US Energy Under Trump

• President-Elect Trump and his appointees plan a major policy and regulatory shift for energy, focusing more on economic benefits and less on environmental impacts.
• Obama-era regulations most at risk of roll-back are those justified mainly on climate concerns not shared by Mr. Trump and his team.
• Emissions are still likely to fall in the next four years as shale and renewable energy output grow. 

Next week's presidential inauguration will trigger the biggest policy and regulatory shift for the US energy industry in at least ten years. That's how long it has been since energy policy was set by a Republican president and Congress. Donald Trump is a different kind of Republican, though, and his goal does not seem to be a return to scarcity and high energy prices. What should we expect, instead?

To gauge how sharply the energy polices of the incoming Trump administration will diverge from those of the last eight years, we need to understand what motivates both leaders. The Obama administration's approach was driven by a deep, shared conviction that climate change is the most important challenge the US--and world--faces. The cost of energy and its impact on the economy became secondary concerns, subordinated by the belief that the added cost of climate policies would be offset in whole or part by the benefits of the green investment they unleashed--remember "green jobs"?

We saw this in President Obama's first year in office. Amid a deep recession he worked with Congress to attempt to limit greenhouse gas emissions by means of an economy-wide cap-and-trade system, on which he had campaigned. The House of Representatives passed the Waxman-Markey bill (HR.2454), a veritable dog's breakfast of economic distortions. Yet despite a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate in 2009, Waxman-Markey and every subsequent cap-and-trade bill died there.

That failure set in motion the agenda that the Obama administration has pursued ever since, to achieve via regulations the emissions reductions it could not deliver through comprehensive climate legislation. Last year's publication of the EPA's final Clean Power Plan was a key component of an effort that seems set to continue until just before Inauguration Day.

The transformation of energy regulations under President Obama was dramatic enough that a transition to any Republican administration would be a big change. The transition now in prospect will be even more jarring. Mr. Trump's rhetoric and his choices for key administration positions point to a concerted effort to unravel as many of the Obama-era regulations affecting energy as possible. That isn't just based on philosophical differences over regulation and markets. For President-Elect Trump the economy and jobs are paramount, so the Obama energy regulations must look like an unjustifiable threat to the fossil fuel supplies that still meet 81% of the nation's energy needs.

Despite that, it is unlikely the new administration will go out of its way to target renewable energy or the tax credits that have driven its growth to date. Renewables are becoming increasingly popular with conservatives. However, because Mr. Trump sees climate change as, at best, a secondary issue that may not be amenable to human intervention, his administration's won't put renewables on a pedestal as the Obama administration has done.

The biggest challenge for renewable energy may come from tax reform intended to make US companies and factories more competitive globally and shrink the incentive for them to relocate to lower-tax countries. This appears to be a high priority for the new White House and Congress, and one on which they broadly agree. If corporate tax rates drop, the value of the tax credits renewables enjoy is likely to fall, too, making wind, solar and other such projects less attractive and less competitive.

It remains to be seen how many of the Obama energy regulations can be rolled back. The most recent regulations might be averted through legislation like the Midnight Rules Relief Act, or the REINS Act, both of which would update the Congressional Review Act, a rarely used 1990s law intended to limit what presidents could impose by last-minute executive actions. Other regulations may eventually stand or fall as the courts rule. The stakes are high, particularly for regulations affecting the production of oil and gas from shale by means of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling.

Energy independence was a touchstone of Mr. Trump's candidacy. Despite his campaign's focus on coal, it is fracking, as hydraulic fracturing is more commonly known, that holds the key to achieving that goal in the foreseeable future. It has been the main driver of the growth in US energy production since 2010.

The latest long-term forecast from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) puts energy independence within reach--in the sense of the US becoming a net exporter of energy--by 2026 or sooner. However, the recent flurry of regulations affecting such things as drilling on federal land, and putting large portions of US waters off-limits for offshore drilling would not have been part of that projection. As EIA Administrator Adam Sieminski remarked at a briefing on the forecast, "If you had policy that changed relative to hydraulic fracturing, it would make a big, big difference to everything that's in here."

That's a key point, because most past notions of energy independence assumed that energy prices would have to be very high to promote lots of efficiency and conservation and stimulate large amounts of expensive new supply. The shale revolution changed that.

However, the global context is also changing. OPEC is attempting to reassert its control over the oil market, with help from non-OPEC countries like Russia. Two years of low oil prices shrank global oil and gas investment budgets by around a trillion dollars, and the International Energy Agency has warned of coming oil price spikes as a result. Forestalling tighter US regulations on fracking and offshore drilling increases the chances that US supplies could grow by enough to balance shortfalls elsewhere and avert much higher prices at the gas pump.

Energy infrastructure is likely to be another focus of the new administration, because the economic and competitive benefits of abundant energy will be diluted if, for example, Marcellus and Utica shale gas or Bakken and Permian Basin shale oil have to be exported because domestic customers don't have access to them.

That suggests an early effort to reverse decisions by the current administration to block the construction of various pipelines, starting with the Keystone XL pipeline and more recently the Dakota Access Pipeline. That will force new confrontations with activists and environmental organizations that have raised their game to a new level in the last eight years.

Such opposition would likely intensify if the new administration sought to withdraw the US from the Paris climate agreement, which recently went into effect, or submitted it for review by the US Senate as a treaty. But it's not clear that a big change in direction would require leaving Paris.

The US commitments at Paris, like those of the other signatories, were voluntary and non-binding. For that matter, recent shifts in US energy consumption and especially electricity generation have put the US in a good position to meet its initial Paris goals with little or no additional effort, as noted by outgoing Energy Secretary Moniz. The Paris Agreement will only become a major point of contention if President Trump chooses to make it one.

In his list of the top energy stories of 2016, fellow blogger Robert Rapier rated the election of Donald Trump ahead of the OPEC deal and many other important events of the year, based on its likely impact on "every segment of the US energy industry." In retrospect that was equally true of Barack Obama's election in 2008. The shift we are about to experience on energy will be that much sharper, because President Obama and President-Elect Trump both set out to make big changes to the status quo for energy, in opposite directions. We shouldn't miss one important difference, however.

The course that Barack Obama's administration followed on energy was largely predictable from the start, because it was based on openly and deeply held beliefs about energy and the environment. Donald Trump's well-known preference for deals over dogma sets up the prospect of some big surprises, in addition to what we can already anticipate.

Is the US Really Energy Independent?

Toward the end of Sunday night's presidential debate I was startled to hear Secretary Clinton reply to an audience question by stating, "We are now for the first time ever energy-independent." If the price of oil were $100, rather than $50, that might have constituted a "Free Poland" moment, recalling President Ford's famous gaffe in a 1976 debate.

This point is likely to get lost in the dueling fact-checking of both candidates' numerous claims, but while the overall US energy deficit has fallen from about a quarter of total consumption (net of exports) in 2008 to just 11% in 2015, we still import 8 million barrels per day of oil from other countries. That includes over 3 million barrels per day from OPEC, a figure that has been growing again as US oil and gas drilling slowed following the collapse of oil prices in late 2104.

Oil has always been at the heart of our notions of energy security and energy independence, because it is our most geopolitically sensitive energy source and the one for which it is hardest to devise large-scale substitutes. So although the US is certainly in a better overall position than it has been in decades, with progress on multiple aspects of energy, it is not yet energy independent, especially where it counts the most.

Moreover, the policies that Mrs. Clinton has proposed would, at least initially, be likely to expand that gap by imposing additional restrictions on hydraulic fracturing, or "fracking." Mr. Trump, for his part, seemed to devote much of his response to Mr. Bone's debate question  talking about coal, which while still a significant player in electricity production has become largely irrelevant to the topic of energy independence, because its use is being displaced by other domestic energy sources, mainly natural gas and renewables like wind and solar power.

In fact, of the various contributors to the energy independence gains the US has made from 2008-15 (shown in blue in the above chart) the largest depend on fracking. Oil still makes up most of our remaining energy deficit, after help from a million barrels per day of ethanol--50% of the energy content of which comes from domestic natural gas. Electric vehicles also help, but the roughly 400,000 on the road in the US today displace the equivalent of only about 12,000 barrels per day of oil products, too small to be visible on the scale of this graph. As a result, continued fracking of shale and tight oil resources must be the linchpin of any realistic strategy to close the remaining US energy deficit within the next decade or so.

I understand that Secretary Clinton's proposed energy policies put a higher priority on addressing climate change. However, she raised the issue of energy independence in the second debate, even though her proposals are unlikely to deliver it in the foreseeable future--or preserve our present, hard-won reduced dependence on foreign energy sources. Anyone who doubts that this is a pocketbook issue should recall where oil and gasoline prices were just three years ago, before US shale added over 4 million barrels per day to global oil supplies.

US Energy Independence in Sight?

• The data analysis arm of the US Department of Energy is forecasting that despite low oil prices, the US will become energy independent within a decade. 
• That result depends on frugality as much as resource abundance, and it includes substantial volumes of energy trade with the rest of the world.

The US Energy Information Administration's latest Annual Energy Outlook features the key finding that the US is on track to reduce its net energy imports to essentially zero by 2030, if not sooner. That might seem surprising, in light of the recent collapse of oil prices and the resulting significant slowdown in drilling. EIA has covered that base, as well, in a side-case in which oil prices remain under $80 per barrel through 2040, and net imports bottom out at around 5% of total energy demand. Either way, this is as close to true US energy independence as I ever expected to see.

It wasn't that many years ago that such an outcome seemed ludicrously unattainable. I recall patiently explaining to various audiences that we simply couldn't drill our way to energy independence. The forecast of self-sufficiency that EIA has assembled depends on a lot more than just drilling, but without the development of previously inaccessible oil and gas resources through advanced drilling technology and hydraulic fracturing, a.k.a. "fracking", it couldn't be made at all. The growing contributions of various renewables are still dwarfed by oil and natural gas, for now.

Every forecast depends on assumptions, and it's important to understand what would be necessary in order for conditions to turn out as the EIA now expects in its "reference case", or main scenario. This includes a gradual but pronounced oil-price recovery, to average just over $70/bbl next year, $80 within five years, and back to around $100 by the end of the 2020s. That helps support a resumption of oil production growth next year, followed by a plateau just above 10 million bbl/day--surpassing 1971's peak output--for the next decade and a gradual decline thereafter. EIA also expects natural gas prices to head back towards $5 per million BTUs by the end of this decade, in tandem with a further 34% expansion of US gas production by 2040.  

However, attainment of zero net imports also depends on the continuation of some important trends, including energy consumption that grows at a rate well below that of population, and a continued decoupling of energy and GDP growth. This is crucial, because through 2040 EIA assumes the US population will grow by another 20% and GDP by 85%, while total energy consumption increases by just 10%. That has important implications for greenhouse gas emissions, too. Energy-related emissions barely grow at all in this scenario.

Renewable energy output is also expected to continue growing, with US electricity generated from wind surpassing that from hydropower in the late 2030s and solar power in 2040 yielding roughly as many megawatt-hours as wind did in 2008.

Finally, reaching a balance between US energy imports and exports also depends on the continued contribution of nuclear power at roughly current levels. That suggests that new reactors in other locations will replace those that are retired, including for economic reasons.

In last month's rollout presentation at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, EIA Administrator Sieminski also emphasized what is not included in the Outlook's assumptions, notably the EPA's "Clean Power Plan" that is currently under review.  It would be hard to imagine US coal consumption remaining essentially unchanged at 18% of the total energy mix in 2040, if EPA's plan to reduce emissions from the electricity sector by 30% by 2030 were fully implemented. EIA will apparently issue its analysis of the impact of the Clean Power Plan this month.

It's also worth comparing EIA's view of zero net energy imports with popular notions of what energy independence. It certainly does not mean that the US would no longer import any oil, natural gas, or other fuels from other countries. Even as the US approaches zero net imports, routine imports and exports of various energy streams will remain necessary to address imbalances between regions and fuel types.

Because EIA's forecast is predicated on current laws and regulations, it does not include any significant growth in oil exports. As a result, exports of refined products such as propane, gasoline and diesel fuel would continue to expand, eventually exceeding 6 million bbl/day gross and 4 million net of imports. In its "High Oil and Gas Resource" case the constraint on US oil exports forces an expansion of refined product exports that seems nearly incredible when refinery capacity in Asia and the Middle East is also slated for expansion, while refined product demand growth slows globally. Perhaps this is EIA's subtle way of focusing attention on the US's outdated oil export regulations. 

Exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) would also take off, accounting for around 9% of US production by 2040, while imports of pipeline gas from Canada would shrink but not disappear. In the high resource case, US LNG exports would grow dramatically until the late 2030s, reaching 20% of a much bigger supply.

The report provides a few surprises, including one that won't be welcomed by advocates of biofuels and a continuation of the current federal Renewable Fuels Standard, the reform of which has gradually become a topic of lively debate in the US Congress. EIA's figures show total US biofuel consumption growing by less than 1% per year, with ethanol's only real growth coming in the form of a modest increase in sales of E85, a mixture of 85% ethanol and 15% gasoline, to around 3% of gasoline demand in 2040.

Overall, I'm struck by several things. First, the value of the EIA's forecasts comes mainly from identifying the implications of current trends and policies, rather than accurately predicting the future. Administrator  Sieminski seemed appropriately humble about the latter task in his remarks at CSIS. Yet the reference case this time suggests an eventual reversion to pre-oil-crash conditions, ending in 2040 at the same oil price in 2013 dollars as last year's forecast--a level that would exceed the 2008 peak by a sizeable margin. That seems inconsistent with a world of expanding energy options, improved drilling efficiency, at least for shale, and a growing focus on the decarbonization of energy.

There also appears to be a disconnect between the forecast's rising real price of natural gas, with implications for the cost of electricity generation, and its virtual flatlining of solar power's expansion after the scheduled expiration of the current solar tax credit in 2016. This looks like a bet against further solar cost reductions and technology improvements, along with structural changes that are already occurring in some electricity markets.

Despite these reservations, I wouldn't dispute the headline finding of steady progress toward a version of US energy independence featuring large volumes of energy trade with both North America and the rest of the world. The combination of resource growth and steady energy efficiency improvements looks like a recipe for finally putting the US on an energy footing that politicians of both major parties have only dreamed of for the last 40 years.

 

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation

As US Oil Production Revives, New Vulnerabilities Appear

• The expansion of US oil production is centered in a handful of states, and in particular two whose gains more than offset declines in two former production leaders.
• For various reasons the West Coast has missed out on this revival, straining infrastructure and creating new vulnerabilities that should be addressed.

On the front page of today's Wall St. Journal I see that "US Rises To No. 1 Energy Producer." This news builds on a number of recent headlines such as, "US oil production reaches highest level in 24 years." Stories like these aren't as attention-grabbing as they were when this streak began more than a year ago, once shale oil production ramped up dramatically.  What occurred to me this time, however, was how different the current distribution of US oil output is than it was in the late 1980s.

A handful of states still account for the lion's share of US oil production. Then and now, Texas tops the list, exceeding its 1989 output by 37%. At nearly 2.6 million barrels per day (MBD) in the most recent reported month --140% above at its low point in 2007--its share of US oil production had grown to around 35% by June. However, beneath Texas  the list of top oil states has been jumbled in ways few would have anticipated two decades ago.

Alaska, California and Louisiana, the second-, third- and fourth-ranked producers in 1989, then supplied 41% of total US crude oil output. After decades of decline, the same three states now contribute just 17%, excluding production from the federal waters off Louisiana's coast. Meanwhile, thanks to the development of the Bakken shale, North Dakota has jumped from the number  6 spot just five years ago to number two, eclipsing Alaska early in 2012.  Traditional mid-tier producers like Colorado, Oklahoma and New Mexico are also contributing to the overall US oil revival. This surge of highly productive drilling in roughly the middle third of the country, on top of a million-plus barrels per day from the Gulf of Mexico --mainly from deepwater rigs--has scrambled existing oil transportation arrangements.

When onshore production in Texas and the rest of the mid-Continent shrank in the 1990s and 2000s, the region's pipeline network gradually evolved into the country's principal oil-import conduit. The growth of production in the federal waters of the Gulf of Mexico, which had reached 1.6 MBD at the time of the Deepwater Horizon accident in 2010 but subsequently declined to about 1.2 MBD, meshed well with that model.

Today's big challenge goes against that grain: moving the growing surplus of oil in the upper plains states to markets on the West, Gulf and East Coasts, increasingly by rail. Much of the turbulence we've seen in the US oil market  in the last two years reflects the delays inherent in realigning and expanding that network to accommodate newly abundant domestic supplies.

Yet on the other side of the Rockies, the picture looks very different. When I was trading crude oil for Texaco's west coast refining system in the late 1980s, balancing the crude oil surplus on the Pacific coast required shipping multiple tankers a month of Alaskan North Slope oil to the Gulf, where production was shrinking, and prompted the construction of a new pipeline to send surplus oil to east Texas over land. After two decades of decline from mature fields, along with moratoria on tapping new offshore fields, imports now make up roughly half of west coast refinery supply, even though regional petroleum demand is essentially back to 1989 levels. It remains unclear whether and when California will allow producers to tap the state's potentially game-changing oil resources in the Monterey shale deposit.

Barring further change, the regional nature of these shifts means that the energy security benefits accompanying the revival of US oil production are a party to which the West Coast has not been invited, or has perhaps declined the invitation. That's significant, because it leaves residents of California, Oregon, Nevada and Washington much more exposed to any disruptions in global oil trade, since the existing US Strategic Petroleum Reserve was never intended to provide coverage west of the Rockies. In this light, the appetite of west coast refiners for trainloads of Bakken and Eagle Ford crude looks strategic, rather than just a temporary response to market conditions.

A different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

IEA Expects Global Energy Focus to Shift Eastward

Last month the International Energy Agency (IEA) released its annual long-term forecast, the World Energy Outlook (WEO). Its projection that US oil output would exceed that of Saudi Arabia within five years was featured in numerous headlines, although some of the report's other findings look equally consequential. That includes the continued strong growth of energy demand in China, India and other Asian countries, and the linkages between that growth and a dramatic expansion of Iraqi oil production. The agency also set a cautionary tone concerning the increase in global greenhouse gas emissions accompanying all this growth.

In the IEA's primary "New Policies" scenario, the US overtakes Saudi Arabia in oil production by 2017, adding 4 million barrels per day (MBD) of unconventional output, mainly from shale (tight oil) deposits such as the Bakken in North Dakota. US oil imports decline significantly, due in roughly equal measure to higher production and the implementation of strict vehicle fuel economy regulations. As a consequence, the need for imports from the Middle East approaches zero within 10 years. When this change is combined with the growth in oil demand in Asia, where China alone accounts for half the forecasted global growth in oil consumption in this period, the IEA envisions Asia becoming the recipient of 90% of Middle East oil exports by 2035.

The detailed assumptions behind the IEA's conclusions weren't provided in the public release. These include crucial questions such as the assumed status of US rules barring most crude oil exports. As noted in a Reuters op-ed at the time, maximizing the potential of US unconventional resources may depend on allowing higher quality unconventional oil to seek global markets, while continuing to import oil from Latin America and the Middle East into Gulf Coast refineries geared to these heavier, higher-sulfur feedstocks. The op-ed's author also reminded us that the natural gas liquids included in the headline comparison with Saudi production are useful but quite different from crude oil, yielding little gasoline and diesel fuel.

The expected growth of energy demand in China remains extraordinary, even with the country's economic growth slowing from the levels seen a few years ago. To put this in context, when Dr. Fatih Birol, Chief Economist of the IEA, presented the new WEO to the media in London on November 12th, he suggested that China's electricity demand would grow by the equivalent of "one US and one Japan of today" by 2035. Much of that additional electricity generation is projected to come from renewables, nuclear power and domestic gas. Nevertheless, and in spite of significant increases in China's unconventional gas production, the IEA forecasts that import dependence will grow from about 15% for gas and 50% for oil today, to 40% for gas and over 80% for oil by 2035. That increase in imports would equate to additional hundreds of millions of dollars per year of outflows for energy.

In the view of the IEA, much of the extra oil demanded in Asia will be supplied by Iraq, which they project will increase its output from around 3 MBD today to 6.1 MBD in 2020 and 8.3 MBD in 2035, in the process becoming the world's second-largest oil exporter, after Russia. Since the reserves to support that growth have already been identified, with much lower production costs than many other basins, the uncertainties involved are mainly political and structural. Resolution of the current standoff with Iran over its nuclear program would provide even more Middle East oil for Asian markets.

As in its earlier "Golden Age of Gas" scenario, the IEA expects large increases in global natural gas consumption. Unconventional sources, mainly in the US, China and Australia, would contribute around half the additional production required to meet expanded demand. However, at the launch presentation in London Dr. Birol also stressed that unconventional oil and gas are still at an early stage, with significant uncertainties about the eventual magnitude of their resources. This seemed to be a particular issue for the agency's post-2020 forecast of oil production in the US and gas production in China.

Despite the rigorous analysis and level of detail involved in producing the IEA's World Energy Outlook, long-term energy forecasting should always be taken with a grain of salt. Yet whether or not the highlighted trends mature precisely in line with these projections, the shifts that the IEA identified are significant and already becoming evident in current data for energy production, consumption and trade. Even if North America failed to become a net oil exporter--which many equate with energy independence--by 2030, the movement of the center of gravity of global energy trade towards Asia is essentially pre-determined: baked in by differences in economic growth rates and resource opportunities. The economic, geopolitical and environmental consequences of that shift are just starting to take shape.

A slightly different version of this posting was previously published on the website of Pacific Energy Development Corporation.

Election 2012: Romney on Energy

After last week's review of President Obama's energy record and campaign materials on energy, Governor Romney's energy plans present a sharp contrast. They are based on a fundamentally different view of energy and the economy, relying on markets to allocate capital to the most productive opportunities, rather than on government to guide a mix of public and private investments along specific paths towards designated ends. They also emphasize technologies that are already deployed at scale today, not those still under development or striving to attain scale. Implicitly, the Romney plan prioritizes supplying the energy for a robust economic recovery over programs designed to address long-term environmental challenges like climate change. These positions present voters with a serious and consequential choice on November 6th.

The Romney campaign's website on energy arrays the candidate's ideas mainly in words, rather than with the kind of images and interactive features that dominate the Obama campaign's sites. Energy is the first plank of Governor Romney's five-point "Plan for a Stronger Middle Class", though it requires a little work to explore the details of his energy program. A list of bullet points  is backed up by a lengthy policy paper with numerous references to external sources, but you have to look for it.

The Romney energy plan focuses mainly on oil, gas, coal and nuclear energy, which together meet 91% of current US primary energy demand and which the Department of Energy projects will still provide nearly 90% in 2020 under the policies in place today. You won't find much on his campaign's website about the new renewables that generated electricity equivalent to 2% of our energy use last year, beyond a critique of the administration's investment in Solyndra and a commitment to R&D on new energy technologies.

Among the details of his plan are support for expanded offshore drilling, including areas such as offshore Virginia that were originally in the Obama administration's early-2010 offshore development blueprint, along with a comprehensive assessment of US resources using current technology, rather than further extrapolations based on 1980s technology. Governor Romney proposes expanding energy cooperation with both Canada and Mexico and would approve the entire Keystone XL pipeline. His goal of attaining North American energy independence is aggressive, yet recent analysis by Citigroup puts it within the realm of possibility. It appears to be based on an assessment by Wood Mackenzie, a top-notch energy consultancy, indicating that US oil and natural gas liquids output could expand by 7.6 million barrels per day, with 6.7 million of that coming from federal lands and waters currently off-limits to development. That compares to US net petroleum imports of 8.5 million barrels per day in 2011.

Another aspect of the plan aimed at streamlining the permitting of energy projects could be just as useful for utility-scale renewable energy projects as for oil and gas exploration and production. Regulatory and permitting delays are among the key reasons it takes longer and costs more to develop crucial energy and infrastructure projects here than in many of the countries against which our competitive standing has been slipping. Governor Romney also proposes giving states greater control of permitting on their non-park federal lands. That could substantially increase energy access and output, especially in the west, where the federal government owns over 280 hundred million acres, or 37% of those 11 states, net of tribal lands.

There are also some missing elements. I would have liked to see more about how renewables fit into Governor Romney's vision. He apparently supports the Renewable Fuels Standard but is silent about the increasingly urgent need to reform it. He is on record against the extension of the wind Production Tax Credit (PTC), a 20-year old subsidy roughly equivalent to the current price of natural gas, yet misses the opportunity to explain how all types of energy would be treated under his proposal to reduce corporate income tax rates while broadening the tax base--policy-speak for closing loopholes and eliminating incentives. In last night's debate he said, referring to the $2.8 billion in annual tax incentives for oil and gas identified by the Department of Energy, "... if we get that tax rate from 35 percent down to 25 percent, why that $2.8 billion is on the table. Of course it's on the table. That's probably not going to survive (if) you get that rate down to 25 percent." I'd also like to hear more about how Governor Romney would address greenhouse gas emissions once the economy returns to stronger growth.

Superficially, much of the Romney energy agenda evokes a return to the pre-2008 status quo: heavy on oil, gas and coal, light on renewables, and largely ignoring climate change. I see it from a different perspective: When Barack Obama began running for President in 2007, the US was considered by many to be tapped out on conventional energy, with domestic oil and natural gas production exhibiting signs of deep and permanent decline. In that context it made sense to look beyond those resources to the potential of renewable energy and vehicle electrification, even if the transition involved would be lengthy. That approach also appeared synergistic with reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and a strategy was born. In the meantime, however, it turned out that US oil and gas were far from exhausted, and the most productive new energy technology of this decade wasn't wind, solar or biofuels, but the combination of hydraulic fracturing ("fracking") and horizontal drilling that has unlocked hundreds of trillions of cubic feet of shale gas and tens of billions of barrels of shale oil or "tight oil" resources. Since 2008 the expansion of shale gas drilling has added as much new US energy production as over 250,000 MW of wind turbines or solar panels--8x the wind and solar power added in the same interval. To the surprise of many, the big global energy opportunity of the 20-teens is US hydrocarbons. The Romney plan reflects the unexpected energy transformation we're experiencing.

As in 2008, this blog isn't in the business of endorsing candidates. Energy remains an issue that, like the Cold War, demands bi-partisan cooperation and some level of consistency from one administration or Congress to the next. However, that doesn't prevent me from observing that the energy agendas of the two campaigns are not equally well-suited for a period of serious US fiscal constraints and shrinking federal discretionary expenditures, in which our energy security and economic growth will still depend largely on fossil fuels. In that context, it's highly relevant that the "all of the above" credentials of one candidate depend on oil and gas outcomes that his policies did little to support. Of course, energy isn't the only issue that matters, but then you wouldn't be reading this if you didn't think it was important.

What If Saudi Arabia Became an Oil Importer?

I've seen numerous references in the last several days to a Citgroup analysis suggesting that Saudi Arabia might become a net oil importer by 2030.  The premise behind this startling conclusion seems to be that economic growth and demographic trends would continue pushing up domestic Saudi demand for petroleum products and electricity--generated to a large extent from petroleum--until it consumed all of that country's oil export capacity within about 20 years.  Even if this trend didn't proceed to conclusion, its continued progression could significantly alter both global oil markets and the context for the current debate about the desirability of achieving North American energy independence.

I'd be a lot more comfortable discussing this news item if I had access to the report on which it's based.  Unfortunately, none of the dozens of references to it that I found on the web included a link to the source, which is probably on one of Citi's client-only sites.  The Bloomberg and Daily Telegraph articles seemed to be the most complete, with the latter including a couple of charts from the report.  As best I can tell, the analysis falls into the category of "If this goes on" scenarios--extrapolations of currently observable trends to some logical conclusion.  That doesn't make it simplistic, because I'm sure the author sifted through volumes of data to flesh it out.  The fact that many oil-producing countries have gone through a similar cycle lends it further credibility.  For that matter, the US was once an important oil-exporting country, until the growth of our economy overwhelmed the productivity of US oil fields early in the last century.  The gradual conversion of the remaining oil exporters to net oil consumers is a basic plank of the Peak Oil meme.

This presents a real conundrum, both for the Saudis and for us, because although many of the means by which this result could be averted are obvious, they aren't all feasible within the current political situation in Saudi Arabia, or indeed many other producing countries.  Start with per-capita energy consumption, which a chart in the Telegraph article shows to be higher than in the US. Consumption is also high relative to GDP. Energy efficiency opportunities should be ample, but it's hard to make those a priority when retail energy is heavily subsidized and thus cheap.  The Citigroup report apparently suggests reducing energy subsidy levels, but that might lead to the same kind of unrest that we've seen in other countries that have cut subsidies.  That seems to leave mainly investment-based options for substituting other energy sources for oil, to preserve oil for exports.  The Kingdom has already embarked on some of these, including nuclear and solar power.  When combined with additional natural gas development, the Saudis certainly have the means and the motivation to shift the current trend of rising internal oil consumption, along with the cash to fund the infrastructure investment involved.

This leaves us with important strategic questions: To what extent should our own energy policy rely on Saudi Arabia succeeding in preserving its oil export capacity by means of substitution or efficiency gains? And if internal Saudi consumption removed just another 2-3 million barrels per day of exports from the market, how would that affect oil prices and the functioning of the global oil market, in which Saudi Arabia has often acted as a moderating force within OPEC?  Considering that a narrowing between demand and available supply of about that magnitude was a key factor in the oil-price run-up of 2006-8, this should cause us serious concern.

That brings us to US energy independence, a tired mantra that has been proclaimed by a long succession of US Presidents, despite most experts for the last several decades having regarded it as unrealistic.  To be clear, when Americans speak of energy independence, we are referring to oil, because as a practical matter that's the only form of energy we import to any significant degree, if you don't count natural gas from Canada.  Yet suddenly energy independence no longer looks like a pipe dream, because of the combination of resurgent domestic oil production and improvements in vehicle fuel efficiency.  An earlier report from Citigroup sketched the outline of potential future North American energy independence based mainly on those elements.   It's hardly guaranteed, but it's not a fantasy, either. 

Despite the risks of a much more unsettled oil market in the future, I continue to see a great deal of misunderstanding about what energy independence could mean for the US.  Although it wouldn't cut us off from the global oil market--perish the thought--it would give us a much more flexible and influential role within it, while taking advantage of the benefits of continued trade.  No longer being a net oil importer wouldn't insulate us from future oil price movements--it's still a global commodity--but oil prices would be lower than otherwise as a direct result of the substantial additions to supply required to shrink US oil imports to near zero.  Prices would be weaker even if OPEC slashed output to compensate, because the resulting increase in spare production capacity would still reduce market volatility.  Moreover, while US energy independence would not preclude the possibility of future oil price spikes, the consequences of those would be very different.  For starters, they wouldn't entail weakening our economy by transferring tens or hundreds of billions of dollars offshore.  Most of the extra oil revenue would stay in the US, and a large slice of it would be captured by state and federal taxes and royalties.  Contrast that with what happened in 2008, and is still ongoing to a lesser degree.

The Saudi analysis from Citigroup proposed a fascinating scenario, with many interesting implications, although I'd argue that it's also subject to the simple advice of Herb Stein that "If something cannot go on forever, it will stop." By coincidence, it's also relevant to the energy debate underway between the US presidential campaigns. Although it's highly uncertain that Saudi Arabia's oil exports will dry up by 2030, we shouldn't assume such an outcome to be impossible, any more than we should base US energy policy on the outdated assumption that it's impossible for us to come close to eliminating the need for oil imports from outside North America.  It might be uncertain whether we have sufficient resources accessible with the latest technology to reach that goal, but it is essentially certain that the growing but still tiny contribution of renewable energy and the eventual conversion of the US vehicle fleet to electricity couldn't get us there for multiple decades.

Are Films the Answer to Understanding Energy's Complexities?

The issues and choices surrounding our use of energy have rarely been more complex than today, yet our main channels for information about them are discouragingly shallow.  The web is often more effective at spreading misperceptions than fact-based analysis.  When our visual media focus on energy, it's usually to flash bad news before flitting on to the next story, leaving behind images of burning oil platforms or blacked-out cities.  One bright spot is the recent wave of documentary films on energy topics.  Films engage us on a deeper level, and the energy challenges we face deserve such longer-form treatment. August seems like a perfect time to suggest a few of them to you.  If you're reading this blog, then I'm betting you might at least consider watching a movie about energy instead of the latest summer blockbuster.   

Although it was hardly the first serious film about energy, the recent trend seemed to start with "Gasland". For all its inaccuracies, which have been documented by groups outside industry, that film helped start a national conversation about the right way to develop the enormous unconventional oil and gas resources that new combinations of technology have unlocked. In the spirit of making that dialog more constructive and even-handed, you should also know about two other documentaries covering the same topic and region from a different angle.  To many of the farmers and other landowners in depressed counties of New York and Pennsylvania, fracking is not a curse but an actual or potential lifeline. Seeing "Truthland" and "Empire State Divide" might not convert fracking skeptics into gas industry supporters, but it should at least fill in some of the gaps left by the "Gasland's" starkly one-sided portrayal of shale gas.

Another energy film I recently ran across, "spOILed", offers a timely reminder that despite oil's many problems it remains an essential ingredient of our global civilization, providing affordable mobility and a host of products that have made our lives much easier than those of our ancestors--or of people in countries that still lack reliable access to energy.  "spOILed" is also very much a movie about the dangers of Peak Oil, which envisions a world in which declining oil production, rising demand in developing countries, and geopolitical risks create persistent and growing shortages of oil.  This is particularly sobering when combined with a sense of just how challenging it will be to obtain the services that oil now provides from other energy sources.   Unfortunately, the film's message was undermined by occasionally jarring choices of visuals, some hyperbolic claims--no indoor plumbing without oil?--and by political overtones that might limit its effectiveness with the wider audience it appears to target. 

The energy film project that I'm most excited about is one aimed consciously at finding and cultivating "The Rational Middle" in the energy debate.  According to its director, Gregory Kallenberg, it started with a TED talk following his previous film, "Haynesville", which examined the impact of shale gas in Northern Louisiana.  As I understand it, the current project consists of 10 short videos on energy, four of which have been released on the group's website so far.  From the episodes I've seen, Mr. Kallenberg's team assembled an impressive group of experts, including Amy Myers Jaffe of the Baker Institute at Rice University, Michael Levi of the Council on Foreign Relations, former Energy Information Agency Administrator Richard Newell, and Dr. Michael Webber of the University of Texas. The series is being launched with a road show featuring panels of some of the same experts interviewed in the films, starting with a session at this year's Aspen Ideas Festival.  The films are focused on information and process, rather than on selling one point of view. Aside from a few assertions in a couple of interviews, the factual presentation in the initial videos was very sound.  I expect to have more to say about The Rational Middle as additional episodes become available. 

If the we are to develop effective energy policies for the 21st century, the public's desire for clean, secure, reliable and affordable energy must be grounded in facts and figures that help us to differentiate realistic expectations from wish fulfilment.   I'm encouraged that a growing number of filmmakers seems willing to explore energy issues in the depth they deserve, with production values that will connect with today's audiences, rather than turning them off. Enjoy!

The 2013 US Energy Agenda

It's tempting to focus mainly on the energy issues that have come up in the context of the presidential campaign, such as the Keystone XL pipeline, tax breaks for energy companies, and whether and how to regulate hydraulic fracturing, a.k.a "fracking".  Yet whoever is inaugurated next January, and however he resolves these issues, he will also face a much wider array of energy concerns, including some that are outgrowths of current policies or have emerged after a long gestation.  Though not intended as an exhaustive list, here are a few such issues that merit close attention from the next president's energy team.

They should begin by taking a fresh and objective look at the overall US energy posture and devising a clear and concise way to describe it to the public.  Big changes have taken place, with many of the issues that preoccupied us for the last decade or longer having become less relevant or out of date.  Topping that list is the sense of energy scarcity that has burdened us since the oil crises of the 1970s and early 1980s.  There's a realistic possibility that the combination of "tight oil" and the gas liquids production from shale gas could push domestic US petroleum/liquids production back above its early '70s peak of around 11 million barrels per day. At the same time, our net oil imports are declining, due in large part to the weak economy.  However, as the share of fuel efficient vehicles in our car fleet increases, it's reasonable to think that we've already seen the peak of US demand for petroleum fuels, even after the economy returns to healthy growth.  The net result might fall short of energy independence, but it will put us in a much better position than our largest economic rivals in terms of real energy security. 

Then there's shale gas.  Not only has it reversed a worrisome decline in US natural gas production that prompted numerous projects to import liquefied natural gas (LNG), but it has upended our assumptions about future prices and emissions in the electric power sector, while completing the divorce of oil and electricity that began in the 1980s.  Now we're talking seriously about exporting natural gas. When you combine all these changes with biofuels that are contributing roughly a million barrels per day to US supply (in volumetric, though not BTU-equivalent terms) the need to revisit some of our most basic assumptions about energy looks compelling. 

Energy scarcity isn't the only paradigm that needs to be rethought.  The current administration apparently took office with a view that was prevalent in the environmental community and among some in energy circles, that the solutions to climate change and energy security were effectively synonymous and synergistic.  That view predates the shale/tight oil revolution and was founded on the notion that renewable energy and efficiency were the only serious answers to both concerns.  That linkage was always oversimplified, because it ignored the trade-offs inherent in the shortcomings of every energy technology available.  And now, thanks to unexpected technological developments, we face an explicit choice between energy abundance based on hydrocarbons and a lower-emissions future based on renewables and electric vehicles that won't reach the required scale for decades, despite promising early signs. The transition from the former to the latter appears long and largely unpredictable, nor will it be cheap. 

The next administration also faces a set of practical issues, along with the big-picture reframing described above. Two of these issues involve urgent tasks.  The first is the growing need for a thorough evaluation of the recent and current approach to incentivizing renewable energy technologies and projects.  Since early 2009 we've spent tens of billions of dollars on a constellation of federal grants, tax credits, and loan guarantees to stimulate the growth of a domestic renewable and advanced energy industry and the deployment of its products. There's a lot of new hardware on the ground, but the sustainability of this industry looks uncertain. Although only a fraction of the companies that received federal support have failed, the tally has grown large enough--with the addition of Abound Solar last week--that it's no longer acceptable merely to shrug off these losses as par for the course.  We need some hard-nosed, detail-oriented outsiders to conduct a comprehensive post-expenditure review and extract the major lessons learned.  That should be an absolute prerequisite before anyone contemplates renewing or expanding any of these programs, including the Pentagon's $210 million "green fleet" program.

Another urgent clean-up task is the reform of the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS).  This 2007 mandate was premised on the imminent arrival of cellulosic biofuel technologies that have turned out to be much harder than expected to transfer from demonstration to commercial scale.  That has resulted in drastic annual revisions to the cellulosic biofuel targets of the mandate, but even these lower targets have not been achieved.  Instead, the EPA imposes penalties on refiners and gasoline blenders for failing to blend non-existent volumes, with consumers ultimately absorbing the higher costs at the pump.  The attractive vision of abundant renewable fuels has thus turned into a bureaucratic game.  And while corn ethanol supplies 10% of gasoline and consumes nearly 40% of the US corn crop, it cannot more than double to meet the entire 36 billion gallon per year RFS target for 2022, nor should we wish it to.  Instead, the RFS must be updated to reflect reality, and the associated biofuel-credit trading system should be restructured to squeeze out the fraud that is infecting it, instead of leaving refiners and blenders--and again ultimately consumers--to pick up a tab estimated at $200 million. 

These items don't constitute an entire energy agenda by themselves, but together with a few higher-profile proposals from among those that both campaigns will announce and debate during the next four months, they could fill out a worthy first-hundred-days' energy plan for 2013.

Five Stars for Robert Rapier's "Power Plays"

It's a pleasure to have the opportunity to recommend a new book by a fellow energy blogger, especially when the blogger in question has the kind of deep, hands-on industry experience that makes Robert Rapier's work so authoritative.  Robert has been communicating about a variety of energy-related topics for years, first at his own "R-Squared Energy" site, where I encountered him in about 2006, and lately at Consumer Energy Report and at The Energy Collective. You should not assume from the book's title, "Power Plays: Energy Options in the Age of Peak Oil" or the image on its cover that it is just another in a long line of recent bestsellers proclaiming an imminent and permanent global oil crisis.  Robert's description of the risks of peak oil is nuanced and balanced, as is his assessment of the many other timely subjects included in the book.  The chapter on "Investing in Cleantech" is worth the price of the entire book for would-be inventors and investors, as well as for those setting or administering government renewable energy policies and programs. 

In some respects this is the hardest kind of book for me to review.  It covers much of the same territory as my own writing, drawing on similar educational and career experiences, so I'm hardly representative of its intended or ideal audience.  It is also very close to the book that I've long been tempted to write, myself, after well over a thousand blog posts on the same set of topics and issues.  With those caveats, I enjoyed reading "Power Plays", mainly because despite superficial similarities, our perspectives are still different enough that I found it thought-provoking.  I even picked up a few new facts.  And I should make it very clear that although the book certainly reflects the large body of writing Robert has produced over the last half-dozen years or so, it does not read like a collection of recycled blog posts.  It is also as up-to-date as any project like this could be, including assessments of the Keystone XL pipeline controversy, the Fukushima nuclear disaster, and other recent events.

"Power Plays" is structured as an overview of the complex set of energy sources and applications in use today, including their intimate connection to domestic and geopolitics.  (The book includes a sobering, non-partisan analysis of the efforts of eight US presidents to promote energy independence.)  It is also based on an explicit point of view about the need to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels and to attempt to mitigate human influence on climate change, while being exceptionally realistic about our available options and likely success.  Robert has definite ideas on energy policies that would be useful, particularly in guiding our long transition away from oil.  I don't agree with all of them, but they're well-reasoned and well-articulated. 

The book is also very sound on the facts.  I didn't spot any notable errors, with the possible exception of a brief explanation of why hybrid cars are more efficient than conventional cars--in my understanding this derives from the optimization of engine output and the recycling of energy otherwise lost in braking, rather than from inherent differences in energy conversion efficiencies between electric and combustion motors.  Otherwise, aside from the natural differences of interpretation one would expect, Robert delivers 250 pages of straight talk about energy.

One word of warning along those lines: If you come to this book as a firm and uncritical advocate of any particular energy technology to the exclusion of most others, you should prepare either to have your feathers ruffled or find yourself questioning some of your beliefs.  That is particularly true for renewable energy and biofuels, which constitute Robert's current main focus as Chief Technology Officer of a forestry and renewable energy company.  On the other hand, if you'd like to learn more about why fuels like corn ethanol are less-than-ideal substitutes for oil, and why cellulosic biofuel is more challenging to produce and scale up than the promoters of many start-up companies would like you to think, this is a great place to start.  And in addition to the obligatory assessment of vehicle electrification and electric trains, his chapter on oil-free transportation features a serious discussion of bicycling and walking, something it might never have occurred to me to include.  All of this is handled with rigor, ample references, and a leavening of tables and graphs that shouldn't overwhelm those who are more comfortable with words than numbers or data.

I highly recommended "Power Plays" for my readers.  It is available in print and e-book formats from Barnes & Noble and Amazon, where it has garnered exclusively five-star ratings at this point.  I intend to post my own five-star review there when time permits. 

Is North America the New Middle East for Oil?

With the President of the United States currently playing the role of pessimist-in-chief with regard to US energy independence, it's refreshing to see that goal raised as a serious possibility by someone whose experience and position give him deeper insights on the subject. A few years ago Ed Morse was running the oil trading operation for Hess, and now he's at Citigroup. His op-ed in today's Wall St. Journal offers an upbeat analysis of the ongoing resurgence in US and Canadian production and the potential for North America to move within striking distance of true oil independence. He doesn't appear to be predicting $2.50 per gallon gasoline any time soon, but he does remind us that permanently higher oil prices needn't be inevitable, although he is also very clear about the obstacles that could impede these developments.

How often have politicians and pundits reminded us that we can't drill our way to energy independence? I've said that myself numerous times in the eight years I've been blogging here. So before exploring the implications of producing significantly more oil than we do today, it's worth asking why some experts are starting to question what has been a bedrock assumption about the US energy situation since our conventional oil production peaked in 1970--not coincidentally just before the first oil crisis in 1973-74.

If the tired talking point about the US having just 2% of the world's oil reserves were truly reflective of reality, rather than a technicality based on the way the SEC requires oil companies to account for their chief assets, people like Ed Morse wouldn't give energy independence a moment's thought. The number to focus on is not the 21 billion barrels of proved reserves on companies' books, but the nearly 200 billion barrels of discovered and undiscovered "technically recoverable oil resources" onshore and offshore, in the lower-48 and Alaska. That figure represents more than 95 years of production at current rates.

That estimate is also mostly based on assessments from the 1980s done with technology that bears the same relationship to current exploration techniques as an old Ma Bell rotary phone does to an iPhone. It's technology that is shifting expectations about what is actually possible. Consider the Bakken shale formation in the Dakotas. The conventional Williston Basin oil fields were discovered in the early 1950s and mostly played out by the late 1980s. The billions of barrels of resources in the adjacent Bakken shale, which might produce a million barrels per day by the end of this decade, simply couldn't have been produced at commercially useful rates with the technology that was available until the last decade. The hot question now is where the next Bakkens will be found.

Then there's deepwater drilling, which suffered a big setback with the Deepwater Horizon accident and spill but is still contributing 1.2 million barrels per day and could reach 1.9 million next year. What moves Mr. Morse's speculation from wishfulness into the realm of practical possibility is the potential of applying technologies like those to exploit conventional and unconventional reservoirs to which industry has not had access since their development, if ever.

Another talking point that we've heard like a drumbeat over the last several months is that even if the US could produce more oil, it would make little difference to oil prices in a global market of 90 million barrels per day. We simply don't control the price of oil; OPEC does. That has been true for essentially the entire time I've worked in energy. But here's where it's handy to have the background in oil trading that I share with Mr. Morse. Traders have to think about how prices are really set, and they understand that it's the interaction of the last few million barrels per day of supply, demand and spare capacity that really count, along with inventories. An extra million or two barrels per day--a quantity of which North America is certainly capable--can make a huge difference in oil prices. We saw that in 2009, when a drop of about 3 million barrels per day of demand sent prices from $140 to $40 within a few months, and we saw something similar involving both supply and demand during the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997-98. (See chart below.)


Nor is OPEC monolithic; it's made up of a group of producers with very different levels of reserves and production, and differing domestic requirements for the revenue they earn from selling their oil. That means that, contrary to yet another talking point, OPEC does not have unlimited capacity to back down production, in order to keep prices high when others increase output. And even when it can maintain enough cohesion to tighten quotas and restrict its own output, the production in question merely shifts to "spare capacity", the expansion of which reduces oil market volatility. Imagine how different the market's response to the current confrontation over Iran's nuclear program might look if other producers had a multiple of Iran's exports in reserve.

Just because something is possible with a decade or so of determined effort doesn't make it inevitable. While I share Mr. Morse's optimism about the benefits of boosting North American oil production on a scale that would dwarf the modest recent upturn, which has received so much attention from politicians who had nothing to do with it, I'm also skeptical that it could proceed to quite that extent in today's climate. Aside from people who are genuinely concerned about the possible environmental impact of more oil development, there are also those who would regard such a turn of events as contrary to their own interests and their perception of the nation's. How would we convince consumers to pay the premium for new cars achieving an average of 54.5 mpg in 2025 if gasoline remained between $3 and $4 per gallon, instead of trending toward $6--let alone shifting them into electric vehicles that the government and carmakers have invested billions in developing? And how would we stimulate production of advanced biofuels if the future price of crude oil were seen as being capped at or below $100 per barrel, except during geopolitical crises?

I believe all such questions have answers that don't depend on us constraining access to our resources at the cost of remaining more vulnerable to overseas suppliers and weakening both our trade deficit and our currency. I'd rather have the extra domestic oil and then worry about how to spend some of the resulting windfall of federal and state taxes, bid bonuses and royalties on achieving our other policy objectives, such as promoting efficiency and reducing emissions. Nor is relying on OPEC to keep prices high the best or most effective way to encourage us to use oil more frugally.

I don't know if North America is the next Middle East, although it's worth recalling that we were the world's biggest oil supplier before the first well was drilled in Saudi Arabia, and DOE estimates suggest we have as much oil left as we've produced to date since 1859. However, I do know that I would much rather give OPEC's leaders sleepless nights worrying how they'll keep oil prices high in the face of a wave of new production from the US, Canada and possibly Mexico, in preference to giving US consumers sleepless nights about how they'll pay for the gasoline they need for their commutes and the fuel to heat their homes, if prices stay this high or higher from here on out.

Net Exports and Gasoline Prices

US petroleum product exports have been in the news, along with the welcome discovery that we are apparently on track to become a net exporter of these fuels this year, for the first time since the 1940s. This is a far cry from energy independence, as various oil skeptics have been quick to point out, but it's still a noteworthy inflection point in energy trends. However, I've also seen stories suggesting that US consumers will pay a lot more at the pump as a result of this change, to which the most succinct response so far is "rubbish." Being a net exporter hasn't suddenly connected US fuel prices to the world market, as if they had somehow been insulated from it until now. In fact, we've been exporting products for many years--as I know from personal experience--but for most of that time we just happened to be importing more. The net effect of our new status on prices here will be minimal, while the main impact will be a positive nudge to our trade deficit.

I am sympathetic to the present urge to see a cloud in every silver lining; we seem to be going through one of those phases in our history. At the same time we should understand that to the extent net petroleum product exports aren't entirely good news, it's because the main driver of this departure from a long trend of steadily increasing net imports was the sudden slowdown of consumer activity that accompanied the recession and financial crisis, from which we are still recovering. And while I agree that more efficient cars have contributed, recent fuel economy improvements have been too incremental to our fleet of 240 million light-duty vehicles (passenger cars, SUVs and light trucks) to have made such a big dent in demand, quite so soon. Mainly, we're driving less, as the statistics on vehicle miles traveled indicate. That might be better news if it reflected a massive lifestyle change, instead of the grim reality of millions of un- and under-employed Americans for whom driving has become a luxury.

Even in that negative context, the fact that we are now exporting more gasoline and other petroleum products than we import is a plus, since without buoyant non-US demand, US refiners might have been forced to reduce operations by more than they have, or to idle more facilities and lay off staff. Today's net exports imply a positive margin between crude oil imports and product exports sufficient to cover refiners' costs, even after netting out freight. That results in more economic activity and value added here, driven by overseas demand, following the same export-led strategy that other industries are pursuing in order to compensate for lower US demand for their output.

More exports and fewer imports mean a smaller trade deficit, but the question on some people's minds is apparently whether this is being accomplished at the expense of US consumers. That might have been the case if, for example, exports had been banned until recently and refiners forced to create an artificial glut of petroleum products to drive down prices. (That's effectively the case in some other countries.) Instead, the US has long been part of a global market for both crude oil and refined products, and refiners and traders have always been alert for gaps between regional markets that could be profitably exploited. When I traded refined products for Texaco's west coast refineries in the 1980s, we occasionally took advantage of export opportunities, even though we were more often importers. When I traded products in London, my team routinely sold cargoes of gasoline, diesel or jet fuel from the US into Europe and Asia, and we did the reverse when the "arbitrage" worked in the other direction. We accounted for just a small portion of the trade in cargoes passing back and forth between continents, which continues today.

As a result of this global market in refined petroleum products, US consumers of gasoline and other fuels have always been competing with consumers in other countries, whether we realized it or not, especially in parts of the country where refiners have easy access to export markets. That's been true since the days when my former employer's advertising touted its success in "lighting the (kerosene) lamps of China". In terms of the impact on domestic prices, it doesn't matter much whether we're net exporters or net importers, as long as we're connected to the global market--a linkage that has saved our bacon on many occasions when US refineries were hit by hurricanes, blackouts, or other disasters.

A more tangible way to test the consequences of product exports involves comparing past and present crude oil and gasoline prices. Making that comparison accurately is complicated by the breakdown of the main US oil market indicator, the price of West Texas Intermediate crude, which for more than a year has been burdened by excessive inventory at Cushing, OK and other factors. For now the price of Louisiana Light Sweet (LLS) is a better gauge of the oil market. LLS has been relatively unaffected by WTI's problems and trended much closer to global oil prices, such as UK Brent crude. It turns out that 104% of the higher retail price of gasoline this November vs. a year ago is explained by the $23 per barrel increase in LLS since then. In other words, crude prices have increased by slightly more than gasoline, suggesting that raw material costs still have a much larger impact on prices at the pump than does the recent shift in US petroleum product trade patterns.

Although the evidence that product exports don't hurt consumers is strong, I don't expect it to dispel this handy new rationale for complaining about gas prices. After all, the price of gasoline is one of the most visible and volatile prices we're exposed to, and for which we have few practical alternatives. Having a narrative to explain these spikes and dips is empowering, even if it's wrong. However, in the midst of all the grumbling it's worth spending a moment thinking about the benefits of having an oil refining industry that has been able to find alternative outlets for its products while it waits for the US economy to recover, instead of yet another manufacturing industry on the ropes, shedding jobs and moving offshore.