Is the US Ready for a Carbon Tax?

• While the Trump administration seeks to undo CO2 regulations, a group of former Republican officials has proposed a new, market-based emissions plan.
• This "carbon tax" looks simpler than EPA's Clean Power Plan or previous cap-and-trade legislation, but not simpler than the pre-Obama status quo.

The idea of taxing the carbon content of energy--and presumably the goods and services produced with it--is back in the news. A group of Republican "wise men" has floated it as an alternative to the regulation-based approach to emissions that the Obama administration pursued after its preferred "cap & trade" legislation died in the Congress.

Reduced to its basics, a carbon tax is a focused version of a consumption tax, based on usage rather than income or valuation. The level of the tax would be set by law, either as a fixed amount per ton of emissions or at an initial rate with preset future increases. What can't be known with certainty in advance is just how much a given level of carbon tax would reduce actual emissions.

This contrasts with the method of setting a price on carbon preferred by many other economists and environmental groups, called "cap & trade." In this approach, the government sets a cap, or maximum level, on emissions for a designated sector or the economy as a whole, while parties subject to the cap are allowed to trade emission allowances and credits with each other under that cap. Thus policy makers set the level of emission reductions, and allow the market to find the resulting price on carbon. In principal, that ought to be more efficient than the simpler carbon tax, because market forces should drive participants with low costs of cutting emissions to make the deepest reductions and then sell their excess cuts to others, for less than it would cost the latter to reduce by that amount.

From the late 1990s until 2009 or '10 I was convinced that cap & trade was the better approach to pricing emissions. However, the experience of watching the US Congress attempt to design a cap-and-trade system for the US economy cured my certainty. As I have described at length, the inclination of legislators to help favored companies, industries and sectors, combined with the extraordinary temptations created by the sheer scale of the revenue such a system would channel through the government's hands, revealed practical problems that look insurmountable in the real world, at least under our political system.

In fairness, cap-and-trade is currently used to promote emissions reductions in various jurisdictions, including California, the mainly northeastern states participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and the European Union. From what I have observed, all of them have experienced technical difficulties involving the allocation of free allowances, inadequate liquidity, and other issues. The biggest practical problem is that the carbon prices these systems have tended to deliver might be characterized as the opposite of a Goldilocks price; i.e., they are typically high enough to generate substantial revenue, creating strong constituencies for their continuation, but too low to influence behavior very much.

For example, California's emissions credits currently trade at around $13 per metric ton of CO2, equivalent to $0.10 per gallon of gasoline containing ethanol. Would an extra $1 per fill-up make much of a difference in how much you drive, which car to buy when you replace your current car, or whether to sell your car (or forgo buying one) and take public transportation?

Moreover, California's emissions have been essentially flat since the state implemented cap-and-trade in 2012. However, since 2002 the state's electric utilities--historically the highest emitting sector--have operated and invested under a Renewable Portfolio Standard requiring them to increase the share of renewable energy in their generation mix to 20% by 2010, 33% by 2020, and now 50% by 2030. I suspect that accounts for most of the 7% drop in emissions since 2002, while the impact of a carbon price equivalent to 0.6 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) is likely lost in the noise. Of course a carbon tax would create its own political and practical complications.

First, consider how a carbon tax would affect different energy sources. As with cap & trade, a carbon tax should have its biggest impact on the highest-emitting forms of energy. In practice that would compound the current disadvantages for coal compared to abundant, low-priced natural gas and rapidly growing, essentially zero-emitting renewables like wind and solar power. At least on the surface, that seems at odds with the stated goal of the Trump administration to attempt to rescue the US coal industry and the communities that depend on it.

Like cap & trade, a carbon tax would also require a significant amount of new bookkeeping to track the path of "embedded emissions"--the CO2 and other greenhouse gases emitted at each step of a product or service's supply chain--through the economy. Some of this is already done voluntarily by companies participating in various sustainability reporting efforts, but it would be new for many others. The EPA, Department of Energy, and numerous non-governmental agencies have done much work to quantify such emissions, but a carbon tax would require a level of rigor and audit trail consistent with the creation of what amounts to a shadow currency within the economy.

A carbon tax also raises similar questions of how to spend the resulting revenue that have bedeviled cap & trade. At the current US emissions and assuming few sources were exempted, the proposed $40 per metric ton initial carbon tax would raise around $275 billion per year. That's 8% of this year's federal budget. It doesn't take a cynic to guess that the first inclination of any Congress enacting such a tax would be to hang onto this money to fund new programs, reduce the federal deficit, or some combination, rather than returning it to taxpayers as former Secretaries Baker and Schultz and the economists who back them suggest.

Their proposal would require that the proceeds of the carbon tax be rebated to essentially the same people who would be paying it at the gas pump or in their gas and electric bills. This sounds similar to the "Cap and Dividend" approach to cap & trade proposed by Senators Cantwell (D) and Collins (R) a few years ago. Their bill had the great advantage of simplicity, requiring just a fraction of the 1,427 pages of the 2009 Waxman-Markey cap & trade bill, the main purpose of which seemed to be to redistribute vast sums of money outside the tax code. But like W-M, it went absolutely nowhere.

Like it or not, that's my best guess of the fate of the current carbon tax idea, too. The biggest challenge facing a carbon tax today is that it would not be running as a simpler, more market-oriented alternative to prescriptive legislation or complex EPA regulations. After all, the administration's intention appears to be to eliminate the EPA's main emissions-reduction regulation, the Clean Power Plan, not to replace it.

And although the new US Secretary of State, Mr. Tillerson, is on record numerous times in support of a carbon tax, that position seems to have been put forward mainly in preference to cap & trade, rather than on its own merits in the absence of any other strict climate policy.

A carbon tax would raise the effective price of energy commodities in which we appear to have a global competitive advantage, at least for now. The current proposal may rebate the carbon tax on exports, but most economic activity starts and ends within this country. And as noted in the NY Times op-ed by Dr. Feldstein and the other economists backing this measure, the revenue recycling to consumers would be on an equal basis, rather than proportional to usage, so there would be winners and losers as with any redistributive taxation. Lower-income Americans driving older cars seem likelier to come out on the short end of that than wealthier consumers driving new cars that meet rising fuel economy standards.

Ultimately, we must ask why President Trump or his team would want to impose a new tax on US consumers and businesses to address a problem that has probably just become an even lower priority for them than it was. Notwithstanding Mr. Trump's demonstrated unpredictability, the simplest answer seems to be that he wouldn't.

A New Angle on Carbon Capture

In my last couple of posts I looked at the difficulty of meeting ambitious targets for cutting greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) without help from the lower-emitting portions of our current energy mix. Last week ExxonMobil announced that it is pursuing a new pathway for capturing carbon from power plant exhaust. That could help revive another important strategy for large-scale emissions reduction from our existing energy sources.

Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) has fallen out of favor, lately, mainly due to the high cost and technical challenges of the early prototypes for large-scale implementation of the technology. Not only are the initial investment costs of today's CCS hardware still very high, but it is also inherently expensive to operate. That's because of the high energy consumption of the process, resulting in a "parasitic" load on the host power plant that reduces its net output by up to 20%, making the remaining output much more expensive. That creates a large deterrent in any market that doesn't provide either direct subsidies for carbon removal, or a high carbon tax or price for traded emissions offsets.

Another reason that CCS has received less attention recently is that the costs of renewable energy technologies like wind and solar power have kept falling. To some they now look cheap enough, especially with further cost improvements extrapolated, to enable us to reach our emissions goals mainly through wider deployment of solar modules and wind turbines.

Even if that were technically feasible, like most other energy industry experts I have met I am convinced that the deep emissions cuts desired for mid-century will require implementing or retro-fitting CCS onto the fleet of coal and gas-fired power plants that will likely still be in service decades from now. CCS underpins several of the emissions stabilization wedges pioneered by Princeton engineering professor Rob Socolow and his colleagues ten years ago.

What makes the approach that ExxonMobil and FuelCell Energy, Inc. have described so attractive is that, instead of being a drain on power generation, capturing CO2 via fuel cells would actually add significantly to a facility's reliable power output. It would increase revenue, rather than curtailing it.

The clever bit, and its potential advantage over current carbon-capture technology, is that CO2 capture in a carbonate fuel cell occurs as a byproduct of the power generation step. That means that it doesn't require a big, expensive, power-hungry process unit, the only function of which is to strip CO2 from flue gas and concentrate it for subsequent shipment and storage.

These fuel cells would still require natural gas for fuel, and they would produce CO2 emissions in the process of generating electricity, though at a lower rate than the coal or gas-fired plant with which they would be partnered. However, both their direct emissions and the CO2 extracted from the power plant exhaust would come out in a highly purified form suitable for geological sequestration and stay out of the atmosphere.

That brings up an important advantage of this approach over various schemes to capture CO2 directly from the atmosphere. Although the article on the Exxon/Fuel Cell Energy development in MIT Technology Review  described the CO2 concentration in power plant flue gas (5%-15%) as "low", that is still hundreds of times higher than its concentration in air.

400 parts per million of CO2 in the atmosphere may be worrying from a climate perspective, but it is still just 0.04% of air that remains mostly nitrogen and oxygen. And the lower the concentration, the harder--and normally more expensive--it is to extract. (Green plants can do this trick cheaply thanks to billions of years of evolution combined with cost-free sunlight.)

The press release makes it very clear that this new carbon-capture technology has so far only been demonstrated in the lab. Scaling it up will require additional work, and success is uncertain. Many other promising innovations, including a host of cellulosic biofuel technologies, have failed to scale. However, its potential applications are compelling enough to justify a lot of patience and persistence. I wish them luck.

The Fallout from Volkswagen's "Defeat Device"

• The repercussions from VW's error in judgment seem likely to extend beyond the hit to their reputation and stock price, and the unnecessary extra pollution from these cars.
• This incident will make a useful, fuel-saving alternative to gasoline cars less attractive, at least for now, resulting in higher future oil consumption and CO2 emissions.

I find the revelations concerning Volkswagen's reported efforts to circumvent vehicle emissions rules disturbing, especially as a VW owner and someone who has advocated diesel technology as a tool for reducing oil consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. VW has apparently admitted its colossal error. However, I haven't seen anyone attempt to explore the implicit emissions tradeoffs involved. As bad as this decision was, did it at least, on balance, help the environment?

The details that have emerged so far have focused on a software routine that manipulated diesel engine performance to produce one level of emissions in regulatory testing, presumably on a dynamometer, and different, much less acceptable results in real-world driving. Aside from the obvious questions about ethics and compliance, what did this mean for actual emissions?

For many years regulators have been tightening restrictions on allowable emissions of so-called criteria pollutants from cars. These include oxides of sulfur and nitrogen, particulates, and hydrocarbons, but not CO2. A whole gamut of technology was developed to tackle these pollutants, starting with catalytic converters on cars and deep desulfurization of fuels in refineries. Today's cars are much cleaner than those of a generation ago.

Oxides of nitrogen, referred to as NOx, are combustion byproducts that don't originate in a car's fuel, but from the nitrogen and oxygen in the air in which it is burned. NOx emissions from diesel engines have always been challenging, because they operate at higher temperatures and compression ratios than gasoline engines. Manufacturers that produce diesel vehicles have deployed different technologies to control NOx. As far as I know the VW Group uses at least two, depending on model.

Larger (and more expensive) vehicles appear to use a process called Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR), in which small amounts of a liquid chemical such as urea chemically react with the NOx. The liquid must be refilled at service intervals. The technical manual for VW's 2-liter diesel engine involved in the current fiasco indicates it uses EGR, or exhaust-gas recirculation, which reduces the oxygen in the engine available to form NOx .

If controlling emissions from diesels is so challenging, why bother with them? Well, a typical diesel car uses up to a third less fuel than a comparably equipped gasoline model. After adjusting for the carbon content of the fuels, the lifecycle CO2 emissions are around 20% lower than for gasoline. Given the shortcomings of similarly priced electric vehicles in range and convenience, diesel provides a useful option. That helps explain why roughly half of European cars today are diesels, in many cases promoted by national fuel- and/or engine-tax policies.

That leads us to the question of whether such a reduction in CO2 might be worthwhile, even if it came at a penalty in NOx emissions, which act locally, rather than globally. To arrive at a ballpark answer let's assume that the 482,000 affected diesel cars couldn't have been sold at all if their engine software didn't fool emissions testers, and that the buyers would have otherwise chosen a comparable gasoline car. For comparison, the EPA rated the 2015 Jetta diesel at 36 miles per gallon (mpg) overall, while the 1.8 L turbo gasoline Jetta gets 30 mpg. At an average of 12,000 miles per year each, the collective annual fuel savings of the cars involved would be 32 million gallons, resulting in avoided CO2 emissions of about 300,000 metric tons per year, or 0.005% of US annual CO2 emissions.

If the tradeoff in extra NOx emissions is based on the reported maximum estimate of 40 times the EPA's allowed level of 0.07 grams per mile, then the affected cars would collectively emit an extra 16,000 metric tons of NOx per year. That's roughly 1% of the annual US NOx emissions tracked under the Clean Air Interstate and Acid Rain Program cap-and-trade markets in 2012. Even recognizing that those programs don't count all US NOx pollution, and that NOx and CO2 are very much apples and oranges in their environmental and health impacts, the relative proportions I calculated don't make this seem like a tradeoff worth making.

Whoever made the decision to circumvent the pollution controls on these cars did enormous damage to VW's brand and reputation. Unfortunately, the response in Europe and Asia suggests that this event has also raised questions about the emissions testing and compliance of the entire car fleet. Resolving them will take time and money, and if they are not seen to be dealt with properly, the impact on the public's trust of these processes on both sides--manufacturers and regulators--could be long-lasting.

Unlike in Europe, diesels made up just under 1% of new cars sold in the US last year. However, the technology was finally shedding the poor reputation that low-quality diesel cars earned in the 1980s, and the "take rate" was growing, along with the number of models offered.  VW's diesels are among the most affordable in the market. The NOx reduction technologies they use have been proven to work, when they are not circumvented, but that is not the message that this debacle will leave with the average consumer. Carmakers will have to work harder to convince buyers that this driver-friendly alternative to gasoline cars is worth a look, and that has implications for future oil consumption and CO2 emissions.

The IEA's Stressful Outlook

• The latest long-term forecast from the International Energy Agency suggests that the benefits of today's low oil prices might be temporary, with more volatility ahead.
• The report focuses on a number of risks, including the adequacy of investment in both new oil capacity and low-emission energy, and the scale of nuclear plant retirements.

For an organization established by energy-importing countries in the aftermath of an oil crisis, the recent launch of the International Energy Agency's annual World Energy Outlook (WEO) took surprisingly little satisfaction in the current dip in oil prices, and none in the difficulties it is causing for OPEC.  Instead, the presentation  was peppered with terms  like "stress", "risk" and  "doubts",  and references to a "false sense of security" and a "stormy energy future." I see that as an indication of how much the global energy agenda has changed and broadened in the last decade or so.

For oil in particular, the IEA sees today's growth in North American production masking the consequences of the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East. In Iraq and other countries in the region, uncertainty is delaying investments that should be made now, if future supplies are to meet demand growth after US "tight oil" and other non-OPEC  expansion has plateaued. And that point could come sooner than expected if drillers reduce US shale investments by 10% next year, as IEA anticipates, or if the significant governance problems of Brazil's oil sector, which were only hinted at, are not resolved soon.

The launch covered several other areas, as well, none of which escaped suggested stresses of their own. Start with natural gas. IEA sees gas on its way eventually to become the "first fuel", consistent with the view of their "Golden Age of Gas" scenario of 2011. This would be driven in part by a large increase in LNG production from new sources such as East Africa, Russia and North America, along with growth from traditional LNG suppliers in North Africa and Australia. IEA expects increased competition from LNG with pipeline gas to improve energy security, especially in Europe, but not necessarily gas prices for end users. In fact, the high relative cost of LNG could impede the displacement of coal by gas in Asia. 

The presentation also highlighted the significant challenges IEA expects in the electricity sector in the period to 2040, a longer interval for which this year's WEO provides the first glimpse. A net expansion of global power generation by around 75% is more challenging than even that figure suggests, because it must incorporate the replacement of more than a third of today's generating capacity. As a result, only oil-fired generation will experience a net decline.  IEA forecasts up to half of new capacity through 2040 coming from renewables, on a scale posing significant risks for power system reliability, especially in Europe.

Nuclear power, a major source of baseload low-carbon electricity, is an area of special focus in this year's report, along with Africa. The expected growth of nuclear energy over the next several decades occurs mainly in the developing world, while 38% of today's nuclear capacity--nearly 200 reactors--will be retired by 2040. Many of those retirements will occur in Europe, and the Chief Economist of the IEA, Fatih Birol, expressed concern about the policies and budgets supporting such decommissioning on an unprecedented scale.

By 2040 the balance of nuclear power capacity would have shifted from around 80% in OECD countries and 20% in today's developing countries, to roughly 50/50. While the report also draws attention to the growing policy problem of nuclear waste disposal, it identifies nuclear as "one of a limited number of options available at scale to reduce CO2 emissions."

The largest source of stress in the report appears to be the disconnect between the narrowing window for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to a level that climate models indicate would limit global warming to 2°C, and the higher emissions inherent in the IEA's central "New Policies" scenario. Meeting the 2° target would require increasing average annual investments in low-carbon energy, including energy efficiency, by a factor of four compared to 2013. At last month's G20 summit in Australia we heard that "red warning lights are once again flashing on the dashboard of the global economy."  Could even the IEA's middle view of energy investments proceed if much of the world slid back into recession?

The presentation wasn't all gloomy, of course. Dr. Birol pointed out the competitive advantage that low energy costs confer on the US, and both he and IEA Executive Director Maria van der Hoevan highlighted the recent China/US emissions deal as a very positive development. (My own analysis concluded that it would still allow China's emissions to grow dramatically before peaking.) They also conceded that lower oil prices would provide oil-importing countries with some timely "breathing space."  And for the first time I heard that three out of four cars sold in the world are now covered by fuel economy regulations, suggesting increases in energy efficiency to come.

It also struck me that some of the negatives in the presentation might tend to cancel each other out. If the global oil industry, especially in the Middle East, fails to invest sufficiently in the next few years to ensure that supplies continue to grow in the 2020s, then the resulting higher oil prices could accelerate the transition to natural gas and renewables, while providing greater incentives for energy efficiency. That combination might reduce emissions sooner than IEA's main forecast indicates.

Last year the IEA's World Energy Outlook failed to anticipate the drop in oil prices; how many other forecasters likewise missed it? It featured some of the same big themes repeated this year, including the ongoing shift of the energy world's center of gravity toward Asia and the scale of the global emissions challenge. On a more basic level, however, a comparison of the two documents suggests that the agency is still trying to understand the transformation of global energy markets by the parallel shale and renewable energy revolutions. They aren't alone in that, either.

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

How Good Is The New Emissions Deal with China?

• President Obama's emissions deal with China sets an ambitious target for US CO2 cuts while leaving substantial headroom for emissions growth in China. 
• It will likely compound his problems, domestically, but could have significant influence on upcoming international climate negotiations.

Only an event like Tuesday's agreement between President Obama and his Chinese counterpart to limit greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) from the two countries could top the unexpected scramble in the US Senate to pass a Keystone XL pipeline bill as the big energy story of the week. The significance of the climate deal is open to interpretation, from both international and US political perspectives. Before exploring those, we should examine its consequences.

The White House announced that in exchange for the US agreeing to reduce "net greenhouse gas emissions 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025", China would undertake to cap its GHG emissions by "around 2030." It also announced plans to step up a number of cooperative efforts with China in this area, including joint R&D and a jointly funded public/private carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) project in China. What does all this mean in terms of US emissions?

We need to start with the 2012 baseline in which net US emissions were already nearly 11% below 2005 levels. The current Annual Energy Outlook of the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), assuming the laws and regulations in force at the time it was produced, projects that US energy-related CO2 emissions will increase by 236 million metric tons (MT) by 2025, compared to 2012, leaving us at roughly 7% under 2005. Emissions from transportation would shrink, while those from industry would rise as the US economy grows by an expected 2.4% per year.

As I understand it that EIA forecast doesn't include the emissions that the EPA's "Clean Power Plan" for existing power plants would be expected to save if fully implemented. EPA targets reducing CO2 emissions from the US electricity sector--accounting for 39% of net emissions in 2005--by 25% by 2020 and 30% by 2030, compared to 2005. That would shave around 460 million MT from the EIA figure for 2025, getting us to nearly 15% below 2005. The additional savings to reach 26% below 2005 are thus in the neighborhood of 700 million MT per year by 2025. To put that in perspective, it's equivalent to the 2012 CO2 emissions from combustion in the entire US industrial sector, and exceeds total emissions of methane from all sectors, including agriculture, oil & gas, and landfills.

So unless I've done my sums wrong, or misinterpreted the government's data, the US/China deal commits to reducing US emissions by as much again as we've cut since 2005--largely as a result of a weaker economy and the shale gas revolution--after banking the expected savings from the 2011 fuel economy regulations, energy efficiency programs and renewable energy incentives, and an EPA plan for the power sector that is certain to run into strong opposition in the new Congress. That seems pretty ambitious to me, although it falls short of the 40% reduction recently agreed by the EU for 2030.

It's harder to assess what China's side of the deal means in practical terms. Its 2012 emissions were estimated at nearly 10 billion MT/yr, having grown by 8%/yr since 2004 and by 6%/yr since 2009. At that rate, even if its emissions peaked in 2030, they could double before starting to decline. If China's emissions growth declined to just 2% per year, consistent with the lower rates of growth in coal consumption observed recently, by 2030 it could still add nearly 4 billion MT/yr--equivalent to the current emissions of the entire EU, and 5 times the incremental US cuts to which President Obama just agreed. The most recent projection of China's emissions from the EIA had them growing by 5 billion MT by 2030 but essentially plateauing thereafter.

This falls substantially short of what would be required to keep global emissions within the range that climate models predict would limit average global temperature increases to 2°C, compared to pre-industrial levels. However, it goes well beyond China's previous commitment on emissions intensity at Copenhagen in 2009.

Now consider how this deal looks from the standpoint of US politics. Voters just resoundingly handed undivided control of the legislative branch of government to the President's opposition. Republican office-holders and those who just voted for them are likely to regard it as an unwelcome commitment of the US by a lame-duck President to a promise that only his successors could fulfill. In the process, it hands China and other countries a point with which to prod future US administrations should they fall short of its goals. In exchange, he got President Xi Jinping to admit that China can't emit CO2 limitlessly, but can still do more or less what it may have been planning, anyway. It's hard to see this making things easier in Congress for the President's existing environmental agenda.

The deal looks better from the perspective of international environmental and climate policy circles in the lead-up to the Paris climate conference, "COP21", at the end of 2015. One lesson from the Kyoto Protocol is that to be meaningful a global climate agreement must have a strong commitment from the world's largest emitters of CO2 and other GHGs. China and the US are the two biggest emitters, and the EU at #3 is effectively pre-committed. Together these three blocs account for over half of all emissions today. Having them on-side at the start raises the chances of reaching a  big agreement.

As others have observed, this deal makes it harder to argue against a global CO2 agreement based on China's relative inaction, while increasing pressure on other developing countries to agree to limit their own emissions. It also signals that despite political weakness at home, the White House will likely push for aggressive targets at COP21, setting up further conflict with Congress in the next election year. Finally, its timing is early enough to influence the negotiations but not so early as to permit close scrutiny of Chinese or US follow-through on its goals before the Paris talks begin.

EPA's CO2 Rule and the Back Door to Cap & Trade

• Significant differences in EPA's proposed state CO2 targets for the power sector are reviving interest in cap & trade as a way to reduce compliance costs.
• This compounds the EPA plan's controversy and raises serious concerns about how the resulting revenue would be used.

Earlier this month the US Environmental Protection Agency released for comment its proposal for regulating the CO2 emissions from existing power plants. It follows EPA’s emissions rule for new power plants published late last year but takes a different, more expansive approach.  If implemented, the “Clean Power Plan” would reduce US emissions in the utility sector by around 25% by 2020 and 30% by 2030.

One of its most surprising features is that instead of setting emissions standards for each type of power plant or mandating a single, across-the-board emissions-reduction percentage, it imposes distinct emissions targets on each state. Based on analysis by Bloomberg New Energy Finance, some states could actually increase emissions, while others would be required to make deep cuts. The resulting disparities have apparently triggered new interest in state and regional emissions trading as a means of managing the rule’s cost.

Although emissions trading has become more controversial in recent years, it proved its worth in holding down the cost of implementing previous environmental regulations, such as the effort to reduce sulfur pollution associated with acid rain. It works by enabling facilities or companies with lower-than-average abatement costs to profit from maximizing their reductions and then selling their excess reductions to others with higher costs. The desired overall reductions are thus achieved at a lower cost to the economy than if each company or facility were required to reduce its emissions by the same amount.

Although the Clean Power Plan doesn’t require that states establish such emissions trading markets, its lengthy preamble includes a discussion of existing state greenhouse gas “cap-and-trade” markets in California and the Northeast. It also points out that measures to comply with the new rule may generate benefits in the markets for conventional pollutants, including those for the recent cross-state pollution rule. Administrator McCarthy also mentioned the benefits of multi-state markets in her speech announcing the new rule.

A patchwork of cap and trade markets across the US, including the addition of new states to mechanisms like the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), might help mitigate some of the cost of complying with 50 different CO2 targets. However, it would still be a far cry from the kind of economy-wide, comprehensive CO2 cap-and-trade system once contemplated by the US Congress.

Cap and trade was an idea that had gained significant momentum and even begun to appear inevitable, prior to the onset of the financial crisis in 2008. To supporters, it looked like a better way to limit and eventually cut greenhouse gas emissions than through command-and-control regulations. And the price it would establish for emissions would be based on the cost of achieving a desired level of reductions, rather than being set arbitrarily, as a carbon tax would be, without any guarantee of actual emissions reductions. Opponents viewed it as an unnecessary or unnecessarily complicated drag on the economy and a tax by another name, coining the pejorative term “cap-and-tax”.

Although early US cap-and-trade bills were bipartisan, including one co-sponsored by Senator McCain, the 2008 Republican Presidential nominee, the debate over cap and trade took on an increasingly partisan tone in a period of widening polarization on most major issues. The Waxman-Markey climate bill, with cap and trade as a major provision, was narrowly passed when Democrats controlled the House of Representatives in 2009, but various Senate versions failed to attract sufficient support, even when Democrats held a filibuster-proof supermajority in that body. The chances of enacting cap and trade legislation effectively died when a Republican won the vacant Senate seat for Massachusetts in January 2010. However, viewing this as a purely partisan divide is simplistic, at best.

Aside from opposition by key Senate Democrats, including one whose campaign included a vivid demonstration of his stand against Waxman-Markey, the versions of “cap and trade” debated in 2009 and 2010 bore little resemblance to the original idea. Waxman-Markey was a 1400-page monstrosity, laden with extraneous provisions and pork. Its embedded allocation of free allowances strongly favored the same electricity sector now being targeted by EPA’s Clean Power Plan, at the expense of transportation energy, for which low-carbon options remain fewer and more costly. It would have created a de facto gasoline tax, while yielding fewer net emissions reductions than a system with a level playing field. Subsequent bills, such as the Kerry-Lieberman bill in 2010, took this a step farther, removing transportation fuels from cap and trade and effectively taxing them at a rate based on the price of emissions credits.

Along the way, national CO2 cap-and-trade legislation evolved from a fairly straightforward way to harness market forces to deliver the cheapest emissions cuts available, to a mechanism for raising and redistributing large sums of money outside the tax code. In some cases that would have been done directly, such as in the gratifyingly brief Cantwell-Collins “cap-and-dividend” bill, or as indirectly and inefficiently as in Waxman-Markey. It’s no wonder the whole idea became toxic at the federal level.

Although emissions trading for greenhouse gas reduction came up short in the US Congress, it took hold elsewhere. The EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) is an outgrowth of the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions trading mechanism, which was included largely at the urging of the US delegation to the Kyoto climate conference in 1997. The ETS is focused on the industrial and power sectors and covers 43% of EU emissions. It has experienced significant ups and downs over the sale and allocation of emissions credits.

Cap and trade also emerged as a preferred approach for some US states seeking to reduce their emissions. California’s emissions market was established via a provision of the 2006 Climate Solutions Act (A.B. 32), and RGGI currently facilitates trading among 9 mostly northeastern states. The relatively low prices of emissions allowances in these systems–particularly in RGGI, which has traded in the range of $3-$5/ton of CO2–suggests that they may still be capturing low-hanging fruit in the early phases of steadily declining emissions caps. Their effectiveness at facilitating future low-cost emissions cuts is hard to gauge, because they also don’t exist in a vacuum.

Except for Vermont, all of the states involved have renewable electricity mandates that by their nature deliver more prescriptive emissions cuts. These markets have also been implemented in a generally weak US economy, which has constrained energy demand, and against the backdrop of the shale revolution, which has yielded significant non-mandated emissions reductions. Nor have these state and regional approaches to cap and trade entirely avoided the debates over how to spend their substantial proceeds that plagued federal cap-and-trade legislation.

For many years my view of cap and trade was that if we needed to put a price on GHG emissions, this was a better, more efficient option than an arbitrary carbon tax, or other top-down method. My experience analyzing more recent “cap-and-trade” legislation left me with serious doubts about our ability to implement a fair and effective national cap-and-trade market for CO2 and other greenhouse gases within the current political environment. Whether on a unified basis or in aggregate across many smaller systems, the enormous sums it could eventually generate are simply too tempting to expect our legislators and government agencies to administer even-handedly.

Whatever its potential benefits and pitfalls, I can’t help seeing cap and trade as a distraction in the context of the EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan. Even at its most efficient, cap and trade couldn’t render painless the wide disparities of a plan that would require Arizona to cut emissions per megawatt-hour by more than half, and states like Texas and Oklahoma to cut by 36-38%, while Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana and even California cut by less than a quarter–and under some scenarios might even increase their overall emissions. Cap and trade would merely be a footnote on the scale of transformation the EPA’s plan envisions for the US electricity sector.

A different version of this posting was previously published on Energy Trends Insider.

EPA's New CO2 Rules Create Opportunities for Natural Gas, for Now

• EPA's proposed rule for reducing CO2 emissions from power plants could increase natural gas demand in the utility sector by as much as 50%, at the expense of coal.
• Cutting emissions by regulation rather than legislation entails legal and political uncertainties that could hamper the investment necessary to meet EPA's targets.

Earlier this month the Environmental Protection Agency announced its proposal for regulating the greenhouse gas emissions from all currently operating US power plants. Unsurprisingly, initial assessments suggested it favors the renewable energy, energy efficiency and nuclear power industries--and especially natural gas--all at the expense of coal. However, the longer-term outcome is subject to significant uncertainties, because of the way this policy is being implemented.

EPA's proposed "Clean Power Plan" regulation would reduce CO2 emissions from the US electric power sector by 25% by 2020 and 30% by 2030, compared to 2005. Although it does not specify that the annual reduction of over 700 million metric tons of CO2--half of which had already been achieved by 2012--must all come from coal-burning power plants, such plants accounted for 75% of 2012 emissions from power generation.

It's worth recalling how we got here. In the last decade the US Congress made several attempts to enact comprehensive climate legislation, based on an economy-wide cap on CO2 and a system of trading emissions allowances: "cap and trade." In 2009 the House of Representatives passed the Waxman-Markey bill, with its rather distorted version of cap and trade. It died in the US Senate, where the President's party briefly held a filibuster-proof supermajority.

The Clean Power Plan is the culmination of the administration's efforts to regulate the major CO2 sources in the US economy, in the absence of comprehensive climate legislation. Although Administrator McCarthy touted the flexibility of the plan in her enthusiastic rollout speech and suggested that its implementation might include state or regional cap and trade markets for emissions, the net result will look very different than an economy-wide approach.

For starters, there won't be a cap on overall emissions, but rather a set of state-level performance targets for emissions per megawatt-hour generated in 2020 and 2030. If electricity demand grew 29% by 2040, as recently forecast by the Energy Information Administration of the US Department of Energy, the CO2 savings in the EPA plan might even be largely negated. EPA is banking on the widespread adoption of energy efficiency measures to avoid such an outcome.

Since we have many technologies for generating electricity, with varying emissions all the way down to nearly zero, many different future generating mixes could achieve the plan's goals, though not at equal cost or reliability. Ironically, since coal's share of power generation has declined from 50%  in 2005 to 39% as of last year, it could be done by replacing all the older coal-fired power plants in the US with state of the art plants using either ultra-supercritical pulverized coal combustion (USC ) or integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC). 

That won't happen for a variety of reasons, not least of which is EPA's "New Source Performance Standards" published last November. That rule effectively requires new coal-fired power plants to emit around a third less CO2 than today's most efficient coal plant designs. That's only possibly if they capture and sequester (CCS) at least some of their emissions, a feature found in only a couple of power plants now under construction globally.

It's also questionable how the capital required to upgrade the entire US coal generating fleet could be raised. Returns on such facilities have fallen, due to competition from shale gas and from renewables like wind power with very low marginal costs--sometimes negative after factoring in tax credits. Some are interpreting EPA's aggressive CO2 target for 2020 and relatively milder 2030 step as an indication that the latter target could be made much more stringent, later.

So while coal is likely to remain an important  part of the US power mix in 2030, as the EPA's administrator noted, meeting these goals in the real world will likely entail a significant shift from coal to gas and renewable energy sources, while preserving roughly the current nuclear generating fleet, including those units now under construction.

If the entire burden of the shift fell to gas, it would entail increasing the utilization of existing natural gas combined cycle power plants (NGCC) and likely building new units in some states. In the documentation of its draft rules, EPA cited average 2012 NGCC utilization of 46%. Increasing utilization up to 75% would deliver over 600 million additional MWh from gas annually--a 56% increase over total 2013 gas-fired generation, exceeding the output of all US renewables last year--at an emissions reduction of around 340 million metric tons vs. coal. That would be just sufficient to meet the 30% emissions reduction target for the electricity demand and generating mix we had in 2013.

The incremental natural gas required to produce this extra power works out to about 4.4 trillion cubic feet (TCF) per year. That would increase gas consumption in the power sector by just over half, compared to 2013, and boost total US gas demand by 17%. To put that in perspective, US dry natural gas production has grown by 4.1 TCF/y since 2008.

EPA apparently anticipates power sector gas consumption increasing by just 1.2 TCF/y by 2020, and falling thereafter as end-use efficiency improves.  Fuel-switching is only one of the four Best System of Emission Reduction "building blocks" EPA envisions states using, including efficiency improvements at existing power plants, increased penetration of renewable generation, and demand-side efficiency measures. The ultimate mix will vary by state and be influenced by changes in gas, coal and power prices.

I mentioned uncertainties at the beginning of this post. Aside from the inevitable legal challenges to EPA's regulation of power plant CO2 under the 1990 Clean Air Act, its imposition by executive authority, rather than legislation, leaves future administrations free to strengthen, weaken, or even abandon this approach.

Since EPA's planned emission reductions from the power sector are large on a national scale (10% of total US 2005 emissions) but still small on a global scale (2% of 2013 world emissions) their long-term political sustainability may depend on the extent to which they succeed in prompting the large developing countries to follow suit in reducing their growing emissions.

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

IEA's Roadmap for Low-Carbon Electrification in a "Golden Age" of Gas

• The IEA's latest Energy Technology Perspectives report provides a roadmap for the long transition to sustainable energy, as well as a report card on its progress.
• It also highlights the tension between the value of natural gas in decarbonizing the current energy mix, and longer-term expectations for phasing out its use.

Last month the International Energy Agency released its latest Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP), a technology roadmap extending out to mid-century, with a major focus on the increasing electrification of global energy against a backdrop of climate change. It may also shed some light on the options for achieving the emissions cuts in the US Environmental Protection Agency's proposed CO2 regulations for power plants.

This is turning out to a big season for climate-change-related reports. The ETP arrived just a week after the US National Climate Assessment, which followed the latest volume of the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report on climate change. The ETP caught the attention of renewables-oriented news sites for its characterization of natural gas as, "a transitional fuel, not a low-carbon solution unless coupled with carbon capture and storage (CCS)."

That might seem to contradict the general tone of IEA's earlier "Golden Age of Gas" scenario, though when that study was released in 2011 it, too, included caveats about the limitations of gas in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. From that standpoint, the new ETP is no more negative about gas than the relatively rosy (for gas) Golden Age scenario was, and in fact sees gas supporting both "increasing integration of renewables and displacing coal-fired generation."

The IEA's press release for the ETP highlighted the growth of electricity as a major energy carrier, particularly in the developing world, increasing from 17% of final global energy consumption in 2011 to 23-26% by 2050. However, it also noted, "While this offers many opportunities, it does not solve all our problems; indeed it creates many new challenges."  Among other things, that alludes to the fact that while renewables such as wind and solar power have been growing rapidly, so has coal use, with the result that, as the ETP launch presentation put it, "the carbon intensity of (energy) supply is stuck."

The emissions benefits of electricity displacing oil from transportation and other fossil fuels from industrial, commercial and residential uses will be largely negated if power generation does not also shift towards lower-emitting sources such as nuclear, hydropower, geothermal, wind and solar power. The "2DS" scenario that received far more attention in the IEA's rollout than the ETP's other two scenarios, provides the prescription and justification for that transition. However, it's important to realize that the 2DS case is not a forecast or prediction; it's what scenario experts might call a "normative scenario"--one that the authors hope to encourage, rather than expect to occur.

2DS reflects the official stance of most member countries of the IEA and links to the low-emission "450" scenario in the agency's current World Energy Outlook. Both are predicated on creating a 50% chance of limiting the average global temperature increase due to climate change to 2°C (3.6°F), compared to pre-industrial conditions. That is generally thought to require keeping the atmospheric  CO2 concentration below 450 ppm (0.045%). In their launch presentation for this report, as in other recent reports, the IEA sounded the alarm that this goal may be slipping out of our grasp. April's monthly CO2 average exceeded 400 ppm for the first time since measurements began, and it is growing at around 2 ppm per year.

The IEA makes a good case that the rapid energy transition described in their 2DS scenario is feasible and economically beneficial, despite its $44 trillion price tag, providing substantial future savings in fuel costs, or more modest ones on the discounted cash flow basis on which most investments are premised. However, they are equally candid that reaching this goal will require significantly greater commitments and actions than countries have already made--or than I would assess to be politically feasible in the current global environment.

Renewables may be on-track, but many other aspects of the low-carbon transition aren't. That's especially true for new nuclear power, post-Fukushima, and carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) on which 2DS counts for 7% and 14%, respectively, of emissions reductions through 2050.

It's worth recalling that the main scenario in the World Energy Outlook was not "450", but rather the less-restrictive "New Policies" scenario, which appears to correspond to the middle "4DS" technology scenario of the ETP. (The WEO also includes a status quo "Current Policies" scenario.)  In that context we must not let the appealing outcomes envisioned in 2DS obscure the emissions-reducing benefits of natural gas in the world we are still likelier to inhabit, based on current trends, than the one we might desire.

Only under the rapid replacement of fossil fuels by renewables and nuclear power and CO2 sequestration assumed in the 2DS/ "450" scenarios would it be true that, "After 2025...emissions from gas-fired plants are higher than the average carbon intensity of the global electricity mix; natural gas loses its status as a low-carbon fuel." Presumably in the ETP's other two scenarios, that crossover would not happen until much later, if at all.

Gas is thus still a crucial bridge to a lower-carbon world, and it will not lose that status until we have made much more progress in reducing energy-related emissions than seems likely in the near future. While I certainly wouldn't bet against the continued growth of renewable energy, the slow progress of the other elements of decarbonization leaves a vital role for gas to help fuel the beneficial electrification of energy that the IEA has highlighted, for multiple decades.

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

An Expensive Subsidy, Twisting in the Wind

• The expired federal Production Tax Credit for wind energy has missed another opportunity for renewal in the US Senate.
• If renewed at the proposed level and extended repeatedly, its annual cost could eventually exceed US tax breaks for oil and gas by a factor of 9:1.

I see that the 2014 "tax extenders" bill, S.2260, failed to pass a cloture vote in the US Senate yesterday. That has spoiled for now the chances of reviving the Production Tax Credit (PTC) for wind and other (non-solar) renewables that expired at the end of last year. The bill might get another opportunity in revised form, but in coming up 7 votes short, it calls into question the Senate majority's preferred approach of tackling the entire package of dozens of tax breaks en masse.

I've written about the PTC at length, most recently just prior to the expiration of its latest version last December. Long-time readers know I am convinced that reform is overdue for this excessively generous subsidy for what amounts to a mature industry. Here's a different way to put both of those aspects of the PTC into context.

First, consider its cost if applied to all current and future wind power installations. As a benchmark, the highly controversial tax benefits received by the oil and gas industry amount to around $4 billion per year in the federal budget.

If all US wind-generated electricity received the PTC at the rate offered in the current extenders bill, the annual cost would approach the oil and gas "subsidy", at $3.9 B/yr based on last year's actual US wind generation of 168 billion kWh, which equates to less than 3% of US oil and gas production in 2013.

If wind and similar renewable sources reached 30% of US electricity generation, as many hope and the Department of Energy has concluded is feasible, then the annual subsidy would exceed $28 B/yr, based on 2013 US net generation. US electricity demand is expected to grow by as much as 29% between now and 2040. That would bring annual PTC outlays to $36 B.

This looks like a reductio ad absurdum argument, because it is. Simply put, is it reasonable, after twenty years of such support, for the wind industry to expect to continue to receive an extremely generous subsidy, compared to other forms of energy, until wind power reaches market saturation?

As for arguments that wind power is not yet mature, other mature industries have exhibited similarly impressive growth and cost reductions in recent years. Natural gas production comes readily to mind. The fact that wind developers assert they still need this subsidy at this level speaks more to the competitiveness of the technology than to its maturity.

Ultimately, the PTC must be seen as a proxy for the comprehensive carbon policy we don't have and may never have. If there's a consensus in the government to support low-emission energy technologies, in lieu of a carbon tax on all energy, shouldn't it at least reward technologies on the basis of their actual emissions reductions, rather than merely for deployment (the 30% solar Investment Tax Credit, which expires in a few years) or operation (the PTC)? At $0.023/kWh, the tax credit for wind power displacing gas-fired power from a combined cycle power plant results in an implicit cost of around $65 per metric ton of CO2 avoided. That's far higher than the price at which emissions credits trade in any of the regional US or international markets.

The perils of the PTC are a microcosm of the provisions included in this bill, which might still eventually be passed. It includes measures with nearly universal support, like the Research and Development tax credit, which has also expired, and a grab bag of narrower and in some cases bizarre tax breaks, such as providing three-year depreciation for race horses. PTC supporters are now left to hope that enough additional legislative favors can be squeezed into the next version of the bill to carry the whole bunch over the top.

ExxonMobil Confronts the Carbon Bubble

• Companies and investors are squaring off over the potential impact of government climate policies on asset values, particularly in the fossil fuel industry.

• ExxonMobil gave its shareholders data and assurances of asset resilience under various policies but dismissed the scenario of greatest interest to sustainability investors.

Last fall I devoted a lengthy post to the notion that future policies to address climate change expose investors in companies producing fossil fuels to a potential bubble in asset valuations. So although I am not an ExxonMobil shareholder, I was particularly interested when the company issued a report last month responding to specific shareholder concerns along these lines. Although the term “carbon asset bubble” did not appear in the report, its references to carbon budgets and the risk of stranded assets in a low-carbon scenario were aimed directly at this emerging meme.

Unsurprisingly, ExxonMobil’s management reassured investors that, “none of our hydrocarbon reserves are now or will become ‘stranded’.” Wisely avoiding past tendencies to question interpretations of climate science, their analysis appears to be grounded in mainstream views of climate change. It focuses on the costs and achievability of an extreme low-carbon scenario, and on the resilience of the company’s portfolio under various climate policies.

Exxon's analysis is based on the company’s latest Outlook for Energy, an annual global forecast broadly similar to the main “New Policies” scenario of the International Energy Agency (IEA). It has fewer similarities to the IEA’s “450″ scenario that underpins carbon bubble claims. The company expects energy demand to grow at an average of about 1% annually over the next three decades–faster than population but much slower than the global economy–with increasing efficiency and a gradual shift toward lower-emission energy sources: Gas increases faster than oil and by more BTUs in total, while coal grows for a while longer but then shrinks back to current levels. Renewables grow fastest of all, producing about as much energy in 2040 as nuclear power does today. As a result of these shifts global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions peak around 2030 and then decline gradually.

That forecast won’t impress those advocating prompt and aggressive changes in the global energy mix to head off serious climate change, but it is not very different from the most recent global forecast of the US government’s Energy Information Administration. If anything, Exxon expects slower growth of energy and emissions than the EIA.

Ultimately, ExxonMobil's argument that it isn’t running outsized carbon asset risks depends heavily on its estimate of the implicit costs of achieving a much deeper and more rapid transition to renewables, compared to its--and others’--forecasts. It gauges this on the intensity of governments’ future climate policies, expressed in terms of their effective cost per ton of CO2 abated, and on the affordability of such measures to energy consumers, especially in the developing world, where emissions are increasing rapidly.

Without directly disputing the technical feasibility of achieving such large and rapid emissions cuts, the company's management essentially questions whether any government would or could impose the extraordinary costs necessary for that to occur. Their proxy estimate of $200/ton of CO2 for such policies is sobering. Even if the sums that would raise were all efficiently recycled by those governments–a heroic assumption–the resulting diversion of investment and increase in energy costs would adversely affect overall economic development.

The sustainable investor groups that raised this issue with ExxonMobil were apparently disappointed with the answer they got. That's not surprising, but having participated in similar exercises at Texaco, Inc., I think ExxonMobil went well beyond the kind of perfunctory reply the investors might have expected. In particular, it has provided enough data to support a more serious dialog with investors on this subject.

For example, Exxon indicated that it “stress tests” its projects and acquisitions at proxy costs of up to $80/ton of CO2, compared to current levels of $8-10/ton in the EU’s Emission Trading System. Implicit in that is the question of whether investors would reasonably expect them to test projects at $200/ton., which would equate to around $100 per average barrel of oil--roughly today's price--based on the nifty “seriatim” chart at the end of the report.

The document also includes information addressing the resiliency of the company’s assets and operations under a lower-carbon future, with their emphasis on natural gas and a global average cost of production under $12 per oil-equivalent-barrel (BOE). Climate policies would have to raise those costs and shrink the associated revenues very significantly to jeopardize current production, nor are low oil prices generally consistent with a low-carbon world. Investments in future production are another matter, though Exxon refers to the IEA’s 450 scenario to demonstrate how much additional oil and gas development would still be required in the next 20 years, even in a world that was determined to constrain global temperature increases to no more than 2°C.

ExxonMobil’s response to investors will not end the debate over the carbon bubble. While providing a lot of information, the company essentially argued that the extreme low-carbon scenario associated with the risks of a carbon bubble is irrelevant, because it can’t be achieved any time soon, irrespective of the risks associated with current emissions levels. That is close to my own view, but it is unlikely to resonate with those who are more focused on the risks of climate change than on the nuts and bolts of what it would take to avert them.

Interestingly, the company’s report on carbon risks was issued on the same day as the latest iteration of the predicted consequences of further warming from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In a sense each report provides context for the other, so that investors who accept the IPCC’s analysis can weigh the potential costs of global warming against the cost and scale of the changes that would be required to put the world on a crash program to avert the worst climate-change-related outcomes. They can then buy or sell accordingly.

A different version of this posting was previously published on Energy Trends Insider.

Converting Coal to Synthetic Natural Gas in China

•  With so much attention focused on China's shale gas potential, its growing synthetic natural gas industry is a wild card.

• In light of China's severe air quality problems,  trading smog for higher CO2 emissions is an understandable choice, but one with global implications.

In its latest Medium-Term Coal Market Report the International Energy Agency (IEA) forecasts a slowing of coal demand growth but no retreat in its global use. That won’t surprise energy realists, but the item I wasn’t expecting was the reference in the IEA press release to growing efforts in China to convert coal into liquid fuels and especially synthetic natural gas (SNG).  It’s not hard to imagine China’s planners viewing SNG as a promising avenue for addressing the severe local air pollution in that country’s major cities, but the resulting increase in CO2 emissions could be substantial. It could also affect the economics of natural gas projects around the Pacific Rim.

Air quality in China’s cities has fallen to levels not seen in developed countries for many decades. There’s even a smartphone app to help residents and visitors avoid the worst exposures. Much of this pollution, in the form of oxides of sulfur and nitrogen and particulate matter, is the result of coal combustion in power plants. Although China is adding wind and solar power capacity at a rapid clip, after years of exporting most of their solar panel output, the scale of the country’s coal use doesn’t lend itself to easy or quick substitution by these renewables.

Natural gas offers a lower-emitting alternative to coal on a larger scale than renewables. Existing coal-fired power plants could be converted to run on gas or replaced with modern combined-cycle gas turbine power plants. Gas-fired power plants emit up to 99% fewer local, or “criteria” pollutants than coal plants, especially those with minimal exhaust scrubbing.

Unfortunately, China doesn’t have enough domestic natural gas to go around. Despite potentially world-class shale gas resources and the rapid growth of coal-bed methane and more conventional gas sources, natural gas supplies only 4% of China’s energy needs. Imported LNG can help fill the gap, but it isn’t cheap. What China has in abundance is coal. Converting some of it to SNG could boost China’s gas supply relatively quickly–perhaps faster than the country’s shale gas infrastructure and expertise can gear up.

SNG is hardly a new idea; the Great Plains Synfuels Plant has been producing it in North Dakota since the 1980s. When that facility was built, natural gas prices were volatile and rising, and greenhouse gas emissions appeared on no one’s radar. The process for making SNG from coal is straightforward, and its primary building block, the gasification unit, is off-the-shelf technology. I worked with this technology briefly in the 1980s, and my former employer, Texaco, licensed dozens of gasification units in China before the technology was eventually purchased by GE. Other vendors offer similar processes.

Gasifying coal adds a layer of complexity, compared to gasifying liquid hydrocarbons but this, too, has been demonstrated in commercial operations. Most of the output of the facilities Texaco sold to China was used to make chemicals, but the chemistry of turning syngas (hydrogen plus carbon monoxide) into pipeline-quality methane is no more challenging.

This effort is already under way in China. Last October Scientific American reported that the first of China’s SNG facilities had started shipping gas to customers, with four more plants in various stages of construction and another five approved earlier this year. The combined capacity of China’s nine identified SNG projects comes to around 3.5 billion cubic feet per day, or a bit more than the entire Barnett Shale near Dallas, Texas produced in 2007 as US shale gas production was ramping up. It’s also just over a quarter of China’s total natural gas consumption in 2012, including imported LNG.

To put that in perspective, if that quantity of SNG were converted to electricity in efficient combined cycle plants their output would be roughly double that of China’s 75,000 MW of installed wind turbines in 2012, when wind generated around 2% of the country’s electricity.

The appeal of converting millions of tons a year of dirty coal into clean-burning natural gas, in facilities located far from China’s population centers, is clear. This strategy even has some similarities to one pursued by southern California’s utilities, which for years imported power from the big coal-fired plants at Four Corners.  For that matter, the gasification process has some key advantages over the standard coal power plant technologies in the ease with which criteria pollutants can be addressed. Generating power from coal-based SNG might actually reduce total criteria pollutants, rather than just relocating them.

However, wherever these plants are built they would add around 500 million metric tons per year of CO2, or around 5% of China’s 2012 emissions, a figure that dwarfs even the most pessimistic estimates of the emissions consequences of building the Keystone XL pipeline. That’s because the lifecycle emissions for SNG-generated power have been estimated at seven times those from natural gas, and 36-82% higher than simply burning the coal for power generation.

What could possibly lead China’s government to pursue such an option, in spite of widespread concerns about climate change and China’s own commitments to reduce the emissions intensity of its economy? Having lived in Los Angeles when it was still experiencing frequent first-stage smog alerts and occasional second-stage alerts, I have some sympathy for their problem. China’s air pollution causes even more serious health and economic impacts and has been blamed for over a million premature deaths each year. By comparison the consequences of greenhouse gas emissions are more indirect, remote and uncertain. Any rational system of governance would have to put a higher priority on air pollution at China’s current levels than on CO2 emissions.

It might even turn out to be a reasonable call on emissions, if China’s planners envision carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) becoming economical within the next decade. It’s much easier to capture high-purity, sequestration-ready CO2 from a gasifier than a pulverized coal power plant. (At one time I sold the 99% pure CO2 from the gasifier at what was then Texaco’s Los Angeles refinery to companies that produced food-grade dry ice.) It should also be much easier and cheaper to retrofit a gasifier for CCS than a power plant.

In an internal context the trade-off that China is choosing in converting coal into synthetic natural gas is understandable. However, that perspective is unlikely to be shared by other countries that won’t benefit from the resulting improvement in local air quality and view China’s rising CO2 emissions with alarm. I would be surprised if the emissions from SNG were factored into anyone’s projections, and nine SNG plants could be just the camel’s nose under the tent.

In an environment that the IEA has described as a potential Golden Age of Natural Gas, large-scale production of SNG could also constitute an unexpected wild card for energy markets. When added to China’s shale gas potential, it’s another trend for LNG developers and exporters in North America and elsewhere to monitor closely.

A different version of this posting was previously published on Energy Trends Insider.