The State of the Union's Two Energy Revolutions

It was no surprise that energy and climate change featured prominently in last night's State of the Union speech, giving me plenty to discuss in my on-camera interview with Reuters this morning. The President devoted an entire section of his address to these topics, leading into it in a very upbeat way: "Now is the time to reach a level of research and development not seen since the height of the Space Race.  And today, no area holds more promise than our investments in American energy."  You'd never guess from that introduction that this president faces a strikingly different energy challenge than his seven most recent predecessors. There are two energy revolutions underway in the US, and the unplanned one is racing ahead of the one to which he devoted most of his remarks--and most of his efforts on energy for the last four years.

Let's start with the positives.  Even more than in last year's speech, President Obama presented energy as a bigger opportunity than a problem. He described our impressive recent progress in oil and natural gas production, renewable energy generation, and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.  As fact-checkers have pointed out, he stepped into aspiration when he claimed credit for doubling automobile fuel economy--a goal that might or might not be attained by 2025--but even this fits within a broad set of energy trends that are all finally moving in the right direction.

The President also endorsed a very good idea that has been floating around for a long time, but has never been seized upon.  He suggested funding R&D for electric and natural gas vehicles and biofuels with the revenue from federal oil and gas lease bid premiums and royalties.  This "Energy Security Trust" would yoke the success of future energy technology to the enormous cash cow represented by the vast oil and gas resources beneath public lands and waters.  He'll have to sort out the allocation of revenues with the states, who surely won't want the new set-aside to come from their share.  If he can work that out, the government will have an even bigger vested interest in ensuring that responsible oil and gas development on these lands proceeds, in order to advance energy innovation.

Yet as pleased as I was with those aspects of his remarks, I couldn't help noticing that he still speaks about renewable energy in much the same way he did four years ago, as though we've learned nothing in the meantime.  He wants us to out-China China in investing in solar energy, despite the fact that many of China's leading solar manufacturers are struggling with the same low margins that have led to a string of solar bankruptcies in Europe and the US, as rampant global over-capacity fuels cutthroat competition.  He also apparently wants to make the wind Production Tax Credit permanent, rather than reforming and phasing it out, as even the leading US wind energy trade association has suggested.  The fact remains that no government on earth can afford to subsidize renewables at the current generous rates all the way up to full-scale deployment.  They need to be encouraged to become fully competitive with conventional energy as soon as possible and then set free. 

Nor has the President lost his enthusiasm for citing statistics like the doubling of the energy that "we generate from sources like wind and solar."  Yet increasing wind power from 1.3% of US electricity generation to 3%, and solar from 0.02% to 0.1%, are not what has set the stage for the US to become a significant net exporter of various forms of energy, and possibly even energy independent.  He spoke strongly in favor of natural gas last night and briefly noted oil's gains, but it's not clear that he sees them as the engines of economic growth that they could be for the next decade and beyond. 

Perhaps that's because after a long stretch in which US efforts on climate change and energy security seemed perfectly aligned, they are now moving out of sync. The 12% reduction in energy-related CO2 emissions since 2007 is largely attributable to fuel switching from coal to gas in the power sector, along with reduced oil demand in a lethargic economy.  There's additional scope for both; however, if all the present trends continue it will become harder to fit the reality of surging oil production and looming natural gas exports into a constrained emissions box. 

In that context, the President's call for a new, "bipartisan, market-based solution to climate change," and his threat to act via executive order if Congress fails, left enormous gaps of necessary detail.  Does President Obama really want another bitter contest over cap-and-trade, as one might conclude from his reference to the McCain-Lieberman efforts of 2003-5, or is "market-based" to be interpreted as a carbon tax, which is coming back into favor in some circles?  What was entirely missing was the necessary admonition to Congress to avoid larding any future climate bill with the kind of distortions and pork-barrel spending that turned its most recent effort, the bill by Reps. Waxman and Markey--both of whom were presumably in the room last night and deserve to feel slighted--into a 1427 page monstrosity.

Judging by my inbox this morning, many people liked what they heard last night concerning energy and climate.  Groups as diverse as the Blue-Green Alliance and the American Petroleum Institute cited portions of the address in support of their agendas.  And at least in the Energy Security Trust idea there were hints of the revitalized energy vision I was hoping for, in which the US rides the wave of shale-driven energy transformation while innovating the technologies of renewable energy, transportation and energy efficiency to the levels necessary to take over from oil and gas by mid-century.  There's always next year.

Comparing US Energy Growth in 2012

2012 was a remarkable year for energy in the US, with domestic output of oil, gas, wind and solar energy all advancing strongly.  This was the result of an unfolding revolution in unconventional oil and gas, along with federal, state and local incentives and regulations promoting renewable energy.  Yet despite extensive media coverage and vocal constituencies for each of these energy sources, I haven't seen any recent efforts to compare their respective contributions to US energy supplies. 

That may be due in part to the confusing array of energy units involved. It's daunting to match up oil in 42-gallon barrels (bbl), gas in cubic feet or British Thermal Units (BTUs), and wind and solar in kilowatts (kW) or Megawatts (MW) of capacity, or kilowatt-hours (kWh) or Megawatt-hours (MWh) of actual generation.  Conversion factors among these various units are easy to find on the internet.  However,  meaningful equivalencies are complicated by important distinctions between liquid or gaseous fuels and grid electricity, and the fact that these energy sources compete with each other only in specific situations.

For purposes of comparison, since wind and solar routinely compete with gas-fired generation, let's assume that the output of wind turbines and solar panels can be equated to the power from a natural gas turbine with an effective heat rate of 7,000 BTU/kWh.  That recognizes the efficiency losses in fossil generation and the premium value of electricity to end users.  Gas and gas-equivalent renewables can be further equated to oil using the standard conversion factor of 5.8 million BTU/bbl.  So even though wind and solar rarely compete with oil in the real world, because less than 0.6% of US electricity is now generated from petroleum products or byproducts, we can still assess their relative contributions to America's energy economy in familiar terms.  Please note that Energy Information Administration (EIA) data on production and generation for the full year won't be available until the end of the month, so the figures below are based on published data for the most recent available 12-month periods.

Through November oil production posted impressive gains last year , as noted several times in the presidential campaign and debates. Thanks to surging tight oil (shale oil) production in North Dakota, Texas and elsewhere, US crude oil output increased by 748,000 bbl/day on a December-November basis, or around 13%. In fact, November's production of 6.9 million bbl/day was the highest for any month since November 1993. Recent production looks even higher.

Natural gas also grew rapidly in 2012, with "marketed gas production", including gas liquids like ethane, propane and butane, growing by 1.4 trillion cubic feet for the 12 months ending in November 2012, compared to the same period a year earlier.  That's equivalent to adding at least 650,000 bbl/day of oil.  US gas production appears to have set an all-time record last October.

Wind power also had a banner year, with developers installing a record 13,124 MW of new capacity in the US.   Much of that growth was attributable to companies accelerating projects in anticipation of the scheduled December 31, 2012 expiration of the federal Production Tax Credit, or PTC, the main US tax incentive for wind energy. As it turned out, the Congress extended the PTC for another year as part of the recent "fiscal cliff" deal. On the basis of the most recent 12-month comparisons from the EIA, US wind farms generated 18 billion kWh more last year than the previous year.  That equates to 126 billion cubic feet (BCF) of natural gas, or around 59,000 bbl/day of oil.

That brings us to solar, which was on pace to set a record of around 3,200 MW of new installations in the US in 2012.  On a December-November basis new solar panels added roughly 2.5 billion kWh of reported generation last year, equivalent to 17 BCF of gas or 8,100 bbl/day of oil. This probably doesn't capture the contribution of all grid-independent installations, but it's unlikely to be off by more than a factor of 2.

Although the above chart shows that wind and solar power have a long way to go to match the recent energy contributions of new fossil fuel production, both have earned credibility by advancing to the point of being measurable on the same scale as oil and gas.  Both also contribute to reducing emissions. At the same time, the significance of developments in US unconventional hydrocarbons leaps off the page.  In just the last year, for the second year in a row, shale gas has added domestic energy production roughly equivalent to the entire current output of all US non-hydro renewable electricity generation: wind, solar, geothermal, biomass and waste power. Tight oil added a like amount in 2012.  We're clearly in the midst of an energy transformation, but it doesn't much resemble the one that was anticipated just a few years ago.  

This is an updated version of a posting that was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

Green Car Tech: Workhorses Trump Thoroughbreds?

Fisker Karma at 2013 DC Auto Show

Yesterday I made my annual trek to the Washington Auto Show, which hosts a media day before opening to the public.  Between the show's focus on policy--a natural draw inside the Beltway--and the opportunity to connect with OEM contacts, it's always worthwhile.  Besides, the cars never look the same on a screen or printed page as they do in person.  Yet despite all of that, this year's show left me with what I regard as a healthy form of disappointment: Unlike past years, which provided my first opportunities to see--and sometimes drive--cutting-edge cleantech cars like the Chevy Volt and Nissan Leaf, I saw ample signs of evolutionary change but no new revolutions in the offing. 

A few data points to support that conclusion: First, the Fisker Karma, undeniably sleek and reminiscent of my favorite Hot Wheels® car of long ago, was arguably the most exotic car there.  It sat unattended and largely ignored.  More significantly, the 2013 Green Car Technology Award announced at the show by Green Car Journal went to Mazda's "SkyACTIV" suite of technologies.  These include improvements in engines, transmissions and chassis that Mazda plans to roll out across its fleet, along with the North American launch of a clean diesel version of its Mazda6 sedan later this year.  Among the other finalists were Ford's stop-start and EcoBoost technologies, Fisker's "EVer" plug-in hybrid powertrain, and Fiat's Multi-Air gasoline engine efficiency package.  Half the candidate technologies related to EVs and hybrids, while the other half focused on making conventional cars incrementally more efficient--in the process raising the bar that EVs and hybrids must vault.   

Yesterday's policy day also provided a chance to meet with the team from Robert Bosch, LLC, which among its many business lines supplies under-the-hood gear for clean diesels and efficient gasoline cars, as well as hybrids.  Our conversation focused on clean diesel, which remains the least-appreciated big-bang fuel efficiency option in the US, despite its wide adoption in Europe, where diesels enjoy about a 50% share in "take rate", reflecting consumers' choices when more than one fuel option is available in a given model.  Diesel take rates range from 30-60+% here, too, but with only 20 diesel models available in the US last year--many of them German luxury models--overall diesel penetration in new cars was just under 1%.  That could start to change this year. Bosch's Andreas Sambel, Director of Diesel Marketing and Business Excellence, indicated 22 new models slated for 2013 introduction, with the total increasing to 54 models by 2017. 

We also discussed future improvements in diesel passenger car technology.  Bosch sees ample opportunities to maintain diesel's edge over steadily improving gasoline-engine efficiency.  Possible enhancements include engine downsizing, higher injection pressures (already 29,000 psi), the addition of stop-start, and combustion improvement via something called "digital rate shaping"--my jargon takeaway of the day.  I was surprised to hear that diesel-hybrid models are already available in Europe, since conventional wisdom holds that doubling down on two expensive efficiency strategies can't be cost-effective.  Mr.Sambel offered the view that hybrids are becoming a distinct market segment, and that fuel choice within that segment will appeal to some buyers.  I'll have to watch for further signs of this intriguing development.  I certainly concur with his take that there is unlikely to be a one-size-fits-all solution.  Don't expect an imminent winner among the proliferating powertrain and fuel choices available to motorists, including biofuels and CNG/LNG.

This year's DC Auto Show includes a wide selection of nicely sculpted steel and glass, but at least from a "green car" perspective the technologies that made such a big splash a few years ago are becoming a bit mundane.  That's just as well.  EVs still haven't taken off, yet, with only 53,000 sold in the US last year out of a much-recovered 14.4 million car total, despite lavish tax incentives.  However, with oil prices stubbornly high and US gasoline prices on the verge of setting new records for this time of year, the evolutionary improvements in fuel economy that were honored and displayed at the DC Convention Center will find plenty of takers.  For the near-term they'll contribute far more to saving oil and reducing emissions than a few more EVs could.

Will California Be the Next Big Shale Oil Play?

I've spent the last couple of weeks contemplating California's Monterey shale, which has been widely discussed recently as the country's next Bakken-style oil play, or even bigger.   The Bakken shale has turned North Dakota into the second-biggest oil-producing state in the US, at the same time that development of the Eagle Ford shale has been shoring up Texas's claim to the number one spot.  So far, The Golden State has largely missed out on the shale revolution, despite having shale oil resources estimated to exceed the rest of the US combined. The scale of the opportunity makes it an intriguing subject, but I find it particularly interesting, because the Monterey is deeply intertwined with the long history of the California oil industry, in which I spent the first half of my career. 

The Monterey shale is hardly a new prospect.  One of the first documents my search turned up was a 1905 USGS report on its fossil content, noting its oil potential.  First production from this shale apparently occurred a decade earlier.  Moreover, it appears that the Monterey formation, which underlies many of the state's conventional oil fields, is actually the "source rock" for those fields: the zone from which the hydrocarbons trapped in their reservoirs originated.  So the estimated 400 billion barrels or so of original oil in place in the Monterey have presumably already yielded a substantial share of the roughly 29 billion barrels of oil that California's oil fields have produced to date.

Development of this play doesn't just lag shale projects elsewhere because of California's well-known environmental sensitivity.  The geology of this deposit also differs significantly from that of the Bakken and other east-of-Rockies shale plays, partly due to its relative youth, as well as the effects of the Golden State's seismic activity.  Its oil-bearing strata are thick and often jumbled up by past earthquakes. One expert characterized this as signifying that the Monterey wasn't a "resource play" but a "structural play."  So unlike the Bakken or Eagle Ford, individual wells carry higher risks of failing to yield commercially useful output.  It also makes it less likely that steady efforts in the Monterey will result in an easily replicable recipe for unlocking the entire deposit. 

That brings us to fracking, which is surely as controversial in California as anywhere, even though, as in many other locations, it's been done safely and with little fanfare for decades.  The state recently announced preliminary fracking regulations, but this may have less impact on development of the Monterey shale than one might suppose.  That's because this formation seems to be less amenable to fracking, or at least to the combination of horizontal wells and multi-stage fracking that's been a game-changer elsewhere. Other techniques, such as acid injection, may prove more useful.

However it is eventually unlocked, the Monterey shale offers significant benefits to California.  Start with the fact that the state's oil production has been in steady decline since the mid-1980s. Together with the depletion of Alaska's North Slope field, that has meant that the US West Coast, which was once a net exporter of oil, now imports increasing quantities of oil--half of it from OPEC--to meet local demand.  That trend has continued even as the import dependence of the rest of the country has fallen substantially due to higher production and receding demand.  The Monterey could slash California's imports, while adding billions of dollars a year to the local economy and to the shaky state budget, along with lots of good jobs.

It could even provide environmental benefits. Restoring oil self-sufficiency would reduce the risk of spills from the tankers bringing in imports, while refilling existing infrastructure.  And if the Monterey yields oil similar in quality to the light, sweet crude now being produced from the Bakken and Eagle Ford shales, it could actually cut both greenhouse gas emissions and local pollution by reducing the refining intensity required to turn the state's current diet of heavier crudes into ultra-low sulfur gasoline and diesel fuel. 

I suspect from my research in the last few weeks that anyone betting on an imminent explosion of oil output from the Monterey shale is likely to be disappointed.  The process seems likely to be slower than elsewhere, though with a bigger potential payoff.  But that doesn't make it irrelevant to a state that has set its sights on being at the forefront of the transformation to cleaner energy sources.  California still consumes 1.8 million barrels per day of petroleum products, and it will burn many more billions of barrels on its way to its chosen future of electric vehicles running on wind and solar power, and trucks and buses burning compressed or liquefied natural gas. Developing the Monterey shale won't solve all of California's energy challenges and might create a few new ones, yet it could prove another timely contribution from a local oil industry that has been a major driver of the state's economy for well over a century. 

Could Diesel Fuel Made from US Natural Gas Compete with CNG and LNG?

The announcement last month of a $21 billion project to capitalize on abundant, low-cost US natural gas should have caught the attention of everyone interested in this resource. As reported in the New York Times, Sasol, a South African energy company, intends to build a 96,000 barrel-per-day gas-to-liquids (GTL) plant in southwestern Louisiana, in conjunction with a new gas processing plant and ethylene cracker. The synthetic diesel fuel produced by this facility would provide a different pathway for shale gas to displace imported crude oil in the US transportation sector, in competition with compressed or liquefied natural gas (CNG or LNG.)

GTL involves a two-step conversion of the methane that makes up the bulk of natural gas into synthesis gas and hydrogen, which are recombined into liquid hydrocarbons by means of the decades-old Fischer-Tropsch (FT) process. GTL is also energy-intensive, with an overall efficiency around 60%. South African companies have vast experience with such synthetic fuels. Sasol are partners in the Oryx GTL plant in Qatar, and their coal-to-liquids plants in South Africa utilize a similar syngas step and the same FT process as GTL.

With the US suddenly perceived to be sitting atop a century's worth of natural gas, mainly in the form of unconventional gas from shale, tight gas formations and coal-bed methane, T. Boone Pickens isn't the only one to see an opportunity to displace imported oil with gas. Yet as attractive as that sounds for reasons of energy security and trade, it isn't obvious whether the public or even fleet operators are willing to switch on a larger scale to a lower-density gaseous fuel requiring both new distribution networks and new or modified powertrains. Only 0.1% of the natural gas consumed in the US now finds its way into vehicles, equivalent to less than 0.1% of US oil demand. Under the circumstances, it would be surprising if someone weren't looking seriously at GTL, one of the few practical ways to circumvent the mechanical and logistical barriers that have impeded the fueling of more US cars and trucks with natural gas.

When I read about Sasol's proposed project, I immediately thought of another, less well-known South African synfuels facility. Since 1992 the Mossel Bay GTL plant has been turning natural gas into gasoline, diesel and other fuels, drawing first on the Mossel Bay gas field and then on newer fields as the original one depleted. Although owned by another firm, the ongoing struggles to keep the "Mossgas" plant supplied are well-known in South African energy circles. I can't imagine Sasol embarking on a project like the one in Louisiana if they had any doubt about their ability to keep it supplied for decades.

Of course volume and price are two very different aspects of supply. A decade ago, conventional wisdom held that GTL required a gas cost of around $1 per million BTUs to be viable. Even with the shale bonanza today's US natural gas price is well above that level. What now makes it possible to conceive of GTL in the US is that the price of the crude oil used to make diesel and other fuels has risen so much higher than that of natural gas. That comparison is more obvious when one converts natural gas prices into their energy equivalent in crude oil. Today's US natural gas price is below the $23 per equivalent barrel that it was in 2001. Meanwhile crude oil has increased from about $26 to $95 per barrel. The drastically improved attraction of GTL becomes even clearer when comparing ten years of wholesale US Gulf Coast diesel prices to natural gas prices using the approximate GTL conversion rate of 10 million BTUs of gas per barrel of liquid product.

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As the chart above reveals, this theoretical GTL margin has exploded since 2009. Yet it also shows that if gas prices returned to the levels we experienced just a few years earlier, the proposed project would encounter significant risks. Perhaps that helps explain Sasol's concept of a larger integrated gas complex with multiple sources of margin, capitalizing on the waste heat from the GTL process and the lighter hydrocarbons it yields as byproducts.

It remains to be seen whether GTL will prove an attractive means of leveraging the US shale gas revolution to back out imported oil. However, if Sasol and others proceed with US GTL projects, anyone eyeing our gas surplus for other purposes, whether in manufacturing, fertilizer production or power generation, would face serious competition linked to the global oil market. That includes potential LNG exporters, who passed an important hurdle with the publication of a favorable analysis by the Department of Energy.

A slightly different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation

Virginia's Gas Tax: Ending A "Dinosaur Tax"

I don't know if the Speaker of Virginia's House of Delegates intended a double entendre when he referred to the state gasoline tax that Governor Bob McDonnell (R) just proposed eliminating as a "dinosaur tax".  He was certainly correct that this tax is rapidly becoming outmoded as its capacity to keep pace with necessary infrastructure investment fades with every EV, hybrid, or other efficient car that's sold.   In the Governor's remarks, he referred to the gas tax as a "stagnant revenue source." In a low-tax state like the Commonwealth, shifting the tax burden for transportation away from fuel taxes and toward registration fees and a higher general sales tax represents an innovative, though also controversial answer to a challenge that has concerned me for some time. 

The scope of the underlying problem should be uncontroversial: Like most states, Virginia's $0.175 per gallon gasoline tax is a holdover from an era in which fuel sales grew in tandem with road use, and both expanded steadily year after year.  I can personally vouch for Northern Virginia's traffic congestion, cited in this morning's Washington Post story on this issue. As in most states, Virginia's gasoline sales have been flat to declining since the recession that began in 2008, while the value of the fixed fuel tax has been further eroded by inflation.  These trends seem likely to continue for years, with recent new-car fuel economy improving sharply. The gas tax simply can't cover the cost of repairing and extending Virginia's highways without a large increase now, followed by periodic increases as future fuel sales fall. 

A key aspect of Governor McDonnell's proposal that appeals to me is that it doesn't rely on high-tech monitoring or low-tech inspections of actual miles driven, like many of the other solutions I've examined.  Instead of trying to fix the fuel-tied tax, he would eliminate it entirely and shift revenue generation to a combination of higher annual fees, especially for alternative fuel vehicles that currently pay little or no road tax, and an increase in the Commonwealth's 5% sales tax to 5.8%.  0.5% of the current sales tax is already dedicated to transportation.  The proposed shift exchanges one regressive tax for another, in a manner that recognizes that all Virginians stand to benefit from improved transportation networks, whether they personally use them or not. 

The current Virginia gas tax costs an average motorist around $100 per year, based on 12,000 miles of annual driving.  The rise in the sales tax would generate comparable revenue from $12,000 of annual spending subject to the sales tax.  That likely equates to little or no tax increase for low-income drivers, and an increase of up to a few hundred dollars a year for the better-off, while still leaving Virginia's sales tax slightly lower than those in Maryland and the District of Columbia. Motorists would continue to pay the federal gasoline tax, currently set at $0.184/gal.

I can envision various objections to the Governor's proposal, including concerns that cutting the gas tax might increase gasoline demand--and emissions--and reduce the incentives for higher fuel efficiency.  That seems unlikely in the current context for at least two reasons.  First, eliminating the Virginia gas tax involves a reduction in pump prices of less than 5% of last year's average price in the region, and more importantly represents less than a quarter of the total range of gas-price volatility we experienced in 2012. Moreover, fuel economy improvements are already mandated under the new federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy regulations that will increase fleet-average miles per gallon to 54.5 mpg by 2025.  Cars will continue to become more efficient, no matter what gasoline costs.

It will be interesting to watch how this proposal fares in Richmond.  The Governor's party may control the House of Delegates and effectively the Senate, by virtue of a tie-breaking Lieutenant Governor, but 2013 is an election year, and Mr. McDonnell is barred by term limits from seeking reelection. I wish him luck with this idea, even though its enactment would probably result in a small net tax increase for my household. I'm sure other states will be watching, too.

A Late Christmas Gift for Renewable Energy

The US Senate's "fiscal cliff" package wasn't exactly eight maids a-milking--the traditional gift for the eighth day of Christmas--though it did apparently resolve the impending "milk cliff".  Of greater relevance, the "tax extender" portion of the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 passed by both the Senate and House of Representatives represented a gift to renewable energy producers and developers worth around $18 billion.  Two-thirds of that is attributable to the extension and modification of the Production Tax Credit (PTC) for wind and other renewable electricity projects. Renewable energy technologies have gained another year of generous support from US taxpayers.  What remains to be seen is whether this win represents a last hurrah for the current US approach to renewable energy subsidies as lawmakers focus on shrinking an increasingly unsustainable federal budget deficit.

Based on the analysis of the bill provided in the Wall St. Journal, other energy-related beneficiaries  included producers of cellulosic and algae-based biofuels, blenders of conventional biodiesel and other alternative fuels, purchasers of 2- and 3-wheeled electric vehicles, as well as various energy efficiency investments including efficient homes and appliances.  Renewables should also benefit from other provisions of the bill, including a one-year extension of 50% bonus depreciation on project investments and a two-year extension of the 20% R&D tax credit. 

Of course the problem with all of this is that it sets up additional cliffs at the end of 2013 and 2014, and thus perpetuates the expiration-anxiety roller-coaster that has confounded both manufacturers and investors in these technologies. Part of the blame for that rests with the process by which the Congress drafts and enacts such legislation.  However, it's also a function of the unwillingness of current beneficiaries to shift their lobbying efforts to support realistic and predictable phaseouts of these subsidies, in light of renewables' improving competitiveness with conventional energy and the magnitude of future US fiscal problems.  Considering that the current PTC for wind power is worth the equivalent of about 90% of today's futures price for natural gas, a proposal by the wind trade association for a six-year phaseout ending at 60% strikes me as too much like St. Augustine's plea for chastity.

The high-pressure negotiations to avert the fiscal cliff provided a poor venue for producing genuine tax reform, while giving supporters of the status quo a golden opportunity to attach measures such as these "extenders" that couldn't be amended before the expiration of the current Congress.  The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office estimated that this bill actually increased federal spending by a net $330 billion over 10 years and added nearly $4 trillion to the deficit, compared to going over the cliff.  It's not clear that the even higher-stakes debt-ceiling debate slated for early in the new Congress will be any more conducive to solving these challenges. But whether then or later in the session, it's going to become harder to avoid some form of tax reform and spending discipline that considers all energy subsidies in the context of their direct costs and indirect revenues. I'll be surprised if the current subsidies for renewables can escape again without major adjustments to reduce their high effective cost per unit of energy produced and increase their long-term bang for the buck. 

2012: The Year in Energy

As in most recent years, energy was constantly in the news in 2012. A post attempting to catalog every noteworthy story or event would be quite long.  However, a few big trends stand out. For starters, it's a near-certainty that the average US gasoline price will set a new record for the second year running, in both real and nominal terms. Americans are responding by choosing more fuel efficient cars. Meanwhile, fundamental shifts emerged from obscurity into the awareness of policy makers and the public.  US energy exports have become a mainstream topic of conversation, and the goal of energy independence--a concept with debatable meanings--has acquired renewed respectability after spending a couple of decades on the fringes of energy policy debate.  Perhaps more significantly, our views of climate change and future oil supplies--once aligned--have diverged. 

For renewable energy it has been the best and worst of years.  Global overcapacity in solar equipment manufacturing drove down the costs of solar panels, at least partly counteracting reductions in government incentives, especially in Europe, and making solar power more competitive.  The US is on track to add a record 3,200 MW of solar capacity this year, while China could add 5,000 MW.  However, solar manufacturers' rapid expansion depressed their margins and extended last year's string of solar bankruptcies, with firms like Abound Solar, Konarka, Solarwatt, Q-Cells and others forced to restructure or liquidate in 2012.  A similar, if less dramatic wave is working through the more mature onshore wind industry, which faces the expiration of a key US incentive, the Production Tax Credit, or PTC on December 31.  In anticipation of that loss, wind developers have added 4,728 MW of new capacity in the US through the first three quarters of 2012, the most since 2009.

Energy played a complex and possibly decisive role in the US presidential election.  Remarkably, President Obama successfully co opted his opponent's energy platform by embracing an oil and gas revival that his administration had done little to help and much to hinder, even though it appeared to conflict with his emphasis on renewable energy and climate change mitigation.  Meanwhile, the shale gas revolution was creating hundreds of thousands of direct and indirect jobs and lowering energy costs across the economy, contributing to US manufacturing competitiveness.  The resulting economic growth, while still below the level of other post-war recoveries, apparently helped the President make his case for a second term.

The inherent tension between surging US oil and natural gas production and concerns about climate change--fanned by Hurricane Sandy--reflects a major shift that occurred this year, at least as an influence on future energy policy.  Recall that until recently, memories of past energy crises, combined with the influential Peak Oil perspective, shaped our expectations of resource availability and future production.  This narrative of hydrocarbon scarcity complemented prescriptions for a rapid transition away from fossil fuels as the only viable solution to climate change, supporting a shared goal of a more sustainable energy economy based on renewable energy, smart grids and electric vehicles.   The exploitation of unconventional oil and gas resources in previously inaccessible source rock--shale gas and "tight" or shale oil--poses significant challenges to both strands of that argument.

First, it undermines the notion of energy scarcity for at least the next decade, and probably well beyond.  US natural gas production set a new record this year, and US oil production returned to levels not seen since 1997, putting increased pressure on OPEC's control over global oil pricing. Nor does the US have a monopoly on these unconventional resources. Canada looks like the next big shale gas play, with China and South Africa possibly not be far behind.  The technologies that enabled the US shale gas revolution and its oil offspring are being transferred around the world.

Yet we also learned that US energy-related CO2 emissions have fallen back to 1992 levels, largely because of a dramatic reduction in the use of coal in power generation.  While renewable energy sources like wind and solar power deserve some of the credit, natural gas-fired turbines--driven by cheap shale gas--have added three times as much net generation since 2007 as non-hydro renewables.

Shale gas and oil might not provide a long-term solution to global warming, but they could at least buy us the time to develop the innovations like improved electric vehicle batteries and low-cost grid-storage that will be necessary if renewables are to displace fossil fuels across the entire spectrum of their use--and dominance.  They could also provide the time to develop and deploy the next generation of nuclear power, including small modular reactors.

I'd like to thank my readers for your continued interest and encouragement and wish you a happy holiday season.

Should Alaska Export More LNG to Asia?

The Governor of Alaska reportedly met this week with officials from the South Korean national gas company to discuss exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Ever since crude oil production on Alaska's North Slope ramped up in the 1980s, industry observers have speculated about the ultimate disposition of the significant associated natural gas reserves found with the oil. In a letter filed with the state of Alaska, BP, ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil, the three main North Slope producers, together with pipeline company Transcanada, recently confirmed their plans for a potential liquefied natural gas (LNG) project, instead of the long-mooted pipeline to deliver the gas to America's lower-48 states. The contemplated megaproject would validate both the scale of Asia's future LNG market and the long-term nature of the US shale gas revolution.

Alaska's North Slope has already yielded 15 billion barrels of oil. Production peaked at over 2 million barrels per day in 1988 and subsequently declined to less than 600,000 barrels per day last year. With around 6 billion barrels of remaining reserves, it's still a very significant field but well past its prime. While the public has focused on its oil output, the producers and the state have long had their eyes on how best to harvest the value of the 35 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of gas dissolved in the oil. In fact, the North Slope complex has produced several TCF per year of gas for years, ranking it among the largest gas fields in the world, but almost all of that gas has been reinjected into the formation to aid oil recovery--and for lack of a market in an isolated and sparsely-populated state.

For decades the default assumption was that a pipeline would eventually be built across Alaska and Canada to link this gas to the existing network feeding the contiguous US. That idea gained traction when US marketed gas production stalled around 2000 and then began to decline. The economics of an Alaskan gas pipeline compared poorly with gas produced along the Gulf Coast, but competing with rising LNG imports looked much more feasible. Then along came unconventional gas, starting with coal-bed methane and culminating with the surge of shale production since 2005. The US gas market now has enough domestic supply to shrink coal's contribution to US power generation by 7% since 2008 and revive gas-intensive industries.

If shale gas were only a short-term phenomenon, as some have suggested, it would be of little relevance to the plans of the North Slope producers. All they'd need to do would be to delay their pipeline for a few more years, and the market would come to them. However, estimates put US shale gas resources at between 482 and 686 TCF--a 60-90 year supply at current shale production rates. And the fact that all three of the main North Slope producers have invested in significant acreage positions and production in US shale basins surely gives them insights into the longevity of those resources.
Nor is time on the side of the Alaskan producers. As oil production declines the economics of the North Slope operation will deteriorate, while keeping the Trans Alaska Pipeline full becomes more problematic. Finding an attractive outlet for the North Slope "gas cap" wouldn't just provide a new revenue source; it could keep oil production going for additional decades.

The LNG option offers several advantages, despite its estimated $45-65 billion price tag and technical complexity. For starters, it cuts roughly 1,000 miles of difficult terrain off the distance that the gas must be pipelined, in this case to a site on the southern Alaskan coast. That location is much closer to Asia, the world's largest LNG market, than export projects intended to ship LNG from the US Gulf Coast. The Asian market is also growing, thanks in part to Japan's post-Fukushima reassessment of nuclear power. The Japanese government has backed away, at least for now, from plans for a firm nuclear phase-out, but it seeks to diversify its energy sources. Among other steps taken in the aftermath of the Sendai quake and nuclear disaster, it has instituted the world's most attractive solar power incentives. Yet Japan's solar resources provide just a few hours of peak output per day, on average, requiring substantial fossil fuel generation to fill in the gaps. Power plants burning LNG are well-suited to that task.

China presents a more complex picture, with its own significant shale gas potential and an energy market expected to add as much natural gas demand by 2035 as all the world's developed countries put together. Considering the scale of eventual demand and the infrastructure necessary to bring China's shale gas to market, it seems likely that the growth of the market in the interim must depend heavily on LNG imports.

Assuming that the state of Alaska presents no obstacles and that US export permits would be forthcoming, because Alaskan LNG exports wouldn't impact US natural gas prices, the main questions that will determine the future of this project can't be answered definitively today. Among these are whether the numerous competing LNG projects being planned and built around the Pacific Rim and elsewhere will saturate the global market in the meantime, and whether the market will provide an attractive price for Alaskan LNG, influenced more by crude oil prices than by US shale gas. The North Slope producers are already immersed in these issues via their other activities, including ConocoPhillips' small LNG plant in Kenai, Alaska, which has been shipping LNG to Asia for more than 40 years. The project timeline provided to the state includes at least three go/no-go decisions along the way as the answers to these questions unfold.

A slightly different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

IEA Expects Global Energy Focus to Shift Eastward

Last month the International Energy Agency (IEA) released its annual long-term forecast, the World Energy Outlook (WEO). Its projection that US oil output would exceed that of Saudi Arabia within five years was featured in numerous headlines, although some of the report's other findings look equally consequential. That includes the continued strong growth of energy demand in China, India and other Asian countries, and the linkages between that growth and a dramatic expansion of Iraqi oil production. The agency also set a cautionary tone concerning the increase in global greenhouse gas emissions accompanying all this growth.

In the IEA's primary "New Policies" scenario, the US overtakes Saudi Arabia in oil production by 2017, adding 4 million barrels per day (MBD) of unconventional output, mainly from shale (tight oil) deposits such as the Bakken in North Dakota. US oil imports decline significantly, due in roughly equal measure to higher production and the implementation of strict vehicle fuel economy regulations. As a consequence, the need for imports from the Middle East approaches zero within 10 years. When this change is combined with the growth in oil demand in Asia, where China alone accounts for half the forecasted global growth in oil consumption in this period, the IEA envisions Asia becoming the recipient of 90% of Middle East oil exports by 2035.

The detailed assumptions behind the IEA's conclusions weren't provided in the public release. These include crucial questions such as the assumed status of US rules barring most crude oil exports. As noted in a Reuters op-ed at the time, maximizing the potential of US unconventional resources may depend on allowing higher quality unconventional oil to seek global markets, while continuing to import oil from Latin America and the Middle East into Gulf Coast refineries geared to these heavier, higher-sulfur feedstocks. The op-ed's author also reminded us that the natural gas liquids included in the headline comparison with Saudi production are useful but quite different from crude oil, yielding little gasoline and diesel fuel.

The expected growth of energy demand in China remains extraordinary, even with the country's economic growth slowing from the levels seen a few years ago. To put this in context, when Dr. Fatih Birol, Chief Economist of the IEA, presented the new WEO to the media in London on November 12th, he suggested that China's electricity demand would grow by the equivalent of "one US and one Japan of today" by 2035. Much of that additional electricity generation is projected to come from renewables, nuclear power and domestic gas. Nevertheless, and in spite of significant increases in China's unconventional gas production, the IEA forecasts that import dependence will grow from about 15% for gas and 50% for oil today, to 40% for gas and over 80% for oil by 2035. That increase in imports would equate to additional hundreds of millions of dollars per year of outflows for energy.

In the view of the IEA, much of the extra oil demanded in Asia will be supplied by Iraq, which they project will increase its output from around 3 MBD today to 6.1 MBD in 2020 and 8.3 MBD in 2035, in the process becoming the world's second-largest oil exporter, after Russia. Since the reserves to support that growth have already been identified, with much lower production costs than many other basins, the uncertainties involved are mainly political and structural. Resolution of the current standoff with Iran over its nuclear program would provide even more Middle East oil for Asian markets.

As in its earlier "Golden Age of Gas" scenario, the IEA expects large increases in global natural gas consumption. Unconventional sources, mainly in the US, China and Australia, would contribute around half the additional production required to meet expanded demand. However, at the launch presentation in London Dr. Birol also stressed that unconventional oil and gas are still at an early stage, with significant uncertainties about the eventual magnitude of their resources. This seemed to be a particular issue for the agency's post-2020 forecast of oil production in the US and gas production in China.

Despite the rigorous analysis and level of detail involved in producing the IEA's World Energy Outlook, long-term energy forecasting should always be taken with a grain of salt. Yet whether or not the highlighted trends mature precisely in line with these projections, the shifts that the IEA identified are significant and already becoming evident in current data for energy production, consumption and trade. Even if North America failed to become a net oil exporter--which many equate with energy independence--by 2030, the movement of the center of gravity of global energy trade towards Asia is essentially pre-determined: baked in by differences in economic growth rates and resource opportunities. The economic, geopolitical and environmental consequences of that shift are just starting to take shape.

A slightly different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

Does the Gas Tax Belong in the Fiscal Cliff Fix?

Recently I've seen several articles along the lines of this one from CNN, suggesting that an increase in the federal gasoline tax might be included in negotiations to avert the impending US "fiscal cliff".  While the gap between the gas tax, which was last raised in 1993, and highway repair costs grows each year, that's not just because past Congresses and administrations have been reluctant to hike it again.  As I've discussed in previous posts, gas tax revenue is declining for structural reasons related to curtailed driving, rising fuel economy and alternative fuel vehicles.  Simply adding another 10-15 ¢ per gallon to the current 18.4 ¢ tax wouldn't solve the long-term problem, although it would raise enough revenue to allow us to continue to ignore these growing challenges for a few years.  For that and other reasons, changing the gas tax deserves closer scrutiny than the waning hours of a preoccupied lame-duck Congress can provide.

Yesterday I attended another excellent event held by Resources for the Future in Washington, DC.  This one was devoted to "The Future of Fuel."  The panel discussion began with a presentation of the current energy forecast of the Energy Information Agency (EIA) highlighting the shifting energy mix the agency expects between now and 2035.  Although the slide deck didn't include the chart below, taken from EIA's 2012 Annual Energy Outlook, I couldn't help thinking of it in the context of both yesterday's meeting and the question of future fuel tax revenues. 

The EIA forecasts US gasoline demand to decline by about 8% from current levels by 2035 as cars meeting the new federal fuel economy standard enter the fleet, along with small but growing numbers of vehicles running on electricity and other non-petroleum fuels. An 8% drop in gasoline sales--and thus gas tax revenues--doesn't sound large until you realize that the current gas tax system was predicated on consistently rising gasoline sales as a means of expanding revenues. That's crucial, because highway construction and maintenance costs rise each year, too.  If gasoline sales were still growing at the 1% annual rate typical when the gas tax was last increased, gas tax revenues would be at least 37% higher by 2035 than the level the EIA would now project.

Stepping back from the details, the government faces a fundamental disconnect between its need to raise sufficient funds from the gas tax to cover the cost of maintaining the nation's road network and explicit federal policies aimed at reducing our consumption of the fuels being taxed.  Another one-time bump in the gas tax, whether of 5¢, 10¢ or 15¢ per gallon, will again be overtaken by the combined forces of inflation and declining volumes.  Fortunately, this problem is well-understood and a number of solutions are under consideration.  Inconveniently, many of them involve basic and controversial changes in how the road tax would be collected, such as shifting to a mileage-based tax assessed via annual inspections or real-time GPS monitoring. 

No one should expect or desire the 112th Congress to resolve these issues between now and the end of its term in January, particularly when the money at stake represents such a tiny fraction of either the fiscal cliff's package of tax increases and spending cuts or of the entire federal deficit.  I'm also not sure that reforming the gas tax belongs within the larger federal tax reform effort that should be undertaken next year, because the issues involved are so different from those associated with revamping the business, income, and payroll taxes.  Even a temporary fuel surtax would likely encounter strong opposition, due to its regressive nature and coincidence with gasoline prices that, despite recent declines, remain at or near seasonal record highs.  Unlike the rest of the fiscal cliff, this might just be one can that would benefit from being kicked down the road, at least past the current crisis.

EPA Unwavering in Support for Ethanol, Despite Drought

Last Friday the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rejected the petitions of a bi-partisan group of state governors for a waiver of the federal ethanol mandate, resolving one of several energy-related issues that had been deferred beyond the presidential election.  The waiver requests filed in August cited the harm that the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) is causing to the poultry, dairy and livestock sectors and related businesses--and by extension to consumers--by increasing competition for corn during a severe drought that has sharply constrained supply.  The EPA's detailed response made frequent references to the "high statutory threshold of severe harm to the economy" required for a waiver of the RFS, and to the output of a model simulating the market for corn and ethanol. It also included the extraordinary assertion that, "the RFS volume requirements will have no impact on ethanol production volumes in the relevant time frame, and therefore will have no impact on corn, food, or fuel prices."  If that were true, then it's not obvious why the mandate should exist at all.

In rejecting pleas for relaxation of the ethanol standard, the EPA appears to be relying on two key facts.  First, wholesale ethanol prices remain lower than wholesale gasoline prices, despite corn prices that are high enough to force many ethanol producers to cut back output.  I'd attribute that mainly to weak US gasoline demand and the much-discussed impact of the "blend wall" in limiting ethanol to 10% of the gasoline pool, rather than as a sign of an unaffected market.  The agency is also relying on the availability of "paper ethanol" in the form of Renewable Identification Number (RIN) credits from past over-blending of ethanol by refiners and other gasoline blenders.  The EPA's estimate puts the number of available RINs at the equivalent of 2-3 billion gallons, or around 20% of this year's 13.2 billion gallon conventional ethanol requirement. As a result of these factors, EPA can claim with some justification that ethanol prices are not harming motorists at the gas pump at this time.  That's small consolation to the petitioners.

EPA's assurances to those in the poultry, dairy and livestock value chains are based on much thinner evidence--in fact, on none at all, unless you count as evidence a model that predicts corn prices would only fall by $0.58 per bushel if the ethanol mandate were eliminated entirely.  Simulations are useful but still aren't reality. The output of a model is only as good as its assumptions and algorithms, and when that output defies logic, it calls for the application of good judgment, particularly when the result happens to align so neatly with the internal concerns about the long-term implications of a waiver that are evident in the agency's response.  I can't help concluding that an agency whose management possessed greater depth and breadth of experience outside of government--especially in the business sector--would have given more weight to the struggles of the dairies, ranchers, meat-packers and others who are being squeezed by a mandate that is projected to consume 42% of this year's corn crop and is very likely inflating the cost of the Thanksgiving meal that many of my US readers will eat on Thursday.   This administration's lack of outside experience has been a glaring shortcoming that the President could easily remedy as turnover creates openings at the start of his second term. 

I can't say that I'm surprised by the EPA's ruling on the waiver requests.  I also can't help wondering whether it provides any indication of how the administration is likely to deal with the other issues that were deferred until after the election.  Yet even if we can't read anything else into this decision, it's clear that the Renewable Fuel Standard enacted in 2007--before the financial crisis and recession--is in serious need of reform.  If its language doesn't require the EPA to adjust the ethanol mandate in light of a drought that will result in the smallest corn crop since 2006, when US ethanol production was 65% lower than last year, then the law simply didn't incorporate sufficient foresight about possible future events.  Together with its unrealistically ambitious cellulosic biofuel standard, the provisions of the RFS increasingly seem to relate to some other, parallel universe, rather than the one in which we live.  

Is Gas Rationing Superior to Raising Prices for Consumers?

With New Jersey about to end the odd-even gasoline rationing  imposed in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, we have an opportunity to consider whether this kind of response actually produces better outcomes than the price increases by which the market would normally balance supply and demand.  Most of the defenses of "price gouging" that I've seen, including Matthew Yglesias's recent posting in Slate, tend to focus mainly on its supply-side aspects. Yet such arguments, however well-reasoned, are unlikely to sway Americans from their innate sense of fairness, on which most anti-gouging regulations are premised.  That's inherent in the judgmental term itself.  However, having spent my share of time in gas lines during the energy crises of the 1970s, I believe that supporters of these rules are ignoring some even more pragmatic, consumer-based arguments for allowing prices to rise after a disaster.

In addition to the tragic loss of life and property inflicted by Sandy, the storm left the petroleum products infrastructure on which New Jersey depends paralyzed for days.  Refineries were shut down, distribution terminals full of gasoline were unable to deliver product, and gas stations without power had no way to sell the fuel stored in the tanks under their forecourts.  This combination represented a huge supply shock to the region, and it wasn't long before gas lines formed at those stations that had both product and electricity.  New Jersey has strict and specific anti-gouging rules and is already charging merchants with violations following Sandy.  Within a few days, in an effort to alleviate the queuing that resulted from the supply shortfall and the inability of retailers to raise prices, Governor Christie resorted to rationing by license plate number.

Although restricting prices might superficially appear more equitable--particularly for lower-income consumers--than allowing them to climb to the levels necessary to clear the market without long lines, it also imposes significant costs on all consumers.  For starters, anti-gouging rules effectively confine motorists to their vehicles precisely when they have many other urgent priorities, including attending to their families and homes. They also implicitly put a very low monetary value on consumers' time.  Waiting on line for four hours to obtain 10 gallons of gas at a pre-disaster price of $3.50/gal., instead of experiencing a much shorter wait to purchase fuel for $5.00/gal., is equivalent to being paid $3.75 per hour--around half the state's official minimum wage.  This situation also increases the chances that an individual will wait for hours only to see the station run out of fuel before his or her turn comes, because demand is unchanged or temporarily higher than before the crisis.  Adding odd/even rationing might reduce gas lines by limiting demand and breaking the psychology contributing to the lines, but it also compounds the harm to consumers, some of whom are left with no legal means of acquiring fuel when they need it most.

I don't expect politicians and regulators suddenly to embrace a purely market-based approach towards post-disaster pricing of necessities like fuel.  However, we ought to expect them to look at the real-world results of their policies and apply some common sense and creativity to improve how they function.  Anti-gouging rules clearly benefit some at the expense of others. How could we simultaneously preserve the benefits for the first group, while allowing those willing to pay a premium for emergency supplies to do so, in the process sending the appropriate price signal to reduce overall demand? One solution might be to allow gas stations with multiple pump islands to raise prices as long as they have at least one set of pumps offering the pre-disaster price.   Technology should provide even more innovative and effective options.

Given the magnitude of the supply disruption post-Sandy, there was no way to avoid a serious shortage of motor fuel in the affected region.  However, the appearance of long gas lines and the resort to a 1970's expedient of odd-even rationing shouldn't satisfy anyone concerning the effectiveness of the pre-existing emergency energy policies that were called into play following the storm.  I can't imagine New Jerseyans being content with the outcome they experienced.   

Push-me/Pull-you: Post-election Energy Policies

I've seen numerous commentaries on the energy implications of President Obama's narrow, 51%/49%  victory. One of the most intriguing of these, from Reuters, concerned the prospects for exporting a portion of the growing output of natural gas produced from US shale deposits.  This issue doesn't only affect gas drillers and their residential and industrial customers, but also developers of renewable energy projects, because of the way that gas and renewables compete in electricity markets.  As much as the President's reelection, the failure of Republicans to capture control of the US Senate might turn out to be a key factor in determining the fate of potential gas exports, and by extension the environment within which renewables like wind and solar power must compete.

A variety of energy issues has been in limbo for months, pending the outcome of Tuesday's election.  That includes approval of the Keystone XL crude oil pipeline from Canada, which might have gotten a favorable nudge as a result of Senate wins by pro-pipeline Democrats in North Dakota and Montana.  Environmentalists are committed to blocking the pipeline, so the President must soon choose which part of his winning coalition he will disappoint.  By comparison, the question of natural gas exports has received much less attention in the media, although it's been discussed extensively within energy and manufacturing circles.  The likely incoming chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, Ron Wyden (D-OR), appears to have strong views on the subject.   

If Senator Wyden does replace the outgoing chairman, Senator Bingaman (D-NM), as expected, this would represent a shift in constituencies from a state with significant oil and gas production to one with essentially none.  Senator Wyden thus brings mainly an end-user perspective to his Energy and Natural Resources role, and from that standpoint his concern about the potential price impact of gas exports, whether in the form of LNG or otherwise, is understandable, although I would argue it is also short-sighted and potentially detrimental to renewable energy, which he strongly supports.

On the surface, restrictions on the export of US gas should result in lower domestic natural gas prices than if large quantities of gas were shipped offshore.  After all, low US natural gas prices, compared to those in Europe and Asia, are the main driver behind the desire to build export facilities, such as the Sabine Pass project of Cheniere Energy.  Natural gas is cheaper in the US than elsewhere for several reasons, including the high and growing output from shale gas resources, as well as the epic disconnect between the natural gas price and crude oil prices, which are the basis for most international LNG contracts. US gas at the wellhead is currently trading for the oil equivalent of $21 per barrel, compared to UK Brent Crude at $107 per barrel.  The extent to which exports might increase domestic prices is a matter of much speculation and study, and I wouldn't venture a guess.  However, we can't just look at demand in gauging the impact of export restrictions.

The efficacy of holding down US prices by keeping more gas here also depends on the response of producers.  If legislators or regulators turn the US gas market into a capped bottle, why would producers be content to supply steadily increasing quantities of gas at prices that don't provide them an attractive return?  To some degree the low prices we've seen this year were the result of the combination of a weak economy and a supply glut created by contractual commitments on the part of drillers to develop gas leases at a specified pace.  My understanding is that most such commitments have lapsed, and that a significant proportion of current gas supply is coming from wells that depend on the economics of their liquids output (crude oil and gas liquids), with the associated natural gas effectively a byproduct.  It's not clear how rapidly gas production can continue to grow without natural gas prices that make gas-only wells economically attractive.  So a US gas market with no export outlets would likely produce less gas in the long run, and that would constrain opportunities to use our abundant gas resources to support new industries, displace oil from transportation, and further reduce the use of coal in power generation.

Moreover, keeping a lid on the US gas market would compound the obstacles for renewable sources of electricity.  Wind power developers and turbine manufacturers now face the expiration of the Wind Production Tax Credit (PTC).  Even if it is extended, the output of wind farms competes with the output of gas turbines, while the grid relies on gas-fired power to provide a back-up for the intermittent output of wind and solar power.  The cheaper the gas, the tougher it will be for renewables to make a profit. Market competition with gas will become an even bigger issue for renewables as they expand beyond the capacity of a cash-strapped federal government to continue to subsidize them.  The one-year extension of the PTC under consideration could cost as much as $12 billion, an annual price tag that would only grow as renewables scale up--as they must if they are going to matter.

Navigating the complexities of allowing or restricting natural gas exports, and balancing the various constituencies involved, could provide an early test of the administration's commitment to an all-of-the-above energy strategy.  That's because "all of the above"--if not merely a slogan--implies more than just producing energy from a variety of sources.  It also entails competition among all these sources within a market in which some sectors of demand are declining, others growing, and new ones--including exports--are appearing all the time.  Pushing back on one part of this market will have large consequences in other parts, and regulators could soon be overwhelmed by unintended consequences.