-Markey would effectively offshore many of those refineries--and their emissions. In a world transfixed by market failures, that would constitute a regulatory failure of the first magnitude.

Climate vs. Security?

In the last few years I've watched perceptions of US energy security and climate change, the two main drivers of energy policy, converge gradually toward a general sense that smart climate policy will be good for energy security, and vice versa. There's even a growing understanding that a stable climate contributes to national security, distinct from any energy considerations. However, there are still cases with strongly divergent energy security and climate change implications, and a new pipeline that will deliver crude extracted from Canadian oil sands is a prime example. The US State Department's approval of this project looks entirely appropriate and sensible, even if it conflicts with the administration's emphasis on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Like it or not--and largely because of past decisions concerning our own off-limits oil resources--Canadian oil sands have become an essential pillar of US energy security.

The "Alberta Clipper" pipeline of Enbridge, Inc. could eventually bring up to 800,000 barrels per day of Canadian crude oil to refineries in the US Midwest, as oil sands production in Alberta Province continues to grow. This oil would displace imports from the Middle East and West Africa, which absent oil sands are likely to grow, in spite of increasing biofuel production and higher fuel economy standards for new cars. That's because output from Mexico, our other main local supplier, is dropping sharply, while higher production from Brazil may only offset declines in Venezuela, which has grossly mismanaged its oil sector. Oil sands are already compensating for the steady decline in conventional Canadian oil production, and without them our imports from our largest oil supplier couldn't be sustained at their current level of roughly 10% of US oil consumption--equating to about five times the energy content of current US ethanol production. There is simply no realistic energy scenario for the next 20 years in which we could forgo imports of Canadian crude produced from oil sands, without a corresponding increase in imports from the Middle East.

The main concern cited about oil sands relates to its higher emissions of greenhouse gases, compared to conventional oil production. This is indisputable, though it's important to put those higher emissions into perspective, while also recognizing that technology and an increased Canadian emphasis on these emissions should reduce this disparity over time. The most recent study I've seen on the subject indicates that although the processes for producing useful liquids from Canadian oil sands result in roughly three times the upstream greenhouse gas emissions of the average barrel of US supply, the well-to-wheels lifecycle emissions are only 17% higher than average. In either case, most of the emissions from oil occur when it is burned in vehicles or other end-uses, not during production. While not insignificant, the excess emissions from oil sands can be offset less expensively elsewhere in our energy economy, particularly if the ultimate US climate legislation gives the utility sector the right incentives to cut its CO2 emissions, which are roughly a fifth larger than those from oil consumed in transportation.

Greenhouse gas emissions aren't the only environmental impact associated with oil sands, but we lack any reasonable or consistent way to assess the trade-off between the others and the potential impacts--physical or aesthetic--of increasing our own oil production from the significant resources we have placed off-limits to exploitation, including the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and the outer continental shelves of California and other states. In effect, American policy makers and consumers have implicitly chosen to ramp up oil output in Alberta to spare other areas of greater concern to American voters. Such decisions have left us reliant on this Canadian energy resource, the incremental greenhouse gas consequences of which can be offset elsewhere. The State Department appears to have reached a similar conclusion.

The Climate-Industrial Complex

An emailed link I received the other day led to a fascinating article featuring a truly eyebrow-raising statistic. According to the Center for Public Integrity the number of companies and groups now lobbying the US Congress on the subject of climate change has passed the 1,000 mark with room to spare, standing at 1,150 as of the second quarter of 2009. Now, in one sense that figure shouldn't surprise anyone; the pending legislation on greenhouse gas emissions would affect nearly everyone in America, directly or indirectly, and it would be remarkable if numerous firms and organizations didn't want to help shape the rules that will govern our future emissions. But let's not kid ourselves. There's more than altruism behind such activity, and the last few Congresses have encouraged it with an approach that turns important legislation such as this into a potential bonanza for favored sectors and groups. In addition to its primary economy-revamping aspects, the climate bill puts hundreds of billions of dollars in tax credits, subsidies, and direct research, development and deployment investment up for grabs, while levying massive sums to pay for it all. Deft lobbying could yield huge rewards or savings.

Browsing through the search function on the Center for Public Integrity climate change site turned up a fascinating array of companies and groups lobbying the Congress on this issue. Traditional energy firms are well represented, including both resource/refining companies and a large number of electricity suppliers and their trade associations. In a sign of the growing strength of the renewable energy sector the list includes not just the expected alphabet soup of "trades" such as AWEA, ACORE, RFA, and SEIA, but also individual biofuel, wind, solar, fuel cell, and synthetic fuels companies. If this fight drags out, or the SEC follows through on threats to force companies to disclose their potential climate change liabilities, the list of participants seems likely to grow even longer.

Nor is it just industrial concerns seeking to protect their interests or capture a piece of the new pie; organizations ranging from AARP to the Water Research Foundation and including, of all things, the National Turfgrass Federation want to be heard on this issue. Then we have agricultural interests, who as the article describes achieved a very valuable save for the ethanol industry in the House at the climax of the Waxman-Markey negotiations. If you're interested in seeing who else is represented and how much they've put into this fight, I encourage you to browse this useful database and its pre-set reports.

I don't blame companies for chasing the plums that Congress is offering. There's too much at stake for many to eschew that pursuit on principle. I do wonder, however, whether this could possibly be the best way to embark on what looks like the most important change in our economy in the last several decades. The outcome now rests with the US Senate. If it is willing to challenge the House over a distorted system for allocating free emission allowances, and the agricultural lobby on requiring corn ethanol to demonstrate that it actually improves global greenhouse gas emissions, compared to petroleum-derived fuels, while rationalizing a plethora of marginally-related provisions, then we might get a climate bill that puts a price on emissions without contorting the economy more than the minimum amount necessary to achieve that end. Otherwise, we will end up with legislation that will tell us more about which sectors and groups wielded the most influence in Washington, DC this year than about how best to cut emissions.

Note: Energy Outlook will be on vacation for the next week or so. New postings should resume on 7/21/09.

The Influence of "Peak Oil"

An article in the Washington Post this weekend, together with a must-read interview in The Independent, a paper I used to read regularly when I lived in London, reminded me of an observation I made several years ago concerning the similarities between Peak Oil and Y2K. Having spent a fair amount of time in my former corporate role planning for the serious outcomes the latter might have produced, I don't intend this as a slam on the former. Without rehashing the technical arguments behind either phenomenon, it's worth spending a few minutes thinking about the consequences of a growing belief that we might be only a few years away from the end of oil, as we know it. Whatever one's take on the validity of the Peak Oil argument, it has already evoked noteworthy consequences, both positive and negative.

A week ago The Independent ran an interview with Fatih Birol, chief economist of the International Energy Agency (IEA). In it Dr. Birol repeated a warning he has issued previously, that higher-than-expected decline rates in the world's mature oil fields and "chronic underinvestment by oil-producing countries" are setting up a severe oil supply crunch within the next few years, as a recovering global economy resumes its growth in energy consumption. It's not hard to imagine the "green shoots" withering if oil reprised its 2007-8 march from around $70/bbl to nearly $150. From the supply side, I have little doubt that this is correct, for reasons I've mentioned frequently in the past: restrictions on access to resources, routine diversion of national oil company profits into social budgets at the expense of reinvestment, chronic project delays, and the inherently long timelags between discovery and production. I'm less convinced that the demand side of the equation would play out the same as last time, with that experience so fresh in our minds. At the very least, though, Dr. Birol describes a highly credible scenario, and belief in its likelihood could have far-reaching consequences, good and bad.

On the plus side, our reactions needn't go to the extent of the author of a Washington Post piece, searching for self-sufficiency on a small farm in New Mexico, to have a beneficial impact on consumption patterns. Our best chance of avoiding the apocalyptic outcomes that Mr. Fine fears is to live our lives on the assumption that the days of cheap oil are indeed past, and that it will be more expensive in the future. From initial reports of the transactions involved in the Cash for Clunkers program, many people already sense this, despite gasoline prices that remain one-third below where they were at this time last year. And while I certainly don't advocate survivalism as an indicated strategy for individuals, everyone who chooses to downshift in this way stretches out the supplies available for the rest of us, making the transition to more sustainable energy sources more manageable. Merely being prepared mentally for another oil crisis might reduce the likelihood of counterproductive behavior, such as hoarding, should we find ourselves in one.

Unfortunately, these psychological effects also point to the main downside of a widespread belief in imminent Peak Oil. While I remain unconvinced of the role of speculation in last year's spike in physical oil prices, to whatever extent the s-word was driving prices on the oil futures exchanges it was underpinned by a pervasive mentality that we were experiencing something truly unprecedented, backed by hints that oil supplies had already reached their natural limit. If you believe in the inevitability of Peak Oil, today's oil futures prices must look like a buy--a steal, even at levels over $90 for delivery in 2016 or 2017.

There are many good reasons to invest in the alternative energy sources that would help mitigate a true Peak Oil crisis down the road, and that hold the seeds of eventually escaping from that threat entirely. The real mark of success for our various renewable energy, nuclear renaissance, and energy efficiency efforts would be the eventual arrival of a peak in global oil output without crippling the economy. However, the dark side of Peak Oil is a self-defeating notion that no amount of increased investment in new oil production can make any worthwhile difference in this outcome.

If the IEA is right, we certainly can't escape this pickle by drilling alone. However, it's equally true that if oil production began to drop in the next few years, no other strategy, by itself or in combination--not even dramatic improvements in energy efficiency--could make a big enough difference to avoid a serious, economy-wrenching crisis. Many of the cars on the road in 2015 will either be those already on the road today or others very similar to them, if a bit thriftier with fuel. Nor could we electrify more than a small fraction of the global car park within that timeframe, let alone a US car fleet of 245 million vehicles at a time when sales (and thus turnover) have collapsed. Double today's biofuel output--which in that timeframe mainly means more corn ethanol, with all its problems--and we still won't have made a big enough dent.

Inescapably we will need as much more oil as we could eke out, because the whole world would be going through this transition at once. If we're saving the oil in ANWR, offshore California, and the Eastern Gulf of Mexico for a rainy day, then imminent Peak Oil would be that deluge, and it takes 5-10 years to go from bidding on leases to full production. Even if this bought us only an extra 1 million barrels per day--Mr. Pickens apparently thinks twice that--the value of that to the US in a world of $200 oil would be $73 billion/year in today's dollars, along with the possible preservation of critical services if the shortfall that went beyond a mere price spike. The US can't make up for the problem of "chronic underinvestment by oil-producing countries" of which Dr. Birol rightly warns, but we could certainly exacerbate it through deliberate under-investment in our own oil capacity.

Plug and Pay

Yesterday's photo-op at an Indiana RV factory for the purpose of announcing more federal assistance for the electric vehicle industry came just a few days after Nissan debuted its Leaf electric car, which might become the first mass-market EV in the world. Cars powered by batteries alone or a combination of batteries and conventional engines look like one of the most promising long-term solutions to the dual problems of energy security and climate change. But precisely because of their potential to have such a large impact, it's vital that the economic arrangements for their energy consumption are put on the right basis from the start. Among other things, that means avoiding the temptation to provide free public recharging for them. If we get this wrong, we risk negating much of the energy and greenhouse gas benefit these cars offer. We could also inadvertently deter the substantial private investment in recharging infrastructure that would be needed to make EVs fully competitive with cars running on liquid fuels.

Against the backdrop of $2.4 billion in new subsidies for EV and battery manufacturers and federal electric vehicle tax credits ranging up to $7,500 per car, my concerns about collecting for the electricity actually used by the first few mass-production EVs might seem disproportionate or even eccentric. After all, how much juice can a few battery cars use, compared to our factories, office buildings, and billions of home appliances? Initially, very little and eventually still less than you might imagine. If every vehicle-mile traveled in the US were driven in an EV averaging 3 miles per kilowatt-hour (kWh), US electricity consumption would only increase by about 27%. The impact on emissions is much harder to assess, however, since it depends heavily on which generating technologies deliver the power used by EVs, and that in turn depends to a large degree on the time of day when they are recharged. Charge up at 3 AM, and you might be getting zero-emission wind power that would otherwise go to waste. Charge up at 3 PM, and you are almost certainly going to be drawing on a gas turbine somewhere--probably a fairly inefficient "peaking" unit--or a coal power plant. To put that in perspective, let's look at the emissions from two comparable cars, under both scenarios.

For our baseline, consider a Prius-type hybrid that gets all of its energy from the fuel that goes into its tank. At 50 mpg, its emissions from gasoline amount to roughly 40 lb. of CO2 per 100 miles. For an EV getting 4 miles per kWh and recharged with wind power, they would be essentially zero. However, the same car recharging during mid-peak or peak electricity demand would trigger power plant emissions between 35 lb. ("peaker" turbine @ 12,000 BTU/kWh on natural gas) and 53 lb. (average US coal plant) for every 100 miles. In other words, while the hidden emissions from an EV would in the worst case still be lower than those of the average car in America today (around 80 lb. CO2/100 mi.), they could be substantially higher than from an ordinary hybrid that never plugs in. So if we want EVs to repay the substantial national investment we're making in them by reducing our fossil fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, we will want them to recharge as little as possible during daylight hours, particularly in the late afternoon, at least until wind, solar and geothermal power account for a much higher share of our annual electricity generation than the 1.6% they contributed last year.

Paying for the electricity to recharge plug-in electric vehicles involves major cultural and behavioral shifts. The price of gasoline is one of the most visible, ubiquitous and transparent prices in our society. You stand at the pump and see the dollars going into your tank. But when you recharge an EV at home, unless you have a separate electric meter, you're going to have to sift through a power bill with a welter of distribution, fuel and non-fuel supply charges plus various state and local taxes and fees to see what it actually cost. At the current national average rate of around $0.11/kWh, a typical driver might only see an extra $27 a month, a big savings compared to the typical gasoline bill even at the current $2.55/gal. The extra power cost could easily get lost in seasonal usage fluctuations and rate changes. The impact would likely be more noticeable for utility customers in places with sharply graduated rate structures or time-of-use rates. For many people, however, even if they don't charge up using someone else's electricity--their employer's, their town's, or the local Starbucks'--it could look nearly free.

That would have implications for companies that are building vehicle recharging infrastructure that would need to recoup their investment on a per-kWh basis or, like Better Place, charges per mile of usage in a manner similar to cellphone service contracts. Those investments won't happen and the companies involved will go out of business if consumers regard the electricity for their new plug-in vehicles as effectively free and resist paying as they now do for fuel.

How this will all turn out is anyone's guess at this point, and I emphasize "guess." Until there are at least hundreds of thousands of these vehicles on the road, in the hands of many ordinary consumers and not just unrepresentative deep-green or "gear-head" early adopters, we can only make assumptions about how they will really be used. Still, it seems safe to predict that recharging that was free or regarded as free would get used more, resulting in more trips, more miles traveled, and eventually more energy consumption and emissions.

Clunkers 1, Critics 0

I have to admit to being somewhat bemused at the apparent success of the "Cash for Clunkers" scheme, which burned through its initial $1 billion of funding so rapidly that Congress is still scrambling to find more money for it before leaving town. Although the final version of the program wasn't quite along the lines of the idea I supported back in January, it appears to have produced much more useful results than most critics predicted when it looked as if it would mainly move Americans out of old SUVs and into new but minimally-thriftier ones. Given its popularity and the boost it's provided the flagging car industry at just the right time, I very much hope the Senate will pass an extension before escaping the August heat and humidity here.

Let me briefly focus on a few key points concerning the program and its funding. If the report I saw in Bloomberg is correct in showing an average fuel economy improvement from 15.8 mpg for the clunkers that were junked to 25.4 mpg for the new cars that are replacing them, that works out to an impressive annual fuel savings of around 280 gallons for the average driver. That's more than the average Prius driver uses in total. Aggregate that across approximately a quarter-million new cars and it works out to 70 million gallons per year--impressive-sounding but still a relative drop in the bucket in a fuel market of 138 billion gallons per year. The corresponding CO2 reduction would be around 700,000 tons per year, which if you figure the cars removed from the road by this program likely only had a few more years of high-intensity usage left in them yields a CO2 abatement cost in the region of $475/ton. As climate policy, this wins no prizes.

However, despite the immense seriousness of that issue, climate surely can't be the only lens through which to view a program such as this. In particular, when you examine the way the House of Representatives came up with the $2 billion to stretch it through the end of September, it is clear that they viewed it as an extension to--or more properly an acceleration of--the federal economic stimulus. Their bill, which is a model of brevity and simplicity, shifted $2 billion from a $6 billion appropriation for DOE loan guarantees to advanced energy projects. Considering that the DOE still has yet to dole out all the money originally appropriated for this purpose when it was funded under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and that their highest-profile decision so far was to turn down an application from a major nuclear fuel processing project in Ohio, it seems fair to say that Cash for Clunkers will get this money into the economy vastly quicker than under a stimulus program that has taken its own sweet time about stimulating anything.

As New York Times columnist David Brooks described Cash for Clunkers in last Friday's weekly segment with Mark Shields on the News Hour, "It's costing some billions of dollars, but it's actually temporary, timely and targeted, so I'm all for it." Despite the program's reported administrative glitches, Mr. Shields liked it, too. That may be as close to a bi-partisan consensus as we are likely to get all summer.

"Over a Barrel" - Part II

Picking up where I left off in Friday's posting addressing the issues raised by ABC's recent "Over a Barrel" report, concerning what Americans ought to know about oil, let's turn to the products that we get from it. Over the course of a century and a half of production--this month marks the sesquicentennial of Drake's well--petroleum has provided us with a cornucopia of fuels, lubricants, and raw materials for industry, many of which grew out of the search for substitutes for other, scarcer commodities or the availability of low-value byproducts from earlier, less-sophisticated refining techniques. In recent years, however, we've acquired a greater awareness of oil's adverse consequences, and it has attracted its first serious competition in many decades in its primary transportation fuels market.

The gasoline we put in our cars, the diesel that fuels trucks and buses and heats many homes, especially in the Northeast, and the jet fuel we can sometimes smell when the plane on which we're traveling has just refueled together accounted for 74% of the 19.5 million barrels per day of petroleum products consumed in the US last year. Throw in propane, lubricants, asphalt, petrochemical feedstocks and solvents, and you're up to around 90%, with most of the remainder coming out as heavy fuel oil for ships, petroleum coke (a solid, coal-like fuel,) and the fuel used by refineries in their processing. The average US refinery is 90% efficient, meaning that 90% of the energy that goes into it comes out in the products it sells, while the other 10% is consumed along the way. Greenhouse gas emissions follow a similar pattern, with the majority occurring not during processing but in the subsequent use of the products.

That's a crucial factor in the effort to reduce emissions. In the recent estimate of last year's US CO2 emissions, nearly 80% of oil's 42% share of the CO2 emitted by fossil fuels came from the combustion of transportation fuels. That means that by far the largest opportunities to reduce emissions from oil are associated with vehicle efficiency, not changes in refinery processes, which are already quite efficient. So while reducing direct refinery emissions by 1/3 would only cut total oil-related emissions by about 3%, increasing the efficiency of cars, trucks and planes by 1/3 would reduce those emissions by 26%. That is a realistic possibility, because most of our vehicles use these fuels so inefficiently. Although we can't easily reduce the 20 lb. of CO2 emitted from the combustion of each gallon of gasoline, we can certainly reduce the number of gallons we burn per mile.

If you asked most people why gasoline has been such a successful fuel for the last century, you'd get a variety of answers, including some entertaining conspiracy theories, but relatively few would zero in on the fuel's remarkable capacity to deliver lots of energy in a compact and easily portable form. Every gallon of E10 gasoline (10% ethanol blend) you put into your car carries roughly 110,000 BTUs, compared to 82,000 BTUs for the E85 ethanol/gasoline blend, or 66,000 BTUs for an 85% methanol/gasoline blend. Those extra BTUs translate into range and convenience, even though the typical internal combustion engine vehicle throws away roughly 80% of them as waste heat and other losses. That's why there's such a big opportunity for hybrids, advanced engines and transmissions, and other technologies to improve the fuel economy of most cars, if consumers are willing to pay the higher up-front costs. It's sobering to think that the advanced battery pack for GM's highly-anticipated Volt plug-in hybrid will hold the energy equivalent of just a half-gallon of gasoline, though the car's electric motor will use that energy much more efficiently than an internal combustion engine would.

So what are you buying when you fill up at the pump? If you watched "Over a Barrel", you probably got the impression that you are paying for an entirely generic fuel, a moderate slice of taxes and dealer margin, and a whole bunch of advertising and other marketing expenses. That's misleading on a couple of levels. It's true that the basic fuel is indeed generic--"fungible" in industry parlance--for the very good reason that this facilitates efficient pipeline shipment and inter-company purchases and exchanges to cover refinery problems and demand fluctuations, while reducing bulk transportation costs. However, there are real differences in the additives injected when the tank truck picks up a load of fuel at the distribution terminal, when the fuel becomes some company's branded product. If you own a newer car with a sophisticated engine, spending a little more to get a major oil company's additive package could pay off in better performance and reduced maintenance costs down the line.

But while the company from which you buy your gas might not have refined every gallon themselves, they must still stand behind it, and in my estimation that's the most important extra you're paying for. If you get a tank of bad gas or one blended with 20% ethanol instead of 10% and need to have your car's entire fuel system rebuilt, you stand a much better chance of getting compensated for the repair by a major gasoline brand than an independent or discount station. I consider myself fairly thrifty, but that's worth an extra 5-10 cents per gallon to me. I'll admit to a bias against buying gas from even a big supermarket chain for the same reason.

Finally, in terms of competition, it's ironic that the most viable competitor to gasoline at the moment is another petroleum product, diesel, which has captured half the new-car market in Europe and is getting a closer look here, thanks to some new technology. While biofuels hold great promise, they are still only available in relatively modest quantities, as explained in Friday's posting, and more as "hamburger helper" for traditional fuels than as fully independent alternatives to oil. While ethanol advocates would doubtless take issue with the characterization of E85 as a failure, so far, its sales have probably been hampered more by its poor value proposition--offering fewer miles per dollar than conventional fuels--than by infrastructure constraints and limited numbers of flexible fuel vehicles. In the long run, electricity looks like the strongest challenger, assuming battery prices come down and mainstream consumers find the trade-offs involved in recharging in hours rather than refueling in a few minutes acceptable.

If "Over a Barrel" accurately reflected Americans' frustration at being dependent on a commodity they feel they no longer control, it also highlighted oil's continuing indispensability. Petroleum and its products aren't about to disappear any time soon, though their dominance is starting to slip. From all indications, US oil demand has peaked, and the industry's remaining growth prospects are centered on developing Asia. The pressure to reduce oil consumption in developed countries is growing, and alternatives that were once dismissed will soon erode oil's share of the transportation energy market. However, absent a technology breakthrough, that transition seems likely to stretch out for decades, and it's a virtual certainty that the economics and geopolitics of oil will continue to frustrate us for many years to come.