EPA's CO2 Rule and the Back Door to Cap & Trade

• Significant differences in EPA's proposed state CO2 targets for the power sector are reviving interest in cap & trade as a way to reduce compliance costs.
• This compounds the EPA plan's controversy and raises serious concerns about how the resulting revenue would be used.

Earlier this month the US Environmental Protection Agency released for comment its proposal for regulating the CO2 emissions from existing power plants. It follows EPA’s emissions rule for new power plants published late last year but takes a different, more expansive approach.  If implemented, the “Clean Power Plan” would reduce US emissions in the utility sector by around 25% by 2020 and 30% by 2030.

One of its most surprising features is that instead of setting emissions standards for each type of power plant or mandating a single, across-the-board emissions-reduction percentage, it imposes distinct emissions targets on each state. Based on analysis by Bloomberg New Energy Finance, some states could actually increase emissions, while others would be required to make deep cuts. The resulting disparities have apparently triggered new interest in state and regional emissions trading as a means of managing the rule’s cost.

Although emissions trading has become more controversial in recent years, it proved its worth in holding down the cost of implementing previous environmental regulations, such as the effort to reduce sulfur pollution associated with acid rain. It works by enabling facilities or companies with lower-than-average abatement costs to profit from maximizing their reductions and then selling their excess reductions to others with higher costs. The desired overall reductions are thus achieved at a lower cost to the economy than if each company or facility were required to reduce its emissions by the same amount.

Although the Clean Power Plan doesn’t require that states establish such emissions trading markets, its lengthy preamble includes a discussion of existing state greenhouse gas “cap-and-trade” markets in California and the Northeast. It also points out that measures to comply with the new rule may generate benefits in the markets for conventional pollutants, including those for the recent cross-state pollution rule. Administrator McCarthy also mentioned the benefits of multi-state markets in her speech announcing the new rule.

A patchwork of cap and trade markets across the US, including the addition of new states to mechanisms like the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), might help mitigate some of the cost of complying with 50 different CO2 targets. However, it would still be a far cry from the kind of economy-wide, comprehensive CO2 cap-and-trade system once contemplated by the US Congress.

Cap and trade was an idea that had gained significant momentum and even begun to appear inevitable, prior to the onset of the financial crisis in 2008. To supporters, it looked like a better way to limit and eventually cut greenhouse gas emissions than through command-and-control regulations. And the price it would establish for emissions would be based on the cost of achieving a desired level of reductions, rather than being set arbitrarily, as a carbon tax would be, without any guarantee of actual emissions reductions. Opponents viewed it as an unnecessary or unnecessarily complicated drag on the economy and a tax by another name, coining the pejorative term “cap-and-tax”.

Although early US cap-and-trade bills were bipartisan, including one co-sponsored by Senator McCain, the 2008 Republican Presidential nominee, the debate over cap and trade took on an increasingly partisan tone in a period of widening polarization on most major issues. The Waxman-Markey climate bill, with cap and trade as a major provision, was narrowly passed when Democrats controlled the House of Representatives in 2009, but various Senate versions failed to attract sufficient support, even when Democrats held a filibuster-proof supermajority in that body. The chances of enacting cap and trade legislation effectively died when a Republican won the vacant Senate seat for Massachusetts in January 2010. However, viewing this as a purely partisan divide is simplistic, at best.

Aside from opposition by key Senate Democrats, including one whose campaign included a vivid demonstration of his stand against Waxman-Markey, the versions of “cap and trade” debated in 2009 and 2010 bore little resemblance to the original idea. Waxman-Markey was a 1400-page monstrosity, laden with extraneous provisions and pork. Its embedded allocation of free allowances strongly favored the same electricity sector now being targeted by EPA’s Clean Power Plan, at the expense of transportation energy, for which low-carbon options remain fewer and more costly. It would have created a de facto gasoline tax, while yielding fewer net emissions reductions than a system with a level playing field. Subsequent bills, such as the Kerry-Lieberman bill in 2010, took this a step farther, removing transportation fuels from cap and trade and effectively taxing them at a rate based on the price of emissions credits.

Along the way, national CO2 cap-and-trade legislation evolved from a fairly straightforward way to harness market forces to deliver the cheapest emissions cuts available, to a mechanism for raising and redistributing large sums of money outside the tax code. In some cases that would have been done directly, such as in the gratifyingly brief Cantwell-Collins “cap-and-dividend” bill, or as indirectly and inefficiently as in Waxman-Markey. It’s no wonder the whole idea became toxic at the federal level.

Although emissions trading for greenhouse gas reduction came up short in the US Congress, it took hold elsewhere. The EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) is an outgrowth of the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions trading mechanism, which was included largely at the urging of the US delegation to the Kyoto climate conference in 1997. The ETS is focused on the industrial and power sectors and covers 43% of EU emissions. It has experienced significant ups and downs over the sale and allocation of emissions credits.

Cap and trade also emerged as a preferred approach for some US states seeking to reduce their emissions. California’s emissions market was established via a provision of the 2006 Climate Solutions Act (A.B. 32), and RGGI currently facilitates trading among 9 mostly northeastern states. The relatively low prices of emissions allowances in these systems–particularly in RGGI, which has traded in the range of $3-$5/ton of CO2–suggests that they may still be capturing low-hanging fruit in the early phases of steadily declining emissions caps. Their effectiveness at facilitating future low-cost emissions cuts is hard to gauge, because they also don’t exist in a vacuum.

Except for Vermont, all of the states involved have renewable electricity mandates that by their nature deliver more prescriptive emissions cuts. These markets have also been implemented in a generally weak US economy, which has constrained energy demand, and against the backdrop of the shale revolution, which has yielded significant non-mandated emissions reductions. Nor have these state and regional approaches to cap and trade entirely avoided the debates over how to spend their substantial proceeds that plagued federal cap-and-trade legislation.

For many years my view of cap and trade was that if we needed to put a price on GHG emissions, this was a better, more efficient option than an arbitrary carbon tax, or other top-down method. My experience analyzing more recent “cap-and-trade” legislation left me with serious doubts about our ability to implement a fair and effective national cap-and-trade market for CO2 and other greenhouse gases within the current political environment. Whether on a unified basis or in aggregate across many smaller systems, the enormous sums it could eventually generate are simply too tempting to expect our legislators and government agencies to administer even-handedly.

Whatever its potential benefits and pitfalls, I can’t help seeing cap and trade as a distraction in the context of the EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan. Even at its most efficient, cap and trade couldn’t render painless the wide disparities of a plan that would require Arizona to cut emissions per megawatt-hour by more than half, and states like Texas and Oklahoma to cut by 36-38%, while Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana and even California cut by less than a quarter–and under some scenarios might even increase their overall emissions. Cap and trade would merely be a footnote on the scale of transformation the EPA’s plan envisions for the US electricity sector.

A different version of this posting was previously published on Energy Trends Insider.

Because That's Where the Emissions Are

Yesterday the Environmental Protection Agency released its tabulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from large facilities in the US. In perusing the data I couldn't help thinking of the quote attributed to Willie Sutton concerning why he robbed banks. Even if he never actually said, "Because that's where the money is," the simple logic of that analysis transfers neatly to the question of why we might be interested in assessing and ultimately managing GHG emissions from such installations. While there are other important sources, notably including motor vehicles and aircraft, the more than 6,000 sites reported in the agency's online registry account for roughly half of all US GHG emissions. Furthermore, just a quarter of these sites--power plants--contribute nearly three-fourths of US emissions from large facilities. That's where the emissions are and where US climate policy should focus.

Although that doesn't dictate that we should entirely ignore all the other facilities, it certainly raises serious questions about the threshold of reporting for the hundreds of installations emitting less than 10,000 tons of CO2-equivalent gases per year, compared to the top-100 facilities, the smallest of which emitted nearly twice that much every day.

It should also challenge the belief systems of some members of Congress concerning the relative importance of different sectors. The highest-emitting oil refinery in the country is also one of the biggest in the world by throughput capacity, at 573,000 barrels per day. Yet it comes in at #45 on the list, with only one other refinery appearing in the top 100. The entire refining sector, comprising 145 plants, emitted around 5.7% of the total GHGs represented in the registry, and thus less than 3% of the US total. Why does that matter as more than an industry talking-point? Because reducing emissions from refineries by 10%--no easy task when they are already roughly 90% efficient in terms of their total energy output vs. inputs--would be lost in the rounding in our national emissions statistics. We won't get very far chasing expensive diminishing returns.

By comparison, reducing emissions from the 1,555 power plants on the list by an average of 10% would reduce US emissions by more than 3%. And because we are blessed with many more processes for generating electricity than for refining oil, this could be achieved in a variety of ways, nor does 10% represent any kind of ceiling for what might be possible. One option would be to retire the least-efficient coal-fired plants and take up the slack at existing gas-turbine power plants, plus some additional renewables. That may happen anyway, as a consequence of other EPA regulations. We could also replace the worst coal plants with near-zero-emission nuclear power plants of advanced design, such as the AP-1000 reactor that won NRC approval late last year, or the various modular nuclear reactors now under development. Capturing and sequestering the CO2 from coal-fired power plants would be another option, if it can be perfected at a reasonable cost.

I would never suggest that climate policy could be truly simple, but the numbers the EPA just reported, combined with what we know about the lifecycle emissions from the petroleum value chain, indicate that the scope of the US climate policy debate could usefully be narrowed to focus on just two main emissions sources: power plants and the end-use combustion of hydrocarbon fuels. On the scale of overall US emissions, almost everything else is noise. Of course that leaves plenty of room for discussion and disagreement on the most effective ways to address these emissions at the lowest cost and least disruption to an already-fragile economy. We can still argue endlessly about the relative merits of putting a price on emissions, providing incentives for emission-reducing technologies, and setting command-and-control regulations. Yet when we contrast the potential effectiveness of such a limited approach with the intricacy and distortions entailed in "comprehensive" efforts like the failed Waxman-Markey climate bill of 2009, it looks like a very helpful simplification to pursue.

Congress Defers to EPA on Climate Policy

The confrontation over climate policy that was teed up by the results of last November's mid-term election culminated with the House of Representatives voting overwhelmingly yesterday to strip the Environmental Protection Agency of its power to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. However, the more crucial votes took place on Wednesday, when the Senate defeated a string of amendments that would have similarly blocked EPA's powers to regulate CO2 and other greenhouse gases (GHGs), whether entirely, only for specific sectors, or for a period of two years. This is a worrying outcome, because it means that the Congress has effectively yielded responsibility for managing these emissions to an approach that nearly everyone, including this administration's EPA Administrator, previously saw as much less desirable, for good reasons. It will impose another layer of intrusive regulations on US industry and businesses, even though it's not clear that it will achieve much in terms of reducing US greenhouse gas emissions, let alone reducing the pace of global warming.

It's worth recalling how we got to this point. A long succession of cap and trade bills, several with bi-partisan sponsorship, ultimately failed to attract enough support to become law. The most recent such legislation, the egregious Waxman-Markey bill, may have looked more like a pork-barrel bonanza than a serious attempt to get our emissions under control, but even it was based on the principle of putting a price on emissions, and harnessing the power of the market and innovation to reduce emissions at a lower cost than through classic tailpipe and smokestack regulations. The former strategy takes advantage of the fact that greenhouse gases behave very differently than the substances associated with smog and other lung-irritating air pollution. Unfortunately, the way that EPA is approaching GHGs ignores that opportunity.

With essentially no adverse local effects, it makes sense to deal with GHGs as flexibly as possible. I can think of several adjectives to describe the path on which the EPA has embarked, but flexible isn't one of them. I suspect that many of the states whose Clean Air Act implementation plans were entirely satisfactory for their originally intended purposes but now find themselves out of compliance would agree. It's ironic that during the debate over Waxman-Markey, EPA regulation was held up as the dreaded alternative to enacting a climate bill, yet now we see a majority of the Senate treating it as something worth defending.

The net result of this week's votes is a House bill that will likely be dead on arrival in the Senate, where the leadership has demonstrated sufficient support for the EPA greenhouse gas regulations that went into effect at the beginning of this year to sustain a Presidential veto of any similar measure that might squeak past the Senate later. At the same time, 17 Democratic Senators voted for some degree of constraint on EPA's powers regarding GHGs. Even if many of those individual votes were focused on blue-state or swing-state electorates going into next year's election, that at least suggests that a bi-partisan majority of Congress does not view EPA regulation as the best strategy for reducing emissions, particularly in a weak economy. And that majority could expand next year. For those of us who are concerned about climate change but also worried that EPA's command-and-control approach to emissions will cost the US economy far more than the modest emissions reductions this will yield are worth, that provides a ray of hope that the current EPA regulations aren't the last word on the subject.

Chicago's Climate Exchange Shuts Down

I see that the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) will be winding down its CO2 trading operations by the end of the year and laying off staff. This is only surprising considering that the parent company of the CCX was acquired just this summer by the Intercontinental Exchange, though mainly for its successful European emissions trading market. In case you were wondering how long the odds against enacting cap & trade legislation in the US have become, the demise of the CCX is a signpost you can't ignore. If the symbolism of a popular Democratic governor using the Waxman-Markey climate bill for target practice during his recent successful bid for the US Senate wasn't clear enough, it looks like his bullet may have also hit the CCX.

I recall a meeting with one of the founders of CCX at Texaco's corporate headquarters in New York prior to my leaving the company at the end of 2001. At that time, Texaco's management was coming around to the idea that sooner or later emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases would carry a price, for the first time in human history. Cap & trade offered a proven way to discover that price, based on the pioneering experience of US markets for sulfur dioxide, a cause of acid rain, and nitrogen oxides. The principles of emissions trading had been embedded in the Kyoto Protocol, largely thanks to the efforts of the US delegation, and European countries were setting up the precursors of the EU Emissions Trading System to manage mandatory carbon reductions. Such developments still appeared to be somewhere over the horizon in the US, which never ratified Kyoto, but they seemed likely to find their way here, eventually. One of the main selling points of the CCX, which was based on voluntary emission reduction commitments by member companies, was that it would provide valuable early experience in a formal market for emissions reductions, giving participants a leg up when such trading was required by law. This argument didn't persuade my former employer, but a number of other companies signed up.

If this scenario now seems like a quaint strand of alternate history--a "what if?" that never materialized--that perspective is quite recent. The prospects for CCX and wider emissions trading looked reasonable for a long time. The value of the CCX contract peaked in mid-2008, when it had become apparent that the ultimate presidential nominees of both major US political parties would be candidates who supported cap & trade, with the Republican even having previously co-authored Senate legislation on the subject. After a severe dip during the worst of the financial crisis, the contract recovered to around $2/ton after the new administration took office, but then swooned again as the Waxman-Markey bill, with its heavily skewed version of cap & trade, neared passage. As the likelihood of parallel Senate action on climate legislation receded, it never really recovered.

In its editorial on the termination of the Chicago Climate Exchange, the Wall Street Journal suggested that the market has delivered its verdict and the idea of national-level cap & trade is now dead in the US. Perhaps, but it certainly doesn't signal an end to all CO2 trading here. Aside from the state and regional programs to which the Journal alluded, companies with global operations subject to emissions caps in other countries will still be active participants in non-US emissions markets, and firms that remain committed to voluntary reductions in the US may continue to trade with each other, via brokers, or with over-the-counter market makers.

For that matter, I can't help wondering whether cap & trade is truly as dead as a Monty Python parrot or just resting. I'm reluctant to let go of an idea I've supported for a long time, but I also still see significant advantages for cap & trade over other means of putting a price on greenhouse gas emissions. Although the idea of carbon pricing may have gone out of fashion in the US, major tax reform for the purpose of deficit reduction could make it much more difficult to provide the monetary incentives for renewable energy technologies that we do today. Without those subsidies or a price on CO2, renewables will have a hard time competing with fossil fuels. And if our only other choices for emissions reduction were mandates or the command-and-control approach for which the EPA is now gearing up, then cap & trade and the emissions trading that makes it work might no longer look quite so appalling to their critics. In that case, the companies that participated in the CCX during the last seven years might not have wasted their time, after all.

FYI, I'll be participating in a webinar on the sustainability aspects of natural gas next Monday at The Energy Collective . To sign up follow this link. In the meantime, I wish my US readers a very enjoyable Thanksgiving. New postings will resume next week.

Interpreting the Election Results

The results of yesterday's election will be interpreted and spun in many ways in the days and weeks ahead. Republicans gained control of the House of Representatives and several key governorships but fell short of capturing control of the Senate. In the process they picked up enough seats--along with at least one like-minded Democratic Senator-elect--to put cap & trade or a national carbon tax out of reach for at least the next two years. Meanwhile, voters resoundingly defeated a ballot initiative in California that would have forestalled implementation of the state's tough greenhouse gas policies. But even if comprehensive federal energy legislation is off the table, divided government doesn't rule out the possibility of a national renewable energy standard or other energy measures, provided they don't involve significant additional expenditures.

On the surface, the election outcome appears to set up a return to the pre-2009 situation, when California and other states were pushing aggressively for action on climate change while the federal government remained deadlocked on the issue. Too much has changed since then for that picture to be accurate. In the absence of Congressional action on greenhouse gas emissions the EPA is forging ahead with its own regulations under the Clean Air Act, and that could provide an early test of the willingness of the new Congress to try to modify the administration's regulatory approach. Meanwhile, although the proposition that would have suspended California's A.B. 32 climate rules was swamped after being portrayed--unfairly, in my view--as mainly benefiting out-of-state oil companies at the expense of the state's new Cleantech industry, California voters passed another initiative, Proposition 26, that will make it harder to impose a variety of new fees on businesses and consumers, including fees related to the environment. Further complicating the outlook, the results of several key governor's races, including in New Mexico and possibly Oregon, could limit the number of other states that might "opt in" to A.B. 32, as well as raising the possibility of more defections from the Western Climate Initiative.

Although as I noted on Monday our fundamental energy situation is largely pre-determined for at least the next few years, last night's results could affect energy policy in a number of other ways, aside from climate change. One example is the President's desire to eliminate subsidies for conventional energy, as part of an initiative of the G-20 group of nations. The main subsidies targeted by this international effort are those that increase demand by limiting the price of fossil fuels for consumers, particularly in developing countries, yet President Obama has linked this to his goal of eliminating a variety of tax breaks benefiting domestic energy production, including the Section 199 tax deduction that all US manufacturers enjoy. Unless this measure is somehow passed in the lame duck session when Congress returns from its election break, it looks dead on arrival come January. From an energy security perspective we should be glad of that.

The change in control of the House also puts the extension of the expiring ethanol blending credit in doubt, along with the prospect of extending eligibility for Treasury renewable energy stimulus grants beyond the end of this year. Even though the latter appears deficit-neutral, and might thus attract bi-partisan support, it accelerates benefits that project developers would otherwise have to wait until their next tax filing to receive, and it probably lets some marginal projects that might not otherwise find private funding escape winnowing. If the lame duck doesn't pass this, the odds of the 112th Congress extending it or anything else connected to the stimulus look poor.

Ultimately the likelihood of meaningful energy legislation of any kind will hinge on the willingness of the President and the new Congress to meet somewhere in the middle to get things done. Otherwise, the scope is limited to a few lowest-common-denominator efforts, which might include a modest national renewable electricity standard, with everything else effectively blocked by the other chamber of Congress or the President's veto pen. I don't expect to lack for topics on which to blog in the next two years.

California Prop. 23 vs. A.B. 32

Aside from the question of which party will control the House and Senate for the next two years, next month's mid-term elections also feature a number of important state contests, including California's closely-watched Proposition 23, a ballot initiative that would suspend enforcement of the state's major greenhouse gas legislation, Assembly Bill 32. Prop 23 has national implications, since California has taken a leadership position on emissions regulations at a time when national climate policy has become deadlocked. Yet as I've watched the coverage of Prop 23 in the blogosphere and mainstream media, I've been amazed by the consistent mischaracterization of precisely what is at stake in this initiative, most recently in Tom Friedman's column in yesterday's New York Times. Californians surely deserve a better assessment of the issues involved.

When the loudest objections to any candidacy or initiative are focused on vilifying its financial backers, this often indicates that its opponents' arguments on its merits are weak. The fact that several oil companies with refineries and other operations in the state are supporting Prop 23 shouldn't trump the pros and cons of the actual initiative, any more than the fact that much of the funding for the anti-Prop 23 effort apparently comes from venture capitalists and companies that stand to profit if Prop 23 is defeated. For example, the portfolio of VC firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, one of whose prominent partners is reported to have donated $2 million to oppose Prop 23, includes investments in biofuels, wind, solar and geothermal power, along with other green technologies, many of which would benefit if A.B. 32 were upheld. From my perspective, this whole line of argument is a colossal red herring. Valero, Tesoro and the other oil company supporters of Prop 23 are part of a $50 billion-a-year California refining industry that employs thousands of Californians and fuels more than 99.9% of the state's 33.6 million registered motor vehicles. The initiative's cleantech-based opponents are part of a smaller but growing sector that has emerged as an offshoot of Silicon Valley and the state's premier research universities. All of these entities have a stake in the outcome, and an equal right to take a position. Their involvement shouldn't constitute a compelling argument for or against Prop 23.

So what is this really all about? Contrary to one of Mr. Friedman's assertions yesterday, it is most certainly not about "making the state a healthier place". The conflation of the greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) that A.B. 32 explicitly addresses with local air quality is probably the most misleading aspect of the entire debate. Perhaps this was an inevitable consequence of the US Supreme Court decision that labeled GHGs as pollution, but it is a most unfortunate one, because it obscures the crucial differences between a law that was intended to restore California's GHG emissions to their 1990 level by 2020--thereby reducing the state's impact on global climate change--and the extensive state, federal and local laws and regs targeting the causes of the smog for which parts of California became infamous. As a long-time California resident during the period when most of the latter were implemented, I can attest to their effectiveness at cleaning up the state's air, despite the enormous growth in population and vehicles that has occurred in the meantime. However, voters should understand clearly that none of this progress, and none of those existing measures regulating the emissions of SOx, NOx, carbon monoxide, unburned hydrocarbons, and the other contributors to local air pollution is at risk on November 2nd. Simply put, both A.B. 32 and Prop 23 deal with climate change, not local pollution.

As for health effects, any connection between the emissions that A.B. 32 regulates and public health in California is tenuous, at best. Understanding why depends on the numbers involved. In 2007 California emitted just over 400 million metric tons of CO2, the primary greenhouse gas implicated in climate change. This constituted 6.7% of total US CO2 emissions, an enviable performance considering that the Golden State accounts for about 12% of US population and roughly 13% of US gross domestic product (GDP). But on a global basis--and climate change is very much a global problem--California emits just 1.4% of the world's anthropogenic CO2. The state could stop emitting CO2 altogether and the global climate would never notice the difference. That doesn't justify doing nothing about the problem or shirking responsibility for the state's contribution to climate change, but it does mean that tracing the future health impacts of the expected future warming of California to the highly attenuated effects of the state's current emissions stretches cause and effect to the breaking point.

Then there are the economics that are at the heart of Prop 23's proposal to delay implementation of A.B. 32 until the state is in better financial shape, and of the opposition's arguments concerning the current law's benefits in fostering a clean energy economy in California. It's noteworthy that when the legislature passed A.B. 32 in 2006, California's economy was booming. Nominal state GDP in 2006 grew by over 6%, on top of 7% growth in 2005 and 8% in 2004. And while Mr. Friedman notes that the state's unemployment rarely falls below the 5.5% threshold on which Prop 23 would make the implementation of A.B. 32 contingent, that's precisely where unemployment was when the law was passed, and for the following year. I don't think that's a coincidence or an arbitrary choice. Whatever its merits--and it has more than a few, in my view--A.B. 32 is the kind of thing you take on when an economy is healthy, not when it's on its knees. That's because it cannot help but increase the cost of energy and the cost of doing business.

California has been down this road before. Starting in the 1980s the state imposed some of the most restrictive specifications in the world on gasoline and other fuels sold there. It also made it much more difficult for refiners to expand operations to keep pace with the growth in fuel demand in a state with a rapidly growing human and vehicle population. This turned California into a virtual "gasoline island", which has contributed to consumers in the state paying an average of 25 cents more per gallon--or 11% more--than the national average for gasoline over the last decade. With the implementation of the Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) included in A.B. 32, it will become even costlier to make gasoline in California, and this price differential could expand significantly. Considering that the state consumes 42 million gallons of gasoline each day, this already amounts to an extra $3.8 billion per year in costs. Increasing that disadvantage is not a trivial consideration. It won't even do much for the domestic ethanol industry, since much of the ethanol produced in the US won't qualify as "low-carbon" under the LCFS's definitions. This is a matter over which the ethanol industry is currently suing California.

With regard to the "green jobs" and cleantech growth that Prop 23's opponents cite, I am skeptical that these will result in meaningful growth in overall employment and output, as the pressure on the rest of the state's economy increases with the ratcheting-down of A.B. 32's emissions cap and LCFS. The recent experience with green-energy deployment incentives at the national level suggests caution in assessing how effective these measures will be in stimulating green jobs in California or the rest of the US, as opposed to offshore, where much of the green energy hardware that is being installed is manufactured. A recent article in MIT's Technology Review also questioned whether the consequences of Prop 23's passage would be quite as severe for the state's emerging cleantech sector as opponents suggest, because other incentives would remain unaffected. Ultimately, the market that matters most for California's cleantech companies is the global one, where they must compete with manufacturers from Asia and Europe. Creating a bubble market on their home turf will do little to advance that cause, as German photovoltaic firms are currently learning to their regret.

When we dispense with all the questionable arguments concerning who is for and against this initiative, whether it will alter the quality of the air Californians breathe, and how many green jobs it might affect, the choice becomes clearer. Proposition 23 asks voters to decide whether California should proceed with the nation's most aggressive effort to curb the greenhouse gas emissions implicated in global warming now--despite high unemployment, low growth and deep deficits--or whether that effort should be postponed until the state has returned to growth of the kind that prevailed when the law was passed, before the housing collapse, financial crisis and recession. The context of this choice should be equally clear, consisting of a complex global environmental challenge that California's efforts can't solve alone, but might help to influence at the margin. Having spent so much of my life in the state, including my entire education, I can easily understand that many Californians would believe it was their responsibility to move ahead at any cost, even if no one else followed. However, I can also envision that many of the state's voters would conclude that, for the moment, the costs and risks associated with A.B. 32 look too high. This is a difficult and consequential decision, even if some choose to portray it as a one-sided no-brainer.

By Executive Order

I recently ran across a mention in the New York Times of a new study suggesting a variety of energy and climate measures the administration could undertake on their own, without requiring new legislation passed by Congress. I've been thinking about this during some long stretches of driving this week. At first glance, the group's ideas merit consideration, and they might indeed be sufficient to meet the near-term emissions reduction goals the US endorsed at last year's Copenhagen climate conference. However, as tempting as such an approach might be in a year of legislative gridlock on energy, its pitfalls probably outweigh its benefits.

I haven't had time to scrutinize the report of the Presidential Climate Action Project item by item, since I'm on vacation. It caught my eye mainly because of the involvement of former Senator and presidential candidate Gary Hart. So my reactions don't really constitute analysis, but are more along the line of ruminations on a first impression that I might examine in more depth later.

At the very least, the idea that the administration could take major steps--beyond what it has already done--to reduce emissions and shift our economy away from its reliance on fossil fuels represents a potentially significant new scenario for the energy/climate environment, particularly if the mid-term elections reduce or eliminate the current Democratic majority in both houses of Congress. It could provide a new policy twist that many of the companies and organizations that have invested so much time in working with Congress on these matters haven't incorporated in their planning.

The problem with such an approach arises from the same source as its appeal: the lack of a sufficient bi-partisan consensus in Congress to enact these changes legislatively. Without a consensus spanning both parties and all factions, any action the President takes on his own could be reversed within a few years. We're not going to lick climate change or our energy problems in the span of any one administration; these problems look much more like the Cold War and require a similarly enduring bi-partisan coalition to deal with them. Major energy policy swings every 4 or 8 years would make this approach much more costly and much less effective, because of the planning and investment horizons involved. The evidence of that is already on display, as this administration reverses many of the energy policies of its predecessors.

Such an outcome is even likelier if these policies become overly identified with a president whose popularity has been waning and who is by no means assured of a second term, barring an unexpectedly robust revival of the US economy. Congress might be even less popular at the moment, but it remains the venue in which a long-term, bi-partisan energy and climate strategy must be hammered out. If a comprehensive energy bill with limits on carbon isn't possible today, important elements of a least common denominator approach to energy security and lower emissions could likely still be enacted. That could include more effort on energy efficiency and a low-carbon electricity standard encompassing both nuclear power and with the currently favored list of renewables. Future administrations and congresses could build on these steps later. A modest compromise along these lines wouldn't please everyone, but it seems preferable to an approach that depends on one party controlling the White House in perpetuity.

Whither Cap & Trade?

Just a year ago it seemed a near-certainty that the US would eventually adopt some form of cap & trade mechanism for greenhouse gases (GHGs). After repeated failed attempts to pass cap & trade legislation in the Senate, the House of Representatives narrowly passed the Waxman-Markey bill, HR-2454, and the Senate was expected to follow, bolstered by a filibuster-proof Democratic majority and urged on by a popular new President. Then came the divisive debate over healthcare legislation, the off-year election of Republican Scott Brown in Massachusetts, Climategate, and an oil spill that among other things derailed the latest bi-partisan (tri-partisan?) Senate climate bill. Today, the prospects for climate legislation remain highly uncertain, while the clock runs out on the current Congressional session. And if all that weren't enough, the EPA has just issued new regulations covering interstate emissions of conventional air pollutants that could effectively terminate the highly-successful sulfur-dioxide market upon which cap & trade for GHGs was based. Can cap & trade survive these travails, and should it?

Time will tell whether Waxman-Markey represented the high-water mark of cap & trade in the US, or if the hiatus since then has merely been a pause in a long process of refining and ultimately adopting this approach. Heaven knows W-M was a highly-imperfect vehicle for cap & trade, with its allocation of emissions allowances skewed to the highest-emitting sector and with hundreds of pages of extraneous provisions that could set up all sorts of unintended or undesirable consequences. The last year has also seen a proliferation of variations on cap & trade that call into question the original formulation of an economy-wide cap on emissions implemented by means of requiring emitters to purchase allowances from a gradually-shrinking national pool of emissions credits, with the proceeds doled out by Congress for purposes including clean energy R&D and deployment, deficit reduction, and mitigation of the impact on consumers and selected businesses. The Cantwell-Collins bill, for example, proposes returning most of the allowance revenue directly to consumers, while the Kerry-Lieberman bill would exclude the transportation fuels sector from cap & trade, but impose on it a sort of carbon tax based on the price of traded allowances. Both of these approaches have complex pros and cons, and as with original cap & trade their effectiveness at reducing emissions without imposing crippling costs on the overall economy depends critically on their detailed provisions, negotiated exceptions, and how they would actually be implemented.

Cap & trade has also come under fire on more fundamental grounds. Some critics have questioned the desirability of creating a vast new financial market for emissions when the shortcomings of other financial markets have caused so much harm, while others have suggested that investing in innovation to make low-carbon energy and efficiency much more cost-effective has greater potential to reduce emissions in a world in which developed-country emissions are being eclipsed by those in developing Asia.

Against this backdrop EPA Administrator Jackson's repeated assurances that she prefers legislated cap & trade to enforcement under the Clean Air Act have become increasingly divorced from reality. Her agency's determination to proceed with enforcement next year if no bill is passed, coupled with its newly-issued rules for power-plant pollution, serve mainly to remind the market that emissions allowances are not a new form of fiat currency, with intrinsic value backed by fractional reserves and the full faith and credit of the US government, but a fragile construct, the value of which can be eroded or erased at the whim of this and other regulators or the courts. Today's Wall St. Journal describes the impact of the new air pollution rules on the SOx market. Any potential participant who imagines that something similar couldn't happen to a future greenhouse gas allowance market is not paying attention.

So despite the apparent enthusiasm of the majority party's Senate caucus for enacting some kind of comprehensive climate and energy bill this year, presumably including elements of cap & trade, we're left with serious questions about whether this is an idea whose time has come and gone. From my perspective, putting a price on GHG emissions is still an essential step if we're serious about reducing them by more than the amounts that have resulted from the inadvertent combination of the recession, cheap natural gas, and existing incentives for renewable energy and efficiency. Cap & trade still has significant theoretical advantages over an arbitrary carbon tax as a means of imposing such a price, but as we've seen the likelihood of cap & trade being enacted in such a pure form seems low in the messy world of US politics--perhaps as low as the chances of a pure and simple carbon tax.

The odds against cap & trade look long at this point. Realistically, the time left for bringing a full-blown climate bill to a vote in the Senate is measured in weeks, rather than months, before the dynamics of the mid-term election campaign take over. Notions of passing an energy-only bill and then grafting on Waxman-Markey's climate provisions via a House-Senate conference committee seem even less likely to produce a mechanism that could survive the political upheaval that the mid-terms appear likely to produce. Nor should anyone be considering the last-gasp option of trying to pass climate legislation in a lame-duck session after the November election. As the Congressional Budget Office recently determined, any sort of controls on emissions are likely to reduce overall US employment--"green jobs" notwithstanding--so getting this right must be treated as more important than just getting something through before the current window closes. I will be watching developments in the weeks ahead with great interest.

Emissions Twilight Zone

The defeat yesterday of a Senate resolution to rein in the application of the Clean Air Act to greenhouse gas emissions, together with the recent announcement by Senator Lindsey Graham that he would vote against the climate bill he helped Senators Kerry and Lieberman to draft, puts US efforts to deal with climate change into a sort of Twilight Zone, in which the widely-preferred approach of most of those wishing to tackle our emissions directly sits on the sidelines, while EPA regulations that were allegedly intended mainly to scare Congress into passing a climate bill this term now look nearly certain to take effect next year. No one on any side of the issue should rejoice at this outcome.

I confess that I haven't found the time to give the Kerry-Lieberman draft climate bill the same degree of scrutiny that I applied to the Waxman-Markey bill that the House of Representatives passed last summer. Based on the summary that I have read, K-L appears to address at least some of the serious flaws in Waxman-Markey, though the devil is often in the details of provisions such as restrictions on who would be allowed to trade emissions permits. In general, I'm pleased that more of the revenue from emissions permits would flow back to consumers and taxpayers under this bill than in the House version, and less would be diverted to favored constituencies or outright pork. That should reduce the net burden of emissions restrictions on the economy as a whole, a crucial concern when the recovery is still fragile. However, the inclusion of offshore drilling provisions that look to some like an endorsement of a practice that has become hugely controversial since the Gulf spill, but that from my reading could shut down most offshore drilling permanently--a conclusion Senator Graham now seems to share--has probably derailed the bill's chances for passage this year.

So without a legislated cap on emissions and a market-based mechanism to distribute the cuts to those parties with the greatest capacity to achieve them at the lowest cost--the essence of the "trade" portion of cap & trade--the EPA will now determine where and how emissions should be cut. That is the least-efficient way to go about this that I can imagine. It's even a mixed blessing that the EPA's "Tailoring Rule" would initially focus application of the Clean Air Act on new or expanding facilities adding large quantities of GHG emissions--one dimension of economic growth--rather than on all existing facilities, though the latter seems to be on tap for Step 3, due in 2013. As described, Step 3 would apply to any facility emitting more than 50,000 tons per year of CO2 equivalent GHGs. That's a lot more than your local pizza shop or most small businesses, but it's not quite as small as it's been portrayed. 50,000 tons is roughly the CO2 emissions from a business or facility consuming a mix of energy equal to two tanker trucks of gasoline or diesel fuel per day, or 9 Megawatts of average US grid electricity around the clock.

One of the ironies of the situation is that anyone now opposing legislation putting a price on carbon because they're not convinced of the risks of climate change is effectively supporting the EPA's approach to emissions. Perhaps that just means that they see the current Congress as a high-water mark of support for aggressive action on climate change and suppose that a future Congress--say, after November's mid-term elections--would be more willing to take the EPA out of the climate change business. Nevertheless, at least for now, the alternative to legislation like the Kerry-Graham bill is not inaction, but command-and-control regulations that could be much more damaging to a weak economy.

Not-So-Grand Compromise

This week Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and Joe Lieberman (I-CT) finally released the draft energy and climate bill they had been working on with Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC.) From all accounts, it was intended to serve as a response to the various criticisms of the climate bill the House of Representatives passed last summer, but in particular as a means for attracting support from Senators whose primary concerns about energy are focused on US energy security and competitiveness. Unfortunately, events have a way of disrupting even the sagest strategies. A cursory review of the new bill--all I've had time for thus far--reveals the degree to which it has been altered in response to the ongoing Gulf Coast oil spill. In the process, unless I've misread its revised provisions on offshore drilling, the expected "grand compromise" has turned into a poisoned chalice, at least for oil.

Like its climate-legislation predecessors and most major bills from the last several Congresses, Kerry-Lieberman (originally Kerry-Graham-Lieberman) starts out at 987 pages and is likely to grow much larger, as it accumulates support one vote--and thus typically one new provision or modification--at a time. I simply haven't had a chance to read the whole thing in detail, yet. Once I've done so, I'll comment on its other key provisions, including the cap & trade mechanism at its heart, which seems to have been influenced by the "cap & dividend" proposal of Senators Cantwell (D-WA) and Collins (R-ME). With so much attention currently directed at offshore drilling, that's where I focused my brief review.

While the bill was being prepared, there was much speculation about the incentives it would include for expanded offshore drilling, which, along with expanded support for new nuclear power, was regarded as one of the principal carrots to be offered to those in Congress who wouldn't otherwise be inclined to support a standalone cap & trade bill. Whatever form those incentives were expected to take, the bill's skimpy offshore drilling "subtitle" looks disappointing, if not downright negative.

On the positive side, it would extend the same royalty-sharing benefits to states pursuing new drilling that the four main Gulf Coast producer states of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama currently receive from oil & gas exploration and production in the federal waters off their coastlines: 37.5% of lease premiums collected and the same percentage of production royalties. This is something that states such as mine, with an official state policy supporting drilling, have been calling for. But while it will be favorably received in Virginia, other states, particularly in the West and Midwest, regard this as an unreasonable diversion of federal revenue. Even if the Deepwater Horizon hadn't blown up, this provision would have been a tough sell.

The rest of the offshore oil subtitle appears to have been hastily modified in response to the spill. Among other things, it offers states a veto over new drilling within 75 miles of their shores. A glance at the map for the planned Lease Sale 220 offshore Virginia shows that at least a portion of it falls within 75 miles of the Delaware and Maryland coasts. Nor do I think this is an unreasonable provision; as we've seen in the Gulf, a spill off Louisiana clearly affects the shorelines and marine activities of neighboring states. By itself, this provision, which I believe was altered from an original 50 mile exclusion, would not rule out a resumption of new offshore leasing and drilling, once the causes of the current spill have been identified and new measures and regulations put into effect to reduce the risk of another occurrence to an acceptable level--however the Congress and administration might specify "acceptable".

The problem lies in Section 1205, which defines the impact studies that must be done prior to opening up an area for drilling. As drafted, paragraph (h)(2) effectively extends the 75 mile limit on the veto rights of non-drilling states, if the government's assessment "indicates that a State would be significantly impacted by an oil spill resulting from drilling activities within an area identified in a 5-year (leasing) plan". Under this paragraph, Florida or Alabama could potentially veto any new drilling off Texas or Louisiana. I'm not a lawyer, but that's what the text appears to say.

Without dismissing the legitimate concerns of neighboring states, this raises all sorts of practical problems. An exchange I had earlier this week with a Maryland-based blogger highlights one of them. He was blogging in support of Senator Ben Cardin's (D-MD) stance against any offshore drilling on the Atlantic coast. However, as I noted in my comment on his posting, Maryland consumed 272,000 barrels per day of oil in 2008, not one barrel of which was either produced or refined in that state. Just how far should offshore drilling be removed in order to satisfy the concerns of a state that is entirely reliant on energy produced by other states and foreign sources, which must bear whatever risks it entails? Is Louisiana far enough away? Is Saudi Arabia?

As compromises go, this one doesn't look very tempting. Unless I've misread the bill's offshore drilling provisions, it appears that their effective result would be to end all offshore drilling, not just in areas that were recently released from long-standing drilling moratoria, but in the long-established zones of the Gulf Coast that are becoming America's energy breadbasket. That would surely qualify as the kind of overreaction to the Gulf Coast spill of which the International Energy Agency has just warned, emphasizing the unintended consequences that we would risk. Perhaps those looking for something in exchange for supporting limits on greenhouse gas emissions will regard the bill's significant support for nuclear power as sufficient, though I'm skeptical. They could probably get the same thing in an energy-only bill, perhaps in exchange for a national renewable electricity standard. As for the crucial source of domestic transportation energy we would forgo if we turned our back on offshore drilling, there is currently no substitute available soon enough, or in sufficient quantities, to make up for its loss.

Half Full and Half Empty?

Yesterday's announcement by President Obama that his administration would allow new offshore drilling on selected portions of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) that had formerly been off-limits yielded a variety of reactions. Energy industry leaders were cautiously optimistic, environmentalists were disappointed or "outraged", and the Washington Post's print-edition headline called it a "political maneuver." From my perspective, it constitutes a welcome concession to the reality that the day when renewable energy sources can pick up the entire load now carried by fossil fuels is a long way off--decades, not just years--and that until then we still have some important levers to pull in minimizing the amount of foreign oil we must import. Yet however it plays in the Congressional dance to devise a "comprehensive energy bill"--the current terminology for describing legislation regulating greenhouse gas emissions--it clearly falls short of what would be required to put the medium-term energy needs of the country on a truly secure footing.

On the positive side, yesterday's announcement sets the stage for oil producers finally to gain access to offshore acreage that had been off-limits for decades as a result of a combination of Congressional and Executive drilling moratoria. So while it does not strictly speaking open up these areas for drilling--that happened in 2008 when the previous bans expired or were lifted--the President made it clear that he will not reinstate a ban for the Atlantic coast south of New Jersey or for the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas off Alaska. If you are concerned about the energy security of this country and the enormous sums we pay to import oil from abroad, that is good news, even if it will take years to go through the process that Interior Secretary Salazar has outlined.

As usual the traditional media has gauged the potential resources involved with its customary lack of insight into how oil & gas are produced in the real world, comparing them to a few years of total US consumption. The subtext here is clear: how much should we risk for a couple more years' supply of a depleting resource? The reality is quite different. Even at the low end of 39 billion barrels of recoverable oil cited by Secretary Salazar, the new zones could eventually contribute several million bbl/day for a couple of decades. If ramped up quickly enough, that could overcome the underlying decline rate of current US output and add significant net production for a decade or two, at a time when competition for the oil we are currently importing is likely to be fiercest: as the growth of Asia continues and the domestic energy needs of exporting countries skyrocket, but before renewables, conservation and vehicle electrification can achieve their full impact.

Perspective is crucial in situations like this, so let's start with some figures already familiar to my regular readers. If 39-63 billion barrels of oil doesn't sound like much compared to the vast energy appetite of the US, which even in last year's recession-dampened economy consumed 18.7 million bbl/day of oil, or when compared to the enormous reserves of the Middle East, consider that cumulative US oil production stands at around 200 billion barrels from reserves that at no point exceeded 39 billion barrels. If that sounds like a contradiction, it's because the industry has always found more oil and more ways to extract it than expected when the resources were first discovered. There is no reason to believe that won't still hold true, particularly compared to resource estimates based on technology that was current when PCs running on Intel's 286 chip were cutting-edge and cellphones were scarce and looked like bricks.

It's also worth thinking about the prospect of an extra couple of million barrels per day of domestic oil in the context of how much renewable energy we'd have to produce to provide a similar quantity of energy. Wind turbines and solar panels don't even enter into this discussion, because they do not displace any meaningful quantity of oil. That's because they produce electricity, and last year oil accounted for less than 1% of all the electricity generated in the US. On an energy-equivalent basis, each million barrels per day of additional oil production equates to the energy content of 27.9 billion gallons per year of ethanol, or more than 2.5 times last year's record US ethanol production. In terms of useful energy contributed after accounting for the energy used to produce it, that comparison grows to more like 5x: the equivalent benefit of more than 50 billion gallons per year of ethanol, or about half-again the ultimate contribution of the entire 36 billion gallon federal Renewable Fuel Standard. And even if we threw away everything but the gasoline yield from this oil, it would still displace as much imported energy as 40 million plug-in electric vehicles--for which we'd still need to come up with an electricity source.

So if there's so much potential in the areas that the President has offered up for drilling, why would anyone be disappointed or see this as a glass half empty? For starters, it imposes new drilling bans on the entire Pacific Coast and carves out of the eastern Gulf of Mexico some of the most prospective acreage closer to the Florida coast, where large natural gas deposits have already been found. And of course it doesn't even mention the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, which the USGS estimated to contain another 10 billion barrels, give or take a few billion. Simply put, outside of the Gulf of Mexico more acreage will again be placed off-limits than will be made available for drilling, and even the expansion into the eastern Gulf will require the approval of a Congress that has not looked favorably on drilling there since it placed its own ban on that region in 2006. My disappointment at those limitations is mitigated by the knowledge that drilling there now would be a non-starter, politically. Better to begin where state and local governments are willing and some even eager. Closer to home for me, it appears that Secretary Salazar is postponing the bidding on the Lease Sale 220 area off Virginia that I blogged about a couple weeks ago from 2011 into 2012, holding up lease revenues my state badly needs to plug serious budget gaps. (This would also require Congressional approval of revenue-sharing for these bids and royalties, similar to what the Gulf Coast states currently enjoy.)

In his comments at Andrews Air Force Base President Obama made it clear that additional offshore drilling must be viewed in the context of a broader plan for addressing US energy needs. Yet because of the structure of our energy economy and the enormous relative impact of additional oil production compared to renewables at their current scale, only massive fuel economy improvements and conservation can contribute as much to reducing US oil imports, which even after last year's big drop still averaged 9.7 million bbl/day and cost approximately $210 billion. Opening up more of the OCS, which lies beyond visible range from the nation's shoreline, is a good step forward, and it is one that future administrations of both parties can build on.

What's the Alternative to KGL?

Although I haven't yet seen the latest discussion draft of the "tri-partisan" energy and climate proposal of Senators Kerry, Graham and Lieberman (KGL), I've been thinking about its rumored provisions for a while. These apparently include a cap & trade system for the electricity sector, eventually expanding to include most industries, and a "carbon fee" on petroleum fuels that would be linked to the cap & trade market, along with measures to increase domestic energy production from a wide range of sources, including oil. It occurs to me that the most important question about the resulting legislation may not concern its actual contents, but what we ought to compare it to.

For all the remaining uncertainty about the risks of climate change, which this week's Economist details, the US regulatory baseline for it has already moved beyond doing nothing. Having issued its Endangerment Finding, the EPA is gearing up to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from both stationary and mobile sources. Almost any other approach to these emissions would be preferable, since regulating point sources ignores the fundamental differences between CO2 and the traditional pollutants like the oxides of nitrogen or sulfur they've been dealing with for decades. If we fail to capitalize on the helpful reality that all GHG emissions anywhere are essentially equivalent in their effect on the climate, we likely won't tackle the cheapest reductions first, and that could cost us a fortune. Yet even without some form of national greenhouse gas legislation or regulations, these emissions are already being regulated at the state level through efforts such as California's A.B. 32 and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. In that context, whatever one's assessment of the underlying science, we all have a stake in Congress passing the most practical and cost-effective greenhouse gas legislation possible. Sadly, the blatant favoritism and profligate spending of the Waxman-Markey bill that passed the House last spring disqualify it on both of these criteria.

One of the biggest challenges for KGL is ensuring that their bill doesn't end up as a bloated monstrosity like Waxman-Markey. You don't need 1,000 or more pages to define a cap & trade regime or a carbon tax, or to set up "cap & dividend", under which most of the money collected from selling emissions permits would flow back to taxpayers. (That approach has its own problems.) You do need hundreds or thousands of pages, however, to accommodate all the pork and giveaways that seem to be necessary to get any major legislation passed these days, one vote at a time. Careful scrutiny of the text of the Waxman-Markey bill suggests that there is not a majority of this Congress--or perhaps of any actual Congress we're likely to get--that sees the necessity of crafting a clear response to climate change as trumping the need to score goodies for their districts and favorite causes or constituencies. Messrs. K, G and L have their work cut out for them, finding enough support for their proposal through its primary provisions, rather than accreting dozens or hundreds of tit-for-tat favors.

Perhaps the key to a successful bi/tri-partisan bill could be found in its approach to the uses of the enormous revenues it would generate. The healthcare bill that passed the House last weekend only achieved deficit neutrality by taking a huge bite out of the revenues and savings that might otherwise have gone to bringing Medicare or Social Security back into balance, and that's not a partisan talking point. If we are indeed facing an entitlements crisis on the scale that many expect, and some form of consumption tax is on the horizon as the only viable revenue alternative to a return to the bad old days of confiscatory taxation on upper-income Americans who already pay 86% of all the federal income tax collected, then energy might be a good place to start. A fee of 25 cents per gallon--roughly equivalent to $25/ton of CO2 emitted--on gasoline, diesel and jet fuel would collect on the order of a half-trillion dollars over 10 years.

If KGL do go down the path of a carbon fee on petroleum, the biggest mistake they could make would be to follow the advice of the economists and experts who advise collecting it as far "upstream" as possible. Taxing refineries is a sure recipe for offshoring one of the few remaining basic manufacturing industries in this country that has managed to remain globally competitive, even if it has fallen on hard times recently. Likewise, taxing US oil & gas exploration and production would make them uncompetitive with foreign sources free from such burdens. Instead, since most of the emissions from the petroleum value chain occur during consumption, rather than production, the best place to apply a carbon fee--can't call it a tax--is at the gas pump. This would subject domestic and imported fuels to the same cost without having to go through gyrations to manage "leakage", only to find out later that they violate international trade rules. Best of all, the government already has the mechanism in place to collect such a fee without adding another expensive bureaucracy: Simply tack it onto the federal fuel excise tax and post the amount on every fuel dispenser whenever it changes.

In a perfect world, we'd establish a price on carbon using a simple and transparent cap & trade mechanism and return every penny collected to the public, in order to minimize the burden on the economy while shifting it in the direction of greater energy efficiency and lower emissions. In the last several years it has become abundantly clear that we don't live in that world, if we ever did. I still favor cap & trade as an efficient mechanism for price discovery, but not if its implementation comes with as much baggage as Waxman-Markey carried. I will eagerly await the details of the KGL proposal to see whether they can navigate the narrow gap between an effective, efficient approach to GHG management and the political forces seeking to feast on the bonanza it represents.