The details of the reorganization plan approved Monday by the judge hearing the Solyndra bankruptcy case reminded me of the admonition of one of my mentors always to beware of unintended consequences. I'm sure the Department of Energy officials who recommended the federal loan guarantee for Solyndra in March of 2009 envisioned that the solar start-up would succeed. As a worst-case outcome, they probably anticipated the loss of the entire $535 million direct federal loan ultimately provided by the Treasury. However, in a remarkable turn of events, the actual extent of the downside for taxpayers has now expanded to nearly $900 million, due to a quirk in the tax code and a subsequent DOE decision in 2011.
This odd sequence of events starts in early 2011 when two venture investors agreed to infuse another $75 million into the already failing Solyndra. In order to facilitate this injection--presumably in hopes of protecting the government's substantial investment in the firm--the DOE agreed to allow the investors' loan to take precedence over the government's if Solyndra went bankrupt. Perhaps they thought that even in that case, they'd still recover most of the government's investment, because Solyndra had a sexy technology and a big new factory in Fremont, CA that could be sold to a competitor for close to full value. They apparently didn't appreciate that Solyndra's high-cost technology had already been bypassed by falling polysilicon prices, and that the factory and its custom equipment wouldn't be of much interest to other solar producers, who were in the process of creating a huge global overhang of solar manufacturing capacity. The Solyndra plant will now apparently be sold to a hard-drive maker for just $90 million.
In the meantime, Solyndra was piling up substantial losses running its plant and selling solar modules below cost, in order to compete with conventional solar panels that had become much cheaper. By the time Solyndra entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, its cumulative losses apparently totaled $975 million. To put that in perspective, the combined after tax profits of First Solar, the largest US solar producer, for the three years in which the DOE's loan to Solyndra was outstanding, were $1,265 million.
What makes Solyndra's losses relevant is that, contrary to intuition, they didn't disappear in bankruptcy. Instead, via the investors' plan for emerging from bankruptcy, they became an asset. And because the DOE ceded the first place in line to private investors, it is those investors who will control those "net operating losses" retained by Solyndra's reorganized parent company, 360 Degree Solar Holdings, Inc. That company apparently kept none of Solyndra's hardware, but when it acquires other companies--in any line of business--it will be able to offset future federal tax liabilities estimated by Bloomberg at $341 million. Meanwhile, the federal government is likely to recover just 5 cents on the dollar on its "secured loan." The Solyndra loan is a gift that keeps on giving.
Hindsight is 20/20, but it seems pretty clear that the folks at DOE were outsmarted by private investors who had a much clearer picture of the stakes for which they were negotiating. As we were reminded last week, Solyndra wasn't the only investment they made that went bad. Let's hope that the others don't include similarly unpleasant surprises. Meanwhile, I wish the IRS and Alameda County the best of luck in appealing the bankruptcy judge's ruling.
John Stanley,
ReplyDeleteThanks for your comment. However, I have a strict no-profanity policy here, and unlike my previous comment system, Blogger won't allow me to edit out the offending bits.
This is what you wrote, minus the bleeped out part:
"What happens when governments get the green religion and go fundamentalist *** **** zealous."
My response is that this goes beyond green. The administration has asked government to take on things that just aren't in its wheelhouse, and in general shouldn't be. When actual venture capitalists invest in a loser--as they do all the time, because it's in the nature of the activity--at least they do so with their and their investors' money, not ours.