I've seen a number of Tweets suggesting that the US will release oil from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) sometime in the next month or two, perhaps in tandem with other member countries of the International Energy Agency. Although circumstances might provide several possible rationales for such a release, including the implementation of tougher sanctions on Iran's oil sector and the possibility that Hurricane Isaac will disrupt some production in the Gulf Coast, it's hard to avoid a political interpretation, as well. As we head into a close Presidential election, gas prices are rising again, and that's never good for an incumbent. Selling oil from the SPR is one of the few levers available that might affect short-term energy prices. However, much has changed since the Clinton administration released 30 million barrels (via exchange) in the lead-up to the 2000 election. In particular, the country's switch from net importer to net exporter of petroleum products implies that a release in response to events other than a physical disruption in oil supplies could result in some of the benefit of such a release being exported, as well.
When it comes to uses of the SPR, I'm a purist, probably because I can recall sitting in gas lines and participating involuntarily in the bizarre "odd-even" rationing-by-license-plate scheme introduced during the oil crisis following the Iranian Revolution. The SPR was designed to provide a backstop for our vital energy supplies in a true physical emergency, not as a tool for price manipulation. I've also suggested for some time that the SPR is overdue for a comprehensive reassessment of its structure. Our energy situation has changed significantly since the mid-1970s, when the present SPR was established, and we are in the midst of the biggest changes in US energy supply and demand patterns in decades. We ought to invest the time and money required to bring this institution into the 21st century. Earlier this year, I also suggested an alternative mechanism for leveraging SPR inventories without depleting them. These are tasks for after the election, whoever wins. For now, we have what we have, and we should think carefully about the implications of using it in situations less compelling than a war in the Persian Gulf or an unanticipated disruption in North American or global supplies.
One of the changes that must be taken into account is our recent shift in refined product exports, about which I've written previously. US refineries are capitalizing on the expansion of domestic oil production in a period of weak US demand to continue to operate at high utilization rates and export the resulting surplus output to growing economies in Latin America and elsewhere. This is generally a good thing, because it helps preserve capacity that might otherwise no longer be available when our own economy eventually resumes healthier growth. It also sustains employment we would sorely miss in a terrible job market. Furthermore, we have benefited greatly in reliability and flexibility from participating on both sides of the global market in refined products. Still, although I view our petroleum product exports as generally positive--just as I do Boeing's exports of jetliners--I wouldn't advocate using petroleum stockpiles purchased with tax dollars to drive down oil prices to give these refiners an even bigger export advantage. Yet because of its temporary nature, in contrast to new pipelines or new production, that's exactly where at least some of the benefit of SPR oil released in the absence of a serious supply crisis would go now.
That doesn't mean I regard rising oil or gasoline prices as harmless to the economy. Consumers are facing the highest pump prices heading into Labor Day weekend since 2008, and that could have a ripple effect throughout the economy. But even if one ignores the longstanding bi-partisan principle that the SPR is intended only as a crisis-management tool, its effectiveness at moderating oil-price volatility is limited. Last year's coordinated SPR release, prompted by the Libyan revolution, had little persistent effect on either oil or gasoline prices. A release now is likely to be no more effective when US refineries are already running above 90% utilization and the current 4-week averages show 3.6% of US gasoline production and 23% of diesel output being exported. None of these statistics suggest refiners are experiencing difficulties in obtaining feedstocks, other than on price. Putting SPR oil into such a market might boost refiners' margins for a while, but it's doubtful it would do much for the product prices that matter to consumers.
There are sharp differences between President Obama and Governor Romney, not least on energy policy. We're sure to hear more about energy from both campaigns in the weeks ahead, and I plan to analyze their positions closer to election day. However, one factor this election doesn't need is a release of oil from the SPR that appears to be aimed at dampening gasoline prices that often decline after Labor Day without intervention, rather than being justified by a tangible threat to US oil supplies, and that fails to take into account the added complexity of net product exports. That wouldn't serve the interests of voters, taxpayers or consumers, and it would come at the expense of a little bit of our collective energy security.
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Monday, August 27, 2012
Wednesday, August 22, 2012
The Unlevel Playing Field for Energy
An editorial in last weekend's Wall St. Journal led me to a recent analysis by the US Energy Information Agency (EIA) summarizing the costs of the federal government's various "subsidies" for energy from different sources. This is both useful and timely, since discussions of specific subsidies such as the expiring wind production tax credit inevitably lead to questions about how incentives for renewable energy compare to those for oil, gas, nuclear, and other more traditional sources. As the Journal noted, the EIA stopped short of comparing these incentives on the basis of the relative productivity of different energy sources, but even without that it's still apparent that the category of new renewable electricity--excluding hydropower--received 21% of the federal energy benefits for 2010, while accounting for less than 3% of domestic energy production that year, when oil and gas, which provided 49% of US energy production, received less than 8% of these benefits. Whether on an absolute or relative basis, renewables receive much more generous federal support than oil and gas.
Before digging further into the EIA's analysis, I should point out an important distinction between the federal expenses and incentives covered in the report and the externalities that are frequently conflated with them. It is certainly true that many of these energy technologies involve significant impacts that aren't reflected in their market prices, and that the production and especially the consumption of fossil fuels create serious environmental and security externalities. However, to whatever extent federal subsidies address externalities they do so indirectly, at best, and in many cases inefficiently. The focus of this posting, just like the EIA report's, is on the federal government's cash outlays and "tax expenditures"--deductions, credits, etc.--that have a direct bearing on the federal deficit and debt burden that are the subject of intense debate in this election cycle.
The tables in the report's executive summary reveal several key facts. Between 2007 and 2010 federal energy subsidies in constant dollars more than doubled to $37.2 B, with most of the increase going to renewables and energy efficiency, except for a sizable bump in low-income energy assistance payments. $14.8 B of the increase originated with the 2009 stimulus bill, none of which was directed at oil and gas, but which appropriated nearly $8 B to conservation and efficiency. Overall, renewables received $14.7 B, split 55/45 between electricity and biofuels, while nuclear received $2.5 B and oil and gas $2.8 B. The latter figure is lower than you'll see elsewhere, because among other incentives that the EIA chose to exclude from its analysis was the Section 199 deduction for manufacturers, which is budgeted at around $1 B/yr for oil and gas firms. The logic behind that exclusion seems sound, because US manufacturers of biofuels, wind turbines, solar panels and other renewable energy equipment qualify for the same tax credit, and at a higher rate than oil companies.
I was also struck by the fact that oil and gas received just $70 million out of the more than $4 B spent on R&D. If there's one category in which federal expenditures on renewables should be expected to dwarf those for conventional energy, this is it, and they did so by a factor of more than 20 times. (Coal R&D received more than $0.6 B, presumably for clean coal technologies.)
It's also the case that while the growth of renewable energy output from 2000-10 was dramatic, the relatively smaller net changes in oil and gas output in that period masked the substantial replacement of depleting resources that would have otherwise resulted in a large drop in output, especially for natural gas. This is precisely the aspect of the mature oil and gas industry at which these federal incentives are aimed, to enable US projects to compete with the international opportunities to which many of these companies have access.
The authors of the report suggested caution in comparing the allocations of incentives to the energy produced by each technology, because some of these incentives were paid for projects still under construction and in some cases represented the front-loading of what would otherwise have been a 10-year stream of tax credits. Fair enough. Yet even with the conservative assumption that the entire $4.9 B of non-R&D subsidies for wind power in 2010 came in the form of cash grants in lieu of the 30% investment tax credit for new wind turbines that would produce for 20 years at a 30% capacity factor, that still equates to a subsidy of more than 16% of the average present wholesale value of all the electricity those turbines will produce, using prevailing industrial sector electricity prices as a proxy for wholesale prices. By comparison, the $2.7 B of oil and gas tax incentives for 2010 represented just 1% of the wholesale value of US production of these fuels, before refining.
A serious debate about the appropriate level of US energy subsidies should begin with the facts, rather than with misperceptions. It should also focus first on the goals of such incentives, before jumping to the details of this tax credit vs. that one. What do we want these measures to achieve? If it's simply the promotion of energy production, then the current incentive system looks too heavily skewed in favor of renewables. If it's jobs, then we should be realistic about how many can be added by such a capital-intensive sector. If it's the promotion of both energy security and innovation, then at least parts of the current system look directionally right, though I'd argue that we'd benefit from spending more on renewable energy R&D and less on the deployment of mature-but-expensive technologies like wind. However, if emissions and climate change are our primary concerns, then these incentives are not a terribly effective way to address them. My own expectation is that regardless of whether the wind tax credit is extended for another year, most of the tax incentives that the EIA assessed here will eventually be swept away by tax reform focused on reducing corporate tax rates to improve US competitiveness, while eliminating loopholes to make the changes revenue-neutral.
Before digging further into the EIA's analysis, I should point out an important distinction between the federal expenses and incentives covered in the report and the externalities that are frequently conflated with them. It is certainly true that many of these energy technologies involve significant impacts that aren't reflected in their market prices, and that the production and especially the consumption of fossil fuels create serious environmental and security externalities. However, to whatever extent federal subsidies address externalities they do so indirectly, at best, and in many cases inefficiently. The focus of this posting, just like the EIA report's, is on the federal government's cash outlays and "tax expenditures"--deductions, credits, etc.--that have a direct bearing on the federal deficit and debt burden that are the subject of intense debate in this election cycle.
The tables in the report's executive summary reveal several key facts. Between 2007 and 2010 federal energy subsidies in constant dollars more than doubled to $37.2 B, with most of the increase going to renewables and energy efficiency, except for a sizable bump in low-income energy assistance payments. $14.8 B of the increase originated with the 2009 stimulus bill, none of which was directed at oil and gas, but which appropriated nearly $8 B to conservation and efficiency. Overall, renewables received $14.7 B, split 55/45 between electricity and biofuels, while nuclear received $2.5 B and oil and gas $2.8 B. The latter figure is lower than you'll see elsewhere, because among other incentives that the EIA chose to exclude from its analysis was the Section 199 deduction for manufacturers, which is budgeted at around $1 B/yr for oil and gas firms. The logic behind that exclusion seems sound, because US manufacturers of biofuels, wind turbines, solar panels and other renewable energy equipment qualify for the same tax credit, and at a higher rate than oil companies.
I was also struck by the fact that oil and gas received just $70 million out of the more than $4 B spent on R&D. If there's one category in which federal expenditures on renewables should be expected to dwarf those for conventional energy, this is it, and they did so by a factor of more than 20 times. (Coal R&D received more than $0.6 B, presumably for clean coal technologies.)
It's also the case that while the growth of renewable energy output from 2000-10 was dramatic, the relatively smaller net changes in oil and gas output in that period masked the substantial replacement of depleting resources that would have otherwise resulted in a large drop in output, especially for natural gas. This is precisely the aspect of the mature oil and gas industry at which these federal incentives are aimed, to enable US projects to compete with the international opportunities to which many of these companies have access.
The authors of the report suggested caution in comparing the allocations of incentives to the energy produced by each technology, because some of these incentives were paid for projects still under construction and in some cases represented the front-loading of what would otherwise have been a 10-year stream of tax credits. Fair enough. Yet even with the conservative assumption that the entire $4.9 B of non-R&D subsidies for wind power in 2010 came in the form of cash grants in lieu of the 30% investment tax credit for new wind turbines that would produce for 20 years at a 30% capacity factor, that still equates to a subsidy of more than 16% of the average present wholesale value of all the electricity those turbines will produce, using prevailing industrial sector electricity prices as a proxy for wholesale prices. By comparison, the $2.7 B of oil and gas tax incentives for 2010 represented just 1% of the wholesale value of US production of these fuels, before refining.
A serious debate about the appropriate level of US energy subsidies should begin with the facts, rather than with misperceptions. It should also focus first on the goals of such incentives, before jumping to the details of this tax credit vs. that one. What do we want these measures to achieve? If it's simply the promotion of energy production, then the current incentive system looks too heavily skewed in favor of renewables. If it's jobs, then we should be realistic about how many can be added by such a capital-intensive sector. If it's the promotion of both energy security and innovation, then at least parts of the current system look directionally right, though I'd argue that we'd benefit from spending more on renewable energy R&D and less on the deployment of mature-but-expensive technologies like wind. However, if emissions and climate change are our primary concerns, then these incentives are not a terribly effective way to address them. My own expectation is that regardless of whether the wind tax credit is extended for another year, most of the tax incentives that the EIA assessed here will eventually be swept away by tax reform focused on reducing corporate tax rates to improve US competitiveness, while eliminating loopholes to make the changes revenue-neutral.
Tuesday, August 07, 2012
Are Films the Answer to Understanding Energy's Complexities?
The issues and choices surrounding our use of energy have rarely been more complex than today, yet our main channels for information about them are discouragingly shallow. The web is often more effective at spreading misperceptions than fact-based analysis. When our visual media focus on energy, it's usually to flash bad news before flitting on to the next story, leaving behind images of burning oil platforms or blacked-out cities. One bright spot is the recent wave of documentary films on energy topics. Films engage us on a deeper level, and the energy challenges we face deserve such longer-form treatment. August seems like a perfect time to suggest a few of them to you. If you're reading this blog, then I'm betting you might at least consider watching a movie about energy instead of the latest summer blockbuster.
Although it was hardly the first serious film about energy, the recent trend seemed to start with "Gasland". For all its inaccuracies, which have been documented by groups outside industry, that film helped start a national conversation about the right way to develop the enormous unconventional oil and gas resources that new combinations of technology have unlocked. In the spirit of making that dialog more constructive and even-handed, you should also know about two other documentaries covering the same topic and region from a different angle. To many of the farmers and other landowners in depressed counties of New York and Pennsylvania, fracking is not a curse but an actual or potential lifeline. Seeing "Truthland" and "Empire State Divide" might not convert fracking skeptics into gas industry supporters, but it should at least fill in some of the gaps left by the "Gasland's" starkly one-sided portrayal of shale gas.
Another energy film I recently ran across, "spOILed", offers a timely reminder that despite oil's many problems it remains an essential ingredient of our global civilization, providing affordable mobility and a host of products that have made our lives much easier than those of our ancestors--or of people in countries that still lack reliable access to energy. "spOILed" is also very much a movie about the dangers of Peak Oil, which envisions a world in which declining oil production, rising demand in developing countries, and geopolitical risks create persistent and growing shortages of oil. This is particularly sobering when combined with a sense of just how challenging it will be to obtain the services that oil now provides from other energy sources. Unfortunately, the film's message was undermined by occasionally jarring choices of visuals, some hyperbolic claims--no indoor plumbing without oil?--and by political overtones that might limit its effectiveness with the wider audience it appears to target.
The energy film project that I'm most excited about is one aimed consciously at finding and cultivating "The Rational Middle" in the energy debate. According to its director, Gregory Kallenberg, it started with a TED talk following his previous film, "Haynesville", which examined the impact of shale gas in Northern Louisiana. As I understand it, the current project consists of 10 short videos on energy, four of which have been released on the group's website so far. From the episodes I've seen, Mr. Kallenberg's team assembled an impressive group of experts, including Amy Myers Jaffe of the Baker Institute at Rice University, Michael Levi of the Council on Foreign Relations, former Energy Information Agency Administrator Richard Newell, and Dr. Michael Webber of the University of Texas. The series is being launched with a road show featuring panels of some of the same experts interviewed in the films, starting with a session at this year's Aspen Ideas Festival. The films are focused on information and process, rather than on selling one point of view. Aside from a few assertions in a couple of interviews, the factual presentation in the initial videos was very sound. I expect to have more to say about The Rational Middle as additional episodes become available.
If the we are to develop effective energy policies for the 21st century, the public's desire for clean, secure, reliable and affordable energy must be grounded in facts and figures that help us to differentiate realistic expectations from wish fulfilment. I'm encouraged that a growing number of filmmakers seems willing to explore energy issues in the depth they deserve, with production values that will connect with today's audiences, rather than turning them off. Enjoy!
Although it was hardly the first serious film about energy, the recent trend seemed to start with "Gasland". For all its inaccuracies, which have been documented by groups outside industry, that film helped start a national conversation about the right way to develop the enormous unconventional oil and gas resources that new combinations of technology have unlocked. In the spirit of making that dialog more constructive and even-handed, you should also know about two other documentaries covering the same topic and region from a different angle. To many of the farmers and other landowners in depressed counties of New York and Pennsylvania, fracking is not a curse but an actual or potential lifeline. Seeing "Truthland" and "Empire State Divide" might not convert fracking skeptics into gas industry supporters, but it should at least fill in some of the gaps left by the "Gasland's" starkly one-sided portrayal of shale gas.
Another energy film I recently ran across, "spOILed", offers a timely reminder that despite oil's many problems it remains an essential ingredient of our global civilization, providing affordable mobility and a host of products that have made our lives much easier than those of our ancestors--or of people in countries that still lack reliable access to energy. "spOILed" is also very much a movie about the dangers of Peak Oil, which envisions a world in which declining oil production, rising demand in developing countries, and geopolitical risks create persistent and growing shortages of oil. This is particularly sobering when combined with a sense of just how challenging it will be to obtain the services that oil now provides from other energy sources. Unfortunately, the film's message was undermined by occasionally jarring choices of visuals, some hyperbolic claims--no indoor plumbing without oil?--and by political overtones that might limit its effectiveness with the wider audience it appears to target.
The energy film project that I'm most excited about is one aimed consciously at finding and cultivating "The Rational Middle" in the energy debate. According to its director, Gregory Kallenberg, it started with a TED talk following his previous film, "Haynesville", which examined the impact of shale gas in Northern Louisiana. As I understand it, the current project consists of 10 short videos on energy, four of which have been released on the group's website so far. From the episodes I've seen, Mr. Kallenberg's team assembled an impressive group of experts, including Amy Myers Jaffe of the Baker Institute at Rice University, Michael Levi of the Council on Foreign Relations, former Energy Information Agency Administrator Richard Newell, and Dr. Michael Webber of the University of Texas. The series is being launched with a road show featuring panels of some of the same experts interviewed in the films, starting with a session at this year's Aspen Ideas Festival. The films are focused on information and process, rather than on selling one point of view. Aside from a few assertions in a couple of interviews, the factual presentation in the initial videos was very sound. I expect to have more to say about The Rational Middle as additional episodes become available.
If the we are to develop effective energy policies for the 21st century, the public's desire for clean, secure, reliable and affordable energy must be grounded in facts and figures that help us to differentiate realistic expectations from wish fulfilment. I'm encouraged that a growing number of filmmakers seems willing to explore energy issues in the depth they deserve, with production values that will connect with today's audiences, rather than turning them off. Enjoy!
Wednesday, August 01, 2012
Last Hurrah for the Wind Power Tax Credit?
Ahead of Thursday's meeting of the Senate Finance Committee, a bipartisan deal has apparently omitted the expiring production tax credit (PTC) for wind power from a package of "tax extenders"--various expiring federal tax provisions, including the annual "patch" for the Alternative Minimum Tax. This development might surprise some of the industry's supporters, but the politics of wind have changed since I last examined this issue in February. A measure that once enjoyed solid bi-partisan support is now caught between two presidential campaigns that hold diametrically opposed views on its fate.
A quick review of the PTC seems in order. This tax credit, which covers a variety of technologies but with wind as the main beneficiary, dates back to 1992--interrupted by several past expirations but then revived in essentially its present form. That's significant, because during the same 20 years in which the PTC has been escalating annually with inflation--from 1.5 ¢ per kilowatt-hour (kWh) to the present level of 2.2 ¢/kWh--the cost of wind turbines and their output has fallen significantly. In the same period, US installed wind capacity grew from 1,680 MW to nearly 49,000 MW as of the first quarter of 2012. So in effect, we're subsidizing today's relatively mature onshore wind technology by a larger proportion than we did when it was in its infancy. That makes no sense, especially in the current environment.
The US wind industry has received substantial government support in recent years. When the long-standing tax credit against corporate profits proved to be much less beneficial during the financial crisis, the administration gave wind developers a better option within the stimulus: a 30% investment tax credit that could be claimed as up-front cash grants, instead of having to wait until power was generated and sold over the normal 10 year period of the PTC. From 2009-11 the wind industry received a cumulative $7.7 B, in addition to ongoing tax credits on older projects, manufacturing tax credits for new wind turbine factories, and loan guarantees for selected wind farms. And even with new turbine installations in 2012 running well below their record rate of 10,000 MW in 2009, the wind projects that qualify for the PTC this year could receive a total of $4.5 B over the next decade.
Many people seem to want to equate the tax breaks that wind and other renewable energy technologies receive with the controversial tax benefits for the oil and gas industry, without realizing how unfavorable that comparison truly is for renewables. Subsidies for technologies such as wind are much higher per unit of energy produced, consistent with their intended purpose of bridging the competitive gap vs. conventional energy. Yet since the total output of new renewables is still relatively small, the disparity in total subsidies is much larger than it appears. One way to illustrate that is that if the oil and natural gas produced in the US received tax credits at the same rate per equivalent kWh as wind power, then the annual oil and gas tax preferences that the Congress and President Obama have been sparring over for the last three years wouldn't be $4.8 B per year, but around $100 B per year.
As the Reuters article makes clear, there will be other opportunities for the PTC to be reinserted in the extenders bill or other legislation. However, by persistently arguing for extending the existing credit without modification, the wind industry and its supporters may be misreading the public's appetite for such generous subsidies in a period of protracted economic weakness, notwithstanding the recent Iowa poll. Despite its rapid recent growth wind still contributes less than 4% of the nation's electricity and just 1% of our total energy consumption, and the green jobs angle is wearing thin. Last year's expiration of the ethanol blenders credit set a precedent for ending another large, generous subsidy before its beneficiaries agreed they were done with it. If congressional Republicans line up behind their party's standard bearer on this issue, the wind industry will have missed its opportunity for a graduated, multi-year phaseout of the PTC, instead of stepping off a cliff in 2013.
A quick review of the PTC seems in order. This tax credit, which covers a variety of technologies but with wind as the main beneficiary, dates back to 1992--interrupted by several past expirations but then revived in essentially its present form. That's significant, because during the same 20 years in which the PTC has been escalating annually with inflation--from 1.5 ¢ per kilowatt-hour (kWh) to the present level of 2.2 ¢/kWh--the cost of wind turbines and their output has fallen significantly. In the same period, US installed wind capacity grew from 1,680 MW to nearly 49,000 MW as of the first quarter of 2012. So in effect, we're subsidizing today's relatively mature onshore wind technology by a larger proportion than we did when it was in its infancy. That makes no sense, especially in the current environment.
The US wind industry has received substantial government support in recent years. When the long-standing tax credit against corporate profits proved to be much less beneficial during the financial crisis, the administration gave wind developers a better option within the stimulus: a 30% investment tax credit that could be claimed as up-front cash grants, instead of having to wait until power was generated and sold over the normal 10 year period of the PTC. From 2009-11 the wind industry received a cumulative $7.7 B, in addition to ongoing tax credits on older projects, manufacturing tax credits for new wind turbine factories, and loan guarantees for selected wind farms. And even with new turbine installations in 2012 running well below their record rate of 10,000 MW in 2009, the wind projects that qualify for the PTC this year could receive a total of $4.5 B over the next decade.
Many people seem to want to equate the tax breaks that wind and other renewable energy technologies receive with the controversial tax benefits for the oil and gas industry, without realizing how unfavorable that comparison truly is for renewables. Subsidies for technologies such as wind are much higher per unit of energy produced, consistent with their intended purpose of bridging the competitive gap vs. conventional energy. Yet since the total output of new renewables is still relatively small, the disparity in total subsidies is much larger than it appears. One way to illustrate that is that if the oil and natural gas produced in the US received tax credits at the same rate per equivalent kWh as wind power, then the annual oil and gas tax preferences that the Congress and President Obama have been sparring over for the last three years wouldn't be $4.8 B per year, but around $100 B per year.
As the Reuters article makes clear, there will be other opportunities for the PTC to be reinserted in the extenders bill or other legislation. However, by persistently arguing for extending the existing credit without modification, the wind industry and its supporters may be misreading the public's appetite for such generous subsidies in a period of protracted economic weakness, notwithstanding the recent Iowa poll. Despite its rapid recent growth wind still contributes less than 4% of the nation's electricity and just 1% of our total energy consumption, and the green jobs angle is wearing thin. Last year's expiration of the ethanol blenders credit set a precedent for ending another large, generous subsidy before its beneficiaries agreed they were done with it. If congressional Republicans line up behind their party's standard bearer on this issue, the wind industry will have missed its opportunity for a graduated, multi-year phaseout of the PTC, instead of stepping off a cliff in 2013.